The European Parliament: Rejecting the Council’s Proposed Budget

On 16 June, 2026, the European Parliament rejected the European Council’s proposed budget for the E.U. not only because of the proposal’s €32.8 billion budget-cut, which would reduce the six-year 2028-2034 federal budget even below that which the Commission had proposed, but also because the Council had refused to address the issue of federal-sources of revenue, which was made increasingly salient by the increasing need of funds at the federal level. In seeking to keep the federal institutions dependent on money supplied by the states, the Council, which like the U.S. Senate represents states, can be viewed exploiting a conflict of interest at the expense of the ability of the E.U. to operate even within its given mandates. Put another way, the requirement that the Parliament pass any proposed budget can be viewed as a check on the state-centric Council’s proclivity to put the interest of the parts above the whole—the individual states above the Union.

Although the proposed federal budget by the Council represented a political compromise between states that wanted “substantial cuts” and other states that “asked for an increase of the budget for agriculture and regional funds,” enough of the Parliament’s representatives elected by E.U. citizens, rather than appointed by state governments, deemed the Council’s proposal as insufficient.[1] Those representatives were oriented to adequately funding extant federal programs rather than doing the bidding even of their own states. This translates into an orientation to the common good that is implied in collection action (i.e., the whole) rather than to the interests of parts. Because the €2 trillion proposal by the Commission had already been rejected as insufficient by the Parliament, the Council’s even lower figure can be interpreted as perplexing unless the states were making a statement that any federal branch is apt to overstate the E.U.’s funding needs so the Parliament’s rejection of the Commission’s proposal could and should be ignored.

Consistent with the alleged proclivity of federal governmental institutions to over-state the E.U.’s needed funding was the refusal of the Council “to touch the issue of the budgetary correction mechanisms known as rebates, revenues coming from taxes at the E.U. level, known as own resources, and the principle of making the budget conditional on the rule of law.”[2] Refusing to increase the E.U.’s own access to revenue independent of funds contributed (and thus controlled by) the state governments was essentially a decision to maintain power over the federal institutions and thus render the Union subservient to the states. At the time, MEP Carla Tavares told the press, “We need to make progress on own resources. . . . It is difficult to achieve a strong and renewed budget with cuts and without new own resources.”[3] In other words, the common good as funded federally would be diminished by the refusal of the state-centric Council to even consider new sources of own resources at the federal level. The distinctly state-level interest in maintaining (inordinate) power in the federal system was operating at the expense of the whole. The self-interested decision of the states in the Council to refuse to make budget-outlays conditional on rule-of-law being upheld in a given state also evinces an institutional (or structural) conflict of interest because using the budget so state governments do not disassemble rule-of-law provisions is in the interest of the whole (i.e., the European Union). One state government being able to backslide could easily domino across state-lines, and as all of the delegates at the U.S. federal Convention thought in 1787, allowing dictators at the state level would be incompatible with a democratic Union. So, the refusal of the Council to address the matter of conditionality can be viewed as putting the Union at risk. Fortunately, the members of Parliament were foremost oriented to the good of the Union rather than to protecting state prerogatives even at the expense of the Union.

One of the benefits of federalism is that the federal and state levels can act as checks on each other so as to preserve liberty against the threat of tyranny. The Parliament’s role in being a check on the use of the Council by the state governments to put the interests of the state government officials and their respective governments above the interests of the whole is thus vital in safeguarding the E.U.’s federal system and thus the E.U. itself. Moreover, putting the interests of parts above the whole of which they are parts is never a good idea, for the interests of a whole are not identical to the aggregate of the interests of the parts; the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

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1. Eleonora Vasques, “EU Parliament Rejects Member States’ First Draft of Long-Term Budget,” Euronews.com, 16 June, 2026.
2. Ibid, italics added for emphasis.
3. Ibid.

The E.U.’s Immigration “ICE”: The Pros and Cons of State Implementation

On 1 June, 2026, the E.U.’s two legislative chambers agreed informally on text for a law called Return Regulation, which is oriented to facilitating the return of illegal aliens to their respective countries. Both The European Council, the “upper chamber,” and the European Parliament, the “lower” legislative “chamber” (roughly corresponding to the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, respectively) worked in what in American parlance is called a Congressional reconciliation or conference committee to agree to text enabling state police to enter the domiciles of illegal immigrants and state governments to set up detention centers outside of the European Union. That the federal law relegates implementation to the states illustrates just how different E.U. federalism differs from U.S. federalism even though both systems are “modern” rather than confederal in that governmental sovereignty in both unions is split between the federal and state levels. Even though the E.U. after thirty years was like the U.S. after its first thirty years in that most of that sovereignty was at the state level, the use of state governments to implement a federal law differentiates the European federal system from the American one. Both advantages and disadvantages go with leaving implementation largely up to the states.

Imagine if the American Congress had passed a law leaving it up to the state governments to exercise “ICE” enforcement powers to rid the Union of illegal immigrants. In U.S. President Trump’s second term in office, Florida would jump at the chance, whereas states such as Massachusetts, Illinois, and California would refuse to implement the federal law. It would not be difficult to surmise how illegal aliens would work around such a patchwork, at least those with enough money to move to a more preferential state. As a result, the federal rationale—that of eliminating illegal immigrants from U.S. soil—would be compromised. However, the differing political-ideological centers-of-gravity in the several states would get more breathing room, and in empire-scale political unions such as the U.S. and E.U., one legislative size does not fit all. When one is imposed, internal pressure builds up that could eventually blow such a union apart.

Even in the E.U., in which the new law reflected “a broader political shift . . . sometimes backed by the far right . . . pushing for a tougher approach to migration,” states could be said to differ as to the political significance of the far right.[1] Some state governments may for example not find much internal political support for a state law that enables police to search a “place of residence or other relevant premises” of illegal migrants, especially as some NGOs (non-governmental organizations) compared “to the notorious raids conducted by the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).”[2] It is not as if the two federal legislative chambers passed the federal law under the assumption that it would be strenuously implemented by every state. “The provision is vague on purpose, to allow a broad interpretation in the different member states. It opens the doors to home raids and also raids in the premises of associations helping migrants and healthcare facilities,” Eleonora Celoria with Asgi, a state-level association of legal experts said at the time of the law’s passage.[3] Celoria’s depiction of the implications highlight just how politically and ethically controversial the law is, and this, I submit, is precisely why the provision is vague on purpose. States could be anticipated to differ on how the law should be implemented “on the ground.” Even though the maximum legal detention period for illegal immigrants waiting to be expatriated back to their respective countries is “extended from six months to two years, with a possible six-month extension and an unlimited duration for persons considered as posing a security risk,” clearly not every state legislature would go with the maximus. The comment made by MEP Mélissa Camara (of the European Parliament) that the legislative text serves “a xenophobic ideology” may resonate more in some states than in others.[4] Hence, the E.U.’s federal system could be said to be healthier than its U.S. counterpart at the time (2026) because the E.U states were legislatively given more breathing room in which to tailor the federal law according to their respective political cultures.

The astute reader may be waiting for “the other shoe to drop,” meaning: what’s the catch? According to E.U. figures, “only 29% of migrants with no legal right to remain” in the E.U “leave the EU.”[5] Illegals were a big problem facing the Union, and leaving enforcement up to whether a given state government favors the proposed legislative text risks creating a legal loophole wherein illegal migrants could simply move to another state where enforcement is lax or utterly lacking. The intentional vagueness in the legislative text makes even no enforcement possible. In California at the time, I was surprised to see a sign outside a popular pizza restaurant indicating that the workers reserved the right to refuse service and entry to ICE police, as if enforcement of U.S. immigration law were up to restaurant workers. Were such law up to the government of California, given the high proportion of registered Democrats over Republicans, it is a safe bet that no enforcement could be passed by the California Senate and Assembly. Contrast this with states such as Oklahoma, Alabama, and Florida! I would even venture to posit that the ideological distance on the issue of illegal immigration between those three states and California is more than existed at the time between E.U. states on the same issue: how, or even whether, illegal immigration should be expunged.

Perhaps my thesis can be generalized to say that giving states in an empire-scale union enough breathing room is inversely related to efficacy at the federal, or Union level. Federalism is a messy business in part because judgment is requisite; there are few easy answers in how to navigate the common good (of the political union) while seeing to it that the states have enough breathing room so their respective residents do not feel suffocated by a one-size-fits-all federal mentality. In other words, modern federalism, whose signature attribute is dual sovereignty, can be said to involve a balancing act. As of 2026, it could be said that the E.U. was doing a better job at that than was the U.S., but at what cost in terms of the interests of the European Union as a whole, which is not a mere aggregate of state interests? This is a dynamic unique to the empire-level, so it does not pertain to E.U. states that have adopted federal systems of their own. No large U.S. states are themselves federal, though in a nod to the Europeans such a prospect is worth entertaining. Even so, the heterogeneity across an empire of 27 or 50 republics dwarfs that which exists even within a large E.U. or U.S. state. This is yet another reason why the E.U. and U.S. should be compared and contrasted, rather than treating a large state in one union as equivalent to the other union. In other words, the U.S. is not a France with a large back yard that stretches across a continent and beyond. Within such an expanse of land, views on immigration can be expected to vary markedly from state to state.

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1. Vincenzo Genovese, “EU Greenlights Controversial Return Hubs in ‘Strictest-Ever’ New Migration Law,” Euronews.com, 1 June 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

The E.U.: A Political Union

Strong’s The Antifederalist is a series of essays critical of the American federal system in which governmental sovereignty is “dual,” meaning that both the Union and the member-states have at least some such sovereignty that the other cannot abolish or override. Had more credence been paid to the arguments in that text, perhaps the state governments would have more power at the federal level to protect their retained sovereignty from federal encroachment. The drafting of the E.U. paid more heed to those arguments in terms of safeguarding state sovereignty by considerable direct involvement of state officials at the federal level. Even so, Euroskeptics have warned of a centralized state in the process, and the U.S. has furnished them with an actual instance of a nearly consolidated empire-scale federal system. The warnings may thus be valid even with the additional safeguards that the E.U. has but the U.S. lacks, at least as of 2026, but claims that the E.U. does not have a federal system and is not a political union of states ring hollow as they are utterly false. So too, but the way, is the mislabeling of the E.U. as a bloc. The E.U.’s parliament alone knocks out all three of these ideological claims.

E.U. citizens elect representatives to the parliament, just as U.S. citizens elect representatives to the U.S. House of Representatives. This itself is inherently political, rather than merely economic, in nature.The resolutions and laws passed by the parliament are also not limited to economic measures. As a case in point, the parliament’s resolutions against the government of Azerbaijan furnish us with a case in point.

By May 1, 2026, the E.U.’s parliament had adopted 14 resolutions critical of Azerbaijan. The latest of those “called for the right of return of Armenians who [had] fled the region in 2023 after an armed conflict [had broken] out over a disputed region. [The resolution] described the detention of Armenian prisoners of war by Azerbaijan as ‘unjust’ and urged their ‘immediate and unconditional release.’”[1] Both the detention and the parliament’s reaction to it are inherently political, rather than concerning trade. Put another way, that which is decried as unjust in the resolution is political; it is not as if the parliament’s resolution opposed an unjust trading agreement between the E.U. and Azerbaijan.

The E.U.’s parliament was even viewed by the government of Azerbaijan as a political (legislative) chamber rather than as a trading organization befitting a bloc. “Hikmet Hajiyev, assistant to the President of Azerbaijan and head of the Foreign Policy Affairs Department of the Presidential Administration, called the European Parliament resolution as ‘a diplomatic disgrace and diplomatic failure,’ and accused members of the parliament of ‘creating obstacles to a peace process.”[2] Besides the fact that peace is a political rather than an economic concept, that the European Parliament was viewed as having engaged in diplomacy, albeit allegedly very badly according to Hajiyev, implies the more fundamental or basic understanding that the parliament is a political body. Diplomacy is that which governments conduct on political matters in international relations.

Therefore, the European Parliament has been viewed by government officials of other countries as a political body engaging in political acts, rather than as a bloc or international organization oriented to trade. As for how that chamber views itself, Roberta Metsola, who is the “Speaker” (translated into American terms for easy comparison) or elected head of the European Parliament, pushed back against the charge that the representatives in that legislative chamber had been obsessing on Azerbaijan by making explicit the political nature of the parliament. Heading to the chamber’s floor to make an impromptu statement, Metsola insisted, “We will never change the way we work, even if it is uncomfortable,” meaning not convenient for people in other countries.[3] Of utmost importance in terms of the parliament’s very legitimacy politically, she had first said: “The European Parliament is a directly elected democratic body, with resolutions adopted by a majority.”[4] The assertion that the E.U. is indeed a political union is satisfied by this statement alone, for that which Metsola described is inherently political.

Furthermore, that the body’s representatives are directly elected, rather than appointed by state governments, means that the E.U.’s federal level is not merely a collection or bloc of states. Just as E.U. law has direct effect on E.U. citizens (and other residents and even tourists), so too do E.U. citizens have political access via elected representatives at the federal level, rather than just through state officials in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Also, through those elected representatives, E.U. citizens can kick out an existing administration at the Commission without the say of state officials.

In short, whereas the European Council and the Council of Ministers, like the U.S. Senate, are founded on international principles, the European Parliament, like the U.S. House of Representatives, is national and thus governmental, in its constitutive principles. This hybrid federal system, differing as it does from a confederation of sovereign states, was invented by political compromise in 1787 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and is detailed in James Madison’s Notes.

To be sure, Euroskeptics would surely bolt from these arguments in utter fury, but I contend that the promulgated axis of political comparison is valid even if it is seldom uncovered and made explicit. The distending nature of ideology finds it easy to engage in denial, especially in the domains of politics and religion. Indeed, the E.U. itself is firmly within the political domain, and on this point Hajiyev and Metsola are in agreement, for it is the very premise on which the statements of both officials are based. San Francisco doesn’t matter.

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1. Vincenzo Genovese, “Roberta Metsola Clashes with Azerbaijan’s Ailyev at European Summit in Armenia,” Euronews.com, 4 May, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

The E.U. and U.S.: Equal Partners

In 2026, even though the U.S. had 50 member-states and the E.U. had only 27 states, both unions were large enough to constitute what in historical terms, with the European early-modern rather than (the smaller) medieval kingdoms in mind, empire-scale republics. As long as elected representatives hold office at the federal level in both political unions, both unions can be said to be republics (as well as containing republics—or, as Ken Wheare wrote in Federal Government, “wheels within a larger wheel”). Were either union to have only five or so states, the empire definition would not be satisfied. Also, that definition includes the requirement of cultural heterogeneity between (as distinct from within) the states. Being on the same (empire) scale is just one of several ways in which the two unions belong to the same political type. It was in this respect rather than based on the sheer number of states that Sophie Wilmes, vice-president of the European Parliament, said that the U.S. should not regard the E.U. as a little sister (i.e., a junior partner). I contend that she was correct.

Including but going beyond economic and political dependence internationally, Wilmes insisted that the U.S. deal with the E.U. as an equal. “What is very important regarding the United States is that we are talking to each other as equal partners and not as a big brother against the little brother or the little sister.”[1] To be sure, little brothers (and I have one who is a decade younger) are perfectly capable of bossing around older brothers. Even so, concerning the context to which Wilmes was referring, the U.S. was dominate on the Iran War and trade tariffs. In fact, the Commission had acted against giant American computer-technology companies on invasion of privacy and anti-competitive grounds only to be threatened by the Trump administration with (retaliatory) tariffs.

It is arguably from the standpoint of not feeling respected that the E.U. leader was speaking out to assert the E.U. as equivalent to the U.S. and thus worthy of reciprocal respect. Put somewhat crassly, just because the American tech companies could have undue (and anti-democratic) influence in American government does not mean that the latter should not respect E.U. law that differs from U.S. law concerning the tech sector. Equal, or reciprocal respect rather than a claim as to the equivalence of the two unions as falling under the same political type is the basis of Wilmes’ public remarks.

Even so, the demand for equal respect is premised on the unspoken assumption that the E.U. and U.S. are indeed equivalent political unions, whose respective states are thus equivalent. In terms of territory and population, the states cluster. The only exception is Alaska, which is larger than even the European Union, not to mention any E.U. state.  That the political unions are both empire-level, cluster in terms of population (i.e., hundreds rather than tens of millions), GDP, and even territory is the grundlagen upon which comparative politics as an academic sub-field in political science and in practice (including in journalism!) should be based even though this foundation is rarely made explicit. Considering the widespread occurrence of political category mistakes with respect to the E.U. and U.S., scholars, government officials, and especially journalists could have done more to make the equivalence explicit in 2026 when the E.U. official made her statement. In 2025, while speaking with the E.U.’s ambassador to the U.S. at Yale, I made this plea in vain, for E.U. officials were then afraid that making the equivalence explicit would give Euroskeptics such as Viktor Orbán more ammunition with which to dismantle the Union, which was certainly not a “bloc.”

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1. Vincenzo Genovese, “’The E.U. Is Not the Little Sister of the US,’ European Parliament Vice-President Wilkes Says,” Euronews.com, 29 April, 2026.

On Retaining the States’ Veto-Power in the European Council: Sovereignty vs. Democracy

Both the filibuster in the U.S. Senate and the veto in the European Council reflect the act that the respective states were sovereign and retain a portion of that governmental sovereignty that has not been delegated to the respective Unions. But whereas the American filibuster is compatible with a federal system based on dual-sovereignty (states and union), the European veto is not; rather, each state having a veto is at home in a confederation, which is characterized by the states retaining their sovereignty rather than having given up some in becoming a state. In April 2026 shortly after Viktor Orbán had lost his bid for re-election in the E.U. state of Hungary, the E.U.’s foreign minister argued publicly that the states’ veto in the European Council (and the Council of Ministers) runs contrary to the democratic principle of majority rule. The prerogative of retained and residual governmental sovereignty was essentially being pitted against a fundamental principle of democracy.

Kaja Kallas, the E.U.’s foreign minister, castigated the requirement of unanimity in the European Council (in competencies, or enumerated powers, in which qualified majority voting does not apply) because the votes of 26 state governments can be hijacked by a single holdout. Her assumption is that majority-rule rather than the rule by one (holdout) is fundamental to democracy, whether direct or representative. Referring to the vetoes that had been exercised by the then-outgoing governor of the E.U. state of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, Kallas pointed out that the Council doing what only one state wants, “not what the 26 [others] want . . . is not really democracy.”[1] In fact, one-state rule can be thought of as autocratic rather than democratic. If so, then it follows that the remainder of sovereignty retained by the states as veto power is antithetical to democracy. Although both principles are valid in a federal system characterized by dual-sovereignty rather than all sovereignty being retained by the states, I contend that a sufficient recognition of the retained sovereignty of the states lies in the voting method by qualified majority, and furthermore, that such a method is not in conflict with democracy because even a super-majority is majority rule.

To be sure, the E.U.’s basic (constitutional, or government framework) law provides “a legal pathway to move from unanimity to qualified majority voting. However, . . . such a shift itself requires unanimous consent.”[2] Such a blatant “Catch 22” suggests that the state governments were exploiting a conflict of interest in devising and approving the pathway as if they were states in a confederation, which, unlike modern federalism, according to Kenneth Wheare’s Federal Government, involves no transfer of limited sovereignty (i.e., enumerated powers) to the federal level. That the hamstringing non-qualified-majority-vote policy and legislation at the federal level could easily have been foreseen indicates a proclivity to put the interests of their own states, and the states altogether, above federal initiatives for the good of the whole, which is more than merely the sum of the parts. In fact, the veto itself may imply that the whole is merely such a sum.

Qualified-majority voting enables sufficient unity at the level of the whole and enables the federal level to exercise its exclusive and shared competencies, or powers. Kallas said, “we need to be united and able to take decisions.”[3] So unity should not be so total that decisions cannot be taken and implemented at the federal level, which consists not only of the European Council (and the Council of Ministers), but also the Commission, Parliament, and supreme court (i.e., the ECJ), which are not so beholden to state-level interests that can differ from the interests of the whole, as represented by the Union.

The counter-argument made by Charles Michel (interestingly at the time of Kallas’s interview) in favor of keeping the veto in the Council that he had chaired from 2019 to 2024 is spurious. Firstly, he undercut his argument against the pressing need to shelve the veto mechanism by predicting that the European Council would be not be more unified on Ukraine following Orbán’s departure because other governors “share elements of his political stance, including on Ukraine.”[4] Slovakia, for instance, could easily step into Orbán’s shoes. This prediction makes Kallas’ point even more urgent!

Michel went on to claim that “the ‘European Dream’ depends on collective agreement among all 27 member states.”[5] Such would be the case were the E.U. a confederation of sovereign states, such as the Articles of Confederation were as the treaty made by the sovereign countries forming the U.S. until 1789, but the E.U.’s federal level enjoys exclusive and a shared-portion of competencies, or enumerated powers, and such sovereignty does not depend on unanimity at the state level because the states are not fully sovereign. The political-type category mistake in which a modern federal system of dual sovereignty is supposed to be a confederation was ultimately responsible for why Britain seceded from the Union; as prime minister, David Cameron mischaracterized the E.U. as but one of the “networks” of which Britain had joined. It is no wonder that a significant number of the Brits chaffed at even the limited governmental sovereignty that the E.U. itself enjoyed at the expense of full state sovereignty.

Michel’s “European dream” involves yet another problematic claim. “If you stop trying to involve every [state],” he said, “you risk weakening the EU’s weight on the international stage.”[6] This statement incorrectly assumes that any state on the losing end of a qualified-majority vote in the Council is not involved in the process, and that the E.U.’s very credibility on the world stage is not undercut when one state hinders federal action in foreign and defense affairs. Even as Russia continued to invade Ukraine for over four years, that the E.U. could not support Ukraine militarily made the Europeans look weak and unprincipled on such an obvious case of unprovoked military invasion.

Moreover, I dispute Michel’s utopian fantasy that 27 governors of states with differing interests, both economic and geopolitical, will nonetheless be unanimous enough on specific federal policy and legislative proposals for the principle of unanimity to be viable (i.e., workable enough) for the E.U. to exercise its own competencies that are subject to unanimity. Put another way, for the states to have delegated a significant amount of governmental sovereignty to the E.U. and yet selfishly, as per state-specific interests, to hold onto unanimity on many important matters being considered in the federal-level councils constitutes wanting to have one’s cake and eat it too. Such a capricious mentality does not deserve credibility on the world’s stage.

To be sure, Michel warned against governors misusing (to excess) the veto-power of their respective states in the Council, noting that the veto should only be used as it was intended to be used, “only when vital [state] interests are at stake.”[7] Given that the authority has been up to the governors themselves whether to use their power, however, an expansionist wielding of the vetoes should have been anticipated at Lisbon. Besides over-valuing even petty interests, as if they should outweigh the interests of the whole (Union), governors could easily invent such interests in solidarity with a foreign foe of the E.U. and thus undercut the Union itself on the world stage. I am referring here to Orbán’s relationship with Russia’s President Putin—Orbán even went to Moscow, undercutting President Von der Leyen’s policy against Putin’s militaristic aggression unprovoked in Ukraine.

The Von der Leyen administration was wise in looking outward to the credibility of the E.U. and its long-term functioning as a federal rather than state-centric system of governance, whereas Michel was entrenched in a status quo premised on fallacious arguments and even a category mistake. Ironically, for the need to expunge the veto-power from the federal-level councils after the departure of Orbán to still be felt as pressing, Michel’s prediction of no increase in cohesion among the governors was significant. Unfortunately, as an impetus to even needed political reform, the abstraction of a prediction pales in comparison to the actual use of vetoes, such as Orbán’s veto of the loan to Ukraine.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Orbán-Style Vetoes Undermind E.U. Democracy, Kaja Kallas Tells Euronews Hoping for Reset,” Euronews.com, 24 April 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Angela Skujins, “European Council Should “Think Carefully” before Removing Unanmity, Says Michel,” Euronews.com, 24 April, 2026.
5. Ibid.; italics added for emphasis.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.

Should the E.U. Pay Prospective States to Reform?

Should the European Union pay prospective, or “candidate,” states to undergo legislative, rule-of-law reforms prior to accession even though becoming a state is not assured? In April, 2026, Marta Kos, the Commission’s commissioner for enlargement warned the E.U.’s parliament that the Commission might “suspect €1.5 billion in E.U. funding for Serbia due to rule-of-law concerns and contentious judicial reforms” that had been introduced in Serbia’s legislature in January.”[1] I contend that the legislative or constitutional proposals should have been sufficient to freeze the very question of Serbia’s accession, and that the Commission should not pay candidate states to undergo reforms in the first place.

Speaking to the elected representatives in the federal parliament, “Kos said she was particularly concerned about legal amendments that introduce major changes, creating a flawed form of autonomy for Serbia’s anti-corruption prosecution and weakening the independence of the judiciary.”[2] That those constituted major changes are were on the scale of amendments rather than mere statutes could have alerted President Von der Leyen as to whether Serbia was in any condition to become a state in a political union in which rule of law (i.e., an autonomous judiciary, and democratically-valid multi-party elections) is assumed rather than even subject to debate. In other words, rule-of-law, as enforced by a judiciary independent of whatever party happens to be in power in the legislative and executive branches of a government, is so fundamental in the E.U. that major changes even being proposed in a prospective state should be a huge red flag. Accordingly, the question goes beyond whether to suspend paying money to such a state to undergo reforms that should be done anyway.

That Serbia’s political culture, at least with respect to its government, was worsening appreciably is clear from Kos’s statement, “We are increasingly worried about what is happening in Serbia. From laws that undermine the independence of the judiciary to crackdowns on protesters and recurrent meddling in independent media.”[3] Such crackdowns and meddling go beyond rendering a judiciary subservient to a governing political group, and thus render Serbia unfit at least for the time being for joining the E.U. as a state. At the very least, in other words, Serbia should not be “eligible for E.U. funding to support its required internal reforms.”[4] If prospective states want to join the E.U., then they should be willing to pay for their reforms themselves. Why, in other words, should the E.U. feel obliged to pay? I contend that joining the E.U. is of such value to any outside state-level republic that the E.U. should not in principle pay for candidate states to get themselves into shape from a democratic standpoint.

Even on policy grounds, the accession of Serbia was risky for the E.U., given the military aggressiveness of Russia in Ukraine. That the E.U.’s parliament had “adopted a resolution criticizing Serbia’s failure to align with E.U. foreign policy” against Russia in 2025[5] should have been a wake-up call for the E.U., given Viktor Orbán’s intentional undermining of E.U. foreign policy with regard to Russia. Did the E.U. administration want another Hungary wielding its veto in the European Council and the Council of Ministers in favor of Russia even as that country was still invading one of its neighbors?

Therefore, Kos’s statement, “We will continue to support Serbia on its E.U. path,”[6] can and arguably should be subject to formidable critique. After all, the E.U. was not so weak at the time, even given its refusal to expunge the veto-power from states in the European Council, that the Commission should have been so desperate to take in even marginal states. The greatness of the E.U. depended more in making internal reforms at the federal level in line with the fact that the member-states were semi-sovereign, than in enlarging. Just because Orbán had just been voted out of office in Hungary does not mean that the intransigence of one state in the European Council and the Council of Ministers could not again hamstring federal foreign and military policy even in the face of the Russian bear invading one of its neighbors on President Putin’s utterly fallacious supposition that the old Russian empire should rise again.

1. Eleonora Vasques, “E.U. Considers Freezing Serbia’s €1.5 billion in E.U. Funds Amid Rule of Law Scrutiny,” Euronews.com, April 20, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

E.U. States and US Economies Compared Economically

Even in reporting and analyzing seemingly-objective economic data for comparative purposes, political ideology can creep in if that instinctual urge is powerful enough. Even in comparisons of political entities that are on the same level (e.g., city, region/province, kingdom, empire), “word-games” can be used to suggest that the republics being compared are on different political levels. The use of linguistic subterfuge is, I submit, underhanded and based on a stubborn refusal to admit to oneself that the two or more political entities being compared are indeed on the same level, rather than one being higher than the other. In the case of comparing GDP and GDP per capita between E.U. and U.S. states, the very fact that the states are being compared to each other, rather than a state in one union to another union (as if a state in one political union were equivalent to another union of states—a category mistake to be sure!), means that the respective states are in fact equivalent even though different labels are used according to whether a given state is in one union or another. In arguing these points, I shall juxtaposition the respective labels to highlight the absurdity of using different labels for ideological purposes.

In mid-April, 2026, Euronews, which reflects Euroskeptic language in order to appease critics of the E.U., reported that top E.U. states and U.S. republics were roughly similar in “economic size rankings.”[1] Even though E.U. states, like U.S. states, were (and had been) semi-sovereign states, Euronews belied its own economic likeness of the respective economic sizes of big states in both unions by erroneously inventing the label, “EU countries” just before “US states.” Then, in the next paragraph, the journalist used the label, “European economies” for the E.U. states yet retained US states. In English, the expression, “Something funny is going on here” is a way of applying suspicion to another person’s underlying motives. In other words, something more is going on in the writing of the article than merely comparing economic numbers. This is the idea.

The “word games” bent on subtly overlaying differentials are undercut when we turn to the numbers themselves. In terms of GDP, the list from highest to lowest shows E.U. states and U.S. states clustered: Germany, California, France, Texas, Italy, New York, Spain, and Florida. That big states in one union of states are economically equivalent to big states in the other union is good evidence that the respective states in the two unions are equivalent more generally. To take one example, the GDP of Spain in 2025 was €1.687 trillion and that of Florida was €1.624 trillion.[2] To be sure, in making more general comparisons between the two semi-sovereign states, Spain’s greater size, 3.6 times the territorial size of Florida, is significant. However, that Spain’s 505,990 square kilometers falls between the 423,970 of California and the 695,662 of Texas strongly suggests that in terms of territory, the large (and small) states of the respective unions cluster together, rather than it being the case that a large state in one union clusters with the other union overall. To be sure, the exception to this is Alaska being larger than the E.U. itself, but otherwise, the large states in the two unions cluster not only in terms of economic output, but also geographical size.

The article’s report of GDP per capita even puts some large U.S. states above even large E.U. states because New York, California, Illinois, Texas, and Florida have higher numbers than do the Netherlands, Germany, France and Italy. The bar-graph in the article even has all of the states in blue whereas the U.S. and E.U. are in other colors so those two unions could be compared to each other. Even though the graph is labeled as “EU’s top 5 economies vs. top 5 U.S. states” (notice, too, the subtle, selective use of periods in “U.S.” but not “EU” as if this means that the latter is an organization rather than a union of states!), that all of the states are shown with blue bars indicates that the states of the respective unions are equivalent (and that the unions can be compared with each other, rather than to a state).

In making the argument of state-equivalence, out of which I derived union-equivalence, I once read the ten volumes of George Bancroft’s History of the United States of America, From the Discovery of the American Continent after having taken Joanne Freeman’s Yale course on the American Revolutionary War. In writing British Colonies Forge an American Empire: A Basis for Trans-Atlantic Comparisons, I wanted to highlight that according to Bancroft’s studies, people on both sides of the Atlantic viewed the British colonies as being on the scale of the countries in Europe at the time. Bancroft reports in his texts that both the political elite in the colonies and in the British Empire’s host kingdom (i.e., Britain) tended to view the United Colonies as being on the empire- rather than kingdom-level.[3] In fact, even New England, the Mid-Atlantic, and Southern (informal) sub-groups of colonies were viewed as empires in themselves by some people! Not just a few British politicians were nervous about there being an empire (or empires!) within the empire; an empire consists of kingdom-level political entities. That both Virginia and Ireland were regarded as members of the British Empire is strong evidence that the British colonies in North America were regarded from the start in the Greek rather than the Roman sense of a colonialization (i.e., a colony constructed to be equivalent to the host country rather than as a part thereof; for example, a city-state in Greece creating another city-state). This is the historical underpinning for my conclusion that the U.S. states, rather than the U.S. itself, are equivalent to E.U. states, and therefore I submit that the claim that a state of the E.U. is equivalent to the U.S. is a political category mistake. In historical terms, no one would have claimed that a kingdom and an empire are equivalent because empires consisted of kingdoms. That both a free-standing, or free, kingdom and an empire were both sovereign does not make the two equivalent because sovereignty is merely an attribute rather than definitive.  

Comparative politics can extend beyond comparing types of political systems (e.g., democracy, autocracy) to consider the matter of equivalence in terms of city-states, regions, kingdoms, and empires. Early in the seventeenth century, the European jurisprud Althusius wrote Political Digest on federalism based on the Holy Roman Empire. In his text, he clearly distinguished between the different levels in a federation: the guilds, the cities, the regions, the kingdoms, and the empire. His theory of federalism has the next-lower being members (and thus represented) in the next-higher, with individuals being members only of the guilds. His isomorphic federalism is more the case in the E.U. than the U.S. because none of the American states have federal systems. By viewing the E.U. and the U.S. as equivalent, Althusius’s theory could be seen to be applicable to the U.S., especially in regard to that union’s large, internally heterogenous states like California, Illinois, and New York. Comparing apples with apples, and oranges with oranges in comparative politics can indeed have such significant practical benefits, but not if Europeans and Americans go on treating individual states in one union as being equivalent to the other union rather than to states thereof.

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1. Servet Yanatma, “E.U.’s Largest Economies vs. Top US States: How Do They Compare in GDP?”  Euronews.com, 12 April, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Skip Worden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire: A Basis for Trans-Atlantic Comparisons.

On the Glacial Pace of E.U. Accession for Serbia and Albania

With Russian troops having been in Ukraine for over four years by March, 2026, the case was indeed being made then for the E.U. enlarging as much and as soon as possible by adding new states, including Ukraine. For in addition to making it more difficult for Russia to invade countries in Eastern Europe by turning them into E.U. states, the main way that a federal union, whether the E.U. or U.S., expands is by the accession of new states from what had been sovereign countries. This is why Canada would enter the U.S. as a state, or, more likely, a few states, rather than in a merge. Especially with the Russians having been dropping bombs on Ukrainian people and infrastructure for years, giving up some governmental sovereignty was arguably not too high a price for state governments to accept.  

In a public effort to push the accession process along for their respective future states, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama published an op-ed in a European newspaper to propose “functional partial integration serving as an intermediate step to revive the EU enlargement process and increase stability in the region.”[1] In other words, Serbia and Albania would at some point get some but not all of the rights that go along with E.U. statehood. The single market and the Schengen area would be granted as the intermediate step, while no decision-making power would be extended at the federal level either for the governments of Serbia and Albania (in the European Council and the Council of Ministers) or for Serbians and Albanians in having elected representatives in the European Parliament. The “trial balloon” of giving Ukraine a similar intermediate limbo-state had popped rather loudly at an E.U. summit, so it would seem to follow that the proposal by the Serbia and Albanian leaders would be dead on arrival at the European Council.

The frustration with the enlargement process in general was certainly palpable by 2026 and could explain the desperate attempt of Serbia and Albania to get  at least one foot into the E.U. sooner rather than later. Thanks in large part to Hungary’s ongoing veto of Ukraine’s accession process from being formally carried out, obstacles to enlargement were getting a lot of press in early 2026. In 2025, an E.U. report on enlargement “highlighted Belgrade’s lack of alignment” with the E.U.’s sanctions against Russia for having unjustifiably invaded Ukraine.[2] Serbia’s lack of reform for media freedom, electoral law, and civil society had also been responsible for the stall in talks. As for Albania, although it was considered “one of the most promising candidates for EU accession,” corruption remained stubbornly entrenched. It would be interesting to compare that corruption with that which was in Ukraine at the time. The question of whether geo-political urgency should relegate concerns about corruption has no easy answer except perhaps in lopping off the extremes. To be sure, Albania had introduced the anti-corruption authority SPAK, but the more interesting question is perhaps whether the Ukrainian government did likewise in a way that leaves a viable record of less corruption.

In general, the “accession process for Serbia and other Western Balkan countries (had) stalled for years, as candidate countries (had not) made sufficient process on rule of law, anti-corruption measures, media freedom and judicial reforms. . .”[3] With the NATO defensive umbrella in place, except for Ukraine, the urgency pertaining to the rest of the candidates was not sufficient, I submit, to justify not finishing the job on rule of law, anti-corruption, media freedom and judicial reforms because all of these are very important to a civil society and a republic on an ongoing basis. Granting some candidate countries some intermediate rights could be expected to reduce the incentive of those state governments to continue to come into alignment with the E.U.’s expectations prior to statehood being fully granted.

Regarding the glacial pace of enlargement generally, a silver-lining to that dark cloud can be seen in that something had to be done about the stultifying impact of the principle of unanimity in the European Council before gaining even more states would make reaching unanimity even more difficult that it was for 27 states. Put another way, making sure that the candidate states made the requisite reforms not only would render the E.U. more solidly democratic and based on the rule of law and freedom (e.g., of the press), but would also give the E.U. more time to reform its internal decision-making process where unanimity was still required for federal law and foreign (and defense) policy to be enacted and promulgated, respectively. Not everything that seems weak in the E.U. is actually weakness, though admittedly requiring unanimity from 27 governments can be coined an exercise in futility in service to the absurd.

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1. Zara Riffler, “Serbia and Albania Issue Joint Text on EU Accession without Veto,” Euronews.com, 11 March, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

E.U. Statehood for Sovereign Countries

Even as the E.U. struggled to come up with foreign policies on Gaza, Ukraine, and Iran in March, 2026, the union must have been cogent enough then for the Icelandic government to set a date at the end of the summer to have a referendum on whether to seek statehood. The term for this is accession, not merger, for an empire-scale union such as the U.S. or E.U. contains semi-sovereign states rather than co-scale and co-equal “partners.” By implication, to liken a state in one such union to another entire union is to make a category mistake that can be thought of in historical terms as making the claim that a kingdom is equivalent to an empire (of kingdoms). Both the E.U. and U.S. are federations composed of early-modern scale kingdoms and republics.[1] This is not so in the cases of Mexico and Canada. In fact, the U.S. has an open invitation for Canada’s accession (rather than merger).[2] People who presume that it was arrogant for the U.S. founders to invite Canada to accede as a state forget that the U.S. was formed by sovereign countries that became semi-sovereign states.

As the E.U. expands, it too draws on sovereign countries to become states through the process of accession (rather than merger). The planned referendum in Iceland was not on a merger of two countries. Iceland had submitted to the European Commission, the E.U.’s executive branch, an application for accession in 2009, but then unilaterally halted the process in 2015 even though 11 of the 33 “chapters” had been completed. As a sovereign nation, Iceland could indeed unilaterally stop the process, and when the Icelandic government announced the date for the upcoming referendum, the Commission could at most welcome the announcement. In doing so, a spokesman for the Commission said, “Iceland is a close and valued partner of the E.U. . . . Our cooperation is already strong and wide-ranging and we look forward to continuing and further strengthening our close cooperation with the Icelandic authorities.”[3] The word partner connotes distance as in the sense that Iceland is a sovereign country rather than an E.U. state. The word is problematic, however, in that it implies an equivalency. Even just in Iceland having submitted an application, a lack of equivalency is inherent to the relationship. Moreover, accession itself lacks equivalency because Iceland could become a state in the E.U., and no state is an equal partner with the union in which the state is a part, for a part and a whole cannot be equivalent.

The same held in the case of the U.S., which was formed first as a military alliance and then as a confederation of sovereign countries, and only on March 4, 1789 as a modern (i.e., dual sovereignty) federation of semi-sovereign states and semi-sovereign federal governmental institutions. In other words, the Articles of Confederation, which was ratified in 1781, was for a union of sovereign countries. Therefore, just as the U.S. was formed in 1776 (and continuing under the Articles) by sovereign countries, so too was the E.U. formed by sovereign countries. In both cases, sovereign countries, such as Iceland in 2026, because semi-sovereign states and thus parts of political unions. Accession itself is a distinctly political process.

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1. See Skip Worden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire: A Basis for Trans-Atlantic Comparisons (Seattle: Amazon, 2017)
2. Because Canada has expanded West since the 18^th century, Canada would most likely accede as three or four U.S. states rather than just one.
3. Gregoire Lory, “Iceland Plans August Referendum on Resuming EU Membership Negotiations,” Euronews.com, 3 March, 2026.

Hungary Blocks €90 billion E.U. Loan for Ukraine: Holding the E.U. Hostage

It is one thing for a dog’s tail to lead; even worse is the situation in which the tail refuses to let the dog walk or run. The staying power of the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. enables any one of the state governments to block federal policy and law. Such a blockage makes the tyranny of a minority look tame. In contrast, qualified-majority voting ensures that enough of a majority—a “super-majority”—is in place that the resulting minority should lose. The notion that every state government must be “on board” for the E.U. to enact a policy or law is misplaced because governmental sovereignty in that Union is “dual” because both the E.U.’s federal level and the state governments have at least some sovereignty. The same is true of American federalism. Neither the E.U. nor the U.S. is a confederation of sovereign states; only in such a federation does the principle of unanimity fit.

Facing an uphill electoral contest in two months, Hungary’s sitting prime minister, Viktor Orbán, had one of his ministers, Peter Szijártó, announce on 20 February, 2026, “We are blocking the €90 billion EU loan for Ukraine until oil transit to Hungary via the Druzhba pipeline resumes.”[1] This is an obvious example of a part putting its own interest ahead of the whole, which includes not only the E.U. but also the entire world-order, given Russia’s non-provoked aggression in Ukraine for years with impunity. Regarding the E.U., the implication that a federal program should be in the particular interests of each state in order to go forward reduces the E.U. to a mere aggregation in which every part must be satisfied and thus federal action is severely constrained even at the expense of the E.U. itself, meaning the collective interest that goes beyond the aggregate of the particular interests of the states.

Besides the systemic problem in allowing each of 27 states to block federal action and even statements, Hungary’s use of its veto to block the loan demonstrates that the governor of an E.U. state is perfectly capable of wielding the veto power immaturely and irrationally. Szijjártó claimed “Ukraine is blackmailing Hungary by halting oil transit in coordination with Brussels and the Hungarian opposition to create supply disruptions in Hungary and push fuel prices higher before the elections.”[2] In other words, the E.U. state was blaming Ukraine. The problem with that narrative is that the “Druzhba pipeline, which dates back to the Soviet Union, was damaged after it was hit by a Russian strike and that has impacted transit.”[3] That the strike had been unprovoked and Ukraine was in the midst of massive power outages due to other Russian strikes seem not to have registered in Budapest. Ukraine was “in the midst of a difficult winter, with gruelling temperatures below zero. Russia’s constant pounding with missiles and drones means a large part of [Ukraine’s] energy infrastructure has been destroyed and cannot cope with the heating needs of civilians.”[4] Was Ukraine to drop everything to fix the pipeline that Russia had damaged? Rather than make this claim, the governor of Hungary could have weened his state off Russian oil. The rationale for the veto is thus dubious at best, and this in turn raises the question of whether the governors of the E.U. states are capable of having a veto at the federal level, especially as one of the rationales for the E.U. is to forestall war from breaking out between states or between a state and a foreign country. This rationale is but one of ways in which the interests of the whole—the European Union—are not mere aggregates of the particular interests of the states, for none of the states has a mandate to look out for peace throughout the E.U.

That Hungary even has a veto over the loan is a stretch because the E.U. states of Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic had successfully been granted federal exemptions from contributing financially to the €90 billion loan. It was “subject to unanimity” nonetheless “because it amends the E.U. budget rules to allow borrowing” for a foreign country.[5] That the E.U. allowed exempted states to vote nonetheless is, I submit, yet another indication that the E.U. was still too wedded to the principle of unanimity and the states were too unwilling to give up that power. That Hungary’s use of that power in this instance was so wrong-headed, for Russia rather than Ukraine was responsible for the non-functioning pipeline, adds urgency to the point that the E.U. should finally confront the question of whether to reform itself by expunging the confederation-fitting principle of unanimity.

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1. Maria Tadeo and Jorge Liboreiro, “Hungary Blocks €90 Billion Loan for Ukraine over Damaged Pipeline as Tensions Escalate,” Euronews.com, 20 February, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

The European Commission: An Aggregate of the States?

The European Union’s governmental institutions are not limited to the European Council and the Council of Ministers, both of which represent the state governments directly at the federal level. Nor, moreover, is the E.U. an aggregation of its states. In foreign affairs, for example, the E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, can speak and take decisions on the basis of consensus rather than the unanimous consent of state-level officials being required. Therefore, the Von der Leyen administration did not overreach in taking the “decision to send the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Suica, as an observer to the first former gathering of the United States President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace” on 19 February, 2026.[1] That Suica was merely an observer suggests that the objecting state officials were overreacting as well as misconstruing the E.U. as a confederation of sovereign states.

The Board of Peace originated at the very least in part to guide the real-estate redevelopment in Gaza. Accordingly, a spokesperson at the Commission explained the E.U.’s interest as follows: “Our participation is really to be seen in the context of our long-standing commitment to the implementation of the ceasefire in Gaza, as well as our commitment to take part in international efforts when it comes to the recovery and reconstruction of Gaza. We do believe that we need to be at the table, otherwise we will simply be a payer and not a player.”[2] E.U. was at the time “the biggest donor of humanitarian aid to the Palestinian people, with a total contribution of €1.65 billion to the territories” since Israel’s genocide began.[3] Also, as many as 14 of the E.U.’s 27 states sent their own representatives to the meeting. Therefore, objections by a handful of states to the E.U.’s observer can be relegated as overblown and unjustified, and likely fueled in actuality by ideological objections to the U.S. federal president. That most of the state representatives at the meeting were diplomats or civil servants whereas the E.U. observer was a “political representative” is a petty objection, and thus likely a political subterfuge overlaying anti-American or anti-Trump resentment or jealousy. That the same people who objected to the “political representative” would likely insist that the E.U. was not a political union also points to a hidden agenda.

Regarding the E.U.’s executive branch itself, the European Commission, a state official of France, Jean-Noel Barrot, erroneously claimed that the approval of the E.U.’s state governments was required for the Commission to speak out or act in foreign policy. Slovenia’s Tanja Fajon even insisted that unanimous approval was necessary.[4] Such a view essentially places the Commission as subordinate to the Council of Ministers and ignores any lawful influence that the European Parliament might have with the Commission. The stances of the two state officials treat the E.U. as if it were a confederation—a mere aggregation of fully-sovereign states—rather than a modern federation wherein governmental sovereignty is “dual” rather than unitary.

To be sure, the European Council and the Council of the E.U. play a role in the setting of the E.U.’s foreign policy, and in those councils the principle of unanimity applies, but those two councils are not the exclusive setters of such policy; any executive branch has some leeway, and sending an observer to a meeting is hardly a substantive foreign policy, especially given the E.U.’s direct involvement in Gaza. Sending an observer can hardly be interpreted as an overreach in need of a unanimous decision by the Council of Ministers.

That some state officials were so interested in subordinating the E.U.’s executive branch to the Councils, while leaving the European Parliament out completely as if E.U. citizens had not voted for distinctly federal lawmakers suggests that the state governments have too much power (given their sense of entitlement) at the federal level. Switching foreign policy to qualified-majority voting in the Councils would be more in line with the fact that the E.U.’s foreign minister can indeed speak and act on the basis of consensus and with a nod to the distinctive foreign interests of the European Union, which the Councils cannot protect because they represent the state governments, which have their own interests. In short, neither the Commission nor the E.U. itself is a mere aggregate of the policies and interests of the state governments. Retaining the principle of unanimity in the Councils invites that mistaken view and thus qualified-majority voting is more consistent with the E.U. overall. For neither the Commission nor the Parliament is subordinate to either or both of the Councils as if the E.U. were a confederation of sovereign states.

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1. Mared G. Jones, “France Says Commission Lacks ‘Mandate’ to Join Board of Peace Meeting as Brussels Remains Defiant,” Euronews.com, 19 February 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Is the E.U. in the U.S.'s Strategic Interest?

Is a more perfect Union in Europe in America’s national interest? On the American holiday in 2026 that principally honors George Washington, whose eight-year commitment as the military commander-in-chief to the cause of freedom for the 13 new sovereign republics that had been members of the British Empire (and would forge a comparable political Union[1]) was decisive, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited the E.U. state of Hungary to deliver “a message of support from the Trump administration to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán,” who was behind in the polls in his re-election campaign.[2] At their press conference, Orbán and Rubio “signed an agreement on energy cooperation and hailed what they described as a ‘golden age’ of bilateral relations.”[3] E.U. officials were nowhere in sight; it was as if Hungary were still a sovereign state rather than a semi-sovereign E.U. state. An implicit question untreated by the media in the E.U. or U.S. is whether bilateral relations between the U.S. and individual E.U. states, as if the E.U. were nonexistent, was still in the U.S. national interest, especially in the context of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

The full essay is at "Is the E.U. in the U.S.'s Strategic Interest?"

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1. Skip Worden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire: A Basis for Trans-Atlantic Comparisons (Seattle: Amazon Books, 2017).
2. Sandor Zsiros, “’We Want You to Continue’: Rubio Delivers Trump’s Campaign Message to Orbán in Budapest,” Euronews.com, 16 February, 2026.
3. Ibid.

Mutual Cooperation as Insufficient as E.U. Defense Policy

The words mutuality and cooperation have positive connotations politically, whereas divisive and exclusive do not. To be sure, mutual cooperation has the drawback of relegating competitiveness, which can foster greater efficiency and effectiveness. In the policy domain of defense, however, wherein nuclear weapons live, competition between weaponized polities can be dangerous and thus not worth any improvements from competing. The Cold War in the twentieth century attests to the superiority of mutuality and cooperation at the international theatre wherein polities act as sovereign militarized entities. Within a federal Union, however, relying on the mutual cooperation between states is, I contend, woefully deficient and inadequate. In fact, relying on states to assume the burden of defense can lead to the violent break up of a Union, as was dramatically demonstrated in what some Americans have called the War between the States (1861-1865), but is more accurately called the war between the U.S.A. and the C.S.A.(the Confederate States of America). Two political unions of very different balances of power between the respective federal and state levels of governance. It is precisely with this historical example in mind that the comments made by E.U. (Commission) President Von der Leyen at the Munich Security Conference in February, 2026 should be analyzed. Relying in going forward from that time on the E.U. states to build up their respective military forces, or militias in American-speak, under the assumption that those states would mutually cooperate military is a very risky strategy for the E.U. at a time in which its cousin across the Atlantic Ocean was pulling back from Europe in terms of military protection.

Von der Leyen’s notion that the E.U. could rely on its states in defense (as well as foreign policy) must contend with reservations previously made by Mark Rutte, NATO’s Secretary General, on Europe being able to defend itself without American cover at least in the medium term. Specifically, Rutte had opined just a month earlier, “if anyone thinks here, again, that the European Union, or Europe as a whole, can defend itself without the US, keep on dreaming. You can’t. We can’t. We need each other.”[1] Still the aggressor in Ukraine, Russia’s Putin was still a reality check on European “deams” of self-sufficiency in defense. Even so, Von der Leyen limited the E.U.’s enhanced defense-capabilities to reliance on its member-states. “I believe the time has come to bring Europe’s mutual defence clause to life,” she said. “Mutual defence is not optional . . . it is an obligation.”[2] She was referring to Article 42.7 of the E.U.’s basic law, which “states that ‘if an E.U. [state] is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other E.U. [states] have an obligation to aid and assist it by all means in their power.’”[3] This article is similar to Article 5 of the NATO international alliance. Besides ignoring the qualitatively and quantitively closer integration of states in a federal Union, copying the article of an international alliance leaves open the greater possibility—one that was foreseen by the American Founders on that Union being in part to prevent internecine wars between the states—that E.U. states could utilize their bolstered militaries to fight each other rather than just cooperate in a mutual action to push Russia out of Ukraine. In other words, Von der Leyen’s decision to rely on Article 42.7 rather than propose a federal army capable of united action beyond mutual cooperation (and to aid in the cooperation of the state militias) ignores the qualitative difference between a federal Union of states (i.e., European integration) and an international alliance. Besides the greater likely of conflicts between states in a Union, the E.U.’s foreign policy competency could lead to offensive rather than merely defensive united action, as for example could have been waged in Ukraine to push the Russian troops out in the first months of that invasion. In other words, the fact that governmental sovereignty in the E.U. is divided, albeit too unevenly, between the E.U. and the state governments means that relying on mutual cooperation between the states for military action is insufficient and even arguably contradictory. The latter treats the E.U. as it were like the U.S.’s Articles of Confederation, under which the 13 states were sovereign countries. Even without the dual-sovereignty that the E.U. federation enjoys, General Washington was (barely) able to hold together a continental army rather than rely on the mutual cooperation of the armies of the 13 American countries in that Union. How much more should the E.U. have a federal army, as per the dual-sovereignty-feature of its federal system! Lest it be countered that the E.U. states were still sovereign in 2026, the voting method of qualified-majority itself represents a transfer of sovereignty to the federal level, as a state could (and has) found itself on the losing side of those votes.

Finally, there is the danger in relying on the states to develop their own nuclear-weapons capability rather than assigning control of those weapons to the federal level institutions, including the European Council, which represents the state governments at the federal level directly. As Rutte said about European sufficiency in defense, “You’d have to build up your own nuclear capability” because “you would lose the ultimate guarantor of our freedom, which is the U.S. nuclear umbrella. So, hey, good luck!”[4] 

I would simply, add, good luck with Vickor Orbán of the E.U. state of Hungary having nuclear weapons as leverage against other states and even the ECJ and the Commission as they try to punish the Hungarian government for violating E.U. law. Moreover, good luck trying to minimize the chance that any E.U. state might use its strengthened military might to invade another state, with no federal army to push back the aggressor. Especially in the context of years of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Von der Leyen’s misjudgment in stopping at Article 42.7 is startling, especially as her speech came shortly after Mario Draghi’s speech urging more federal competencies in the E.U. to strengthen the federal system from being too dominated by its states at the expense of united action that goes beyond even mutual cooperation.

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1. Alice Tidey, “Von der Leyen Rebukes NATO Chief over ‘No Security Without US,’ Calls for European Mutual Defence,” Euronews.com, December 14, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

The ECJ Castigates the Commission for Paying Off Hungary

In an opinion submitted to the European Court of Justice, which tends to follow the legal opinions the 11 Advocates General, Tamara Capeta recommended in February, 2026 to the Court that it “should annul the European Commission’s 2023 decision to disburse €10.2 billion” to the E.U. state of Hungary.[1] Capeta found that the state government had not sufficiently addressed “concerns over systemic corruption and rule of law violations” to qualify for the payment.[2] That the Commission released the payment nonetheless points to corruption at the federal level—in its executive branch in particular—and this charge against the Von der Leyen administration renders the charge against the Hungarian government rather ironic. Rule of law should apply (and be respected!) at both the federal and state levels for the E.U. to continue to be viable. This applies especially to the Commission, as it is tasked with enforcing E.U. laws, directives, and regulations as well as treaty obligations that the EU, including its state governments, have to other countries, whether they are federal unions (e.g., the U.S.) or independent states.  

The Commission’s decision to reverse itself on the payment “came just days before a crucial December 2023 EU summit, where Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán threatened to veto a €50 billion aid package for Ukraine and block the start of EU accession with Kyiv.”[3] At the European Council’s meeting, “Orbán left the room for a coffee break, allowing the other 26 E.U. [states] to approve the accession talks.”[4] At “an extraordinary” Council session in February 2024, “Hungary lifted its veto on the €50 billion Ukraine support package.”[5] Some representatives in the E.U.’s parliament “suspected the E.U. [had] struck a deal with Hungary, trading unfrozen funds for Orbán’s withdrawal of his veto” even though the Commission “denied any such agreement was made.”[6] Given Orbán’s twice reversal after his state government had just received the suddenly unfrozen funds from the Commission, its denial strains credulity at best, and more realistically actually confirms the charge of sordid dealings in the Commission at the expense of E.U. law.

It is harmful enough to the federal union when a state government violates E.U. law, especially with impunity; for a federal-level governmental institution to shirk federal law says in effect that the E.U. does not respect its own law (so why then should state officials respect it?). Presumably either the Commission and/or one or more of the states could have made a deal with Orbán that did not involve violating E.U. rule-of-law.

Moreover, occasioning the unlawful deal is the staying power of the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of the EU. A minimum of nine states was at the time sufficient for the federal program of “enhanced cooperation” to be invoked, in which case blocs of states could move forward in being subject to a federal law or regulation even though one or more state would still be in opposition but not to be subject to the law. Of course, this program could not apply to votes on whether to annex another state to the Union, and to decisions on whether to spend E.U. funds on other countries, including Ukraine because on such matters, the E.U. itself must either act as one or not act. So a so-called “multiple-speed” E.U. is not a complete answer to the basic problem of applying the principle of unanimity to 27 (and potentially more!) states.

Rather than relying primarily on its state governments for defense and even foreign policy, the E.U. could look to the U.S., which has both a federal military and state armies (called militias). That the federal president can temporarily call upon such armies even if their respective state presidents refuse does not mean that those armies are federal. Such an arrangement, which the E.U. did not have at least as of 2026, is consistent with the underlying dual-sovereignty of both the federal and state governments (or, for the ideologically squeamish, governmental institutions). The augmented federal powers would need to be decided by qualified-majority voting in the Councils that represent the state governments at the federal level; otherwise, no such partial transfer of governmental sovereignty could take place. Being politically unwilling to “step up to the (baseball) plate and bat,” federal and state officials should not collude in deal-making in ways that violate federal laws, lest the Union itself head down a slope wherein federal law has no force. This is especially of value in a world in which military aggressors such as Russia and Israel were wantonly violating international law with impunity; E.U. and U.S. jurisprudence, which is not international, and the corresponding duties at both federal and state levels of government, is not as self-evidently strong as Europeans and Americans may have been assuming in as invasions and genocides elsewhere were going on with impunity internationally.

On a visit to Florida at the time, I was shocked at the extent of brazen refusals by police employees of at least two cities to enforce criminal law—some employees even denying the existence of whole statutes, and the subordinates’ respective managers refused to hold those employees accountable. I was so stunned by the sheer brazenness of the lies that I decided not to move to that U.S. state. The rule of law cannot be assumed as though it castigates sordid personal discretion automatically; rather, law depends on humans to enforce it with integrity. This is why the international “laws” that Putin and Netanyahu were able to violate with such violence for years may not even count as law, for the enforcement-mechanism was entirely lacking de jure et de facto. “Law” without this cannot be counted as law.

The obligation of government officials to recognize and enforce rather than deny the very existence statutory law should be a given. It follows that federal officials in the Commission should not have been permitted to ignore the relevant federal law when it became an obstacle to making political deals with Hungarian state officials. If getting those state officials on board with a political priority of the Commission was so important, then the Commission could alternatively have pressured the states to reduce or end outright the application of the principle of unanimity in the two federal councils that represent state officials directly at the federal level, at least with respect to foreign policy and defense and even on the matter of “enlargement” (i.e., annexing future states). If qualified-majority is too low, then perhaps 75% of the states could be used as a benchmark for such very important policy decisions. The QMV-unanimity distinction is a false dichotomy, given the daylight available between the two voting methods. If one state can hold an entire Union back, then something is wrong with that federal system, and violating federal law to get around that problem is at best a short-sighted, expedient solution. In other words, the E.U.’s federal system has been suffering, at least as of 2026, from a much more serious problem than (collusive) corruption in the Commission and the Hungarian government.

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1. Sandor Zsiros, “E.U. Court Challenges Controversial €10.2bn Payment to Hungary,” Euronews.com, February 12, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.