The European Parliament: Rejecting the Council’s Proposed Budget

On 16 June, 2026, the European Parliament rejected the European Council’s proposed budget for the E.U. not only because of the proposal’s €32.8 billion budget-cut, which would reduce the six-year 2028-2034 federal budget even below that which the Commission had proposed, but also because the Council had refused to address the issue of federal-sources of revenue, which was made increasingly salient by the increasing need of funds at the federal level. In seeking to keep the federal institutions dependent on money supplied by the states, the Council, which like the U.S. Senate represents states, can be viewed exploiting a conflict of interest at the expense of the ability of the E.U. to operate even within its given mandates. Put another way, the requirement that the Parliament pass any proposed budget can be viewed as a check on the state-centric Council’s proclivity to put the interest of the parts above the whole—the individual states above the Union.

Although the proposed federal budget by the Council represented a political compromise between states that wanted “substantial cuts” and other states that “asked for an increase of the budget for agriculture and regional funds,” enough of the Parliament’s representatives elected by E.U. citizens, rather than appointed by state governments, deemed the Council’s proposal as insufficient.[1] Those representatives were oriented to adequately funding extant federal programs rather than doing the bidding even of their own states. This translates into an orientation to the common good that is implied in collection action (i.e., the whole) rather than to the interests of parts. Because the €2 trillion proposal by the Commission had already been rejected as insufficient by the Parliament, the Council’s even lower figure can be interpreted as perplexing unless the states were making a statement that any federal branch is apt to overstate the E.U.’s funding needs so the Parliament’s rejection of the Commission’s proposal could and should be ignored.

Consistent with the alleged proclivity of federal governmental institutions to over-state the E.U.’s needed funding was the refusal of the Council “to touch the issue of the budgetary correction mechanisms known as rebates, revenues coming from taxes at the E.U. level, known as own resources, and the principle of making the budget conditional on the rule of law.”[2] Refusing to increase the E.U.’s own access to revenue independent of funds contributed (and thus controlled by) the state governments was essentially a decision to maintain power over the federal institutions and thus render the Union subservient to the states. At the time, MEP Carla Tavares told the press, “We need to make progress on own resources. . . . It is difficult to achieve a strong and renewed budget with cuts and without new own resources.”[3] In other words, the common good as funded federally would be diminished by the refusal of the state-centric Council to even consider new sources of own resources at the federal level. The distinctly state-level interest in maintaining (inordinate) power in the federal system was operating at the expense of the whole. The self-interested decision of the states in the Council to refuse to make budget-outlays conditional on rule-of-law being upheld in a given state also evinces an institutional (or structural) conflict of interest because using the budget so state governments do not disassemble rule-of-law provisions is in the interest of the whole (i.e., the European Union). One state government being able to backslide could easily domino across state-lines, and as all of the delegates at the U.S. federal Convention thought in 1787, allowing dictators at the state level would be incompatible with a democratic Union. So, the refusal of the Council to address the matter of conditionality can be viewed as putting the Union at risk. Fortunately, the members of Parliament were foremost oriented to the good of the Union rather than to protecting state prerogatives even at the expense of the Union.

One of the benefits of federalism is that the federal and state levels can act as checks on each other so as to preserve liberty against the threat of tyranny. The Parliament’s role in being a check on the use of the Council by the state governments to put the interests of the state government officials and their respective governments above the interests of the whole is thus vital in safeguarding the E.U.’s federal system and thus the E.U. itself. Moreover, putting the interests of parts above the whole of which they are parts is never a good idea, for the interests of a whole are not identical to the aggregate of the interests of the parts; the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

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1. Eleonora Vasques, “EU Parliament Rejects Member States’ First Draft of Long-Term Budget,” Euronews.com, 16 June, 2026.
2. Ibid, italics added for emphasis.
3. Ibid.

Should the E.U. Pay Prospective States to Reform?

Should the European Union pay prospective, or “candidate,” states to undergo legislative, rule-of-law reforms prior to accession even though becoming a state is not assured? In April, 2026, Marta Kos, the Commission’s commissioner for enlargement warned the E.U.’s parliament that the Commission might “suspect €1.5 billion in E.U. funding for Serbia due to rule-of-law concerns and contentious judicial reforms” that had been introduced in Serbia’s legislature in January.”[1] I contend that the legislative or constitutional proposals should have been sufficient to freeze the very question of Serbia’s accession, and that the Commission should not pay candidate states to undergo reforms in the first place.

Speaking to the elected representatives in the federal parliament, “Kos said she was particularly concerned about legal amendments that introduce major changes, creating a flawed form of autonomy for Serbia’s anti-corruption prosecution and weakening the independence of the judiciary.”[2] That those constituted major changes are were on the scale of amendments rather than mere statutes could have alerted President Von der Leyen as to whether Serbia was in any condition to become a state in a political union in which rule of law (i.e., an autonomous judiciary, and democratically-valid multi-party elections) is assumed rather than even subject to debate. In other words, rule-of-law, as enforced by a judiciary independent of whatever party happens to be in power in the legislative and executive branches of a government, is so fundamental in the E.U. that major changes even being proposed in a prospective state should be a huge red flag. Accordingly, the question goes beyond whether to suspend paying money to such a state to undergo reforms that should be done anyway.

That Serbia’s political culture, at least with respect to its government, was worsening appreciably is clear from Kos’s statement, “We are increasingly worried about what is happening in Serbia. From laws that undermine the independence of the judiciary to crackdowns on protesters and recurrent meddling in independent media.”[3] Such crackdowns and meddling go beyond rendering a judiciary subservient to a governing political group, and thus render Serbia unfit at least for the time being for joining the E.U. as a state. At the very least, in other words, Serbia should not be “eligible for E.U. funding to support its required internal reforms.”[4] If prospective states want to join the E.U., then they should be willing to pay for their reforms themselves. Why, in other words, should the E.U. feel obliged to pay? I contend that joining the E.U. is of such value to any outside state-level republic that the E.U. should not in principle pay for candidate states to get themselves into shape from a democratic standpoint.

Even on policy grounds, the accession of Serbia was risky for the E.U., given the military aggressiveness of Russia in Ukraine. That the E.U.’s parliament had “adopted a resolution criticizing Serbia’s failure to align with E.U. foreign policy” against Russia in 2025[5] should have been a wake-up call for the E.U., given Viktor Orbán’s intentional undermining of E.U. foreign policy with regard to Russia. Did the E.U. administration want another Hungary wielding its veto in the European Council and the Council of Ministers in favor of Russia even as that country was still invading one of its neighbors?

Therefore, Kos’s statement, “We will continue to support Serbia on its E.U. path,”[6] can and arguably should be subject to formidable critique. After all, the E.U. was not so weak at the time, even given its refusal to expunge the veto-power from states in the European Council, that the Commission should have been so desperate to take in even marginal states. The greatness of the E.U. depended more in making internal reforms at the federal level in line with the fact that the member-states were semi-sovereign, than in enlarging. Just because Orbán had just been voted out of office in Hungary does not mean that the intransigence of one state in the European Council and the Council of Ministers could not again hamstring federal foreign and military policy even in the face of the Russian bear invading one of its neighbors on President Putin’s utterly fallacious supposition that the old Russian empire should rise again.

1. Eleonora Vasques, “E.U. Considers Freezing Serbia’s €1.5 billion in E.U. Funds Amid Rule of Law Scrutiny,” Euronews.com, April 20, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

On the Glacial Pace of E.U. Accession for Serbia and Albania

With Russian troops having been in Ukraine for over four years by March, 2026, the case was indeed being made then for the E.U. enlarging as much and as soon as possible by adding new states, including Ukraine. For in addition to making it more difficult for Russia to invade countries in Eastern Europe by turning them into E.U. states, the main way that a federal union, whether the E.U. or U.S., expands is by the accession of new states from what had been sovereign countries. This is why Canada would enter the U.S. as a state, or, more likely, a few states, rather than in a merge. Especially with the Russians having been dropping bombs on Ukrainian people and infrastructure for years, giving up some governmental sovereignty was arguably not too high a price for state governments to accept.  

In a public effort to push the accession process along for their respective future states, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama published an op-ed in a European newspaper to propose “functional partial integration serving as an intermediate step to revive the EU enlargement process and increase stability in the region.”[1] In other words, Serbia and Albania would at some point get some but not all of the rights that go along with E.U. statehood. The single market and the Schengen area would be granted as the intermediate step, while no decision-making power would be extended at the federal level either for the governments of Serbia and Albania (in the European Council and the Council of Ministers) or for Serbians and Albanians in having elected representatives in the European Parliament. The “trial balloon” of giving Ukraine a similar intermediate limbo-state had popped rather loudly at an E.U. summit, so it would seem to follow that the proposal by the Serbia and Albanian leaders would be dead on arrival at the European Council.

The frustration with the enlargement process in general was certainly palpable by 2026 and could explain the desperate attempt of Serbia and Albania to get  at least one foot into the E.U. sooner rather than later. Thanks in large part to Hungary’s ongoing veto of Ukraine’s accession process from being formally carried out, obstacles to enlargement were getting a lot of press in early 2026. In 2025, an E.U. report on enlargement “highlighted Belgrade’s lack of alignment” with the E.U.’s sanctions against Russia for having unjustifiably invaded Ukraine.[2] Serbia’s lack of reform for media freedom, electoral law, and civil society had also been responsible for the stall in talks. As for Albania, although it was considered “one of the most promising candidates for EU accession,” corruption remained stubbornly entrenched. It would be interesting to compare that corruption with that which was in Ukraine at the time. The question of whether geo-political urgency should relegate concerns about corruption has no easy answer except perhaps in lopping off the extremes. To be sure, Albania had introduced the anti-corruption authority SPAK, but the more interesting question is perhaps whether the Ukrainian government did likewise in a way that leaves a viable record of less corruption.

In general, the “accession process for Serbia and other Western Balkan countries (had) stalled for years, as candidate countries (had not) made sufficient process on rule of law, anti-corruption measures, media freedom and judicial reforms. . .”[3] With the NATO defensive umbrella in place, except for Ukraine, the urgency pertaining to the rest of the candidates was not sufficient, I submit, to justify not finishing the job on rule of law, anti-corruption, media freedom and judicial reforms because all of these are very important to a civil society and a republic on an ongoing basis. Granting some candidate countries some intermediate rights could be expected to reduce the incentive of those state governments to continue to come into alignment with the E.U.’s expectations prior to statehood being fully granted.

Regarding the glacial pace of enlargement generally, a silver-lining to that dark cloud can be seen in that something had to be done about the stultifying impact of the principle of unanimity in the European Council before gaining even more states would make reaching unanimity even more difficult that it was for 27 states. Put another way, making sure that the candidate states made the requisite reforms not only would render the E.U. more solidly democratic and based on the rule of law and freedom (e.g., of the press), but would also give the E.U. more time to reform its internal decision-making process where unanimity was still required for federal law and foreign (and defense) policy to be enacted and promulgated, respectively. Not everything that seems weak in the E.U. is actually weakness, though admittedly requiring unanimity from 27 governments can be coined an exercise in futility in service to the absurd.

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1. Zara Riffler, “Serbia and Albania Issue Joint Text on EU Accession without Veto,” Euronews.com, 11 March, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

The ECJ Castigates the Commission for Paying Off Hungary

In an opinion submitted to the European Court of Justice, which tends to follow the legal opinions the 11 Advocates General, Tamara Capeta recommended in February, 2026 to the Court that it “should annul the European Commission’s 2023 decision to disburse €10.2 billion” to the E.U. state of Hungary.[1] Capeta found that the state government had not sufficiently addressed “concerns over systemic corruption and rule of law violations” to qualify for the payment.[2] That the Commission released the payment nonetheless points to corruption at the federal level—in its executive branch in particular—and this charge against the Von der Leyen administration renders the charge against the Hungarian government rather ironic. Rule of law should apply (and be respected!) at both the federal and state levels for the E.U. to continue to be viable. This applies especially to the Commission, as it is tasked with enforcing E.U. laws, directives, and regulations as well as treaty obligations that the EU, including its state governments, have to other countries, whether they are federal unions (e.g., the U.S.) or independent states.  

The Commission’s decision to reverse itself on the payment “came just days before a crucial December 2023 EU summit, where Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán threatened to veto a €50 billion aid package for Ukraine and block the start of EU accession with Kyiv.”[3] At the European Council’s meeting, “Orbán left the room for a coffee break, allowing the other 26 E.U. [states] to approve the accession talks.”[4] At “an extraordinary” Council session in February 2024, “Hungary lifted its veto on the €50 billion Ukraine support package.”[5] Some representatives in the E.U.’s parliament “suspected the E.U. [had] struck a deal with Hungary, trading unfrozen funds for Orbán’s withdrawal of his veto” even though the Commission “denied any such agreement was made.”[6] Given Orbán’s twice reversal after his state government had just received the suddenly unfrozen funds from the Commission, its denial strains credulity at best, and more realistically actually confirms the charge of sordid dealings in the Commission at the expense of E.U. law.

It is harmful enough to the federal union when a state government violates E.U. law, especially with impunity; for a federal-level governmental institution to shirk federal law says in effect that the E.U. does not respect its own law (so why then should state officials respect it?). Presumably either the Commission and/or one or more of the states could have made a deal with Orbán that did not involve violating E.U. rule-of-law.

Moreover, occasioning the unlawful deal is the staying power of the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of the EU. A minimum of nine states was at the time sufficient for the federal program of “enhanced cooperation” to be invoked, in which case blocs of states could move forward in being subject to a federal law or regulation even though one or more state would still be in opposition but not to be subject to the law. Of course, this program could not apply to votes on whether to annex another state to the Union, and to decisions on whether to spend E.U. funds on other countries, including Ukraine because on such matters, the E.U. itself must either act as one or not act. So a so-called “multiple-speed” E.U. is not a complete answer to the basic problem of applying the principle of unanimity to 27 (and potentially more!) states.

Rather than relying primarily on its state governments for defense and even foreign policy, the E.U. could look to the U.S., which has both a federal military and state armies (called militias). That the federal president can temporarily call upon such armies even if their respective state presidents refuse does not mean that those armies are federal. Such an arrangement, which the E.U. did not have at least as of 2026, is consistent with the underlying dual-sovereignty of both the federal and state governments (or, for the ideologically squeamish, governmental institutions). The augmented federal powers would need to be decided by qualified-majority voting in the Councils that represent the state governments at the federal level; otherwise, no such partial transfer of governmental sovereignty could take place. Being politically unwilling to “step up to the (baseball) plate and bat,” federal and state officials should not collude in deal-making in ways that violate federal laws, lest the Union itself head down a slope wherein federal law has no force. This is especially of value in a world in which military aggressors such as Russia and Israel were wantonly violating international law with impunity; E.U. and U.S. jurisprudence, which is not international, and the corresponding duties at both federal and state levels of government, is not as self-evidently strong as Europeans and Americans may have been assuming in as invasions and genocides elsewhere were going on with impunity internationally.

On a visit to Florida at the time, I was shocked at the extent of brazen refusals by police employees of at least two cities to enforce criminal law—some employees even denying the existence of whole statutes, and the subordinates’ respective managers refused to hold those employees accountable. I was so stunned by the sheer brazenness of the lies that I decided not to move to that U.S. state. The rule of law cannot be assumed as though it castigates sordid personal discretion automatically; rather, law depends on humans to enforce it with integrity. This is why the international “laws” that Putin and Netanyahu were able to violate with such violence for years may not even count as law, for the enforcement-mechanism was entirely lacking de jure et de facto. “Law” without this cannot be counted as law.

The obligation of government officials to recognize and enforce rather than deny the very existence statutory law should be a given. It follows that federal officials in the Commission should not have been permitted to ignore the relevant federal law when it became an obstacle to making political deals with Hungarian state officials. If getting those state officials on board with a political priority of the Commission was so important, then the Commission could alternatively have pressured the states to reduce or end outright the application of the principle of unanimity in the two federal councils that represent state officials directly at the federal level, at least with respect to foreign policy and defense and even on the matter of “enlargement” (i.e., annexing future states). If qualified-majority is too low, then perhaps 75% of the states could be used as a benchmark for such very important policy decisions. The QMV-unanimity distinction is a false dichotomy, given the daylight available between the two voting methods. If one state can hold an entire Union back, then something is wrong with that federal system, and violating federal law to get around that problem is at best a short-sighted, expedient solution. In other words, the E.U.’s federal system has been suffering, at least as of 2026, from a much more serious problem than (collusive) corruption in the Commission and the Hungarian government.

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1. Sandor Zsiros, “E.U. Court Challenges Controversial €10.2bn Payment to Hungary,” Euronews.com, February 12, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

Congressional Subpoenas: The Case of the Clintons

The rule of law is absolutely essential to a representative democracy being able to endure even as strong personalities in public office may seek to bend or even dismiss law for their own purposes. The notion that anyone subject to law gets a pass according to one’s own discretion and power is toxic to a republic being regarded as fair. Just as everyone has a right to due process in legal proceedings in the U.S., no one is above the law there. This applies to former presidents and secretaries of state, and thus to Bill and Hillary Clinton. Their written statement in refusing to recognize a Congressional subpoena as valid—a presumptuous stunt to be sure—reveals that they held the presumption of being able to decide whether a law to which they were subject was valid. This presumption could also be seen when Bill Clinton occupied the White House, for he deliberately lied under oath, “I did not have sexual relations with” Monika Lewinski even though she had performed oral sex with him in the Oval Office when she was a White House intern. My point is that the underlying pattern is clear with respect to a lack of regard for law itself (even though both Clintons went to Yale’s law school) and the presumption of setting oneself in the position of invalidating law to which one is subject. That Bill Clinton was no punished with incarceration in the 1990s was unfortunate even for him and his wife as they were not afforded the opportunity to learn a lesson.

On January 21, 2026, members of the Republican group in the U.S. House of Representatives began the process “to hold former President Bill Clinton and former Secretary of State Hillary in contempt of Congress” because the couple had repeatedly refused to honor a Congressional subpoena to testify on the Epstein sex-girls racket.[1] Photographic evidence that Bill had been in contact with Epstein had been made public, and members of the House had questions for the Clintons regarding what they may have known of Epstein’s crimes. Even though the demand for testimony sounds reasonable enough, Rep. James Comer, the chairman of the relevant committee, had said at the start of a hearing in which the Clinton’s attendance was required that the Clintons had responded not with “cooperation but defiance.”[2] Such a blatant response to a Congressional subpoena is astonishing because, as Comer said, “Subpoenas are not mere suggestions, they carry the force of law and require compliance.”[3] The Clintons contended that the subpoenas were “invalid because they do not serve any legislative purpose.”[4] But it is not for subpoenaed people called to testify to assess whether any such purpose is being served, for otherwise anyone could disregard a Congressional subpoena simply by declaring there to be no legislative purpose.

In his ethical theory, Kant argues that if universalizing a maxim results in a contradiction, such a maxim is unethical.  For example, if no one were to tell the truth, no one would believe anyone else’s truth-claims and so making such claims would not make any sense. Universalizing the maxim that it is ok to lie would result in no claims being made. Similarly, were everyone to act on the maxim, a person subject to a Congressional subpoena can determine the validity of said subpoena and act on that determination, it would not make sense for Congress to issue subpoenas because none would be honored. Universalizing that maxim results in the absurd, so that maxim is unethical.

Another formulation of Kant’s ethical theory holds that rational beings should be treated not merely as one’s means, but also as ends in themselves. In presuming that the committee members were merely playing political games in issuing the subpoenas and dismissing them, the Clintons were treating the members as means only (to the Clinton’s own ends) rather than as ends in themselves worthy of respect by virtue of being rational beings. Why worthy of respect?  Because to Kant, it is by the use of reason that we assign value in the world, so reason itself must have absolute value and thus be worthy of respect. To Kant, the formulations of his Categorical Imperative have the necessity that law does.

It is such necessity, both in law itself and in ethical principles, according to Kant, that the Clintons repeatedly and conveniently overlooked or dismissed outright, and with impunity. It is significant, therefore, that being in contempt of a Congressional subpoena can carry time in prison. There is a good reason for that, so I submit that the criminal charges should be automatic rather than depend on a majority-vote in the House chamber. Obviating accountability by means of political deals does no favor to the guilty in terms of lessons learned, and no favor to an institution that looks weak if its subpoenas can be ignored with impunity. Impunity for some and jail for the rest is no way to run a republic that is based on the rule of law.

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1. Stephen Groves and Matt Brown, “House Republicans Begin Push to Hold the Clintons in Contempt of Congress Over the Epstein Probe,” APnews.com, January 21, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

NBA Team-Owner Faces Wrath of the Mob For Racist Conversation

As the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court were looking at two cases involving cellphone privacy from the standpoint of police access, NBC Commissioner Adam Silver announced that he had banned Los Angeles Clippers owner Donald Sterling from attending any NBA team practice or game for life and was being fined $2.5 million. Interestingly, given the tenor of the public discourse, the Clippers’ owner had not made a public pronouncement regarding his negative view of black people; rather, a tabloid had taped and broadcast a private cellphone conversation. That is to say, Sterling would have to pay a multi-million dollar fine for what he had said in a private conversation with his girlfriend. I contend there is reason to pause at this news, lest such public pressure establish the precedent wherein the passions of the mob is effectively given such reign as to render property ownership and the rule of law as so contingent that might makes right. 

Had the NSA rather than a Hollywood tabloid outfit recorded the conversation and made it public, the absolutist tone in the media’s non-debate would doubtlessly have been muted. Even so, the judgment on Sterling’s less-than-sterling moral turpitude would probably have been just as swift. Interestingly, a judge in Egypt had just announced his sentencing of over 600 defendants to death after what had been a ten-minute trial (with the vast majority of the defendants tried in abstentia). Although no one was publically calling for Sterling’s head literally, the air of la fait accompli would be difficult to miss throughout the American media. The sheer absolutist tone rings particularly shrill in a democratic republic that enshrines the rule of law rather than that of garden-variety dislike (whether that of Sterling or his many detractors).

As one pundit said on CNN, “You can’t fall on the other side of this issue.”[1] He added that the same applies to childhood obesity. Presumably a NBA team owner cannot denigrate fat kids and expect to be able to continue to attend the team’s practices and games. Saying “that player’s kid is a real fattie” on a private phone call thus risks the kid’s big brother coming back with public condemnations and a demand that the team owner be banned and even forced to sell his or her property.  In other words, property ownership can be contingent what a person says in private conversations that can be construed by other people as immoral or out of sync with contemporary societal norms.

Overwhelmed by the lashing out of anger at the octogenarian who had grown up in a very different era—indeed, in another century, when Nazi doctors were measuring facial features to extract impure races from Europe—the media barely mentioned the lack of any precedent in the NBA for removing an owner, and that moral turpitude is not listed in the bylaws as justifying the remove of an owner’s property-interest in a team.[2] Although a provision allows for “the interests of any owner” to be terminated if he or she “wilfully violates” any other provisions of the NBA “constitution,” The Wall Street Journal reports, “Many of the behaviors that constitute a justification for a forced sale involve financial issues, like failing to make payments on time or gambling on NBA games.”[3] If what is said in a private conversation between a man and his girlfriend can constitute a wilful violation of virtually anything stated or implied in the “constitution,” then why even bother with parchment?

One commentator even decried the owners for not having acted immediately to divest Sterling of his ownership, as if the owners would be justified in ignoring the NBA’s board of governors’ bylaws that give Sterling a period to reply and plead his case to his peers.[4] The sudden invisibility of the NBA’s own rules was itself largely off the media’s radar screen, conveniently dwarfed by the cavalcade of calls for Sterling’s head on a silver plate. John Locke, who had penned on the natural rights to life, liberty, and property, would doubtless be more than a bit uneasy at the demands that Sterling be forced to sell his property in such a way. Put another way, if owning a NBA team is so contingent, does ownership even apply?

(Image Source: favimages.net)

We are so human, all too human in fact, in our wilful summary judgments and infallible sentencing—both presumptions being based on the human instinct of dislike and even hatred stemming from an unrequited injury from the past—that we hardly realize collectively (i.e., in our public discourse as a society) that we have all sailed right past the rule of law as though it were some relic from an ancient saint. The irony here is of course that lynching used to be associated with Caucasian racists rather than their foes. 

One of Sterling’s attackers, one of many pundits referred to the need for healing following the “conversation on race.” Yet it fell on Chuck Todd as if to remind both his colleagues and the public at large that “there was no debate; no one defended [Sterling].”[5] This point ought to give us all at least some pause, regardless of which view we hold on this case, presuming we as a civilized society still believe in the rule of law rather than the passions of the mob, and still value the true diversity that is necessary for truly free and open public discourse.

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[1] The Situation Room, CNN, April 29, 2014.

[2] One exception was Chuck Todd of NBC News, as evinced on The Daily Rundown, MSNBC, April 30, 2014.

[3] Ashley Jones, “NBA’s Decision Against Clippers’ Owner: Is It Legal?” The Wall Street Journal, April 30, 2014.

[4] Christine Brennan, “Owners Drop Ball,” USA Today, April 29, 2014.

[5] Chuck Todd, The Daily Rundown, MSNBC, April 30, 2014.