On the Ideological Illogic of European Federalism

Europe may have contributed immensely to philosophy but logic seems to have been in short supply at times, as Europe ties itself in ideological knots in service of nationalism itself, as if that ideology had not given rise to two world wars in the twentieth century. I am not referring to the incendiary, irrational fear of the word, federalism, being applied to the European Union, but, rather, to the role of nationalist ideology in distorting the application of comparative institutional politics by journalists.

Take, for example, the following paragraph from Euronews: “Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni hosted three-way transatlantic talks in Rome on Sunday, which European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen highlighted as a possible ‘new beginning in international relations between the two blocs.”[1] Scant reasoning is needed to conclude that the two blocs being referred to are the E.U. and U.S., and that the Italian prime minister represents the third party, Italy.

The logic begins to fray, however, because the E.U. state of Italy is not separate from the E.U., so the talks were not actually three-way. To treat a state in a union of states as equivalent to that or any other like union is to commit a category mistake. Politically, the other E.U. states might get jealous were the E.U. state of Italy to be reckoned both as a state of the E.U. and as a third party in the talks, as if an umpire between the two “blocs.”

Typically, European journalists refer to only the E.U. as a “bloc” in order to differentiate that union from the other empire-scale union across the proverbial pond. To refer to both unions as blocs defeats that purpose. In actuality, neither union is a bloc because neither union is temporary nor oriented around one issue, or pillar. Furthermore, the federal, yes, federal governmental institutions of both unions are more than merely a playground for intergovernmental relations among state governments. In other words, both the E.U. and the U.S. have the sort of federal system wherein governmental sovereignty is split between the federal and state systems. In Federal Government, Ken Wheare uses “systems” instead of levels to make the point that where sovereignty is divided up, one locus is not “above” the other. In fact, the system of state governments can act as a check on over-reaches at the federal level, and vice versa.

Therefore, the E.U.-U.S. talks were actually bilateral between two empire-scale federal unions comprised of federal and state governmental institutions. The same powers need not be federalized in both unions for the latter to evince what Wheare calls modern federalism to distinguish it from confederalism, wherein the states hold all governmental sovereignty. Nor need there be a balance of power between that of the “feds” and the states, although I contend that balance is important in both loci being able to serve as a check on the other. Neither the E.U. nor the U.S. has, at least as of 2025, achieved balance, and it may not be an altogether stable property of federalism. This does not relegate either union to being a “bloc,” and the E.U. ambassador to the U.S. agreed with me on this point when we met on May 1, 2025, when we met at Yale, whose European Studies Council takes the E.U. as being more substantial than does the counterpart at Harvard. The E.U. is neither mainly intergovernmental relations nor an alliance.

So in Rome on May 18, 2025, Meloni was simply playing host to the Vice President of the U.S. and the President of the E.U., both unions (not blocs) having distinct roles in foreign policy. The governor of Italy was not present to negotiate on behalf of the E.U. on tariffs pertaining to the U.S.; in regard to them, von der Leyen and Vance had their work cut out for them in dealing with both tariff and non-tariff barriers to E.U.-U.S. trade.

If the E.U. were a bloc, then the U.S. would be one too, but actually both claims would be counter-productive at a time when strength at the respective federal levels was needed. This is not to imply that any two empire-scale modern-federal unions are or even should be identical for them the be classifiable in the same political genus: modern federalism as distinct as a political “species” from confederalism, and also from instances of modern federalism at the “kingdom” (i.e., member-state) rather than empire-level. The inter-state heterogeneity in an empire-scale polity is a leap, or step, rather than degree, more than that which exists within a state, and this difference gives modern federalism at the empire-scale distinct properties, and in fact federalism itself is geared to such heterogeneity. This is not to say that regional differences do not exist at the state, or “kingdom” level, and a federal system can be useful there as well. Hence, California, for example, could benefit by adopting a federal system for itself. New York and Illinois could benefit too, as could the former E.U. state of Britain, which, like Switzerland, is (early modern) kingdom-level too. Hence UK-US or EU-UK is misleading in a way that E.U.-U.S. is not, even if nationalism goes down hard.

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1. “Italian PM Meloni Hosts EU-US Talks on Trade, Ukraine and Defence,” Euronews.com, May 18, 2025.

Territorial Economic Inequality: On the Impact of Ideological Category-Mistakes

Why do some countries have more inequality in terms of wealth or economic development, whether between big cities and urban areas, or just from region to region, than do other countries? I contend that in comparing the internals of one state/country to those of another, as much “all else equal” should be satisfied as possible. This can be accomplished to a large extent by resisting the error, or temptation, to make category mistakes, such as in comparing Singapore with China—a city-state to an empire-scale country—or in likening an E.U. state to the entire U.S. European scholars of comparative politics tend to make this category mistake, and non-European scholars are so used to the ideological aggrandizement that they do not typically even recognize the category mistake of treating an early-modern(rather than Medieval) kingdom-scale state of an empire-scale federal union as equivalent to another such union, as if a state in one such union, or a comparable sovereign state, were itself an empire-scale union. Resisting the ideologically-driven urge to begin with a category mistake would do wonders in studying comparative politics and political economy and providing more accurate and beneficial conclusions and recommendations.

Illinois, for example, has fifteen economic regions, yet the one containing Chicago dwarfs the other regions, with are either rural or sport a medium-sized city like Springfield, Rockford, and Peoria, none of which is known for its wealth. How does this compare with Switzerland in contrasting Zurich, and to a certain extent Geneva, which is half the population of Zurich, to the counties, or cantons, that are mainly rural? Both in territory and population, Illinois is larger than is Switzerland, and Chicago relative to the rest of Illinois has a higher population and greater metro-territory than Zurich has to the rest of Switzerland; perhaps comparing Paris in France to Chicago in Illinois would be a closer comparison. Unlike Switzerland, neither Illinois nor France has a federal system, and both are semi-sovereign states in federal systems, the U.S. and E.U., so in comparing Illinois and France, a scholar would better able to “hold all else constant,” except in terms of population, than is the case in comparing Illinois and Switzerland. In that regard, comparing Arizona and Switzerland would be better, as the respective populations are around 7 to 8 million people.

Avoiding the temptation to make category mistakes, such as in claiming that Switzerland is a United States of Europe, with county-sized cantons be likened to red and blue American states, is a prerequisite to being able to make accurate comparisons. At a talk at the Center for European Studies, a Swiss junior scholar acted on the urge during a talk on this topic in November, 2024, to ignore this point even though it had been made by a senior scholar and the scholar from MIT visiting to give his talk that E.U. and U.S. states are comparable with respect to contrasting large cities with rural areas. Ideology, whether States’ Rights in America or the Euroskeptic, or “nationalist,” ideology in Europe, can entrap even scholars, such that their scholarship may be compromised from their decision on an axis of comparison. Hawaii, Alaska, or Texas becoming a member-state in the U.S. is not comparable to one of Switzerland’s county-scale cantons.

After avoiding category mistakes that are based on ideology rather than reason, we can investigate whther too much power being given by a government to localities and regions increases the economic inequality from region/locality to region/locality because there tends to less economic redistribution to less developed regions or urban areas, and because they tend to compete with each other for direct investment by companies. How can we reconcile the cities competing against others to economic equality between regions and cities within a country?

Moreover, there is not only an economic divide between big cities and rural “left behind” places; there are social and cultural differences too; for example, anti-urban sentiment can be non-economic barrier to moving to a big city for school or a job. In some states/countries, the chasm may be more cultural whereas in other cases the difference may be more economic.  To claim that cultural differences within a European state are comparable to those between certain U.S. states, such as Hawaii and Alabama, even ignoring the fact that different languages are spoken to a considerable extent in those two U.S. states and even dismissing the non-linguistic differences that can exist between two distant and large geographical territories, such as Hawaii and Alabama (or Louisiana!), reflects the convenient imprint of a European ideology.

In short, category mistakes, whether spuriously using political, economic, or cultural factors, can doom a study of comparative politics and economics from the start. Much of what is concluded by reason once such a mistake has been made is likely to be faulty. Perhaps the largest cost in doing so in many studies may be in the loss of scholarly reputation of the fields of comparative politics and political economy. Judging from the talks at Harvard’s Center for European Studies, the ideological motivate is salient even among scholars, and this prompts me to ask whether the results of their scholarship is in fact academic in nature or too compromised by the common instinctual-urge to put one’s own ideology in the driver’s seat. To Nietzsche, the content of ideas is instinctual urges, and reasoning is the process in a brain whereby those urges compete with each other for dominance.  

Beyond Breaking California Up into Six States: A Federalist Alternative

In any epoch and in any culture, the human mind displays a marked tendency to accept the status quo as the default—being so ensconced in fact that efforts at real change almost inevitably face formidable road-blocks. In this essay, I analyze the 2014 failed ballot-petition that would have put the proposal of breaking California into six separate states to Californians. I contend that the proponents could alternatively have taken up a more optimal alternative—one much easier to put into effect. Interestingly, that idea comes from the E.U. rather than the U.S.

The full essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

The Swiss Vote to Restrict Immigration: Direct Democracy in Action

On February 9, 2014, the Swiss voted in a non-binding referendum by a narrow margin (50.3%) in favor of immigration quotas and an end to “mass immigration.”[1] This result took the government by surprise; officials had been urging the people to vote no. So too had the Swiss bankers—only coincidentally of course. Just enough voters rebuffed the establishment of power and wealth for the referendum to pass. Johann Schneider-Ammane, the Swiss Economy Minister, suggested that a “culture of excess” in the pursuit of profit sometimes at the expense of the common good had discredited the political and business elite in the eyes of ordinary people.[2]

Johann Schneider-Ammane, the Swiss Economy Minister. Rarely does a prominent member of the political/business elite publicly criticize it while stressing how it differs from the people. 

(Image Source: Ruben Sprich of Reuters)

Put more abstractly, direct democracy broke from the grips of a firmly-established plutocracy (rule by wealth), even if only for a day.  This caveat is important, for the referendum’s non-binding feature means that the government is not bound to craft the majority vote into law. Put another way, the game-rules were tilted or rigged in favor of the financial sector and the government, and thus of representative over direct democracy, and, moreover, of plutocracy over democracy itself. If the check on popular passions afforded by representative democracy (e.g., terms of office) does not trump the value-added from the direct will of the people in direct democracy, the non-binding rule is sub-optimal.

As yet another drawback, E.U. government officials did not miss a beat in exploiting the non-binding feature by publicly pressuring the legislators of the independent state to resist writing the referendum’s result into law. Besides what this high-level squeeze says about the tilt toward representative democracy and even plutocracy at the expense of the people’s will having direct effect, I submit that the distinction between the nature and scale of an empire and those of polities on par with the empire’s constituent political units (i.e., states) is disregarded as well.

Martin Schultz, the president of E.U.’s parliament at the time of the referendum, immediately accused the Swiss citizens who voted yes of having succumbed to “the lowest instincts” rather than being led “by rational arguments.”[3] If the statement sounds like rhetoric designed to influence a vote already taken, the underlying intent may have been to exploit the referendum’s non-binding feature by pressuring the government of the independent state to act contrary to the will of the majority.[4] That is to say, Schultz and other E.U. government officials sought to exploit the distinction between direct and representative democracy.

The question of fairness in government officials of an empire-scale union of states pressuring legislators in an independent state largely flew under the world’s radar screen. As various E.U. officials hinted that the maintaining the free movement of workers is a requirement in the European free-trade agreement (EEA), no one bothered to recall that an empire-scale “territory of territories” consists of many cultures, whereas within a state (or even an independent state-scaled republic like Switzerland) cultural or ethnic diversity does not necessarily exist, at least not anywhere near that of an empire-scale federal union. In fact, the E.U. citizens and residents moving from one state to another are actually “quasi-immigrants”—a hybrid status that reflects the dual-sovereignty that exists in modern federalism (e.g., the E.U. and U.S.). Therefore, inter-state movement of people within the E.U. is more necessary than the free movement of immigrants in the independent state of Switzerland (whose cantons are roughly equivalent in scale to counties in some E.U. and U.S. states). 

Is it fair that a policy stemming from the nature of an empire-scale “compound” polity be pushed on an independent state? At the scale of polities that are states (in empire-scale Unions-of-states) or regions (in China), or republics (in Russia), homogeneity (e.g., a shared culture) has been the default, and indeed arguably of value in terms of solidarity (which an empire typically has trouble achieving, given the inherent interstate diversity).

To be sure, the Dutch and German states had been empires in medieval times; that Switzerland was as well can be seen in the linguistic and cultural diversity still remaining there. Yet by early modern standards, those federations were on the scale of the early-modern nations (hence then on the state-scale, rather than that of empire). The strengthening of centralized monarchs and the related military advances effectively extended the quarters of homogeneity, and thus pushed out the scale of empire (as consisting of those nations).

In conclusion, in threatening the Swiss government with exclusion from the free-trade area because a slight majority of the Swiss voting yes felt that the diversity already extant in their state-scale polity was compromising unity possible at that scale (but not at that of an empire), the E.U. officials were conflating the nature of an empire with that of the political units therein. In other words, to apply the level of inter-state “immigration” needed in the E.U. to state-scale Switzerland involves a rather fundamental political category mistake. What is necessary and fitting for one level of governance is not necessarily so at another level.  

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[1] Euronews, “Switzerland Votes in Favour of Capping Immigration into the Country,” February 9, 2014.

[2] Edward Taylor, “Swiss Immigration Vote Shows Loss of Trust in Business Elite: Minister,” Reuters, February 12, 2014.

[3] Euronews, “Swiss Voters Cause Upset with EU over Support for Immigration Quotas,” February 10, 2014.

[4] Actually, the majority of 50.3% is only barely a majority. Considering that only half of the eligible voters voted, the “majority” is actually a minority of the electorate, not to mention the general population.