The Case for a Presiding President in Russia

On December 31, 2010, a Russian judge sentenced Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the Russian tycoon who had been imprisoned in 2003 after defying Vladimir Putin, to an additional six years in prison. According to The New York Times, "It was a politically tinged decision that undermined President Dmitri Medvodev."[1] Leonid Goman of the Right Cause Party in Russia agreed. "It was obviously a political, not a judicial, decision." He went on to say that in general terms, "corruption is endemic, government power is often abused and senior politicians are rarely, if ever, held accountable for misdeeds."[2]  Clearly, Prime Minister Putin was still very much in control in Russia.  His message was that wealthy businessmen should not interfere in Russian politics. What a contrast to American politics, especially after the U.S. Supreme Court's Citizens United case!  Khodorkovsky was at one time the richest person in Russia, having been one of the oligarchs who bought government assets at bargain prices after the fall of the USSR, but he financed opposition parties in a political system that was anything but democratic.

Analysis:

This case points to the importance of separating a judiciary from executive and legislative branches of government, as in the E.U. and U.S. The fragile nature of a judiciary's credibility can be of dangerous ground even when the branches are separated. But in Russia technically under President Medvodev in 2010, a court doing the bidding of a powerful prime minister (in name only) contributes to the demotion of the credibility of the country's judiciary. Ultimately, the president of a country is charged with presiding over its system of government with an eye towards protecting it as a going concern.  

For example, U.S. President Andrew Jackson in the early 1830's looked out for the viability of the country's federal system by pushing Congress back on its tariff that hurt South Carolina and pushing the latter to repeal its Acts by which federal law could be nullified. He also vetoed a bill that, if enacted, would have allowed Congress to appropriate money for what was really a state road in Missouri. The President's focus was on maintaining the balance between the federal level and that of the member-states that is so important to maintaining a viable federal system in the long term. 

In the case of Russia, the problem concerning the political use of the court was that neither the president nor prime minister were interested in safeguarding the judiciary's long-term viability, for they prostituted it for political expediency. I submit, moreover, that most governments have lacked a presiding president, by which I mean a president who is primarily fixated on maintaining the continued viability of the system of government, including its credibility. It is too easy for voters to elect partisans who are more focused on their respective ideological agendas than putting the system itself first. Similarly, it is too easy for dictators to use all branches of government to consolidate more power for themselves or their party rather than to protect the viability of the branches, including how they are related, rather than to be primarily oriented to presiding over the system as a whole. 

See related essay: "On the Eclipse of Russian Federalism: Implications for the E.U."

1. Clifford Levy, "Russia Extends Prison Sentence of Tycoon 6 Years,” The New York Times, December 31, 2010, p. A1.
2. Ibid. 

Preparing for the U.S. Presidency: Build a Resume

How should an aspiring candidate for President of the United States go about attaining that esteemed office?—an office whose occupant was regularly referred to as “the leader of the free world” when part of that world was behind an iron curtain. Mitt Romney spent six years of his life campaigning for the job only to lose it to an incumbent whose record on “pocket-book issues: was mixed at best. Perhaps it is possible to want something too much. Fortunately, a more substantive alternative is also possible.

Hillary Clinton as U.S. Secretary of State.           

                                                                                                           
As Hillary Clinton was nearing the end of her tenure as U.S. Secretary of State, Michael Bloomberg, who was nearing the end of his own mayoralty in New York City, encouraged her to run for his office. Being every bit “New York,” the New York Times refers to the option as “trading international diplomacy for municipal management on the grandest scale.” In case anyone misses my sarcasm here, I should add that being mayor of New York City is not merely executive experience on a grand scale. Being chief executive of The City could be comparable to being governor of some states. Accordingly, becoming mayor of the city that never sleeps could give the former legislator and chief diplomat significant experience as a chief executive. Ironically, the latter could be most essential to the presidency.

Alternatively, were Hillary Clinton really intent at the time on running for presidency, political consultants might have been whispering in her other ear, “you need to get up to New Hampshire and over to Iowa.” However, early and regular visits to those states do not, as the case of Mitt Romney suggests, necessarily translate into winning come election day. This is not to say that a third alternative, such as taking a well-deserved break—maybe writing a book—might not be preferable to being mayor of New York City. Nevertheless, in the choice between never-ending campaigning and governing, it would be nice to think that the American people would reward substance over excess eagerness. The people have not exactly demanded of a president that he (or she) be a senior statesman when it comes to governmental experience. John Adams had been U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain (besides having had a hand in the writing of the U.S. Constitution) before being elected president. Thomas Jefferson had been the U.S. Secretary of State (besides having had a hand in, well…you know). Had he lived, James Hamilton might have been president after having served as Washington’s Secretary of the Treasury. Experience can even be ex post facto, as when President Taft joined the U.S. Supreme Court after serving as president.

From the perspective of having several substantive governmental offices, an occupant of the office of U.S. president can have both wisdom and perspective. That is, such a person would be more likely to discern instinctively the forest from those particular trees that demand too much attention. Such a person would be more oriented to the system as a whole, as President Jackson was when he opposed funding the Second National Bank of the U.S. even as he opposed South Carolina’s nullification act (by which the state legislature could invalidate U.S. laws detrimental to the state’s interest). That is to say, the president was oriented to protecting what he saw as a balance in the federal system. His perspective was systemic and thus not primarily partisan or even bureaucratic in nature.

To be sure, putting someone in the office who might be suspected of sporting a suitable countenance is ultimately up to the American people—whether we value it enough. Lest it be pointed out that few candidates could be found, it is also up to the candidates themselves—whether they are willing to substitute more governmental experience for the seemingly endless parade of chicken dinners. To those candidates, I would say: focus on the knitting and the campaigning will take care of itself; focus on the campaigning, however, and the sweater could slowly unravel from all the waving and handshakes. In short: have faith that investing in governing now will pay off later. This could mean trusting in the judgment of the American electorate, or being a leader (hence gaining leadership experience!) by providing a higher example of real presidential material. Of course, the people may not be wise or virtuous enough of character to grasp such leadership, in which case the republic itself will decline even in spite of the suitable candidates.

Source:

Michael Barbaro, “Clinton for Mayor in ’13?Bloomberg Asked Her to Consider Succeeding Him,” The New York Times, December 4, 2012.

Obama Standing up to Wall Street: Fact or Fiction?

An interesting bit of news-reporting from the time of the Obama Administration sheds light on business and government: “What haunts the Obama administration is what still haunts the country: the stunning lack of accountability for the greed and misdeeds that brought America to its gravest financial crisis since the Great Depression. There has been no legal, moral, or financial reckoning for the most powerful wrongdoers. Nor have there been meaningful reforms that might prevent a repeat catastrophe. Time may heal most wounds, but not these. . . . After the 1929 crash, and thanks in part to the legendary Ferdinand Pecora’s fierce thirties Senate hearings, America gained a Securities and Exchange Commission, the Public Utility Holding Company Act, and the Glass-Steagall Act to forestall a rerun. After the savings-and-loan debacle of the eighties, some 800 miscreants went to jail. But those who ran the central financial institutions of our fiasco escaped culpability (as did most of the institutions). . . . The weak Dodd-Frank financial-reform law that rose from the ruins remains largely inoperative, since the actual rule-writing was delegated to understaffed agencies now under siege by banking lobbyists and their well-greased congressional overlords. . . . Rather than purge the crash’s crimes, Wall Street’s leaders are sticking to their alibi: Everyone was guilty of fomenting this “perfect storm,” and so no one is. Too-big-to-fail banks are bigger than ever, and ­Masters of the Universe swagger is back.”

Analysis:

 The hegemony of the moneyed interest in any republic renders the public weal subject to a plutocracy—rule by wealth. In the wake of the credit crisis of 2008, U.S. Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois observed that the banking lobby still owned Congress even as the public regarded the banks as at least partially culpable for the crisis. Durbin made his remark after the Senate defeated his amendment that would have allowed foreclosure judges to modify mortgages in trouble. Even though mortgage companies had written steep interest rate hikes into the subprime mortgages that the mortgage writers must surely have known the borrowers could not afford, the servicers stood by the vaunted sanctity of contract doctrine—a faithfulness conditioned, no doubt, by the article serving their interests. Financial influence over elected representatives enabled the U.S. Government to provide cover, or at least to refrain from going after the financial institutions that had been so culpable. That government also refused to break up the banks too big to fail, whose very concentrations of wealth, increased by the TARP program, stood even more as systemic risk.

 Historically, Americans have looked to independently-minded occupants of the U.S. Presidency to stand up to powers of the day to protect the viability of the states. Andrew Jackson, for example, stood up to the moneyed interest before his reelection in 1832 in depleting the Second National Bank of the United States of funding (the bank ended in 1836). Doubtless Jackson spent many nights before the election worried that standing up to money might cost him the election. Of course, he won and enjoyed distinct respect.

 I suspect that Barak Obama did not enjoy respect in the wake of the credit crisis precisely because he did not stand up to the banking lobby. Relatedly, he caved to the demands of the health insurance industry lobby that he no longer push for a public option and resist a mandate for guaranteed customers. I suspect that people sense a lack of political courage and recalibrate their respect accordingly. The political weight of such a collective judgment at the ballot box is an open question; the reward such as Jackson received in 1832 is likely more certain even as it is thought less. Herein occupies the political trap wherein the path of least resistance may gain the upper hand in a president’s political calculation. Faith in the people rewarding courage against concentrated interests can be difficult to embrace even as such reward is perhaps germane to the office as it was designed and intended. Americans seem to innately know this, even as their collective judgment is difficult for politicians to discern.

 In the want of a Jacksonian presider standing for the public weal against being overrun by the private moneyed interest, the historical answer would have been to look to normative, even religious, constraints. Frank Rich includes this type among the more contemporaneously popular legalistic and economic ones where he writes, “There has been no legal, moral, or financial reckoning for the most powerful wrongdoers.” Even so, he concentrates on government regulation as essentially the only means available to constrain the unrepentant greed of Wall Street. Historically, ethical constraint against greed was thought to depend on religious, and specifically Christian, auspices. Frank Rich’s focus alone may be read as rendering a verdict on the efficacy of Christian ethics in countering the fundamental desire for more. Yet how many Jackson’s have the States seen that we may rely on presidential leadership and any ensuing regulation to constrain the moneyed interest?  Moreover, what if greed is so entrenched in human nature that virtually any bulwark must ultimately be found wanting?  

 Source:

 Frank Rich, “Obama’s Original Sin,” The New Yorker, July 3, 2011.

Related essay: “Godliness and Greed”

President Trump: Revisiting Presidents Jackson and Lincoln on their Statesmanship

In an interview in 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump said he wondered why the issues leading to the U.S. Civil War “could not have been worked out” to prevent the republics from exiting the U.S.[1] “People don’t realize, you know, the Civil War, if you think about it, why?”[2] In particular, “People don’t ask . . . why was there the Civil War? Why could that one not have been worked out?”[3] The reigning assumption has been that President Lincoln could not have resolved the dispute short of going to war. Trump then suggested that had President Andrew Jackson been president rather than Lincoln, we “wouldn’t have had the Civil War.”[4] Aside from the point that Jackson was a Southerner, his feat in resolving the Nullification Crisis without a shot being fired suggests that Trump had a point; the war between the C.S.A. and U.S.A. could have been averted. More importantly, the mentality that won the war may not be as salubrious as we suppose.

In 1828, when John Quincy Adams was the federal president, a tariff—a tax on imported manufactured goods that originally went into effect in 1816—was increased even beyond the increase in 1824. The intent was to protect the nascent American manufacturing sector, which was mainly in the Northern states, from cheaper European imports. As a result of the tariff, Southern plantation owners had to pay more for manufactured goods from Europe, and Europeans had fewer dollars with which to buy Southern exports, of which cotton and rice were particularly important to the Southern agrarian economy.

In 1829, Andrew Jackson became the U.S. President and John C. Calhoun became the Vice President. The latter, who was from South Carolina, proposed the doctrine of nullification, wherein a state government could constitutionally nullify any federal law injurious to the state’s interests. Even from the standpoint of a loose federation, or a confederated Union of mostly sovereign republics, the doctrine was specious; for it would eviscerate virtually any federally-agreed-to constraint on the states. The former president John Quincy Adams argued more practically that the U.S. Supreme Court, not the state governments, had the ultimate authority to declare federal law unconstitutional. For his part, President Jackson sided with Adams out of fear that state-nullification could potentially lead to the break-up of the Union.

Meanwhile, South Carolina’s government declared the tariff to be unenforceable in the state. European firms could export their goods to buyers in South Carolina without having to pay the tariff. Hence, the buyers would get the lower prices, and the sellers and their compatriots would have more dollars with which to buy South Carolina rice and cotton. The tariff would remain in effect in the U.S. where the toll on economies was less. Interestingly, Calhoun also argued that the federal government had constitutional authority to use tariffs only as a means to raise revenue for that government, rather than to favor certain economic sectors; such picking and choosing—essentially between states—was going too far, especially as a certain region of states was losing power in Congress as the Union added new states. I submit that South Carolina’s government officials and Calhoun pushed their favored confederal approach or interpretation of American federalism too far in incorporating the nullification doctrine precisely because the plantation economy was becoming less and less, proportionally speaking, of the American economy, and the Southern states, less and less, also proportionately, of the total number of states in the American Union. This dynamic, not its symptom of slavery, was the underlying cause of the war between the C.S.A. and the U.S.A. How this interpretation differs so from the victor’s moralistic, almost apolitical narrative! How bound we are, without even realizing it, to the narrative!—alternatives being deemed nothing short of heresy! Abominations!

President Jackson diffused the changing dynamic—shifting regional power in the Union in the midst of two starkly different preferences of federalism (confederalism and modern federalism, respectively)— by signing tariff legislation in 1832 and again in 1833 that lowered the tariffs even as he stated that South Carolina’s nullification law was null and void and sent federal troops down to the state to enforce the law. The deal, in other words, was a much lower tariff in exchange for the state’s repeal of its nullification law. Because the president pressed Congress to repeal its increased tariff, essentially giving that one to Calhoun’s point on the federal use of tariffs for revenue only, Jackson cannot be said to have been staunchly on the side of the federal government—which is something, considering that Jackson headed one of its three branches! Rather, the president gave something to South Carolina—putting the state’s interests ahead of the other states and the federal government. Yet the state’s government had to pay a price—giving up on its cherished, albeit over-extended, doctrine of nullification.

South Carolina’s legislature had prepared a secession, or “exit,” document—Calhoun himself was involved in crafting it. The same document would be used in 1861 for the “SoCarexit”—to borrow from the E.U. secessionist state’s lexicon. Interestingly, Congress had again just enacted a tariff increase in 1858. It is possible that this old issue, as much as new free states being admitted to the Union, sparked renewed impetus to divorce from the U.S.[5]

The threat to the Southern plantations in 1861 was not the imminent end of slavery there. The threat was indirect and more diffused, coming in the form of new states with different economies being admitted to the Union. The theory of confederalism insists that the enumerated and residual sovereignty of each state is protected—hence the balance of power resides with the states. The Southern fear was that the balance was already shifting in favor of the federal head, and this made the decreasing proportion of the Southern states in the enlarging Union particularly worrisome. In other words, the “nationalist” variant of federalism (modern federalism) was gaining over confederalism, and the interests of the Southern states—political, economic, cultural, religious—were becoming more of a minority in an increasingly heterogeneous, larger empire: the United States. The tariff and slavery were only symptoms.

Jackson’s peaceful resolution of the Nullification Crisis lays in stark contrast to Lincoln’s “take it or leave it” approach to the Southern secessionist states. Whereas Jackson had the federal government retreat voluntarily on its tariff, Lincoln’s approach can be seen as being one-sided because he did not even offer to have the federal government step back at all from its position. When all the political heavy-lifting is put on the other side—for it to do the backing down—it is no wonder that resistance is encountered and a long, bloody war results. I submit that Lincoln could reasonably have compromised and yet save the Union in the sense of retaining all of its existing states.

For example, Lincoln could have assuaged the Southerners’ fears by proposing a qualified majority voting system in the U.S. Senate and perhaps even in the U.S. House of Representatives. Such a system would be designed such that legislation could not pass without at least some Southern support. The federal government would thus not be able to turn on the South—which I submit was the underlying fear. In the E.U., for instance, qualified majority voting in the federal legislative chambers—the European Council and the European Parliament—requires at least 55% of population of the Union and 55% of the states be represented on the yes side of votes for the bills to become law. Lincoln and Congressional leaders could have entertained novel ideas on how to craft such a system. A Council of Regions, for instance, wherein only the major regions of the U.S. were represented—each region having a veto--could have been added as a third legislative chamber, or perhaps even to replace the U.S. Senate! Even beyond Jackson’s fine job in 1832, thinking outside the box in such occasions is invaluable in thwarting violent conflict from engulfing all other possibilities of resolution.

For the slavery-reductionist advocates, I submit that the Southern states were a significant portion of the Union and so were justified politically in wanting to feel that they would not be rolled over in federal chambers—even though the institution of slavery was squalid, especially to our modern sensibility in the twenty-first century. The institution is for us unthinkable, undenkbar, vorbotten even in retrospect (i.e., in a historical context). For us, to think of other human beings as wild animals or property is nothing short of pathological. Even so, we must allow ourselves to admit that because the Emancipation Proclamation did not occur until 1863 (and did not apply to the five slave states that remained with the Union, and had no effect in the rebel states), the immediate point of contention in 1861 was not slavery itself where it existed. The fear was more future-oriented, and generalized, and the anger was informed by political theory—namely, two contending versions of federalism—and declining political power. Accordingly, the conflict at hand could have been resolved short of war without the South having to give up the institution of slavery. The demand that Jackson's approach applied back in 1861 include the abolition of slavery where it then existed is unfair, for not even the new Republican Party was demanding then that the South give up its sordid institution! 

Had Lincoln adopted Jackson’s approach at that time, the South might then have moved years later to put its slavery in play. Perhaps the Southern states would have accepted federal financial help with a new plantation labor system in exchange for a repeal of the 1858 tariff, combined with the region having a veto on federal legislation in a Council of Regions or a stiff qualified-majority voting system in the U.S. Senate—either of which could have been enshrined as a constitutional amendment. To be sure, any of these items could have been used in 1861 to walk back from war. At any rate, ensuing incremental agreements, progress without war, might have been possible once cooler heads could again prevail. My point is that we cannot assume that were Jackson’s approach put in place in 1861, slavery would have endured for decades. But I digress.

Jackson was able to resolve his “either/or” by putting together a deal in which both sides—the federal government and the state—gave something and got something in return. Such an approach is superior to Lincoln’s “my way or the highway” stance—that of making demands of the other side without any accommodation or retreat on his side. Rigidity begets rigidity, and much harm came ensue when two pieces of sandpaper are rubbed against each other. Even beyond Jackson’s paradigm, however, of resolving a seemingly intractable “either/or” within itself is the ability to see a third, fourth, and even fifth alternative that may never be even thought of in holding fiercely onto the typical “either/or” paradigm. In short, I think we make things more difficult than they need be, even in assuming that the Civil War had to be fought. We do not even recognize our own mental cages, so we go on making the same mistakes over and over. To arrest this pattern, revisiting even “sacred cows” can be invaluable.

---

[1] Jonathan Lemire, “Trump Makes Puzzling Claim About Andrew Jackson, Civil War,” The Sacramento Bee, May 1, 2017.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] The use of the term divorce is incorrect as it assumes two equal or equivalent parties. A state is not equivalent to a union of such states, hence the use of the term for the secession of a state involves a category mistake. In the context of “Brexit,” for example, “divorce” can be read as presumptuous for the secessionists.

Obama Caving to Plutocracy

I contend that Obama caved on his campaign pledge (or promise) not to extend the bush tax cuts for the rich.  The added growth expected in 2011 from ALL of the cuts is just a half of a percent of GNP growth.  I have read that the rich save their tax cuts rather than use them in ways that stimuate the economy.  As for savings, banks have enough capital to lend (this isn't why they are still skittish in 2010).  That the vacuous argument that tax cuts for the rich will somehow create lots of jobs and save the economy from another recession has had any weight or credance really discourages me about American political discourse.  That Obama didn't "just say no" is also discouraging. 

On December 14, 2010, Pat O'Reilly said on his Foxs News show that the "far left" is in retreat because Ameriicans have rejected it.  He said even Obama has rejected the left. I think the left has vanquished itself.  Perhaps it could be said that the left is willingly impotent. Where is Al Gore?  Ralph Nadar?  Micheal Moore?  silence.  Only the sound of Obama caving. He should have refused to sign a tax cut continuation for the rich and said the Repubs could refuse to extend the cut for lower and middle income people--it would be the Repubs provoking the resumption of higher taxes for everyone rather than just on those who can afford them.  We need a Teddy Roosevelt or an Andrew Jackson. Teddy stood up to Standard Oil, and Jackson stood up to the Second Bank of the United States.

By contrast, Obama has operated largely in line with Wall Street (e.g., the bailout for the banks rather than foreclosed homeowners) and the health insurance industry (e.g. not even a public option, which was odious to the industry).  Barak Obama does not want to displease the powers that be; I suspect reelection has a lot to do with this state of affairs.  This raises the question: is there a counter in American politics to plutocracy?

On the Nineteenth-Century Eclipse of Democratic Governance by Capitalism

I contend that a trajectory wherein capitalism came to eclipse or capture democratic governance occurred in the nineteenth century in the United States. President Andrew Jackson’s actions in the early 1830s can be viewed as a benchmark wherein government officials were still willing to relegate the interests of capitalists for the good of the whole. 

According to Brands, “Andrew Jackson embodied the democratic ethos, by both his humble origins and his reverence for the people as the wellspring of political legitimacy. Jackson waged political war on the pet projects of the big capitalists of his day, smashing the Bank of the United States, vetoing federal funding on roads and canals, and beating down tariff rates.” (1)  Actually, Jackson’s object was not to reduce the capitalists of his day; rather, he was attempting to protect the balance between the general and state governments in the federal system.

For example, President Jackson vetoed federal funding for the Mayville road because it was confined to the territory of Missouri. That is, the road did not cross state lines, so it did not involve interstate commerce directly. The state itself had jurisdiction. Had Jackson not vetoed the funding, then interstate commerce “regulation” as spending would have opened the floodgates to Congressional power. Jackson was also rejecting the argument that spending for the general welfare goes beyond the enumerated power domains. In refusing to fund the public works project, Jackson was not acting in the interest of the potential private construction bidders. Hence as a byproduct the president was standing up to capitalists in his effort to contain federal power from encroaching on the state governments.

Second, Jackson feared that having a bank of its own would give the general government in Washington too much power relative to the state governments. For example, the Second Bank of the United States could conceivably print an unlimited number of bank notes to fund its government’s spending “for the general welfare”—eviscerating the enumerated powers in the process. Jackson refused to fund the bank before his re-election. Thus he risked having the financial sector turn against him in an election season. The long term viability of the American federal system was worth more to him than his own continuance in office.

Notably, Jackson was willing to cross Wall Street (something notably absent in President Obama’s financial “reform” law) for the good of the republic’s governance system. Put another way, the president’s protection of the system of democratic governance wherein governments check and balance governments in federalism trumped the particular financial interests of capitalists. By the time of Lincoln’s tight re-election race in 1864, capitalists would find a president willing to use (and defraud) the government to benefit them financially.  The balance of power between capitalism and democracy had already shifted.

1. Henry W. Brands, American Colossus: American Colossus: The Triumph of Capitalism 1865-1900 (New York: Doubleday, 2010), p. 5

On the Health-Insurance Mandate: Nullification or Judicial Review?

A Republican U.S. President pushes hard for the U.S. Government to play a more active role in K-12 education under the rubric of “No Child Left Behind.” A Democratic U.S. President pushes hard for the U.S. Government to require residents to purchase health-insurance. Some of the same Republicans who cry foul on the insurance mandate insist that “marriage” be federalized through an amendment to the U.S. Constitution. From whichever vantage-point one cares to assume, political consolidation at the expense of federalism seems to be the name of the game in American politics.

Proponents of the health-insurance mandate have argued that Congress acted within its authority under the U.S. constitution’s commerce clause. However, Ken Cuccinelli, the attorney general of Virginia, argued the U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled that the clause allows Congress to require citizens to purchase a good or service in commerce. Cuccinelli’s complaint suggested that the Virginia law that outlaws the federal government from forcing state residents to purchase health insurance trumps the federal law because it is a matter assigned to the states under the Constitution’s 10th Amendment rather than enumerated to the purview of the U.S. Government. In other words, the supremacy clause pertains only to powers delegated to the U.S. Government. That government is not supreme where the states are sovereign. The latter is substantial in principle, even if not recognized in practice; all powers not explicitly granted to the federal government remain with the states or the people, according to the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

So it is rather perplexing that the State governments have generally been sleeping through federal encroachments since the time of the CSA-USA war in 1861-1865. As repeated efforts to thwart federal encroachment failed, I suspect the state governments have given up, though several of them seem to have woken up in contesting the federal mandate on health-insurance. Yet the objection is issue-specific, and thus not apt to lead to any fundamental realignment from consolidation back to federalism. Americans tend to be issue- rather than systemic-oriented, and this is reflected in the focus of their elected representatives. Unfortunately, this can mean that no one is left watching the store itself; everyone is debating the particular products on the shelves—and with carefree indifference to even the most relevant history. For instance, the history of nullification has apparently fallen off the shelf, at least with respect to any collective memory.

In 1830, Andrew Jackson sent federal troops into South Carolina because its legislature had decided that it could nullify federal law encroaching on its domains of governmental sovereignty. The South Carolina legislature relented (though its succession document would be retrieved in 1858, after the Congress had just passed another tariff on rice and cotton exports. Jackson’s message was that nullification of federal law would mean the dissolution of the Union.

Nevertheless, the governor of Virginia signed a bill into law in 2010 nullifying the federal mandate. The policy argument against nullification stresses that state opt-outs would reduce the size of the insurance pool and thus reduce the anticipated cost-savings. Similarly, Gov. Mike Rounds of South Dakota, a Republican, signed a bill into law on March 12, 2010 declaring that the federal regulation of firearms is invalid if a weapon is made and used in South Dakota. On the day before, Wyoming’s governor, Dave Freudenthal, a Democrat, had signed a similar bill for that state. The same day, Oklahoma’s House of Representatives approved a resolution that Oklahomans should be able to vote on a state constitutional amendment allowing them to opt out of the federal health care overhaul. In Utah, lawmakers embraced states’ rights with a vengeance in the final days of the legislative session that week. One measure said Congress and the federal government could not carry out health care reform, not in Utah anyway, without approval of the Legislature. Another bill declared state authority to take federal lands under the eminent domain process. A resolution asserted the “inviolable sovereignty of the State of Utah under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.” Alabama, Tennessee and Washington are considering bills or constitutional amendments that would assert local police powers to be supreme over the federal authority. Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin — none of them known as conservative bastions — were considering bills that would authorize, or require, governors to recall or take control of National Guard troops, asserting that federal calls to active duty have exceeded federal authority.

Given the Nullification Crisis in the nineteenth century, the actions of public officials at the state level in the twenty-first century seem foolhardy. They were on much firmer ground in contesting the validity of the federal law through the federal courts, which can declare a law of Congress unconstitutional. However, this means is not without drawbacks.  In particular, there is a structural conflict of interest in having the federal high court decide a matter between the government of which the court is a branch and a state government. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has tended historically to interpret the U.S. Constitution in the federal government’s favor. It is like having a member of one of the teams as the umpire and finding that that umpire tends to rule in favor of his or her own team. The surprising thing is that onlookers are surprised when this happens.

“Everything we’ve tried to keep the federal government confined to rational limits has been a failure, an utter, unrelenting failure — so why not try something else?” said Thomas E. Woods Jr., a senior fellow at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, a nonprofit group in Auburn, Alabama. Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution indicates that federal law is superior over state law where there is a conflict, but this doesn’t make sense outside of the federal government’s enumerated powers—for otherwise why even enumerate? To rely on elections for the needed correction is not sufficient, according to Mises. “Whether the political impulse of states’ rights and nullification will become a direct political fault line in the national elections this fall is uncertain.” It is almost never asked: “Who is the sovereign, the state or the federal government?”—a question put by State Representative Chris N. Herrod, a Republican from Provo, Utah. Technically (but not in practice), both governments have governmental sovereignty in the American federal system; it is not an “either/or” question.

The question is perhaps whether a balance between the two systems of governmental sovereignty within the American system can be restored simply by reacting issue by issue. Is it possible, moreover, for the American people to embrace a constitutional moment wherein the architectonic of the system itself is the issue?

Sources:

Kirk Johnson, “States’ Rights Is Rallying Cry for Lawmakers,” New York Times, March 16, 2010. 

Alexander Mooney, “Virginia Governor to Sign Law Firing Back at Health Care Bill,” CNN, March 24, 2010.