Chinese President Xi Exploits a Vulnerability of the E.U.

Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Europe in May, 2024 “amid concerns in Europe over Chinese support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and European markets being flooded with cheap Chinese electric vehicles.”[1] Although these matters were at the time properly matters for the E.U. rather than its states, Xi oriented his visit to the state level, and in particular to states including France and Hungary that had “special bilateral relationships” with China.[2] In other words, the Chinese leader sought to exploit the E.U.’s vulnerability wherein state governments have sufficient sovereignty to undermine the federal level. I contend that the state leaders should have refused to meet with Xi, redirecting him to meet with federal officials.

The full essay is at "China Exploits a Vulnerability of the E.U."

---

1. Yuchen Li and Wesley Rahn, “Did China’s Xi Jinping Expose Disunity in Europe?” Deutsch Welle (DW.de), May 10, 2024.
2. Ibid.

The Impact of Federalism on Corporate Power in American Legislatures: The Case of Health-Insurance Reform

Florida, like about a dozen other states, debated in 2009 a proposed amendment to its state constitution that would have blocked, at least symbolically, much of the federal health-care insurance overhaul on the grounds that it tramples individual liberty. Behind the amendments was an industry with a vested interest—an industry that made substantial campaign contributions to the supporters of the amendment. I contend that there is an ethical conflict of interest lurking here, even if it is constitutional (assuming that wealth constitutes free speech, which itself is a problematic assumption), but the main issue here is how the blockage of federal law applying in Florida (and other states) would have affected federalism. What would have been better for the American federal system: federal or state legislation, or perhaps a combination? 

It was not just ideology that united the proposal’s legislative backers in Florida. The amendment's 42 co-sponsors, all Republicans, were almost all recipients of out-sized campaign contributions from major health care interests, a total of about $765,000 in 2008 alone. Around the 2008 election, moreover, the groups that provided health care contributed about $102 million to state political campaigns across the U.S., surpassing the $89 million the same donors spent at the federal level. 

The conflict of interest for the 42 co-sponsors in the Florida legislature opened them and their health-insurance backers to attack by those who wanted the federal government to be involved in health-insurance. Indeed, those federalists argued that the magnitude of the health-care industry’s contributions demonstrated the dangers of leaving such a question up to individual states, where campaign finance and ethics rules varied at the time from strict to negligible. The industry had enormous power at the state level, those federalists contended, and very few states had state-level consumer groups that were able to lobby effectively against the industry-legislator nexus. 

On the other hand, federalizing health-insurance law contributed to the consolidation-tendency of the "extended republic" at the expense of its member republics, or states. Indeed, the matter of the U.S. Government’s enumerated (i.e. limited) powers was not lost on the state legislators of several states who  were opposed to a federal health-care law. “We are trying to prepare, and trying to send a message that there is no reason for those decisions to get made at the federal level,” said Representative Linda L. Upmeyer, a Republican who was leading efforts in Iowa's legislature to prevent the anticipated federalization by the federal president, Barak Obama.[1] Upmeyer and anti-federalists knew that without “opt-in” or “opt-out” provisions in the federal legislation, state constitutional amendments would be preempted even should Congress refuse to reform health insurance. 

To be sure, states opting out of the eventual Affordable Care Act could have compromised the economies of scale assumed by the federal cost-saving measures. However, not even the cost-efficiency of proposed federal legislation should always overrule the contribution of the bill on the system of federalism. This focus had been a factor in the trend since the 1860's toward the consolidation of power at the federal level at the expense of the diversity-expressive power of the states. Too much "one size fits all" with not enough taking into account the differences between the member-states in an empire-level political union leads to an unbalanced system of federalism and thus eventual demise of the union itself. This point is lost when the focus is on particular pieces of legislation, and more specifically on their respective redeeming cost-efficiencies. 

What if industry power over legislation is strongest at the state level? Would not another incremental movement towards political consolidation at the expense of federalism have the virtue of protecting democracy from the encroachment of plutocracy, the rule by wealth? Yet leading up to Obama's Affordable Care Act of 2010, the president dropped his public-option for health insurance when the lobbyist for the private health-insurance industry threatened to withdraw its support. Obama's political calculus was doubtless that the vote would be so close that he would need the industry's support--hence, as often is the case in American legislation--incrementalism is the rule and large packages like FDR's New Deal are the exception. 

Therefore, even though the member-state legislatures are perhaps more easily dominated by big business, the federal head is also capable of being controlled or steered. Perhaps part of the solution to the problem of industry dominance over government lies in enabling the state governments to be able to check the federal government, and vice versa. In other words, the worst enemy of corporate corruption of public officials at either government may be balanced federalism.

1.  David D. Kirkpatrick, “Health Lobby Takes Fight to the States,” The New York Times, December 28, 2009. 

On the Economic Justification of American Society and Federalism: The Oxymoron of Congress Mapping the Human Brain

In his 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama cited brain research as an example of how the government could and in fact should literally “invest in the best ideas.”[1] He cited the $140 return to the economy from every dollar that had been invested to map the human genome, and added that funding the Brain Activity Map would be a job-creating investment in science and innovation. In terms of comparative economic advantage, he said, enlarging the “knowledge economy” would be a good strategy for maintaining a formidable standard of living. As laudatory as more knowledge of the human brain is, Obama's perspective suffers from economic reductionism and a lack of political basis.
Economic reductionism means that everything reduces finally to its economic impact. Mapping the genome may have good economic returns, but the impact in terms of human fulfillment is arguably much more beneficial and thus important. Finding the gene that causes baldness, for instance, would surely have an economic benefit for some, but the non-economic benefits to bald men would be much more important. More importantly, to the extent that mapping the genome has led to new treatments for illness, especially those that are fatal, the primary benefits have surely not been economic in nature. An old person who can live ten more years rather than one does not leap for joy because of the the additional retirement income. Because this is obvious, Obama's economic basis can now be seen as artificial or skewed at best even it it was politically and economically prudent for him to point to economic returns as they would have been particularly of interest to the companies that made campaign and other, less direct, economic contributions to the Wall Street president. Unfortunately, people reading or hearing his speech could have gotten the idea that the reduction to the economic effect is fitting rather than distorting. A government, after all, should look after the public good, which is not only economic. Of course, it has been by lip service to the general welfare that U.S. presidents have tried to justify federal spending in virtually any area, hence robbing the state governments of more and more sovereignty. 
That the federal government had any constitutional basis to be funding a map of the brain's activity is a question the federal president seems not to have considered. To be sure, balancing spending for the general welfare with the enumerated (i.e., limited) powers of the federal government is a difficult task unless the general-welfare spending is assumed to pertain only to the enumerated (i.e., listed) powers of that government. It makes no sense to say that government's powers are limited and yet spending can pertain to any domain, even preempting state spending. So by logic alone, it stands to reason that the spending clause must have been intended to furnish Congress with the authority to fund its enumerated powers.
Put another way for the faint of heart, if a positive economic return to the economy is the litmus test, then the federal government could intercede in so many areas that the state governments could eventually become little more than local governments. The crucial political benefit of federalism, wherein the state governments have the power to act as a check against encroaching or tyrannical federal power so the only check is not on the state governments by the federal government, is lost if federal lawmakers and the executive can amass virtually unlimited power for the U.S. Government (and themselves in the process!) especially if done at the expense of the states. 

A Congressional rendering of how the human brain might be mapped.      Source; nytimes.

Admittedly, a person could look at the U.S. Constitution and point out the spending clause, whereby the Congress has the authority to spend funds “for the general welfare.” in itself, the clause contains no limitation, and the general welfare is indeed wide in scope. Scientific advancement, it could be argued, is surely in line with advancing the general welfare of the people. Virtually any purpose, even those purposes in which the effect on the general welfare is merely a byproduct, could fit within the clause. To restrict the clause could foreseeably hold back the general welfare from what it would otherwise be. 
Turning to the enumerated powers of Congress, the commercial implications from mapping the brain's activity might seem to fit within the interstate commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. After all, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled in Wickard v. Filmore (1942) that even a farmer in Iowa who grows wheat for his family's own consumption can be subject to regulation. Even if his activity "be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect."[2] The majority opinion reasons that the harvests of wheat for private consumption, if aggregated, would have a significant effect on the interstate wheat commerce. Even an indirect effect on the interstate wheat market can justify even the growing of wheat for private consumption being subject to the interstate commerce clause, and thus federal power. So it is no accident that the federal executive publicly justified the federal funding to map the brain's activity by characterizing such a map as "a job-creating investment in science and innovation." Obama may have engaged in warped economic reductionism in order to gain more power for his government. He and the federal court before him both distorted logic for the sake of additional power going to the federal government.
The institutional and personal conflicts of interest should be obvious. Since that ruling, the reach of the commerce clause has expanded. Even something that is not itself commerce can be federally regulated as commerce. This flawed logic should be enough of a red-flag to tell us that something went deeply wrong in the federal court's reasoning where federal power was at stake or could be expanded. 
In regard to funding the mapping of the brain's activity, commerce of the completed map could indeed extend beyond state lines (i.e., be interstate commerce), but to argue that the regulating of interstate commerce extends to investing in manufacturing of the product itself conflates spending with regulating, which is to set rules. 
President Obama could be challenged for his presumption that the federal government is the definitive level of government for virtually any matter of public policy to be enacted into law. He could have quoted from Alexander Hamilton, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention and the first U.S. Treasury Secretary,  who had wanted the states to be mere districts implementing federal policy. Of course, he also wanted the U.S. president to be in office for life.
Before Obama was the federal executive, I asked Sandra Day O’Conner, a former justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, why the Court had allowed the Congress to encroach so onto state matters. "It takes a majority," she said (meaning of justices). Then she observed that Congress was “acting like a state legislature.” This remarkable insight would prompt me years later to wonder whether Obama himself was conflating the federal and state levels. He may not have fully realized the distinctiveness of federal government on the empire scale from governance on the state, or kingdom, level. Whereas an empire-scale government of a federation must take into account differences in culture, political and moral ideology, economy, and even religion that exist from state to state, a state government need not as a state can be homogeneous rather than diverse within. The British, who had once had an empire to manage, suppose their state in the E.U. is diverse. I submit that the E.U. itself is much more diverse from state to state, and so taking into account such differences is an appreciable aspect of E.U. governance but not of that of a state, even the United Kingdom (or California in the U.S.). Yes, Virginia, such a comparison is valid.
I submit that President Obama did not sufficiently heed the vital differences between the federal and the state governments. Nor have majorities of justices sitting on the U.S. Supreme Court. Viewing things from the perspective of the federal government, and even having its interests at heart, it is possible to interpret general welfare and the commerce clause so broadly as to warp logic and yet not even notice this or the eventual cost (to use an economic term!) to the Union itself (i.e., impairing its federal system). Economic reductionism can be placed in service, resulting in bloated federal power and a warping of priorities (i.e., financial as the definitive litmus test for everything, including the public good). Of course, big business feels right at home in such a society--societal norms and values reflective of those of business. Meanwhile, the warped system feeds on itself, without being noticed and becoming even more warped in the process. For all of the reliance on the general welfare, who exactly is looking out for it as regards the impact on it from the federal system of government and the economic reductionism? 

See related: Institutional Conflicts of Interest, Essays on Two Federal Empires, and British Colonies Forge an American Empire, available at Amazon.

1. John Markoff, “Obama Seeking to Boost Study of Human Brain,” The New York Times, February 17, 2013.
2. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.

Federalism 101: Does Power Naturally Consolidate?

Consolidated power seems, at least in theory, to be contrary to American political culture.   The financial consolidation even after the financial bailouts of 2008, can be deemed dangerous economically and even politically, given the unlimited campaign contributions made possible by the Citizens United case in 2010. Such consolidation complements the political consolidation at the federal level in the U.S.  Is the consolidation, which has occurred since 1865, and especially from FDR's New Deal onward, natural or contrived? That is to say, will the E.U., when it is over 200 years old, suffer the same plight? If so, federalism itself, which I submit must include a balance of power, given the checks and balances feature, between the federal level and that of the states, may be a temporary system inherently. 

For Europeans to reflect on these questions, it is first necessary to avoid the typical category mistake, which compares a state in the E.U. with the entire U.S., obviating the rather obvious point that states should be compared with states, and empire-level unions with other such unions. 

Will the E.U. consolidate political power as has occurred in the U.S.? Lest it be assumed that the popularity of state-identification issuing out in "states' rights" checks on federal power will suffice as an enduring fortress, the same identifications were common in the early U.S. So the question is whether the consolidation of power can be expected (i.e., whether it is natural), and, if so, whether safeguards in the E.U.'s basic, or constitutional, law are sufficient. Unfortunately, parchment tends to pale against pressing political pressures of the day. 

Not even democracy can be relied on, for majoritarian preferences may be for more federal-level power without any thought of the implications for the federal system. Even a constitutional court, such as the European Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court, cannot be relied on, for turning back an onslaught of power that has already been transferred to the federal level can be deemed impractical. Imagine, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 2018 that Social Security, which was enacted in the 1930s, must be turned over to the state governments without any federal-level funding or legislation. That court had not even ruled that the federal requirement to have health insurance was should be a matter for the states.

One problem of consolidating power for federalism is that the states cannot serve as a check on tyranny (or over-reaches) at the federal level if that level holds much more power. Another problem is that federal legislation in an empire-scale union tends to follow a "one size fits all" approach that ignores the ways the states differ. A healthy federal system allows for both overarching legislation for the good of the whole union and legislation that takes into account the distinctiveness of each state. 

The lack of balance in the American federal system begs the question of whether governmental power naturally consolidates over time. I suspect it does, for historical examples of decentralized power enduring as such are sparse. The question is then whether the Europeans can create countervailing safeguards without counting on "nationalistic" sentiment of the day. 

For more on this topic, see: Two Federal Empires and American and European Federalism

Federalizing the Criminal Code: Racial Opportunity Costs

On December 13, 2011, a bipartisan group of legal experts told a panel of lawmakers in the U.S. House of Representatives that the federal criminal code had grown so large that U.S. citizens could not possibly keep up with it. “We ought to get rid of the old myth that you’re presumed to know the law,” Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.) said. About 4,500 criminal statutes exist, according to Ed Meese, a former U.S. Attorney General under President Reagan. “This is in addition to over 300,000 other regulations that don’t appear in the federal code but nevertheless carry essentially criminal penalties including prison,” he said. “So the vast array of traps for the unwary that lurks out there in federal criminal law is more extensive than most people realize.” The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts figures some 80,000 defendants are sentenced in federal court each year.
Back in the 1990s, Sandra Day O’Connor, then a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, said at a small gathering, “Congress is acting like a state legislature.” She went on to point to all the crimes being federalized. I asked her why the Rehnquist Court had not applied the brakes to this breach of federalism. “Because it takes five,” she replied. In other words, not even the Rehnquist conservative majority, which had been responsible for the Morrison and Lopez rulings, was sufficient to arrest the ongoing political consolidation via the federalizing of criminal law.
In late 2011, Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, chairman of the U.S. House Judiciary Committee’s panel on crime, introduced a bill that would reduce the federal criminal code by a third and define the level of criminal intent that is necessary to break the law. Laying aside the matter of Congress over-criminalizing society at the expense of liberty, and the related matter of the “micro-managing” mentality that is implied in a ceaseless desire to “mold” or control others by threatening penalties, federalism itself ought to be brought to bear on Sensenbrenner’s proposal.
Specifically, in addition to reducing the quantity of federal criminal statutes and regulations to that which the citizenry can reasonably be expected to digest, each statute and regulation should be either retained or thrown out on the basis of whether it falls within one of the enumerated powers of Congress. By “falls within,” I do not mean indirectly or by extension, as in the specious argument that an Iowa farmer’s home-grown wheat used solely by the farmer (and his family) is subject to the reach of the interstate commerce clause because if enough farmers grew wheat for their own consumption, the price of wheat transported between states would be impacted. The term expressly need not be used in the U.S. Constitution for it to be understood that the enumerated powers do not distend through sheer reasoning to preempt those powers reserved to the American republics or their residual powers. Wheat that never leaves Iowa cannot, by definition, be considered to be part of interstate commerce. I suspect that the same logic is being broken in Congressional efforts to federalize criminal law.
The U.S. Constitution clearly states that the police power resides with the states. Considering the abuses associated by state officials in implementing (or abusing) that power (e.g., California police pepper-spraying students to manipulate them off the sidewalk on a public university campus), the U.S. Government could shift from undercutting federalism by “federalizing” criminal law outside the enumerated powers to strengthening federalism by acting on a check against abusive state officials. In other words, federal criminal law could be primarily directed to the states (i.e., their officers), and to citizens secondarily and only within the powers enumerated for Congress. This approach is consistent with the confederal element that is retained in the broader notion of modern federalism (e.g., as applied in the U.S. and E.U.), while acknowledging that the general government also reaches to the citizenry directly (“direct effect”).
One example of the federal government attempting to check a systematic abuse of power by police in a state’s county is the three-year investigation by the civil rights division of the U.S. Department of Justice of the Maricopa County sheriff’s office in Arizona. The ensuing report found “a pervasive culture of discriminatory bias against Latinos” reaching Sheriff Joe Arpaio himself. Deputies are said to “target Latino drivers on the roadways and detain innocent Latinos in the community in their searches for illegal immigrants,” according to the New York Times. Such practices, according to the report, are in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures. The report adds that Latinos have been systematically mistreated in the county jail. Besides the report, a separate federal grand jury investigation was underway as well, focusing on accusations of abuse of power by the sheriff department’s public corruption squad.
For its part, the Justice Department was urging the sheriff to cooperate with the federal government in turning his department around, or risk a lawsuit and the loss of millions of dollars in federal money. Even so, Arpaio “brushed off the criticism in a news conference as politically motivated,” according to the New York Times. He was particularly upset that the homeland security secretary, Janet Napolitano, a former Arizona governor, had announced that the federal government would no longer allow the sheriff’s deputies to check the immigration status of inmates in their custody. In reaction, the sheriff remarked, “This is a sad day for America as a whole.”
Besides the inherent impoussance of the Justice Department’s plan “to do cultural change” in a sheriff department that is headed by intransigence, the sheer time during which the alleged abuses had been allowed to continue (e.g., the report taking three years) bespeaks a woefully inadequate priority in the federal government to act as a real check on the states. To be sure, Arizona is a sovereign state with regard to its police power, and the federal government is obliged to respect that sovereignty. However, neither a government of a state nor of the union is free to violate the U.S. Constitution, which is the source of all of the governmental sovereignty that is in the federal system (characterized by dual sovereignty—split between two systems of government, that of the states and that of the union). So Arisona is not free to violate the Fourth Amendment, and the general government can legitimately provide a check, as judged by the judiciary. Therefore, rather than usurping state criminal law by federalizing criminal statues, Congress should go to work to give the federal government better tools with which to act as a check on sheriffs such as Arpaio. Generally speaking, there is more than enough for the Congress to do within its federal role without encroaching on federalism itself paradoxically by “federalizing” powers assigned to the several states. The latter activity involves an opportunity cost that I dare say the Latinos in Maricopa County doubtless do not appreciate.

Sources:

Gary Fields and John Emshwiller, “Criminal Code Is Overgrown, Legal Experts Tell Panel, Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2011. 

Marc Lacey, “U.S. Says Arizona Sheriff Shows Pervasive Bias Against Latinos,” The New York Times, December 16, 2011. 

The E.U.’s Border-Control and Coast Guard: Held Hostage by Confederalism

In policing its borders as late as 2016, the E.U. suffered the same plight as the U.S. did under its Articles of Confederation—only whereas in the case of the U.S. the States retained all of their governmental sovereignty under the Articles, some governmental sovereignty in the E.U. was already lodged at the federal level. I contend that this perplexing disjunction between extant federal competencies and state rights in the E.U. is not sustainable.

On October 6, 2016 when the E.U. opened its Boarder and Coast Guard Agency to police the E.U.’s borders given the refugee crisis stemming from Syria’s civil war, the state governments were not required to provide guards and equipment. Those governments had “proved slow in delivering on their pledges to the agency’s predecessor, Frontex.”[1] Accordingly, E.U. Migration Commissioner, Dimitris Avramopoulos, warned, “Everyone must join in and implement it as soon as possible. We have no time to lose.”[2] He was not the first federal official to face such a frustration. Similarly, Alexander Hamilton had had so much difficulty getting the U.S. States to send their quotas of men and equipment to General Washington’s Continental Army that he would later push for a large transfer of governmental sovereignty to the federal level of the U.S. Fortunately, that level had few enumerated powers under the Articles of Confederation, whereas the E.U. Commission has a substantial number of competencies in 2016.

Therefore, having to rely on voluntary contributions from the state governments really does not fit in the case of the E.U.’s border-control and coast guard agency. Even just getting to the goal of 1,500 border-guard officers could be difficult if state officials decide to hold their government’s quota hostage for some other political purpose, for example. Moreover, that a state could fall short and yet get the benefit of border-control agents sent from other states gives such a state an incentive to fall short. Exactly the opposite should be the incentive.

The underlying problem is structural in nature: the federal level of the E.U. had at the time sufficient competencies (i.e., enumerated powers) that the extent of remaining state sovereignty was too much for the federal system itself to function viably. Put another way, state and federal officials, and the European electorate, had stood by in desiring both more federal competencies and substantial state sovereignty—proverbially wanting their cake and eating it too.

---

[1] Valentina Pop, “EU Launches Effort to Police Its Borders,” The Wall Street Journal, October 7, 2016.

[2] Ibid.

Dish Network and the U.S. Government Dominating Colorado: A Court Ruling on Marijuana

The Colorado Supreme Court ruled on June 15, 2015 that Brandon Coats, a quadriplegic medical marijuana patient from Colorado who had been fired by Dish Network in 2010 for using the drug while at home and off-duty, was not protected under the state's "lawful activities statute." According to the Court, “Colorado’s ‘lawful activities statute,’ the term ‘lawful’ refers only to 14 those activities that are lawful under both state and federal law. Therefore, employees 15 who engage in an activity such as medical marijuana use that is permitted by state law 16 but unlawful under federal law are not protected by the statute.”[1] This reasoning seems pretty solid, though if we unpack use and consult with the company’s own rationale, the case is considerably messier. In fact, the problem may reside with the American federal system itself, in which case an erroneous judicial decision could be expected.

According to the Huffington Post, “(t)he arguments from both Dish's and Coats' attorneys centered on the question of what exactly constitutes "lawful" use of medical marijuana outside of the workplace -- and how such use can be considered lawful when federal law still classifies marijuana as an illegal substance, even though the state of Colorado has legalized its use both medically and recreationally.”[2]

Meghan Martinez, the attorney for Dish Network, had argued before the Supreme Court that whether or not Coats was ever impaired at the workplace was not the issue. Instead, the point was the "use" itself, which she defined as having THC in a person’s system. "He tested positive, had THC in his system," Martinez said. "We are alleging that he was using THC at the workplace. The definition of use is in the medical marijuana act [Colorado's Amendment 20]. It's the employment of something, the longstanding possession of something. He smoked marijuana while at home, but he crossed the threshold [to his office] with THC in his system. The use is the effects, it's the THC, it's the whole point of marijuana. So when he came to work, he was using."[3] Using in this sense is distinct from impairing.

Because inactive THC can remain in a person’s system for up to 90 days, the definition of “use” in Colorado’s Amendment 20 is problematic if impairment is assumed to apply. According to Martinez, the issue was never about whether the THC was impairing Coat’s work. Instead, he was violating federal law even while he was at work. Therefore, the issue is not that of how far managers can go into their employee’s life outside of work.

However, the company’s own stated rationale for the drug tests implies impairment. “To ensure a safe and productive work environment, Dish Network reserves the right to administer nondiscriminatory, unannounced random drug testing," the company drug policy reads. "No employee shall report to work or be at work with alcohol or with any detectable amount of prohibited drugs in the employee’s system. Any violation of this statement of policy will result in disciplinary action up to and including termination.”[4] Specifically, impairment is implied in such use as would get in the way of “a safe and productive work environment.” Nothing is said about ensuring a workplace environment in which people are not breaking a federal law. In other words, the company’s position is internally contradictory as to which sense of use is relevant.

From Coats’ perspective, impairment would be the only basis on which the managers could justifiably terminate his employment based on the drug-test. “The mere presence of THC is not proof of impairment,” his attorney Michael Evans said in his arguments to the Court.[5] In fact, Coats, who worked at the company as a telephone operator, was a good employee. “I think he was late twice, but that was the extent of any discipline,” Evans told reporters in 2014.[6] Not only had Coats not detracted from a productive work environment; it sounds like he advanced it. “Put that in your pipe and smoke it!,” he could have told the manager firing him.

As for the matter of illegal use, the contradictory Colorado and U.S. laws on medical marijuana were itself the problem. In upholding the trial court’s decision in favor of Dish Network, the appellate judge had ruled that federal law trumps state law on marijuana.[7] Were preemption applicable on any federal law, then the very notion of enumerated powers would be moot. In other words, the judge’s statement ignores the point that federal powers are not unlimited, but, rather, are limited, as enumerated, whereas those of the states are residual.[8]

In regard to medical and even recreational marijuana-use in Colorado, the antipodal U.S. law could arguably be said to apply to the drug in interstate commerce and in going to and from the U.S., rather than within Colorado.

For example, while I was driving eastward across Nebraska after marijuana had been legalized in Colorado, a Nebraska trooper pulled me over because I had not used my turn-signal to shift lanes on the interstate highway. After strangely asking me about my writings, as if they would play any role in my having failed to use my turn-signal after passing a car, the policeman looked me straight in the eyes and asked,

“Are you trafficking marijuana or guns?”

I was stunned at the young man’s assumption of equivalence. I would be very concerned if someone were trafficking guns, but actually indifferent were someone transporting pot. The last thing I wanted to do was to give a Nebraska cop a lesson on category mistakes—his mentality was so very strange, or distorted, in my reckoning. So I offered to have him look in the car, which he did before sheepishly telling me I could go. Cultural differences between the states do indeed exist!

That a Nebraska policeman would enforce a federal law on an interstate highway makes perfect sense, even were the matter at hand legal under Nebraska law. Similarly, the lawful use of marijuana within Colorado does not extend to taking the drug into another state, or abroad for that matter. 

When the federal authority is tied back to its enumerated powers, moreover, the fact that the federal and state laws on marijuana conflict is no longer a problem; rather, both can co-exist within the larger federal system. Indeed, one of the virtues of federalism is its feature of accommodating cultural differences that cannot but exist between country-size states in an empire-scale union. If federal preemption is applicable to any extant federal law, then the accommodating feature is eclipsed by the desire for “one size fits all.”

Adopting a still wider scope, I detect overreaching both by the company and the federal government in that case. The latter’s marked tendency during the twentieth century to take more and more authority at the expense of the state governments is of the same urge, I submit, that prompts managements to encroach on their employees’ lives away from work even on matters that do not impact their work. Such overreaching can become a way of doing business and governing, such that a presumption attaches to it. That is to say, even a slight pulling back on the reins can trigger furious rage, as in how dare you!, even though the expression would be more accurately directed to the people who are encroaching as if doing so were their right. The real loser in the case in Colorado may be balance itself.

---

1.  No. 13SC394, Coats v. Dish Network, June 15, 2015.

2.  Matt Ferner, “Employers Can Fire Medical Marijuana Patients For Private, Off-Duty Use, Colo. Supreme Court Rules,” The Huffington Post, June 15, 2015.

3.  Ibid.

4.  Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6.  Matt Ferner, “Employers Can Fire You For Using Marijuana, But Brandon Coats’ Case Could Change Everything,” The Huffington Post, March 24, 2014.

7.  Ferner, “Employer Can Fire Medical Marijuana Patients.”  See also the appellate decision.

8.  The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

On a Central Federal Policy in Education in the U.S.: Implications for American Federalism

In a speech in January 2015, U.S. Education Secretary Arne Duncan urged a continued central role for the federal government in education policy. He said the president was proposing to increase federal spending on elementary and secondary schools by $2.7 billion; Congress had appropriated $67 billion to the U.S. Department of Education—with $23.3 billion for the Elementary and Secondary Education Act—in the 2015 budget.[1]  Typically, debate on the federal government’s role had focused on the use of standardized tests in holding schools accountable. I submit that a self-governing people has a duty to consider the wider implications, such as the impact of a greater role on the federal system. Otherwise, unintended consequences may show up after it is too late to do anything about them.

Federalism is rarely on the media’s radar screen in the U.S., yet this dimension can be detected in statements made by public officials. For example, in his speech, Duncan said, “If we walk away from responsibility as a country—if we make our national education responsibilities somehow optional—we would turn back the clock on educational progress, 15 years or more.”[2] In positing a responsibility as a country to education, he is claiming that national education responsibilities exist. This implies that the U.S. Government has a legitimate role. This is a contestable claim.

Under the U.S. Constitution, the powers of the federal government are limited, or enumerated, whereas those of the states are both enumerated and residual. Education is not explicitly listed among the federal government’s enumerated powers, but that government can spend money for the general welfare. Education certainly contributes to that. In fact, so many things do that reading “the spending clause” so broadly eviscerates (i.e., wipes out) the enumerating itself because the federal government could get around the list simply by spending money on an additional policy domain. Put logically, a broad reading of the spending clause contradicts the very notion of enumerating powers, so both in original intent and practically, the spending clause must surely apply to the general welfare via any of the enumerated powers. Spending on education is the task of the several states.

Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-TN), chairman of the Education Committee, brought federalism to the surface in his remarks at the time, but without presenting a coherent alternative. Referring to the “No Child Left Behind” law passed while George W. Bush was president, Alexander said, “My goal is to keep the best portions of the original law and restore to states and communities the responsibility for deciding whether teachers and schools are succeeding or failing.”[3] In other words, he wanted to retain the federal government’s role—making it better—even as he wanted to restore to the states and localities their responsibilities. Such cooperative or shared-competency federalism, while common in the E.U., runs up against the enumerated feature of federal power in the American system. Put logically, returning to the states their respective responsibilities would mean taking the federal government out of the education business. Practically speaking, retaining a role for the federal government risks further encroachment on the states.

Generally speaking, the more the enumerated feature of the U.S. Constitution is blurred or distended, the less the states will be able to act as a check against federal encroachment. The check feature of federalism can protect not only the states as viable republics in their own right, but also citizens from abuses of power on the federal level. Likewise, keeping the states from encroaching on the federal enumerated powers can enable the U.S. Government (e.g., the Department of Justice) to protect citizens from abuses of power from state officials. Civil rights during the 1960s is a case in point.

Therefore, the implications of education policy may be more important than the educational issues that pertain more directly to education. Keeping the implications on the system of public governance on the public’s radar screen is thus part of the responsibility of a self-governing people and its elected representatives.

---

[1] Caroline Porter and Siobhan Hughes, “Education Secretary Presses Central Federal Policy Role,” The Wall Street Journal, January 13, 2015.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

Federalism and the Democratic Deficit: The E.U. as Suboptimal?

One major criticism of the E.U. has concerned its “democratic deficit.” The European Commission, the E.U.’s executive branch, has taken most of the criticism because the bureaucrats are not elected. Even though the European Council consists of elected state executives, the state legislatures are viewed as “closer to the people” and therefore more democratic. At the E.U. level, the European Parliament is the most directly democratic, as the EP’s representatives are directly elected by E.U. citizens. Therefore, one means of reducing the “democratic deficit” has been to increase the Parliament’s authority relative to those of the Commission and the Council. Lest it be thought that this solution has no drawbacks, the case of whether E.U. ships should be permitted to be beached for recycling in South Asia illustrates a problem.

Beaching old ships for recycling in South Asia is cheaper but can result in leaks of toxic chemicals. Image Source: Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Facing pressure from South Asian governments, the E.U. state leaders on the European Council opposed a ban on beaching over the objections of environmental groups. Facing a different political dynamic, the European Parliament favored the ban. After weeks of negotiations, the parliament and council agreed to a compromise. Beaching a ship would be allowed as long as “fixed structures” are involved. As this wording is notoriously open to interpretation, clarity was sacrificed for the sake of a compromise.[1]

Interpretation may not even be necessary, as the E.U. has no language in the compromise to prevent ships from changing their flags, Patrizia Heidegger of the NGO Shipbreaking Platform observed. “So the stronger language won’t mean much,” she added.[2] The compromise looks a bit like Swiss cheese. Lest this flaw be attributed solely to politics, that the Council had to negotiate with the Parliament on the matter means that the solution to the “democratic deficit” is at least partly to blame. That is to say, public policy can suffer from efforts to reduce the deficit.

Of course, that the E.U. consists both of states and citizens means that the Council and Parliament both have vital roles in the E.U.’s government aside from the issue of democracy in a federal system. So public policy being diluted in the negotiation process is also a necessary part of having a federal union of states with direct effect. Even if no “democratic deficit” existed, in other words, the involvement of both the Council and the Parliament, and thus the negotiation, would be on firm ground. Even so, this “cost” of having a federal union can be minimized by the principle of subsidiarity, wherein legislation is to be accomplished at the lowest governmental level possible. In the case of the U.S., the problem of “lowest common denominator” federal legislation can in principle be mitigated by the fact that Congress’s powers are enumerated, and thus limited, with the residual sovereignty residing with the state governments. The problem is thus when too much legislation occurs at the federal level, whether in the E.U. or U.S.

---

1. Costas Paris, “EU Won’t Ban Ship Recycling on Asian Beaches,” The Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2013.

2. Ibid.

No State Left Behind: American Education Eclipsing Federalism

Facing a federal requirement that every student be proficient in math and English by 2014, the member-states in the U.S. rushed to apply for waivers in 2011 and 2012. In 2010, 38 percent of the schools had failed to meet their goals for annual progress toward the 2014 goal. The U.S. Secretary of Education thought that figure could soar to 80 percent. When a school fails to meet such goals, the No Child Left Behind law requires “a series of interventions by the district and the state that can culminate in a state takeover. With so many schools failing, “that threatened to create an impossible burden on states and districts,” according to Chester Finn, director of an institute that studies education.[1] The waivers did not come without strings, however. The Obama administration pushed the governments to measure teacher performance, and put increased emphasis on low-performing groups as well as on the lowest-performing schools.

While the waivers can easily be seen as an effort to put the Obama administration’s own priorities on legislation from a prior administration, the Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, claimed that his aim was to get out of a bad law that could overwhelm states that don’t measure up. “Our goal with this waiver process, frankly, has always been to get out of the way of states and districts,” he said.[2] If this were so, however, he would not insist on negotiating for better terms in granting the waivers. Beyond this extent of intervention, that of the No Child Left Behind law requiring “interventions by the district and the state” with failing schools interlards the U.S. Government in a domain that is constitutionally reserved to the states. Absent the enumerated (i.e., listed) powers of the federal government, the fifty republics are sovereign states. While the Congress can spend in the general welfare of the political and monetary union, strings beyond the general purpose trigger a breach of the constitutional design, which should give the republics enough power to act as a check on the other system of government—that of the union itself. That is, specifying down to district intervention meddles inordinately in a state’s system of government to implement federal law.

In terms of education, the role of the U.S. Government should be oriented to regulating the interstate aspects, such as making sure that students are not deprived of equal protection (e.g., not discriminated against) and that out-of-state students are not gauged at the university level. Any spending should come attached to a general purpose (which I believe must be within an enumerated power, especially if there are any strings attached), rather than with requirements for implementation (or penalty). Should a republic not spend the money in line with the purpose (especially if that purpose lies within one of the sovereign domains of the member states), the federal government could sue to get the money back. If this seems to restrict Congressional power unduly, it may be that the federal power had gone so far beyond what is consistent with a federal system that what seems drastic is merely what is necessary to get back in line with it. In terms of failing schools, the underlying problem may be that Americans (i.e., including parents of school children) do not value self-discipline (i.e., at the expense of instant gratification) or education itself enough. Imposing federal requirements and penalties are doomed to fail against such societal disvalues. In other words, we are trashing federalism for nothing.

1. Richard Perez-Pena, “Waivers for 8 More States from ‘No Child Left Behind,” The New York Times, May 30, 2012.

2. Ibid.

Wickard vs. Filburn: Federalism vs. Congress

If you are wondering how the Congress got away with taking over so much from the state legislatures, you need look no further than Wickard v. Filburn, on which the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously decided that the interstate commerce clause can reach all the way to penalize a farmer for growing his own wheat.

Filburn and his wheat.  (Mary Lou Spurgeon  NYT)

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

The General Welfare Clause: Is the Power of Congress Constitutionally Unlimited?

Art. 1, Sec. 8. of the US Constitution: Congress “shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” Does this clause mean that the US Government can legislate in any way that benefits the Union? According to Thomas Woods, the general welfare clause “was a restriction on the power of the federal government: it had to exercise the powers delegated to it with an eye to the welfare of the country as a whole, not to the particular advantage of one state or section.” That is to say, the Congress could provide for the general welfare of the United States only within its delimited powers listed in the US Constitution.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

On the Health-Insurance Mandate: Nullification or Judicial Review?

A Republican U.S. President pushes hard for the U.S. Government to play a more active role in K-12 education under the rubric of “No Child Left Behind.” A Democratic U.S. President pushes hard for the U.S. Government to require residents to purchase health-insurance. Some of the same Republicans who cry foul on the insurance mandate insist that “marriage” be federalized through an amendment to the U.S. Constitution. From whichever vantage-point one cares to assume, political consolidation at the expense of federalism seems to be the name of the game in American politics.

Proponents of the health-insurance mandate have argued that Congress acted within its authority under the U.S. constitution’s commerce clause. However, Ken Cuccinelli, the attorney general of Virginia, argued the U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled that the clause allows Congress to require citizens to purchase a good or service in commerce. Cuccinelli’s complaint suggested that the Virginia law that outlaws the federal government from forcing state residents to purchase health insurance trumps the federal law because it is a matter assigned to the states under the Constitution’s 10th Amendment rather than enumerated to the purview of the U.S. Government. In other words, the supremacy clause pertains only to powers delegated to the U.S. Government. That government is not supreme where the states are sovereign. The latter is substantial in principle, even if not recognized in practice; all powers not explicitly granted to the federal government remain with the states or the people, according to the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

So it is rather perplexing that the State governments have generally been sleeping through federal encroachments since the time of the CSA-USA war in 1861-1865. As repeated efforts to thwart federal encroachment failed, I suspect the state governments have given up, though several of them seem to have woken up in contesting the federal mandate on health-insurance. Yet the objection is issue-specific, and thus not apt to lead to any fundamental realignment from consolidation back to federalism. Americans tend to be issue- rather than systemic-oriented, and this is reflected in the focus of their elected representatives. Unfortunately, this can mean that no one is left watching the store itself; everyone is debating the particular products on the shelves—and with carefree indifference to even the most relevant history. For instance, the history of nullification has apparently fallen off the shelf, at least with respect to any collective memory.

In 1830, Andrew Jackson sent federal troops into South Carolina because its legislature had decided that it could nullify federal law encroaching on its domains of governmental sovereignty. The South Carolina legislature relented (though its succession document would be retrieved in 1858, after the Congress had just passed another tariff on rice and cotton exports. Jackson’s message was that nullification of federal law would mean the dissolution of the Union.

Nevertheless, the governor of Virginia signed a bill into law in 2010 nullifying the federal mandate. The policy argument against nullification stresses that state opt-outs would reduce the size of the insurance pool and thus reduce the anticipated cost-savings. Similarly, Gov. Mike Rounds of South Dakota, a Republican, signed a bill into law on March 12, 2010 declaring that the federal regulation of firearms is invalid if a weapon is made and used in South Dakota. On the day before, Wyoming’s governor, Dave Freudenthal, a Democrat, had signed a similar bill for that state. The same day, Oklahoma’s House of Representatives approved a resolution that Oklahomans should be able to vote on a state constitutional amendment allowing them to opt out of the federal health care overhaul. In Utah, lawmakers embraced states’ rights with a vengeance in the final days of the legislative session that week. One measure said Congress and the federal government could not carry out health care reform, not in Utah anyway, without approval of the Legislature. Another bill declared state authority to take federal lands under the eminent domain process. A resolution asserted the “inviolable sovereignty of the State of Utah under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.” Alabama, Tennessee and Washington are considering bills or constitutional amendments that would assert local police powers to be supreme over the federal authority. Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin — none of them known as conservative bastions — were considering bills that would authorize, or require, governors to recall or take control of National Guard troops, asserting that federal calls to active duty have exceeded federal authority.

Given the Nullification Crisis in the nineteenth century, the actions of public officials at the state level in the twenty-first century seem foolhardy. They were on much firmer ground in contesting the validity of the federal law through the federal courts, which can declare a law of Congress unconstitutional. However, this means is not without drawbacks.  In particular, there is a structural conflict of interest in having the federal high court decide a matter between the government of which the court is a branch and a state government. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has tended historically to interpret the U.S. Constitution in the federal government’s favor. It is like having a member of one of the teams as the umpire and finding that that umpire tends to rule in favor of his or her own team. The surprising thing is that onlookers are surprised when this happens.

“Everything we’ve tried to keep the federal government confined to rational limits has been a failure, an utter, unrelenting failure — so why not try something else?” said Thomas E. Woods Jr., a senior fellow at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, a nonprofit group in Auburn, Alabama. Article 6 of the U.S. Constitution indicates that federal law is superior over state law where there is a conflict, but this doesn’t make sense outside of the federal government’s enumerated powers—for otherwise why even enumerate? To rely on elections for the needed correction is not sufficient, according to Mises. “Whether the political impulse of states’ rights and nullification will become a direct political fault line in the national elections this fall is uncertain.” It is almost never asked: “Who is the sovereign, the state or the federal government?”—a question put by State Representative Chris N. Herrod, a Republican from Provo, Utah. Technically (but not in practice), both governments have governmental sovereignty in the American federal system; it is not an “either/or” question.

The question is perhaps whether a balance between the two systems of governmental sovereignty within the American system can be restored simply by reacting issue by issue. Is it possible, moreover, for the American people to embrace a constitutional moment wherein the architectonic of the system itself is the issue?

Sources:

Kirk Johnson, “States’ Rights Is Rallying Cry for Lawmakers,” New York Times, March 16, 2010. 

Alexander Mooney, “Virginia Governor to Sign Law Firing Back at Health Care Bill,” CNN, March 24, 2010.