The European Union’s governmental
institutions are not limited to the European Council and the Council of
Ministers, both of which represent the state governments directly at the federal
level. Nor, moreover, is the E.U. an aggregation of its states. In foreign
affairs, for example, the E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, can speak and
take decisions on the basis of consensus rather than the unanimous consent of state-level
officials being required. Therefore, the Von der Leyen administration did not
overreach in taking the “decision to send the Commissioner for the
Mediterranean, Dubravka Suica, as an observer to the first former gathering of
the United States President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace” on 19 February,
2026.[1]
That Suica was merely an observer suggests that the objecting state officials
were overreacting as well as misconstruing the E.U. as a confederation of
sovereign states.
The Board of Peace originated
at the very least in part to guide the real-estate redevelopment in Gaza. Accordingly,
a spokesperson at the Commission explained the E.U.’s interest as follows: “Our
participation is really to be seen in the context of our long-standing
commitment to the implementation of the ceasefire in Gaza, as well as our
commitment to take part in international efforts when it comes to the recovery
and reconstruction of Gaza. We do believe that we need to be at the table,
otherwise we will simply be a payer and not a player.”[2]
E.U. was at the time “the biggest donor of humanitarian aid to the Palestinian
people, with a total contribution of €1.65 billion to the territories” since
Israel’s genocide began.[3]
Also, as many as 14 of the E.U.’s 27 states sent their own representatives to
the meeting. Therefore, objections by a handful of states to the E.U.’s observer
can be relegated as overblown and unjustified, and likely fueled in
actuality by ideological objections to the U.S. federal president. That most of
the state representatives at the meeting were diplomats or civil servants
whereas the E.U. observer was a “political representative” is a petty
objection, and thus likely a political subterfuge overlaying anti-American or
anti-Trump resentment or jealousy. That the same people who objected to the “political
representative” would likely insist that the E.U. was not a political union also
points to a hidden agenda.
Regarding the E.U.’s executive
branch itself, the European Commission, a state official of France, Jean-Noel
Barrot, erroneously claimed that the approval of the E.U.’s state governments
was required for the Commission to speak out or act in foreign policy. Slovenia’s
Tanja Fajon even insisted that unanimous approval was necessary.[4]
Such a view essentially places the Commission as subordinate to the Council of
Ministers and ignores any lawful influence that the European Parliament might
have with the Commission. The stances of the two state officials treat the E.U.
as if it were a confederation—a mere aggregation of fully-sovereign states—rather
than a modern federation wherein governmental sovereignty is “dual” rather than
unitary.
To be sure, the European
Council and the Council of the E.U. play a role in the setting of the E.U.’s
foreign policy, and in those councils the principle of unanimity applies, but
those two councils are not the exclusive setters of such policy; any executive
branch has some leeway, and sending an observer to a meeting is hardly a
substantive foreign policy, especially given the E.U.’s direct involvement in
Gaza. Sending an observer can hardly be interpreted as an overreach in need of
a unanimous decision by the Council of Ministers.
That some state officials were so interested in subordinating the E.U.’s executive branch to the Councils, while leaving the European Parliament out completely as if E.U. citizens had not voted for distinctly federal lawmakers suggests that the state governments have too much power (given their sense of entitlement) at the federal level. Switching foreign policy to qualified-majority voting in the Councils would be more in line with the fact that the E.U.’s foreign minister can indeed speak and act on the basis of consensus and with a nod to the distinctive foreign interests of the European Union, which the Councils cannot protect because they represent the state governments, which have their own interests. In short, neither the Commission nor the E.U. itself is a mere aggregate of the policies and interests of the state governments. Retaining the principle of unanimity in the Councils invites that mistaken view and thus qualified-majority voting is more consistent with the E.U. overall. For neither the Commission nor the Parliament is subordinate to either or both of the Councils as if the E.U. were a confederation of sovereign states.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
