Elon Musk’s Controversial Politics: Beyond the Financials

As U.S. President Trump signed his “Big Beautiful Bill” into law on July 4, 2025, Elon Musk, shareholder and CEO of Tesla, announced that he would create a new political party (or “group” in European-speak). Musk opposed the projected trillions of dollars that the bill would add to the debt held by the U.S. federal government, though, as CEO of SpaceX, he was fine with cutting a trillion dollars from Medicaid, which provides health coverage to the poorest of the poor, and from food assistance while the defense budget was augmented. Musk’s proposed “America” group would likely draw support from Trump’s “MAGA” base, rather than from moderate Republicans and any Democrats. Whether Musk was more motivated by breaking up the political duopoly of the two major parties, or groups, to increase the practical options for voters or to split Trump’s support and punish the Republican party, such controversial political involvement by a major shareholder CEO is without doubt risky business. This is not to say that CEO’s should not be active politically apart from business strategy, for even business managers are citizens and thus may feel compelled to become active politically. This is to be lauded especially if the motive is out of duty to repair or otherwise improve a political system.

On the next working day after Musk’s announcement that he would be forming a new political party, “Tesla shares plunged nearly 7 percent . . . as investors registered dismay” at Musk’s “plans to form a third party and his intensifying feud with President Trump.”[1] Even though 7% is not exacting “plunging” or “crushing” Testa shares, beyond the hyperbole of journalists is the point that not avoiding controversy politically has costed Tesla and Musk himself financially. To be sure, billionaires can afford to lose significant wealth and still be left standing comfortably, and even in the case of business practitioners, economic reductionism doesn’t always hold. Also, political involvement can raise stock prices, as, for example, “Musk’s involvement in politics and his financial support for the president’s campaign were once seen by investors as a benefit to Tesla, fueling a steep rise in company shares after the election” in November, 2024.[2] No one but the most cynical would deny, however, that Musk’s chief motivation that led to his involvement in “DOGE” in the White House was for his businesses to benefit even though they did, initially. So that they took a hit when Musk broke from President Trump and then formed the America Party cannot be assessed only as concerns the financial impact on Tesla or SpaceX.

In American history, the notion that wealthy people should devote some time to public service for the benefit of the Union or their respective member-states was once well-known. Both because such people could afford financially to take time off from business and because their experience could be useful in governing, the notion of public duty was beneficial to the public good. Men like Thomas Jefferson and George Washington did not make public service into a career and did not go into politics primarily for its positive financial benefit. As a frustrated General dependent on the sovereign states whose delegates met in the Second Continental Congress, Washington would not have endured such hardships as he did were his motivation simply to benefit himself and his landholdings in Virginia financially. Even though Musk is by no stretch another Washington, more has been involved in Musk’s political motivation than maximizing Tesla’s stock price or gaining government contracts for SpaceX, and even getting back at Donald Trump. Government, moreover, is not just the aggregate of business interests without remainder.

Other billionaires might look to Musk’s example not in terms of his political ideology necessarily, but in terms of having enough financial cushion to weather political-turned-financial pushback from going beyond business to engage in public service—to give back, as it were, so to improve the system of government and add to the public good. It is admittedly very easy to be guided by personal and business financial considerations in delving into politics, whereas being willing to hold those at bay out of a sense of public duty is more difficult, and, frankly, increasing rare as American history has proceeded but not necessarily evolved politically. The notion that duty pertains to citizenship has become increasingly recessive in public discourse and consciousness. This is to say that duty-bound CEO’s are saints; rather, it is to say that we shouldn’t be so surprised when a billionaire businessman jumps into politics not merely for financial reasons, and thus not turn back to shore after a financial hit. Even if motivated by political ideology rather than in saving the union from itself (e.g., public debt), personal and business financial benefit is not the whole story, and the public good can still be a beneficiary. 

Mozi says, "'worthy people [are] those who are well versed in virtuous conduct, discriminating in discussion, and broadly knowledgeable!’ . . . . When the wealthy and eminent in the state heard this they retired and thought to themselves, ‘At first, we could rely on our wealth and eminence, but now the king promotes the righteous and does not turn away the poor and the humble. This being the case, we too must be righteous.'"[3]

---

1. Jack Ewing, “Musk’s Idea of 3^rd Party Is Crushing Testla Shares,” The New York Times, July 8, 2025.

2. Ibid.

3. Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, ed.s, Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (New York: Seen Bridges Press, 2001), 58.

Congress: Hitched to the Status Quo

To lead is to be out in front, pointing the jet’s nose one way rather than another. Leadership is not that which causes drag at the back of the plane. Leadership is not that which holds a society in place or protects the vested interests. Whether envisioning something new or a return to a better time, a leader is not oriented to the status quo. It is significant, therefore, that the Minority Leader of the U.S. House of Representatives, one of the two chambers in the American Congress, has stated publicly that the Congress is rigged to advantage the status quo. The stunning implication is that members of Congress are actually anti-leaders.

In an interview in 2013, Nancy Pelosi admitted, “This is an environment that is almost rigged, intentionally or not, wittingly or not, rigged so that the status quo just goes on.”[1] This amazing line can be read as confirmation that the fears of some of the American Founders has come true—namely, that the U.S. House would itself become an aristocratic body rivaling the U.S. Senate. With just 435 representatives for over 310 million people, George Washington’s plea on the last day of the Constitutional Convention that a minimum of 30,000 rather than 20,000 in a district would not be sufficiently democratic sounds trite, even antiquarian. With so few representatives relative to the total population, the U.S. House could not help but be aristocratic, each member being like a magnet to huge “gifts” from vested interests. “We have to kick open the door and make our own environment” in the Congress, Pelosi urged, “reduce the role of money [in campaigns], insist on the civility of debates, and bring more women here, and that’s a better reflection of our country.” In painting this picture for us, the Minority Leader was indeed leading, for she was intrepidly venturing out beyond the status quo. Nevertheless, the thrust of leadership is not always enough to counter the gravity of the vested interests grounded in the status quo.

For example, as long as so few representatives hold such power, the money of the vested interests will inevitably find its way to the campaigns and the Congressional bills will continue to be written by the vested interests themselves. In approaching this problem systemically, more is needed. One possibility is to sift the E.U.’s lower legislative chamber for possible solutions. 

The U.S. House of Representatives (top) and the European Parliament (bottom). 

At the beginning of 2012, European Parliament had a maximum of 751 representatives to cover a population of about 504 million, which works out to an average of 671,105 people in a district. Meanwhile, the U.S. House had 435 representatives to cover a population of about 313 million, which corresponds to an average of 719,540 people in a district. The difference is 48,435 people per district. To get down to 671,105 people per district, the U.S. House would need to add 31 seats. Were the House to have 751 representatives, the average number of people in a district would be 416,777. While more democratic than districts with an average population of 719,540, neither figure comes close to satisfying George Washington’s objection that 30,000 people in a given district is not sufficiently democratic (i.e., too many constituents for a given representative).

Therefore, in addition to increasing the number of seats—with the knowledge that 751 in a chamber can work—further reduction in the centralized power would be needed to reduce the money magnet’s power. One option would be returning more domestic policy areas to the state legislatures. At the time of Pelosi’s statement, the U.S. states had 7,382 state legislators altogether. [2] Spreading around additional powers, taken from the Congress, to so many more representatives would not only make American federalism more democratic, but also open up possibilities for real change beyond the grasp of the status quo. As a few examples even without the additional power, some states had legalized gay marriage, two had legalized pot, and one had achieved universal health-insurance. Admittedly, the status quo has a greater grip in some states (e.g., Kansas) than others (e.g., California). However, spreading out governmental power could perhaps be sufficient to give leadership a chance to outpace the moneyed interests in the status quo.     

1. Laura Bassett, “Nancy Pelosi: Congress Is ‘Rigged’ to Maintain the Status Quo,” The Huffington Post, June 5, 2013.

2. National Conference of State Legislatures, “Sizes of Legislatures,” 2013.

Morsi as Partisan in Constitution-Building: Lessons from Washington

Appealing for unity after the controversial ratification of a draft constitution in December 2012, President Morsi of Egypt pledged in a televised address to respect the one-third of the electorate that had voted against the proposed constitution. He claimed that “active patriotic opposition” should not annoy the president or the people in a democracy. I contend that the office of president should not be of the sort that would have partisan opposition, ideally at least. That is to say, presiding means safeguarding the process itself, as well as the good of the whole, rather than pushing a partisan agenda. That Morsi was on record in support of the partisan-drafted proposal undercut his role as presider in chief. Given the innate instability of a nascent democracy, the role for a presider “above the fray” was particularly valuable in Egypt at the time. Morsi fell short in this regard, and thus put the fragile democracy at risk.

President Morsi speaking behind the seal of Egypt, suggesting a "good of the whole" orientation.     source: csmonitor

In his address, Morsi said, “We don’t want to go back to the era of the one opinion and fabricated fake majorities.” Such an era is the extreme of a partisan president. The presiding president, in contrast, transcends opinions and even majorities, being oriented to the long-term interest of the republic itself. Literally, to preside means to “stand before,” as exemplified by George Washington’s officiating role at the constitutional convention in the United States in 1787. He resisted the urge to “trade on his stature” to advance one or another proposal until the last day, when he suggested that a U.S. House district of 40,000 rather than 30,000 would be insufficiently representative.  Had Morsi followed Washington’s example as the draft Egyptian constitution was being proposed and ratified, Egypt might have had a more credible person to hold up the fragile democracy so it would take root rather than succumb to partisan strife.

While pursuing a partisan path is undoubtedly tempting for a president, the costs are often ignored or hardly transparent. In Morsi’s case, his invitation for the opposition to join a dialogue was met by Husseain Abdel Ghani’s comment that the invitation was merely Morsi’s “dialogue with himself.” Only by standing above the proposed draft could the president have had enough credibility to effect a reconciliation. It was not enough for him to move to the political center after the ratification had been secured.

Instead of being invested in the draft, Morsi could have focused on “the big picture” in terms of how much consensus is necessary for a constitution to be something more than a partisan-approved document. Put another way, Morsi could have been oriented to the process by which the partisan-dominated draft could have been further modified such that at least part of “the opposition” would have been on board. Unlike a law, a constitution should have more than a majority faction’s stamp on it. Because most of a society should be behind a convention, it should not be dominated either in its formulation or ratification by the majority faction, or else follow-up work is warranted. Here is where a presiding president can come into the picture, being oriented to the society as a whole—to which a constitution rightly corresponds.

In short, Morsi may have approached the draft constitution as though it were a law rather than a constitution. Advancing the document that was dominated by his party in being formulated, he missed the opportunity to seek a wider massaging of the document into a final form. A similar mistake occurred in the American case as the convention there refused to consider proposed amendments from the countries’ ratifying conventions—some of which had sizable anti-federalist representation. Had this minority been assuaged, perhaps the resulting document might have had more safeguards against political consolidation at the expense of the governments of the member states.

Washington, himself a federalist, missed the opportunity to suggest on the last day of the convention that it would be in the long-term interest of the United States for the states to send new delegates to another convention for the purpose of considering amendments proposed by the ratifying conventions because a viable constitution should be something more than reflecting one perspective—as any one perspective contains blind spots. Moreover, incorporating a minority’s concerns could provide a check against the tyranny of the cultural artifacts of the age. A resulting document would be more likely to stand the test of time.

Similarly, by the way, an academic treatise can only be determined to be a classic after the scholar’s age has passed because only then—in another culture, in effect—can the artifacts of the author’s own be fully transparent. Like a good scholar being oriented at least in part to readers not yet born, a presiding president is oriented to a process most likely to render a constitution into a classic. Of course, it would be impossible for such a presider to ever know if he (or she) has been successful. The best such a president can do is to take pains that the process not succumb to expediency. Having such a perspective, such a president should be indifferent toward the various partisan agendas, even that of his (or her) own party. From the standpoint of such a presidential viewpoint, partisan agendas are merely the fleeting vanities of vanities.

Source:

David Kirkpartick, “Morsi Admits ‘Mistakes’ in Drafting Egypt’s Constitution,” The New York Times, December 27, 2012.

The Veto Power of the U.S. President

On September 12, 1787, in the U.S. Constitutional Convention, Gerry claimed that the "primary object of the revisionary check on the President is not to protect the general interest, but to defend his own department" (Madison, Notes, p. 628). Gerry was stressing the value of maintaining the separation of power that was to exist between the three branches of the U.S. (General, or federal) Government. I believe he was inordinately fixated on his point--missing the presiding function of the U.S. President. Also on September 12, Madison averred that the "object of the revisionary power is twofold. 1. to defend the Executive Rights 2. to prevent popular or factious injustice" (Madison, Notes, p. 629). In addition to be an advocate of the separation of power within the U.S. Government, Madison was concerned that a large faction in the majority might oppress a minority faction and he viewed the expanded republic of the union as a means to minimize such tyranny. He too was slighting the presiding role of the president. 

At the end of the convention, George Washington, who had been presiding over it as one controversial point after another were debated, noted the problems inherent in both presiding and advocating on particular issues. Madison reports that when "the PRESIDENT rose, for the purpose of putting the question [of the Constitution], he [Washington] said that although his situation had hitherto restrained him from offering his sentiments on questions depending in the House, and it might be thought, ought now to impose silence on him, yet he could not forbear expressing his wish that the . . . smallness of the proportion of Representatives [in the U. S. House] had been considered by many members of the Convention an insufficient security for the rights &; interests of the people. . . . he thought this of so much consequence that it would give [him] much satisfaction to see it adopted. No opposition was made . . . it was agreed to unanimously" (Madison, Notes, p. 655). Washington believed that as he was presiding over the Convention it was necessary for him to remain silent on all of the particular points being debated throughout the Convention; even on the last day he hesitated in expressing his desire that there be no less than 30,000 people per House Rep. rather than 40,000 as the Convention had decided. 

The silence of a presider places him or her in good position to weigh in on a point "of so much consequence."  In other words, a presider literally sits before, rather than participates, so as to be able to protect the whole from dangers from points of large consequence.  Weighing in on every partisan point, such as most U.S. Presidents have done, not only keeps them from seeing the forest through the particular trees, but also detracts from their credibility with which they could push through the few matters of such consequence that the system would succumb otherwise. 

It follows that the veto should be used not to give the President a share in every piece of legislation, but to enable him or her to stop bills that would otherwise compromise the system as a whole.  In the U.S. Constitution as it was drafted by the Convention, the U.S. House was the only democratically elected body or branch in the U.S. Government.  Neither the U.S. Senators nor the U.S. President were elected by the people. The Senate represented (and protected) the state governments, and special electors were chosen by the state legislatures to select the U.S. President.  The quality of representative democracy in the U.S. House was therefore vital to the Government having a balance within which democracy was a part. Compromise democracy in the House and the U.S. Government might become an aristocracy or monarchy.  These terms were used by many of the convention's delegates. 

George Washington understood the nature of presiding, which can be gleamed from Madison's report of what the PRESIDENT said on the last day of the convention. It is a pity that his example has been lost on so many U.S. Presidents.

Source: James Madison, Notes in the Federal Convention of 1787 (New York: Norton, 1987).

What Is a Member-State?

It is easy to get locked into a certain way of viewing something, even if the perspective, it turns out, has more to do with one’s epoch than the thing itself, including how it came about and was designed. I contend that one of the main category mistakes is that wherein one Union is treated as equivalent to a state in another Union. It is astounding when citizens of the former acquiesce in the likening of “apples and oranges” at their own expense—in this case, citizens of the United States unwittingly treating their Union as though it were simply France with a very big backyard rather than a Union commensurate with the European Union (in which France is a state). The affable “going along” is caused in part by a willful indifference that relegates any study of the origins and history of the United States. I submit that a proper comparison between the U.S. and E.U. takes both after their respective first fifty years—hence most Americans are ill-equipped to refute the asseverations of European friends that the U.S. itself is somehow equivalent to a state in their own Union.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.