E.U. Federalism: On SIS Counterterrorism

The FBI was created in 1908, more than a century after the U.S. federal system of dual sovereignty had gone into effect in 1989; before then, the U.S. had been a military alliance and then a confederation of sovereign countries (under the Articles of Confederation). An ahistorical American mindset tends to overlook the international beginnings of that political union, and especially that the federal system designed in the Convention in 1787 incorporated both national and international elements into the federal level. This history bears not only on the American federal system, but also in how it can be accurately compared with the E.U.’s system, which also divided governmental sovereignty between the federal and state levels, and whose federal level also contains national and international elements, institutionally. Unfortunately for the E.U., the destructive technology available in the twenty-first century, as in advanced weaponry for mass destruction, has put pressure on E.U. officials to federalize intelligence-capabilities that could otherwise take over a century, as in the case of the U.S., to be federalized from the state level. Such pressure could exacerbate fears that the E.U. might be headed like a fast train to becoming a central state, consolidated at the expense of even its distinctly federal elements—for the U.S. had arguably consolidated too much, given its empire-scale, since at least the end of World War II.

A German citizen having some association with Lebanon intentionally drove into a crowd of people at a gay Pride festival in Berlin on 26 July, 2026, killing one person and injuring at least 29 others. “Everything we see here points to us dealing with an Islamic terror attack,” the state’s Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt said.[1] The suspect, who would be killed by police after a manhunt, “had previously sought to join the militant Islamic State group,” according to prosecutors.[2] Even though the problem facing Europeans regarding the presence of socially-conservative Muslims in the relatively open society of the E.U. had obviously not been solved, questions also swirled regarding the all-but-absent E.U. intelligence on the culprit. I contend that the state-biased federal system itself—one that the U.S. also had for over a century at the very least— is culpable.

Even though the Schengen Information System (SIS) “enables police, border guards and customs officers . . . to access real-time alerts on wanted criminals, missing persons and individuals linked to terrorism and other serious crimes,” the alerts are state to state, and even include four countries, so culprits can slip through the cracks.[3] “According to the European Commission, counterterrorism remains primarily the responsibility of individual member states,” with the federal level being limited to facilitating “cooperation through intelligence sharing and common security tools.”[4] Even though the Schengen Information System is “the EU’s common security database,” it allows state authorities “to identify and locate terrorist suspects,” a Commission spokesperson said at the time of the attack. The donut hole in the federal system is evident in the absence of federal authorities and with authority and a “EU-wide intelligence register showing how many people are under surveillance for suspected involvement in Islamic extremist networks,” as each state applies “its own legal definitions, surveillance thresholds, and monitoring practices.”[5] This problem should be obvious, and yet the state-centric bias in the Europeans’ approach to federalism at the empire-level (i.e., consisting of kingdom-level polities) had preempted any fruitful attempts to fill in the hole at the federal level such that it’s role would be more than coordinative.

In the parlance of American history, the anti-federalists (i.e., Euroskeptics) had successfully resisted the creation of an FBI-like agency at the federal (i.e., E.U.) level. That the weapons available to the bad guys had become considerably more dangerous than eighteenth-century muskets did not matter to state officials anxious to preserve their turf from what they would view as encroachment by the Commission. It is precisely this institutional and personal (power) conflict-of-interest that keeps the E.U. from moving to a balanced system of federalism. Such a balance requires more from the federal level than merely a coordinative role, especially if the operative network (i.e. the SIS) is not even limited to E.U. states!

To be sure, a glance over to Hong Kong since China regained control of the “special administrative area” could bring fears that a centralized intelligence operation run by the E.U. could result in “no dark corners” (i.e., security cameras covering every public area) in the E.U. and federal agents too numerous to count (even if they could be recognized) in every E.U. city. Furthermore, Edward Snowdon, once a NSA contractor in the U.S. had made public just how invasive the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) had been in collecting data often without warrants even on American citizens.  E.U. citizens in turn could legitimately be worried about giving their consent to the Commission being expanded to include a NSA-comparable agency. Even just in using some words here that are likely to be “picked up” by the NSA or FBI, or even the CIA even though I am an American citizen within the U.S., I empathize with the fears of E.U. citizens who may have heard of the Pride attack yet still resisted calls to strengthen the E.U.’s intelligence capabilities at the federal level.

Whereas the overly-consolidating tendency of the U.S. at the expense of its federal system inhibits the member-states from acting as a collective check on excessive power at the federal level, the E.U. states were, at least as of 2026, fully able to act as a check should the Commission be charged with doing more than cooperative work in the intelligence field. Whereas in the U.S., it was tenuously assumed that the separation of powers within the federal level would protect citizens from inappropriate intrusion by federal intelligence agencies, E.U. citizens could count not only on the Parliament and the Councils to check the Commission, but also on the state governments to leverage their direct involvement at the federal level, via the Councils, to check the federal executive branch from over-reaching. In this respect, the E.U.’s federal system is healthier, but that assumes that more power is given to the Commission to be checked! It makes little sense to trumpet the ability of the states to act as a check on the Commission on X if the power to do X is still held by the states.

At a more abstract (i.e., federal theory) level, the coordinative role of a federal level is consistent with a confederal system in which, as in the U.S.’s Articles of Confederation, all governmental sovereignty is held by the states. Having federal institutions (and officials) do more than merely coordinate state activities is consistent with “modern” federalism, meaning federalism with dual sovereignty—at least some autonomy is reserved for the states and some for the Union itself. At the empire-scale (of territory), a political union benefits from diverse laws set by its parts as well as unified laws reflecting the common good of the whole. Dual-sovereignty not only allows for both, but also gives each some governmental autonomy from the reach of the other. As of 2026 at least, reliance on the SIS can thus be viewed as founded on a category mistake—taking the E.U. to be a confederation of still-sovereign states rather than a federal system in which both E.U. and state governmental institutions have some sovereignty. Qualified-majority voting alone is enough for dual-sovereignty to be demonstrated as extant in the E.U.’s federal system; exclusive competencies of the Commission add even more support. In short, matching the federal role with the E.U. as federal rather than merely confederal would enhance the security of E.U. citizens because the E.U. would be doing more than coordinative work as state officials of various states variously decide on thresholds for intelligence, and thus on what can be shared with other states.  

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1. Stephen Sorace, “Berlin Pride Attack Suspect Killed in Police Confrontation: AP,” Foxnews.com, July 26, 2026.
2. Anna Weglarczyk, “Berlin Pride Attack Sparks Fresh Questions over EU Intelligence Sharing,” Euronews.com, 28 July, 2026.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

Do Police Departments Unwittingly Attract an Aggressive Mentality?

Might the personality type most excited by inflicting pain on others be drawn to “serve” on a police force?  Might force itself be an allurement to such a personality? Moreover, might organizations populated by the personality be inclined to set up defenses against being held accountable either internally or by other organizations? At the very least, deference ought to go to the victims rather than the “officers.”

The New York City police department and the district attorney’s office set investigations in motion after video surfaced of Anthony Bologna of the police department using pepper spray against protesters of Wall Street greed and the lack of accountability there. Even as the department’s own investigation was yet to commence, the chief publically questioned whether the video offered enough context to evaluate the inspector’s actions. To the chief, merely protesting in a way that blocked traffic justifies the use of pepper spray without warning. The inspector’s union boss claimed the motive had been to restore order—though the video shows that the victims were not disorderly or resisting arrest. Indeed, the police did not attempt to arrest those sprayed. It is not difficult to see where the police investigation of its own will go.

Beyond the hypocrisy involved in those sworn to protect actually attacking and the anti-Americanism involved in trying to curtail a protest, it might reasonably be asked whether Bologna was acting on his own, or whether Wall Street money was ultimately behind the aggression. In the protest’s first four days, the mega media companies scarcely covered the protest; Bologna’s unprovoked aggression came after the news networks could no longer viably ignore the movement. So was the case simply that of American banks using the police state to keep a movement from spreading to their detriment? Were there actual accountability on Bologna, might the bird sing, affording us some transparency concerning any such hidden relationships?

Even if no such conspiracy existed, there is obviously a need for stronger instruments of accountability that could be imposed externally on police departments and their employees. In the wake of Bologna’s attacks, the media reported that such incidents are not uncommon. Indeed, I have witnessed them. While in Pittsburgh, for example, I witnessed how the police treated black teenagers who were simply walking along the sidewalks in the university area of town (Oakland). It was evident to me at the time (as a bystander leaving a restaurant) that the police employees believed they did not face any meaningful accountability. So I was not surprised to see video surface of Anthony Bologna’s sadism on full display in New York.

Thomas Hobbes writes that in the state of nature, and even in society, each person has the right to protect his or her person, as per the right of self-preservation. A sovereign cannot take this inalienable right away. When Bologna acted outside of the law, and thus outside of the social contract, his victims had the right to defend themselves, even in using pepper spray against the attacker. In other words, Bologna could and should have been treated as a criminal attacker by his victims and bystanders. Perhaps in the future protestors ought to carry pepper spray in case any criminals show up and attempt any aggressive attacks. It could be that the offending attackers are imprisoned while the self-preserving protestors are exonerated. Then maybe police departments will recognize that accountability applied to their own employees is in the departments’ interest. Legitimate force goes only so far before it lapses into criminality, and we all have an obligation as citizens to thwart crime as it is happening by whomever. If police employees do not want other citizens to be put in the position of making this judgment, then perhaps those employees might want to reassess their attitude and habits. In the meantime, citizens need to be on guard against criminals even and especially where they are least expected and perhaps most commonly found.

Source:

Al Baker and Joseph Goldstein, “Officer’s Pepper-Spraying of Protesters Is Under Investigation,” New York Times, September 29, 2011. 

Anna Hazare: A Modern Incarnation of Gandhi?

On August 21, 2011 in New Delhi, India, tens of thousands marched in support of Anna Hazare, then in the sixth day of his hunger strike in support of the Jan Lokpal anti-corruption bill. He told the crowd, “Even if the prime minister comes, I will not withdraw my hunger strike until the [bill] is passed in the Parliament. I can die but I will not bend.”[1] What a unique and intriguing statement! To be sure, the man's “professed unwillingness to compromise,” as well as his “occasionally belligerent tone, . . . attracted criticism.”[2] Even so, he inspired mainly hope, particularly from the young. His main constituency, however, was the middle class, who felt alienated and unfairly treated. Hazare self-consciously embraced the model of Gandhi. That model, including the principled unbending, is no stranger in India, yet I am surprised that it took until 2011 for a societal figure so Gandhi-like to emerge and galvanize a mass protest using Gandhi’s methods. Of course, the likeness between the two men could be overstated. How much like Gandhi was Hazare and his political action? For example, would Gandhi have stopped eating simply out of preference for one of two bills before the Parliament? Putting a stop to widespread violence is arguably much more significant than reducing corruption. Also, the demand that conduct be changed is more direct than that a law be enacted unless to abolish an unjust one. 

                              

The uncompromising rectitude plays out differently in the two cases  Gandhi's underlying moral concern made his unwillingness to compromise laudable. Such stubbornness can fall on its face in a legislative context in which political compromise is inherent to the process. In appealing directly to the people for their malicious behavior to stop, Gandhi sidestepped the incrementalism of legislative politics. 

For a refusal to compromise to be a virtue, some pretty convincing principles must be at stake and a clear distinction must be drawn. In other words, a serious moral wrong must be involved. Typically, such a wrong involves great human suffering. Wide-scale  corruption, especially if it involves extortion of the poor and middle class incurs human suffering, but arguably not that which is involved in widespread societal violence that even results in death. In subjecting himself to death, Hazare may thus have been acting disproportionately. Taking up the mantle of Gandhi's method is perhaps not as simple as it may appear. 

1. Jim Yardley, “Thousands Back Antigraft Hunger Strike in New Delhi,” New York Times (August 22, 2011). 
2. Ibid.

Social Media in the UK: Protests and Criminal Activity

Officials from the E.U. state of the United Kingdom met with representatives of Twitter, Facebook and Blackberry on August 26, 2011 “to discuss voluntary ways to limit or restrict the use of social media to combat crime and periods of civil unrest.”[1] Theresa May, the state’s Home Minister, said the aim of the meeting was to “crack down on the networks being used for criminal behavior.”[2] However, reducing the protests, rioting, and looting to such behavior ignores the point that civil unrest can include political protest. So it may be disturbing to some that the discussion, according to some who were present, “was still aimed at reeling in social media and strengthening the hand of law enforcement in gathering information.”[3] What would stop the police from gathering information on people taking part in a political protest against police brutality, for example? It would be convenient for a police department to classify a march as “criminial behavior” in breaching the peace, or simply collect information without any subterfuge.

Jo Glanville, the editor of Index on Censorship, observed, “You do not want to be on a list with the countries that have cracked down on social media during the Arab Spring.”[4] Indeed, Iran sent a human rights delegation to Britain to study human rights violations.” It is worth pointing out that the E.U., of which Britain is a state, has a charter of human rights. Yet as Gordon Scobbie, a senior police employee pointed out, the police’s duty to protect people from being harmed by others should be balanced with human rights rather than simply disregarded. Innocent people in Britain were afraid for their housing and lives during the riots, and it would surely be moral for the police to have protected them. The decisive question is perhaps whether officials’ special access to social media could effectively be limited to this moral purpose, which is delimited by criminal rather than political behavior.

As Lord Acton said, absolute power corrupts absolutely. If the state gains too much control over individual citizens, that alone can act as a pressure-cooker that could explode in political violence and even revolution. What would stop a government from using its inroads in social media to defend itself from the political opposition? Furthermore, to the extent that social interaction and liberty are things that should be valued in a society (and republic), might decreased privacy, such as is already the case on Facebook, be counterproductive in the long run? Might even the potential invasiveness lead people to feel less secure, and thus more susceptible to joining efforts to topple the regime itself? In other words, too much institutional control of individuals can backfire and give rise to a self-fulfilling prophesy.

1. Ravi Somaiya, “In Britain, A Meeting on Limiting Social Media,” The New York Times, August 26, 2011. 

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

The London Riots of 2011: Protesting Police Power

Over three nights of rioting in London after the police shooting of a 29-year-old father of four, over 450 people had been arrested and 44 police officers injured. The rioting began on August 6, 2011 when a peaceful march in protest of the police use of lethal force turned violent. According to The Huffington Post, “Hooded and masked youths threw bottles and petrol bombs at police and buildings and vehicles, setting a building, a bus and cars alight.”[1] The source of the violence seems clear, at least with respect to its beginning. Rather than being fueled by greed at that point, anger at a possible abuse of power by the local police seems to have been the motive.[2] To be sure, rioting spread to include the looting of stores by kids and opportunistic adult thieves, but to claim that greed itself was the driving force instigating the riots is to miss the purpose of the initial march and give the London police a pass.

According to The New York Times, “The Daily Telegraph struck a popular chord when it blamed a ‘culture of greed and impunity’ that [the Telegraph] said extended to corporate boardrooms and the government itself.”[3] Indeed, the greed that almost took down the global financial system in September 2008 seemed unglued from any feasible normative constraint, including that proffered by Christianity (which formerly could threaten an afterlife literally of fire and brimstone).  Indeed, the Christian virtue of magnificence (i.e., philanthropy on a grand scale) can even perpetuate greed, as being wealthy is a prerequisite— rather unlike like a camel too big to get through the eye of a needle. Left unanswered by The Telegraph, however, was how or whether the greed in a bank’s boardroom that results in liars’ loans followed by foreclosures differs from the greed of a looter.  The differential treatment by the state government was palpable: bankers get bailouts (and bonuses), while looters get the full force of the law.

In any case, irrespective of any accretions of greed having been adjoined to the violence, residual anger at the police’s use of their power was likely in play as late as the third night, when, according to the deputy Mayor, “disturbing levels of violence were directed at officers again,”[4] including one policeman suffering broken bones and another receiving an eye injury. Were greed the only motive, anger would not have been directed at the police. Rather, the strategy would have simply been to evade them.

Furthermore, lest it be presumed that the anger over the force used by the police was simply a manifestation of selfishness, it could be argued alternatively that the unselfish human motive to stand up to power in the midst of an injustice was involved. This is not to justify the behavior, for the protestors/rioters would have been wiser to wait for the Independent Police Complaints Commission do its work and arrive at a determination; an unsatisfactory answer could then be matched with peaceful protest and an unwillingness to volunteer to help the police, rather than with violence.

At a distance from all the “mayhem,” I suspect that there is more to this story than merely a reaction against one incident (and even the looting).  I would not be surprised if the local police had a pattern of behavior of abuse of power, and that the shooting of the father of four was the last straw. To be sure, the troubled youth culture that partook of the violence and stealing is perhaps just as corrosive as unaccountable police abuse of citizens. Both problems are in need of being addressed in many cities around the world, not just in London. This is not to say that the riots reduce to public policy choices such as spending cuts in services (or to a debate on them). A police culture that does not respect law or citizens is unacceptable in a free society. A police officer who ignores department policy and even law to push a citizen beyond what is right and lawful is just as much of a thug as is the teenager who throws rocks at store windows in order to steal a plasma TV. To be sure, a youth culture of utter disrespect for others is also unacceptable, and it would be good if citizens would stand up to such thugs. Standing above both the police and teenage self-vaunted bullies are the people who sought to march in peace to point to the possible injustice of the initial killing. My point is simply that those people and their message were too quickly forgotten in the public uproar about greed, selfishness and the slow police response.

Therefore, rather than point to greed and selfishness exclusively, I would recommend that the investigation by the IPCC be expanded to look at whether the London police department has a pattern of abuse of citizens. That the department was inadequate in responding to the first riots suggests a culture of incompetence, and such a culture can easily go with an unethical culture. Where there is smoke, there is usually fire too—meaning they may not have only been in the cars and buildings. Riots do not pop up out simply from greed, which is more or less a constant in human nature. Nor do selfish people wake up one day and start rioting because they are suddenly more selfish. Rather, specific injustices fomenting resentment and frustration are much more likely to spark violence (which in turn can enable kids and adults to steal and destroy property even as ends in themselves).

I am not denying that people are greedy. In fact, emphasizing justice, especially in terms of benevolence, can serve as a constraint on greed! Along with actively valuing justice, people can have a low tolerance for injustice when accountability seems compromised or utterly corrupted by power-aggrandizement. Of course, two wrongs don’t make a right even where an injustice is the spark; the initial march could and should have remained peaceful.  Non-violent non-cooperation—including giving a corrupt police force the cold shoulder, actively ignoring police on their beat as outside society—would do more to make the sordid presumption of assumed power transparent.

1. Dina Rickman, “London Riots,” The Huffington Post, August 9, 2011. 

2. “Questions Over Duggan’s Death as Tension in London Remains High,” The Huffington Post, August 8, 2011.

3. Ravi Somaiya, “After Riots, Conflicting Answers as to ‘Why’,”The New York Times, August 13, 2011. 

3. Dina Rickman, “London Riots,” The Huffington Post, August 9, 2011.

Bad Psychology and Political Violence: A Toxic Cocktail

Before the assassination attempt on Rep. Gabrielle Giffords in early 2011, it had been quite some time since there had been a major assassination attempt on American soil. The attempt on President Reagan had been almost thirty years earlier. During the intervening time, the naive view that American politics had outgrown such barbaric acts of political violence could grow and thrive. Then in July 2011, the world witnessed an anti-Muslim European go on a shooting spree in a delusional sense of being at war. In his mind, there was an actual war and his acts were justified. In fact, he viewed himself after the fact as a savior. Undoubtedly, there was no internal check in his mind for how far his sense of political reality could get from the “facts on the ground.”

To be sure, there are some political crazies out there, and they are not necessarily mentally ill. If you have ever been to a public political speech or event, I would be surprised if you didn't notice a few people who seemed unseasonably animated or perhaps simply odd--their quirks being brought out by the political nature of the event. I am not referring to simply voicing a different point of view here, or even expressing some emotion that could be reasonably expected in a political context. So I am not pointing simply to people exercising their first amendment right of free speech--a right that cannot insist on conformity of opinion. Rather, what I am getting at is the inordinate expression of emotion, which doesn't seem to fit with what one would make sense in coming from the political context. It is only natural in observing a person evincing odd behavior to suspect something else in play—something idiosyncratic to the person's psychological condition.

When uniqueness or quirkiness goes further to schizophrenia, the mix of mental illness with politics seems to be a particularly toxic cocktail. Sadly, there seems to be little or no self-restraint in the minds of many untreated schizophrenics; the quirky person, having a tenuous grasp of political reality, can unexpectedly make a beeline to “taking matters in one’s own hand.” Public officials—and the rest of us—must undoubtedly keep this point in mind.

Of course, I could simply be observing that society contains people who are not of the familiar norm. Perhaps going to a political rally or speech proffers a chance to see just what our society looks like, beyond one's circle of friends, co-workers and family. Coming out of our homes and work environments, away from our friends and family, we find that there exist people in the broader society who are "different" from us. That is to say, we realize that not everyone is like us psychologically. Of course, this doesn't mean they are crazy. "Different" must be distinguished from "emotionally disturbed." Even so, it must be admitted, I think, that there are disturbed people who react in a political situation much as an alcoholic might in being at a party. Most people at a party chat and laugh, dance and eat, but then there is the person who loses control and behaves in a way not accounted for by the context.

In the case of Rep. Giffords, the suspect was by several accounts a very troubled man. The New York Times described the suspect in court as being "wide-eyed."[2] At the defense table, "his eyes darted back and forth and his mouth curled up at one point into a quick smile."[3] He had been kicked out of college after having been disruptive in several classes. In the case of the shootings in Norway, the suspect’s own lawyer admitted that the guy was insane to believe he was fighting a real anti-Muslim war in Europe. I suspect that were you or me to talk with either suspect, we would be shocked as to how different (not just strange) their versions of political reality are; we might be surprised that individuals with such an unchecked-warped view of social reality could function in society. We might wonder why such persons are not in a more structured environment. Society itself may be too loose—too tolerant.

The “live free or die” attitude in modern society and the associated right of free speech should not be an excuse for a society to allow untreated schizophrenics to evade treatment. If they want the freedom to be sick, society has a greater right (and obligation) to protect the sick and the society. We need to question the right of untreated mental illness in society, as though there were a right to be sick wherein there other people are put at risk. Structured living arrangements, for example, could be required—with less structure available in exchange for accepting meds. If psychologists were required to treat poor malcontents in society pro bono as part of the license to practice, society itself would look much different and we would all be among the beneficiaries.

1. Huffington Post, “Anders Behring Breivik, Oslo Terror Suspect, Asks How Many He Killed,” July 26, 2011. 
2. Marc Lacey, “Shooting Suspect Waives Bail and Is Ruled ‘a Danger,’” The New York Times, January 10, 2011. 
3. Ibid.