Saturday, May 3, 2025

On the 2025 Political Convention of the European People’s Party

Competition within a pollical party and recognition that a political party is indeed a political party are essential or at least advantageous to any political party in a democratic system. Moreover, a republic, even if it contains smaller republics but is not just them in aggregate, deserves to be recognized as such rather than implicitly relegated by erroneous nomenclature that is designed to appease skeptics so they won’t rise up to resist the federal republic itself. “Let the chips fall where they may” is, I believe, an expression from gambling. Another expression comes from playing cards: Call a spade a spade. These two expressions evince truth and power, whereas hiding behind false notions is sheer weakness. Much of my writing on the European Union is oriented to strengthening it, as well as to gleam lessons for both the E.U. and U.S. by comparing and contrasting them as federal empire-scale unions of states.

Rubber-stamping closed-room decisions is hardly uncommon at conventions of political parties. The E.U.’s European People’s Party is no exception. At the annual convention in 2025, the party’s leadership appeared “quite monarchic” in spite of the fact that the E.U. was “the world’s second largest democracy,” and that President Von der Leyen had been touting the value being placed on democracy.[1] At the convention, Manfred Weber was re-elected by 502 of 563 votes “while his loyal ally Dolors Montserrat was elected unopposed to the position of secretary general with 91% of the votes cast.”[2] The lack of intra-party competition could be expected to have an impact politically on the E.U. itelf, as the “ascendant” EPP included E.U. Commission President Von der Leyen, 13 commissioners, and 188 representatives in the Parliament.[3]

With the E.U. being a few years over 30 years old, the EPP in the E.U. could be likened to the Congress Party in India during the twentieth century. To be sure, the latter party eventually lost its dominance, and the EPP could be expected to lose its early foothold too. Beforehand, however, a democracy deficit can exist not only when one party dominates at the federal level of an empire-scale polity of polities, but also when such a party is monocratic at the party level.

In other words, a multiplier effect can be in the mix when dominance is salient within a party that in turn is dominate in a government, and an executive branch, a legislative chamber elected by citizens, and a supreme court do indeed constitute a government even if denial has a firm foothold in the public square. In fact, for the media to mislabel a political party’s convention as a congress, which is actually an international meeting of sovereign countries, and a union such as the E.U. as a bloc undermines the credibility of a party and union. Both a democracy-deficit and enervating ideological (i.e., Euroskeptic) misnomers imperil a federal system, especially if the states hold most (but not all!) of the governmental sovereignty. 

For the Commission to be able to enforce even its exclusive competencies (i.e., enumerated powers), it is important that that executive branch be representative rather than oligarchic and known to be something more than of a bloc, which is a temporary grouping for one purpose. The E.U. was not intended to be temporary or of just one pillar. Indeed, the third pillar belies any claim that the E.U. is merely an economic international organization. International organizations such as NATO and the UN have no governmental sovereignty of their own, and do not have legislative chambers whose representatives are directly elected by citizens. International organizations do not even have citizens! A little intellectual honesty can go a long way.



1. Jeremy Fleming-Jones, “The EU’s Biggest Political Party Met in Valencia—What We Learned,” Euronews.com, 30 April 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Thursday, May 1, 2025

Bottom-Heavy Federalism: The E.U. Stability and Growth Pact

With Russia still in Ukraine in 2025, the E.U. faced pressure to enact more laws and regulations at the federal, yes, federal level to reap the benefits of collective, coordinated action. Although the fear that Russia might invade one or more of the eastern E.U. states was probably unrealistic, given that Russia was still mired in Ukraine, the crisis of an invasion so close to the E.U. could legitimately serve as a “wake-up call” for the federal and state officials in the E.U. to get their federal system of dual sovereignty in order. The ability of state governments to successfully evade the state deficit and debt limits in the federal Stability and Growth Pact and the flipside of the Commission’s weakness can be read as indicative that more work is needed to get to a viable federal system. The states have been able to weaken the limitations successively over years, including by leveraging the fear of invasion by Russia as a call for more defense spending at the state rather than at the federal level.

By 1 May 2025, several E.U. states had notified the European Council of their intent “to make use of an exemption allowing them to go over budgetary limits in order to boost military spending. The Commission, the E.U.’s executive branch, had proposed earlier that year that E.U. state governments “could use an emergency clause to spend up to 1.5% of their GDP on defence investments over the next four years without breaching rules on public deficits and debt” at the state level.[i] The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) mandates that any state’s government budget deficit be kept below 3% of GDP and government debt below 60% of GDP. The regulations are based on Articles 121 and 126 of the Functioning of the European Union basic (i.e., constitutional) law. The weakening of the strictures on states in violation has been the norm rather than the exception. In 2024, for example, the Commission suspended the debt limit out of concern that economic growth would be compromised by state governments raising taxes or cutting spending to reduce their respective total debt to below 60% of GDP. That such reasoning could be used at any time undermines the contention that 2024 uniquely justified the Commission’s caution.

I submit that in actuality, the Commission’s officials were coming to the realization after years of state violations that enforcement of the federal regulations was too difficult for such a weak federation. In other words, the state governments still had not delegated enough authority to the Commission that it could hold the states accountable on matters of exclusive federal competencies.

As for shared competencies (i.e., policy domains of authority), the lack of respect of several states for the federal regulations on deficits and debt suggest that the Commission has its work cut out for it in negotiating with state governments on cooperation on shared policies so federal and state policies on a given matter will not work at cross-purposes.

As for the competencies retained by the states, agreeing to shift at least some of them to the federal level (as enumerated federal powers) is needed so there is a check-and-balance between the states and the union. In other words, that state governments have gotten away with serially violating the Stability and Growth Pact suggests that the Commission does not have enough leverage even to enforce federal regulations on states. The overall balance of governmental sovereignty between the union and the states is itself problematic, or at least sub-optimal.



1. Rory Sullivan, “Sixteen EU Countries to Trigger Clause Increasing Defence Spending,” Euronews.com, 1 May 2025.