Behind Political Culture: U.S. President Clinton’s Lying under Oath

The stature that comes with occupying (and even having occupied) public office, whether elected or appointed and especially if high office, combined with the ability to attract the attention of the media such that the (former) official’s statements have the credibility of pronouncements, and thus of being true rather than false statements, is rarely examined for what the stature and societal “mouth-piece” imply (i.e., veracity). A very high former elected representative who has even admitted lying under oath in a court proceeding back while in office can very easily be assumed decades later to be making a true statement by the public even though that statement is practically identical to the statement known (and admitted) to have been false. Even published photos that are strong evidence that the second statement is false can be dismissed by a public too liable to being beguiled by clever political birds of prey. I have in mind here the twin statements of Bill Clinton, who was the U.S. President for two terms in the 1990s and went on to associate with Jeffrey Epstein, the infamous head of the child-prostitute sex-ring, and at least one of his paid girls.

At least three compromising photos of Clinton with girls in close proximity were released by the FBI to my knowledge in 2026. In one photo, Clinton is situated between Maxwell, who was Epstein’s accomplice, and an under-aged girl in an indoor pool at a resort (not in the U.S.). Maxwell would later be convicted (and imprisoned) for her role in arranging girls for Epstein’s clients. In another photo, Clinton is sitting in a hot-tub with an underaged girl. In a third photo, he is seated with one arm (and hand) low around the waist of a girl in what appears to be Epstein’s private jet. To be sure, even though the positioning of Clinton’s arm (and his hand) low around the girl’s waist connotes sexual rather than paternal interest, and that a girl is with Clinton in the hot-tub photo (and the pool photo) are together highly suggestive, none of those photos is evidence that Clinton raped (i.e., had sex with) one or more of Epstein’s girls. Moreover, anyone accused of a crime is assumed to be innocent in any of the United States unless or until the accused is convicted in a court of law of having broken a law.

Even though the arm being around a girl’s waist and being in a pool with an under-aged girl and an adult whom we can now say definitely arranged Epstein’s girls for sex may bring to mind the old phrase, “where there is smoke, there is fire,” I bring up the matter of the photos merely as context to show just how misguided it was for the American public to assume that Clinton was testifying honestly before a Congressional committee in 2026 on his relationships with Epstein and the child-prostitutes. That Clinton was recognizable (i.e., fame) and had political stature as a former U.S. president are not sufficient for the default-assumption to be that even what he has said under oath is truthful rather than mendacious. This is the idea.

Asked under oath while testifying before a Congressional committee if he had had “sexual relations” with the woman in the hot-tub photo, Clinton answered, “No.”[1] Even if the photos make his answer difficult to believe, that he also “denied knowledge of Epstein’s crimes” may be so incredulous that a person could reasonably toss out all of Clinton’s testimony for being deceitful throughout.[2] It is possible that he rationalized lying because, as he had claimed, he believed that the Congressional subpoena, which he had unlawfully ignored, had been politically motivated.  Because Clinton claimed to have been unaware of Epstein’s business (i.e., prostituting girls to the rich and/or famous) in spite of spending leisure time with the criminal and his accomplice, and because Clinton knowingly violated the law by ignoring a Congressional subpoena, a rational basis can be laid for leaning at the very least toward concluding that Clinton lied under oath about having committed statutory rape.

Clinton being asked whether he had had sexual relations with a child-prostitute ought to ring a bell for anyone who was following U.S. politics toward the end of Clinton’s time in the White House. Back in January, 2001, the media reported that in “an 11-hour deal to avoid criminal charges over his sex-and-lies fling with Monica Lewinsky, President Clinton . . . admitted ‘knowingly’ lying under oath.”[3] Clinton had to surrender his Arkansas law license and pay a $25,000 fine. Stating, “certain of my responses to questions about Ms. Lewinsky were false,” on his last day in office, Clinton was referring to his responses made under oath in a deposition to questions including, “Did you have sexual relations” with Lewinsky? His answer under oath was a perjurious “No.” Sound familiar? Why would anyone lend any credence to Clinton’s answer to the same question decades later in regard to a child-prostitute? Why would his answer be reported as though his earlier answer to the same question in regard to another woman were truthful?

I contend that a person who has admitted to having lied, under oath, in answering a question of having had inappropriate sexual relations (with an intern) and is asked the same exact question (regarding a child-prostitute) should at the very least be viewed as questionable in terms of whether his second answer can be believed to be true. At the very least, the media should have inserted a footnote to remind readers that Clinton had lied, “I did not have sexual relations with that woman,” in speaking to the American people about Lewinsky’s “oral” contact with Clinton in the Oval Office. To the extent that the American public’s reaction to reports of Clinton’s Congressional testimony in 2026 was muted rather than publicly raising the obvious point that especially on the matter of sexual relations, Clinton was not to be believed, the undue credit that is implied or inherent in holding (or having held) public office and having a mouthpiece in the established, “main-stream” media can be surmised and judged to be problematic in themselves.

Societal credibility enjoys a certain default that, even if dislodged once as in the case of Clinton, can exist without any real foundation based in the character of the office-holder celebrities.  This is not to say that if they are caught “red-handed,” such as U.S. President Nixon was, and members of Congress have been more commonly, societal credibility can be difficult to regain. My point is that the public tends to swallow too easily that which should at the very least be held as suspect in terms of veracity. That Clinton lied under oath and to the American people about having had sexual relations with Lewinsky in the 1990s should have registered on the media’s radar screen and in popular reaction to Clinton’s answer, again under oath, to the same question, to Congress in 2026. An old dog can indeed learn new tricks, but personal ethical development should not be assumed as if the proverbial dog had not done the old, sordid deed once already.

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1. Leo Briceno, “WATCH: Bill Clinton Grilled on Shirtless Hot Tub Photo amid Swirling Questions on Epstein Relationship,” Foxnews.com, March 2, 2026.
2. Ibid (on the quoted material).
3. Marilyn Rauber, “Finally Admits He Lied under Oath: Dodges Criminal Charges with a Last-Minute Deal,” California Post, January 19, 2001.

U.S. Presidential Encroachment on State Prerogatives

Both in the E.U. and U.S., the member-states are semi-sovereign, and are even guaranteed all residual sovereignty that is not in any of the enumerated competencies (i.e., powers) of the respective unions and the states. Europeans are smart to have multiple avenues for the state governments in the European Council and the Council of Ministers so those governments can protect themselves against encroachment by the Commission. To be sure, these safeguards go too far, especially given the sheer number of states even by the mid-2020s, in giving each state a veto especially on important matters in which qualified-majority voting does not apply. In other words, the safeguards against federal encroachment in the E.U. are excessive as long as each state can wield its veto against federal policies, legislation, and regulations. Regarding the latter, the directive means provides each state with some latitude. I suspect that the Europeans who constructed the E.U.’s federal system were in part fearful of federal encroachment because so much of that had already built-up in the U.S., where federal consolidation had become a threat to the governmental sovereignty of the member-states, as if they were just regions rather than republics holding even more sovereignty, on parchment at least, than does Congress and the federal president. So, it is worth taking not of the rare instances in which a state legislature pushes back against threats from the U.S. president on a competency (i.e., enumerated power) reserved by the states.  The rejection by the Indiana Senate of U.S. President Trump’s pressure to accept new districts for U.S. House representatives from Indiana—a map in which the Republican Group would likely pick up two seats—is important because Congressional-district maps are the prerogative of the states rather than an encroaching federal executive.

According to Article 1, Section 4 of the U.S. basic law (consolidated as a constitution), the member-states have the primary authority to regulate the “times, places, and manner” of the U.S. House or Representatives’ elections. This authority includes enacting the boundaries of the districts within a state. To be sure, Congress has been delegated authority to override a state’s Congressional-district map, as federal oversight is in line with the “checks and balances” feature of modern federalism. For instance, a state’s map that discriminates against regions populated mostly by a racial minority would be ripe for Congressional action. It is significant that the U.S. president plays no role either in crafting such maps or in oversight. Therefore, U.S. President Trump’s threats laid against certain senators in the Indiana Senate so they would pass a new Congressional map before the next census so to give Trump’s Republican group in the U.S. House of Representatives more representation than otherwise would likely be the case was a case of federal encroachment of a state power encased in the U.S. Constitution. The Indiana senators voted prudently and justifiably in rejecting the U.S. President’s “bully tactics.”

Senator Michael Crider, a Republican, who faced “threats of violence and intimidation,” issued a statement after he voted no on the redistricting proposal.[1] “When you get kind of bullied and threatened, if that tactic works, then you can expect to deal with that for the rest of your political career.”[2] Sen. Vaneta Becker issued the following statement: “I think this looks like and feels like bullying, and I don’t think Hoosiers respond well to bullying.”[3] Neither, I might add, do Illinoisians on the other side of the Wabash river, to whom people from the Indiana side of the river-border used to shout, “Whos you’r,” hence the mascot, “Hoosier”, instead of who are you?

The same consequences of giving into a bully can be said of a state legislature; once it capitulates to threats and pressure from the federal executive (or Congress), threats will be more likely to continue and even become more dire until the member-state legislators are afraid to use even the powers reserved for the states. In the case of the redistricting plan, President Trump even threatened the Indiana government that federal funds would be cut off from the state in retaliation for not approving the president’s partisan plan. Sen. Spencer Deery made the problem of encroachment on the state explicit: “As long as I have breath, I will use my voice to resist a federal government that attempts to bully, direct and control this state or any state. Giving the federal government more power is not conservative.”[4] That a prerogative of a state legislature could be circumvented “at the whim of a president’s request” was too much for Sen. Mike Bohacek too.[5] Therefore, both in terms of threatening Indiana lawmakers, who have been democratically elected, and in terms of eclipsing federalism, wherein the vital element of checks-and-balances between the federal institutions and those of states, the political courage of the Indiana Republican senators who voted against President Trump’s partisan plan is laudable. Threats of violence have no place in politics, and efforts to usurp the governmental sovereignty that is reserved for the states, whether in the U.S. or E.U., should be resisted lest the check-and-balance “oversight” feature of modern, dual-sovereignty, federalism be lost.

Fortunately, the “acts of intimidation and threats and acts of violence targeting [Republican Indiana] senators who opposed” the proposal backfired, as a majority of the 40 Republican senators voted against the bill.[6] Ironically, politically conservative principles were cited by some of those senators. The head of the Republican Group in the Indiana Senate, Sen. Rodric Bray, said, “many of my caucus members don’t think redrawing our Congressional map mid-cycle is a guaranteed way for Indiana.”[7] In short, changing maps for partisan purposes mid-way through a decade violates the tradition of redrawing maps only just after the U.S. census, which occurs once every decade. As per conservative principles, Bray urged Republicans to campaign more so as to sway a district that was then held by a Democrat but becoming increasingly Republican. As the saying goes, elections have consequences.

 

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1. Paul Blumenthal, “These Are The Indiana Republicans Who Voted To Crush Trump’s Redistricting Plan,” The Huffington Post, December 12, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.

Texas Overreaching

With enough Democratic members of the Texas House of Representatives staying in Illinois and New York as of August 3, 2025 that the legislative chamber could not reach a quorum and thus be able to hold a vote on a Congressional redistricting plan that could gain the Republic Party five more seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, Greg Abbott, who at the time was Texas’ head of state and head of the executive branch, was considering various options to bring the lawmakers back. That only one of those options was legal points to the importance of the rule of law being applied to government officials.

The most egregious option, legally speaking, had been proposed by the Attorney General, Ken Paxton, who wrote, the “cowards should be found, arrested, and brought back to the Capitol immediately.”[1] In other words, police whose jurisdiction is limited to Texas would be able to have the jurisdiction expanded by Abbot. “He has no legal mechanism,” Rep. Jolando Jones, one of the departed Texas lawmakers said; “Subpoenas from Texas don’t work in New York, so he can’t come and get us. Subpoenas in Texas don’t work in [Illinois].”[2] The Texas Supreme Court had ruled in 2021 that leaders of the House of Representatives had the authority to “physically compel the attendance” of missing representatives, but not even a decision by Texas’s Supreme Court can reach into Illinois or New York; only the U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction throughout the bloc.[3] Hyperextending police-power in Texas beyond even the jurisdiction of the Texas Supreme Court would set a bad precedent that could be used even to cover police brutality. That the Attorney General of Texas suggested the blatantly illegal usurping of Illinois’s retained sovereignty by extending that of Texas is itself troubling. In a federal system, it is necessary that everyone colors within the lines.

Abbott was also considering what was only “a nonbinding legal opinion issued by Republican Attorney General Ken Paxton that suggested a court could determine that a legislator had forfeited {one’s] office.”[4] Based only on Paxton’s legal opinion, Abbott said he would “begin trying to remove Democratic lawmakers from office.”[5] Presumably he would make the request to a judge rather than remove the lawmakers by his own authority, which again would be illegal even by Paxton’s reasoning.

The only option backed up by extant law that Abbott was considering is fining the absent lawmakers $500 a day, though even that option was being twisted by Ken Paxton, who was running for the U.S. Senate at the time. He “suggested that lawmakers may have committed felonies by raising money to help pay for fines they could face.”[6] So it was apparently illegal to have someone one pay one’s fine. Be careful in Texas if a friend or relative, or even a charity organization, is willing to pay your traffic ticket; you may be committing a felony, which, by the way, is a type of federal law. Perhaps Paxton was actually positioning himself for, or worse, already saw himself, as the U.S. Attorney General rather than a U.S. senator.

That the options that Greg Abbott, the figure-head and chief executive of the Texas government, was considering tended to push beyond what was legal at the time is itself worthy of noticing, for such power-aggrandizement by a member-state in a federal system can, if it were to spread, doom that system as state governments turn on each other and the U.S. president takes sides, thus undercutting that presiding role.

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1. Joey Cappelletti and Andrew DeMillo, “Texas Governor Threatens to Remove Democrats Who Left State over Trump-backed Redistricting,” The Associated Press, August 4, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. I am using a word that is popular in the E.U. for a federal system in which governmental sovereignty is split between a union and states. In truth rather than ideology, “bloc” applies neither to the E.U. or U.S.
4. Joey Cappelletti and Andrew DeMillo, “Texas Governor Threatens to Remove Democrats Who Left State over Trump-backed Redistricting,” italics added for emphasis.
5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

Undermining the U.S. Supreme Court: Non-Jurisprudential Ideology and the U.S. Constitution

As in the case of the Roman Empire, which internal corruption likely weakened and even destroyed centuries after that empire had been a republic, modern republics are also not immune from internal decay. Even though political corruption can go under the radar, especially if systemic rather than merely episodic or around particular office holders, the subtle, gradual impact can be just as destructive than had Carthage defeated Rome’s general, Skippio Africanus, in north Africa. Making subtle decadence all the more embarrassing is the fact that it can be right under the noses of upstanding office-holders. I contend that this is the case with Chief Justice John Roberts of the U.S. Supreme Court.

In his annual report in December, 2024, Roberts “slammed what he described as ‘dangerous’ talk by some officials [in the two other branches, or arms, of the U.S. Government] about ignoring court rulings,” as that could result in a judiciary that is less than independent of the legislative and executive branches and their respective members.[1] Both Republicans and Democrats had “hinted at ignoring rulings in recent years.”[2] To Roberts, that every presidential administration “suffers defeats in the court system—sometimes in cases with major ramifications”[3]—is the main reason why some presidents, including Andrew Jackson, have been tempted to leave it to the high court to enforce its rulings rather than rely on the executive branch. But this explanation ignores something else—something just below Roberts’ nose.

Even as Roberts “lamented that ‘public officials’ . . . had ‘regrettably’ attempted to intimidate judges by ‘suggesting political bias in the judge’s adverse rulings without a credible basis for such allegations,” the chief justice dismissed the claim of political bias as “inappropriate.”[4] I submit that the claim has sufficient basis to be taken seriously, and, furthermore, that it goes beyond questions about the ethics of particular justices, such as Thomas’ acceptance of vacations and Alito allowing his wife to fly a right-wing flag at one of their houses.

Proverbially with a straight face, the chief justice wrote in his 2024 year-end report that the role of the judicial branch is “to say what the law is.”[5] I submit that the justices do more than that. Just in the media referring to “the conservative 6-3 majority” contains the implicit assumption that there are indeed conservative and liberal justices and that such labels go beyond referring to jurisprudential hermeneutics (i.e., approaches to interpreting the U.S. Constitution) and even what opinions on what law itself is. Emphasizing what the words in the document meant in 1787 versus what they mean today, or privileging the original intent of the delegates at the U.S. Constitutional Convention versus interpreting the text in terms of the modern world are just two examples of how the words conservative and progressive (or liberal) could appropriately be applied to court justices in a way that delimits the extent to which their ideology can play a role.

I submit that when Justice Sandra O’Conner wrote the U.S. Supreme Court’s majority opinion before the oral arguments in Bush v. Gore—the ruling that effectively gave George W. Bush the federal presidency—something more political than jurisprudential hermeneutics being applied was in play. That O’Conner had been a Republican in Arizona’s lower house from 1969-1974 may have something to do with why she subsequently wrote the Bush v. Gore opinion for the conservative, Republican-nominated majority before even oral arguments were heard.

Furthermore, that justices who were against abortion constituted the majority opinion that overturned Roe v. Wade (1973) may suggest that a non-juridical ideology played a role, and thus that those justices went beyond merely deciding what the law is to stating what it should be. That the justices who constituted the majority in the Citizens United (2010) case were conservative, and thus likely pro-business, may have meant that the nonjuridical economic ideology of free, unencumbered markets even manifesting with money being free-speech was in play.

On the other ideological side, it is likely that attitudes towards race played a role in the liberal majority’s opinion in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education (1954) that separation is not equal and thus racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional. Similarly, the finding of an implicit privacy right in the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution in order to render abortion legal in the Roe v. Wade decision may point to an extra-judicial ideology bearing on life and abortion, and even religion, as being in the driver’s seat.

When moral, political, cultural, or even religious ideologies or beliefs are salient in a judicial decision, then the designation of conservative or liberal points to a broader judgment both as concerning the justices themselves and their respective rulings. If such broadly-informed judgment is really what the electorate in a republic should bring to voting, then the implication is that public matters requiring or even just fitting such broad judgment should not be decided by unelected justices. I submit that such deference is precisely the point on which Roberts and his court (as well as other, past courts, including that of Warren) has lapsed. Individual judges and even an entire court can thus be seen as opportunistic in short-circuiting the prerogative that actually belongs to the popular sovereign: the people. This does not mean that the will of a majority of an electorate should trample over individual rights, as a judiciary is rightfully charged with protecting such rights precisely because a majority of an electorate may act heedless of minorities, as can legislatures and even presidents; but defending rights from majoritarian tyranny does not mean or require a judge coloring beyond the jurisprudential lines on a page to impose one’s own exogenous ideology, which anyone could do—hence the deference.

That the U.S. presidency, which unfortunately has been partisan at the expense of the credibility needed to preside, nominates U.S. Supreme Court justices and Republican or Democratic U.S. Senators (and occasionally an Independent) confirm the nominees means not only that politically conservative or liberal justices can be expected to be sitting on the bench, but also, and perhaps more importantly— though unfortunately almost invisible to the naked eye—the selection process itself is culpable in essentially exporting political judgments from the American electorates to the unelected justices. In short, Americans should not be surprised at all that political ideology, infused with moral, economic, and even religious valued beliefs, has such an impact in U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The U.S. Constitution itself is biased in favor of this, and that the amendment process is itself so hard to complete means that the vulnerability to partisanship on the bench that is structural in the document is effectively intractable.

Being human, all too human, all of us would love to imprint our respective ideologies on law, whether statutory or common. So, we should all have the means to do so through the vote. Essentially, I am arguing that popular sovereignty—government by the people rather than vice versa—has unwittingly ceded too much territory to the U.S. Supreme Court under the subterfuge of an expansive notion of judicial interpretation. Ironically, there is thus a silver lining in this respect to the anti-abortion justices imposing their moral or religious beliefs in overturning Roe v. Wade because as a direct result, some state legislatures have voted on legislation bearing on abortion and even the voters in some states have been able to exercise their popular sovereignty by being able to vote directly on the matter via referendi.[6]

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1. John Fritze, “Roberts Warns Against Ignoring Supreme Court Rulings As Tension With Trump Looms,” CNN.com, December 31, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. That last word is the plural form of referendum; you can blame Latin, and ultimately the Romans whose empire fell at least in part due to corruption within. No human social artifact can be expected to last forever. 

The Senate Trial of President Trump: Riddled with Conflicts of Interest

At the beginning of a U.S. Senate trial on whether to remove an impeached U.S. president from office, the senators take an oath to be impartial jurists. The impartiality is important because the senators are theoretically to listen to the partial U.S. House prosecuting managers and the president’s defense lawyers. Were the senators themselves partial, they would simply reflect the two sides that make their respective cases. In the trial of Donald Trump, I submit that few if any senators had any intention of being impartial and thus as serving as a jurist rather than as an extension of the prosecutors or defense. In effect, the verdict is left to whichever political party controls the Senate. I contend that having the Senate try presidents is problematic due to a conflict of interest.

To be sure, removal from office requires a two-thirds majority so the verdict cannot be made only by one party—especially if it is other than that which the president heads. Yet to reply in such a scenario on the party that the president heads brings in a conflict of interest. Such a conflict is particularly pronounced when the president’s party controls the Senate. In such a case, even the rules of the trial, which are decided by majority vote, can be expected to be skewed in favor of the defendant (i.e., the president). It is simply too much to ask human nature to be impartial whether in setting up the trial or in acting as an impartial jurist in such a conflict of interest. This is why I contend in Institutional Conflicts of Interest that conflicts of interest are inherently unethical (i.e., even they are not exploited for personal or institutional gain).

The gravity of the conflict of interest can be easily detected when it is being exploited in rather obvious ways. Sen. Lindsey Graham (Republican), “a close ally of the [Republican] president, criticized Democratic House managers’ arguments at the trial in recent days, calling Thursday’s presentations ‘like way too much. [1] Graham made the comment when the prosecutors were making their opening statement, so the implication is that he was already not impartial for he did not wait until even the conclusion of both opening statements to make his statement. The sheer brazenness suggests that senators of both parties may have regarded the oath of impartiality as a sham. Indeed, even the labeling of the prosecutors as Democrats and the defense attorneys as Republicans can tell us that political partisanship dwarfed the oath.

In the trial of President Trump, the party he headed at the time controlled the Senate. Given this conflict of interest, it is not surprising (sadly) to find the trail schedule modified to suite the president. After he complained about low television viewership-levels on Saturdays being “Death Valley in T.V.,” the Senate’s majority leader announced that the first day of the president’s defense attorneys’ opening statement, which was on a Saturday, would only be for a few hours. The defense was “planning a more robust presentation for Monday and Tuesday.[2] To be sure, two Democratic Senators running for president had campaign events scheduled for that Saturday night, but I submit that the majority leader was more attentive to the defendant’s wishes than to campaigning senators of the other party—the one that the president does not head. The defendant was able to schedule his own trial.

The president’s reach extended even to whether the trial would have witnesses! Former National Security Director John Bolton could have provided a first-hand account of the president having admitted to holding appropriated military aid to Ukraine until the Ukraine president publicly announced that his government was launching an investigation into Trump’s likely presidential rival in 2020, Joe Biden (and his son). But the president’s majority party in the Senate refused to allow the witness nonetheless, even as the president’s defense argued that the prosecutors had not provided first-hand account testimony from an impeachment witness in the House (which in turn is debatable).

Impartial jurists of the president’s party argued as if they were part of the defense that calling witnesses could run into the obstacle of the president claiming executive privilege. One of the prosecutors, a member of the opposition party, replied that the U.S. Chief Justice, who was presiding over the trial, could make such a determination, but such a rule could be overridden by a majority vote (the president’s party being in the majority) by the Senate.[3] Here again the institutional conflict of interest is evident. Senators of the president’s own party could vote to override the Chief Justice to block witnesses in the trial.

Even in terms of documents that the president had refused to provide to the U.S. House in its impeachment investigation, the Senate’s majority looked the other way. Rep. Sylvia Garcia, a prosecuting manager, said in the opening statement, "The House investigative committees sought a total of 71 specific categories of documents from six different agencies and offices. President Trump blocked every single one of these requests, all of them." Between Dec. 27, 2019 and Oct. 10, 2019, Garcia said, “House investigative committees issued subpoenas to the State Department, the White House, the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Defense and the Energy Department. Some agencies initially suggested that they might comply. Some turned over documents to the Trump administration so they could be turned over the Congress. But in the end, the president turned over nothing in response to the House impeachment inquiry,” she said.[4] Surely national security would not have been compromised in all of those documents, yet the Senate exploiting the conflict of interest would tell future presidents that supplying documents critical of the administrations can be avoided. What then of the legislative check on the executive branch?

Was the trial of President Trump even a trial without witnesses, potentially critical documents, and even an impartial jury? To the extent that the defendant could get his way even in the voting on the trial’s rules, could the trial be viewed as valid? Apparently it was. Not even the Chief Justice could enforce the oath of impartiality. Senators having made statements showing prejudice for or against the defendants could perhaps have been disqualified. The two-third majority could then perhaps have been applied to senators with an open mind, although silence does not necessary mean that a person is impartial. Also, presumable the Senate could override the ruling on particular senators or forbid such rulings, as no one likes to be excluded. Again we would find a conflict of interest in the disciplined being able to overrule the impartial judge.

Hamilton suggested at the constitutional convention that the U.S. Supreme Court decide whether an impeached president should be removed from office. It was felt, however, that such a role would put the impartial court into the political realm, especially to the extent that the justices are biased toward the defendant one way or the other. Justices are nominated by presidents, after all. I contend that such bias would be less intense than in the U.S. Senate because judicial reasoning and judgment can temper the influence of politics in the Supreme Court even though ideological bias is likely present generally (though it may be indirect, rather than direct as in the Senate). Put another way, the defendant’s party controlled the Senate, but the justices would be less likely to take orders from the defendant, especially given the Court’s reverence for the institution of a trial (e.g., witnesses, impartial judges and thus scheduling). In contrast, senators may tend to view a trial of a president as fitting within the framework of a political debate, wherein no one is impartial and “horse-trading” to get votes to exploit a conflict of interest are acceptable. Imagine a jury of a criminal trial making deals in deliberation such as, “You vote guilty and I’ll see that you get a car loan.” In the Senate, the majority (and minority) leader could privately promise something of political or economic value to a senator of the same party who would otherwise vote to allow witnesses. Indeed, if enough majority-party senators are not impartial, setting the rules of the trial is also a conflict of interest. In the Trump trial, the majority leader was opposed to witnesses even before he took the oath of impartiality. Rather than having the Senate establish the rules, the U.S. Supreme Court could do so in order to obviate the conflict of interest, which is especially pronounced when the Senate votes on rules (such as whether to allow witnesses) during the trial!

What about having the American electorate act as the jury? Is there any basis to assume that We the People would be less partisan? The biases in the Senate may be a muffled representation of a polarized electorate. Additionally, the electorate was largely not following the trial, let alone listening to the opening and closing statements. In the case of the Trump trial, the next presidential election would be in less than a year. In a presidential election, a myriad of factors come into play--the articles of impleachment being just two. Less knowledge of the case is needed; the matter is more one of an overall judgment of the incumbent (as well as the challenger). Lest it be argued that the regular elections be sufficient to hold a president accountable, such reliance would do nothing to purge the U.S. of a criminal such as Nixon mid-term in order to stop the bleeding. It may be that a majority of the senators assessed the two articles of impeachment against Trump as not sufficient to justify removing the president from office, but given the institutional (and possibly personal) conflicts of interest, the electorate cannot be confident. Judging from the smile on the majority leader's face just after he met with a republican senator previously in favor of allowing John Boltan to testify, I believe that horse-trading went on regarding the setting of at least one of the trail's rules. If it sounds strange that jurists in a trial would do such a thing even on whether to alter the trial rules, remember that institutional conflicts of interest can operate like black holes in that the gravitational force is powerful and light cannot escape.

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1. Rebecca Ballhaus, “Lindsey Graham Says Bidens' Actions Need More Scrutiny,” The Wall Street Journal, Jan 24, 2020.

2. Natalie Andrews and Rebecca Ballhaus, “Impeachment Schedule for Today and Tomorrow,” The Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2020.

3. Linsey Wise, “Schiff Calls Fears of Witness Fights Delaying Trial ‘Nonsense’,” The Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2020.

4. Linsey Wise, “Demings: Trump’s Obstruction Was ‘Categorical, Indiscriminate, and Historically Unprecedented’,” The Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2020.

On the Role of Socialism in American Political Polarization

In a stunning upset in the 2012 Republican U.S. Senate primary in Indiana, Indiana's Treasurer, Richard Mourdock, beat incumbant veteran Richard Lugar by 22 percent (61-39%). Even though Lugar's 36 years of experience in the Senate had seasoned him into a statesman in foreign policy, the Tea-Party-backed Mourdock was able to portray the aged senator as out of touch and too willing to compromise with Democrats. Mourdock had no intention of extending any hand across the aisle. Is such polarization worth the loss of experience in international relations? Moreover, what is the role of socialism in the political polarization? 

"While Lugar advised in his concession speech . . . that Mourdock would need to work together with lawmakers in the Senate, the new nominee stuck to the belligerent tone he [had] maintained in the campaign, warning that Democrats and socialists were destroying the nation."[1]  Even if Democrats were for government ownership of the means of production (i.e., companies), which is socialism, it does not follow that those Democrats were also attempting to sabatage the U.S. in its foreign relations. Especially given Lugar's expertise in that area, working across the iasle would only make sense. Nevertheless, Mourdock saw a link. 
"Today," he said, "we see the Obama White House and we see a Senate chaired by Harry Reid that's doing everything it can -- though perhaps not intentionally -- to turn our dreams, to turn our great national hope and our dream into the nightmare of ever-growing government, to make us that … western European-style nation,’ Mourdock said. ‘Just yesterday, France elected a socialist,’ he continued. ‘There are those I'm sure in the administration and in the left side of the Democratic Party that were cheering for that. But we're not going to stand for that in Indiana because the supporters of Barack Obama are not going to win!”[2] In other words, Mourdock expected the Democrats to cheer on and perhaps even aid "socialist" governments around the world, the spread of which could isolate the U.S. and the related interests of private property. In 2019, for example, the World Trade Court ruled against the E.U. for having unduly (i.e., unfairly, in terms of free trade) subsidized Airbus. The government ownership of a company goes beyond such subsidization of a corporation like Airbus, which, as of 2019, was owned by EADS, which in turn was owned by a mix of private companies and a few E.U. states. 

What about those supposed socialist countries? To be sure, Francois Hollande ran under the Socialist Party banner. However, the “socialist” policies that he had campaigned on were redistributionist. He did not advocate that the state own more of the means of production. Hollande was redistributionist in that he suggested that la dette (government debt) that Sarkozy had doubled should not be cut only by austerity (i.e., budget-cuts), which hurt the poor disproportionately; rather, the rich should be taxed what they had been taxed before the top tax rate was lowered. 
In fact, Hollande was in a position fresh from his victory to push for federal (i.e., E.U.) economic stimulus spending to complement the federal austerity programs in debt-ridden states, including Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. Using tax increases and budget cuts to reduce government debt is hardly socialism. 
So, Mourdock's lack of knowledge on socialism as an economic system as well as on European governments, combined with his refusal to reach across the aisle, were misplaced, and thus not worth the loss of Lugar's expertise in foreign policy. 

1, Michael McAuliff, “Dick LugarLoses to Tea Party’s Richard Mourdock in Indiana Republican Senate Primary,” The Huffington Post, May 9, 2012. 
2. Ibid.

On the Role of Partisan Political Ideology in the U.S. Supreme Court

Observing a pattern of sustained ideological proclivities in the decisions of justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, The New York Times editorialized in 2011 that the “court cannot maintain its legitimacy as guardian of the rule of law when justices behave like politicians.”[1] One could just as easily say behave like human beings, for juridical interpretation itself contains ample space for an interpreter’s ideology to have a role, especially given human nature that is apt to exploit such leeway. In other words, ideology may be part and parcel of the essential function of a constitutional court, given the nature of juridical interpretation. 
Rather than being a technical application sans discretion of a constitution to a matter of law, constitutional interpretation may be one of many ways of pushing for one’s view of the optimal government and society. Accordingly, the arrangement wherein a constitutional court is the final decider of the constitutionality of law, short of a constitutional amendment, may be criticized because it enables the ideologies of a few unelected jurispruds to rule, in effect, or have the last word.

The editorial in The New York Times displays a tendency to skirt the basis of the problem. For example, the editorial castigates justices who have attended political events in violation of the ethics code that applies to the rest of the federal judiciary. Such conduct compromises the appearance of being impartial and independent. This appearance in turn is based on the presupposition that the judiciary is not a political branch. Justice Ginsburg, for example, makes this assumption explicit in pointing to its tenuousness: “What I care most about I think most of my colleagues do, too, is that we want this institution to maintain the position that it has had in this system, where it is not considered a political branch of government.”[2] 

I contend that not considering the U.S. Supreme Court as involving political ideology is to ignore the space for ideology allowed in constitutional interpretation. No human being is impartial internally concerning matters of government and society. Beyond the reach of ethics codes, the space allowed by interpretation is naturally to be filled not only by “pure reason,” but also by ideology informed by one’s values and beliefs concerning the good society and ideal governance.

In the Court’s 2010-2011 term, for instance, ten of the sixteen 5-4 decisions were split along the familiar ideological grounds. The conservative majority showed “contempt for laws that provide some balance to the unlimited amounts of money flooding the political system,” “made it much harder for private lawsuits to succeed against mutual fund malefactors, even when they have admitted to lying and cheating,” made it more difficult for citizens to hold prosecutors accountable, and struck at consumer (ATT) and labor (Wal-Mart) rights.[3] The similarity between this judicial conservative majority and the political right makes these rulings particularly suspect. Were the Court’s “conservative” majority conservative in a distinctly judicial sense distinct from the planks of political conservatives, the role of the judicial ideology would not be as harmful or baleful to the republic. The fear, in other words, is that politically partisan agendas operate through judicial decisions of the Court via the discretion involved in judicial interpretation. Conservatives had a sense of this from the Warren Court just as liberals suspect the influence of politically conservative ideology in the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. Neither conservatives nor liberals go far enough, however, in recognizing that constitutional interpretation itself allows for ideology.

The Times points to the superficial distinction that informs the design of the U.S. Supreme Court. “The framers of the Constitution envisioned law as having authority apart from politics. They gave justices life tenure so they would be free to upset the powerful and have no need to cultivate political support.”[4] However, the source of the political ideology is less due to political support and more a function of a justice’s own ideology. This is why an ethics code ought not be relied upon to eviscerate the interlarding of partisan politics in the Court. The justices are human, all too human, just like the rest of us. Perhaps we ought not assume otherwise.

The editorial touches on the inevitability of partisan ideology in the Court in the following passage: “Constitutional law is political because it results from choices rooted in fundamental social concepts like liberty and property. When the court deals with social policy decisions, the law it shapes is inescapably political — which is why decisions split along ideological lines are so easily dismissed as partisan.”[5] Being “dismissed” as partisan might be too loose; the decisions cannot but contain a partisan element, given human nature and the space in interpretation.

Rather than expecting the justices not to be human or assuming that an ethics code would do the trick, we could admit to the inevitability of political ideology in judicial interpretation. If the ideologies of five to nine citizens who serve on the U.S. Supreme Court ought not be definitive, judicial review ought not be the final decider short of constitutional amendment. A supermajority in the U.S. House and U.S. Senate, or a supermajority of the state legislatures, could be given the authority to overturn a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. I would suggest that both Congress and the state governments could act thus to have the final say short of undergoing the constitutional amendment process. All branches of all governments in the United States are duty-bound, after all, to consider the constitutionality of their respective laws. Constitutional interpretation is an exercise not devoid of political ideology, as one’s values and beliefs cannot but come into play.

1. The New York Times, “Ethics, Politics and the Law,” Editorial, July 1, 2011, p. A22.

2. Joan Biskupic, “Justice Ginsburg Wields Greater Sway on High Court,” USA Today, July 1-4, 2011, p. A1.
3. The New York Times, “Ethics, Politics and the Law,”
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

On the Political Power of Capitalism in American Society

In his confidential memorandum, “Attack on American Free Enterprise System,” Lewis Powell, later to be a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, wrote in 1971 that the “leftists” were launching a frontal assault on the “free enterprise system,” “capitalism,” or the “profit system.” Powell saw this as an attack on, rather than a defending of the “American political system of democracy under the rule of law.” That the corporate profit-interest might be a threat to “one person, one vote” apparently did not occur to the future Justice. Rather, what is good for GM he presumed must be good for American democracy. Moreover, both, he presumed, are consistent with, or perhaps even foundational for American values.

Powell goes on to write, “A visiting professor from England at Rockford College gave a series of lectures entitled ‘The Ideological War Against Western Society,’ in which he documents the extent to which members of the intellectual community are waging ideological warfare against the enterprise system and the values of western society.” Powell notes in his report that almost half of the students on twelve representative college campuses favored socialization of basic U.S. industries. He cites Stewart Alsop, who had written that “Yale, like every other major college, is graduating scores of bright young men who are practitioners of ‘the politics of despair.’ These young men despise the American political and economic system.” It is strange, therefore, that, forty years later, the American political and economic system would be so well-undisturbed—having been so un-molested by the minions of educated young voters who had gone on to become leaders in that system. Yale, after all, contains in its mission the intent to educate the future leaders of America (and perhaps the world as well). There must have been a giant collective change-of-mind among the myriads of socialists before the Reagan landslide of 1980.

Powell goes on to suggest that business managers (including executives) “have not been trained or equipped to conduct guerrilla warfare with those who propagandize against the [business] system. . . . The traditional role of business executives has been to manage, to produce, to sell, to create jobs, to make profits, to improve the standard of living, to be community leaders, to serve on charitable and educational boards, and generally to be good citizens.” The practitioners here are the citizens; Powell is not pointing to what would come to be called “corporate citizenship,” a marketing slogan designed to get customers to feel better about buying more widgets. Nor is Powell pointing to the related notion of “corporate social responsibility,” which was invented by businessmen (rather than by “socialists” adding to corporate obligations) in the late 1950s.

Absent from Powell’s description of the businessman is the role of corporations even in 1971 in lobbying Congress for favorable legislation and/or regulation that would translate into higher profits. Powell would be hard-pressed to account for the role of the banking lobby in getting the U.S. Senate to vote down Senator Durbin’s amendment that would have given bankruptcy judges the authority to modify mortgages in foreclosure. This is how the “free enterprise system” has fought back “attacks” from “socialists.” After the Citizens United decision of the U.S. Supreme Court (2010), corporate money in unlimited amounts could go toward political advertising—including for or against a candidate—anonymously through “social welfare” non-profits. This is how corporate America has gone after its “attackers.”

Generally speaking, corporate American knows very well how to shut down its opposition in the halls of Congress. Powell’s memo pushes beyond the need for “public relations” and “governmental affairs” to urge a “scale of financing available only through joint effort” and related “political power” through the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Business must learn the lesson “that political power is necessary…it must be used aggressively and with determination.” The corporation—created by the government—must, one might say—become the government, necessarily from within—through the system—rather than via revolution.

This sally into the political arena includes funding a highly competent staff of lawyers at the U.S. Chamber to argue before the courts in line with corporate interests. In the 2011 term, the Chamber’s ensuing legal defense department batted 100% on U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Powell could well have added that business’s lobbying and campaign dollars could be directed to not only defeating threatening legislation and regulations, but also influencing the nomination and confirmation of justices to federal (and state) courts. The astonishingly high success rate was therefore no accident.

In short, the threat to American democracy and even to the American principle of market competition may come not from “socialists” in academia and the media, but rather from the supposition that political power oriented to the corporate good rather than the public good is itself a good. That is to say, Powell’s memo may have the story turned around. His antagonists may have been oriented to saving the American system, whereas his proponents would actually subvert it in line with their narrow self-interest.

Source:

Lewis Powell, “Attack on American Free Enterprise System.” Memorandum, 1971. See pdf download at page-bottom of: http://billmoyers.com/content/the-powell-memo-a-call-to-arms-for-corporations/2/

The Case for a Presiding President in Russia

On December 31, 2010, a Russian judge sentenced Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the Russian tycoon who had been imprisoned in 2003 after defying Vladimir Putin, to an additional six years in prison. According to The New York Times, "It was a politically tinged decision that undermined President Dmitri Medvodev."[1] Leonid Goman of the Right Cause Party in Russia agreed. "It was obviously a political, not a judicial, decision." He went on to say that in general terms, "corruption is endemic, government power is often abused and senior politicians are rarely, if ever, held accountable for misdeeds."[2]  Clearly, Prime Minister Putin was still very much in control in Russia.  His message was that wealthy businessmen should not interfere in Russian politics. What a contrast to American politics, especially after the U.S. Supreme Court's Citizens United case!  Khodorkovsky was at one time the richest person in Russia, having been one of the oligarchs who bought government assets at bargain prices after the fall of the USSR, but he financed opposition parties in a political system that was anything but democratic.

Analysis:

This case points to the importance of separating a judiciary from executive and legislative branches of government, as in the E.U. and U.S. The fragile nature of a judiciary's credibility can be of dangerous ground even when the branches are separated. But in Russia technically under President Medvodev in 2010, a court doing the bidding of a powerful prime minister (in name only) contributes to the demotion of the credibility of the country's judiciary. Ultimately, the president of a country is charged with presiding over its system of government with an eye towards protecting it as a going concern.  

For example, U.S. President Andrew Jackson in the early 1830's looked out for the viability of the country's federal system by pushing Congress back on its tariff that hurt South Carolina and pushing the latter to repeal its Acts by which federal law could be nullified. He also vetoed a bill that, if enacted, would have allowed Congress to appropriate money for what was really a state road in Missouri. The President's focus was on maintaining the balance between the federal level and that of the member-states that is so important to maintaining a viable federal system in the long term. 

In the case of Russia, the problem concerning the political use of the court was that neither the president nor prime minister were interested in safeguarding the judiciary's long-term viability, for they prostituted it for political expediency. I submit, moreover, that most governments have lacked a presiding president, by which I mean a president who is primarily fixated on maintaining the continued viability of the system of government, including its credibility. It is too easy for voters to elect partisans who are more focused on their respective ideological agendas than putting the system itself first. Similarly, it is too easy for dictators to use all branches of government to consolidate more power for themselves or their party rather than to protect the viability of the branches, including how they are related, rather than to be primarily oriented to presiding over the system as a whole. 

See related essay: "On the Eclipse of Russian Federalism: Implications for the E.U."

1. Clifford Levy, "Russia Extends Prison Sentence of Tycoon 6 Years,” The New York Times, December 31, 2010, p. A1.
2. Ibid. 

Holding the U.S. Debt-Ceiling Hostage: A Case of Political Expediency over Statesmanship

In April of 2011, S & P lowered expectations on U.S. Government debt from “stable” to “negative.”  Astonishing, the $14.2 trillion U.S. debt was still rated as AAA. The shift in expectations did not trigger higher borrowing costs because the market presumed that a political deal lowering the deficit would be facilitated by the warning-call. At the same time, Congress and the U.S. president were grappling with the need to extend the federal debt ceiling. The federal government was projected at the time to reach its borrowing limit by May 16, 2011, though the Treasury secretary, Tim Geithner, said he could use accounting options to push the date back to July 8. He assured the public that Republicans in Congress had told President Obama that they would go along with a higher limit. “I want to make it perfectly clear that Congress will raise the debt ceiling,” the Geithner said.  He also said the Republican leaders had assured the president that they “couldn’t play around with the government’s credit rating. They recognize it, and they told the president that.”[1] Such a recognition and statement by the Republican leadership, if true, would evince statesmanship over political expediency, for Republican lawmakers could have leveraged their votes on raising the ceiling to get more in negotiations on the budget. This would be particularly notable considering that appropriations to keep the U.S. Government's non-essential operations going were pawns in a Congressional-presidential power-struggle during the Trump administration. 

However, Rep. Paul Ryan, chair of the U.S. House Budget Committee and later to become Speaking of the House, said that while it was true that nobody wanted the U.S. Treasury to default, “(w)e want cuts in spending accompanying a raising of the debt ceiling. And that is what we have been telling the White House.” A spokesperson for Obama said a debt ceiling vote could not be contingent on upcoming negotiations over the budget.  So, in effect, the matter of default on the U.S. debt was being used for leverage in negotiations rather than held as untouchable.  It is no wonder S & P lowered its expectations concerning the ability of U.S. Government officials to avoid default by failing to raise the federal debt limit. Had the lower expectations been assumed to be a wake-up call for federal lawmakers and the executive, S & P would have been naive.

To say that no one wants default but then to hold it ransom is disingenuous and duplicitous. It is as if to say, “I don’t want to do it but I have to,” when in fact the deed does not have to do it. We see such statements from corporate managers and customer service employees. “Unfortunately, that can’t be done”—weakness that seeks to dominate typically takes assumes the passive voice as if to hide—when in fact the person or especially his boss could. Company policies are in actuality guidelines. Sadly, customers typically enable the false rigidity by taking it at face value rather than questioning it by going above the employee or even manager. 

Rep. Ryan could have resisted the temptation to gain greater advantage on the budget by holding the debt ceiling hostage. Even if he made the statement to cover himself with his political base in Janesville, Wisconsin, he bore responsibility for giving the appearance of putting partisan advantage over statesmanship.  

Given the encroaching nature of expediency whether for power or profit (or both), even verbal statements can get the ball rolling even for other political parties. Soon the government's duty to act in the public interest becomes a mere byproduct, as if by accident rather than primary intention. Given human nature, political expediency and the desire to make even more money are inherently antithetical to any self-enforced limitation. Hence in government, we can say that statesmanship involves voluntarily giving force to a self-imposed constraint or limitation. 

1, “Geithner Confident Congress Will Raise Borrowing Limit,” USA Today, April 18, 2011, p. 6A.

On the Impact of Political Rhetoric: From “Global Warming” to “Climate Change”

Words matter in politics. The side that can frame a question by definitively naming it in the public mind enjoys a subtle though often decisive advantage in the debate and thus in any resulting public policy as well. For example, “pro-choice”privileges the pregnant woman, while “pro-life” defines the abortion debate around the fetus. Similarly, “global warming” implies a human impact, whereas“climate change” defines the issue around nature. Even though the shift from“global warming” to “climate change” is more in keeping with the evolving science and won’t be bumped off by a cold winter, political players have been the driving force—language hardly being immune to ideological pressure.

Regarding the weather shifting popular perception on the issue, research published in Public Opinion Quarterly in 2011 claimed that a bad winter can indeed discredit the “global warming” label.[1] The Washington Policy Center claimed two years later that the heavy snowfall during the latest winter had led to “climate change” replacing “global warming.”[2] The cold refusing to relent in March of 2013 and hitting North America hard in January of 2019 seemed to undercut or repudiate the scientific “global warming” hypothesis even though meteorology, a empirical science,  always demands long-term data.

However, in looking back at the name-change, we must consider the influence of political actors, who are prone to manipulate the public's perception in part by using words to frame the debate. In 2002, for example, Frank Luntz wrote a confidential memo to the Republican Party suggesting that because the Bush administration was vulnerable on the climate issue. The White House should abandon the phrase “global warming,” he wrote, in favor of “climate change.”[3] As if by magic, although “global warming” appeared frequently in President Bush’s speeches in 2001, “climate change” populated the president’s speeches on the topic by 2002.[4] In other words, the president’s political vulnerability on the issue was answered by changing the label to reframe the debate. Not missing a beat, critics charged that the motive was political in downplaying the possibility that carbon emissions were a contributing factor.[5] Both Bush and Cheney had ties to the oil and gas industry. In fact, Cheney's through Halliburton may have played a role in the administration's advocacy in favor of invading Iraq under the subterfuge that it had been involved in the attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center in 2001. 

The Obama administration likely went with “climate change” rather than "global warming" because the former was less controversial. The corporate Democrat tended to hold to the center politically; after all, Goldman Sachs had contributed a million dollars to his first presidential campaign in 2008. In September 2011, the White House decided to replace the term “global warming” with “global climate disruption.”[6] The administration subsequently annulled its own decision. 
So much attention on the matter of a mere label indicates that just how important what you call something is to its outcome. Labels are not always neutral. For instance, the term "African American," was making inroads whereas "Black American" was hardly ever heard. "African" slips in ethnicity whereas "Black," or negroid, refers to race. Changing the axis on which the controversy had hinged was in favor of the race-now-ethnicity. Meanwhile, the American public didn't notice the artful conflation of ethnicity (i.e., culture) and race. Obama used the ethnic term and applied it to himself even though his mother was Caucasian. He also claimed Illinois as his home state even though he moved to Chicago after college. He could benefit politically from the support of Black Americans and Illinoisans. 
Similarly, Obama could benefit politically from adopting "climage change." As the academic journal Public Opinion Quarterly reported in 2011, “Republicans are far more skeptical of ‘global warming’ than of ‘climate change.’” Whereas the vast majority of Democrats were indifferent to the label being used.[7] With “global warming” carrying “a stronger connotation of human causation, which has long been questioned by conservatives,” Obama stood to gain some republican support simply by changing how he refers to the issue.[8] That support was part of the president's ability to straddle the center in American politics. 
Given the effort that has gone into labels, it is amazing that more time in the Congress has not gone into debating labels. I am also curious why the American people did not realize that they were being manipulated by the choice of label. If "climate change" allows for the contention that human-sourced carbon emissions into that atmosphere have not been a cause of the warming of the oceans and air, then it is possible that the very survival of the species could be in jeopardy because of  the choice of a label for short-term economic and political reasons.

1. Tom Jacobs, “Wording Change Softens Global Warming Skeptics,” Pacific Standard, March 2, 2011. 

2. Washington Policy Center, “Climate Change: Where the Rhetoric Defines the Science,” March 8, 2011.

3. Oliver Burkeman, “Memo Exposes Bush’s New Green Strategy,” The Guardian, March 3, 2003.

4. Ibid.

5. Washington Policy Center, “Climate Change: Where the Rhetoric Defines the Science,” March 8, 2011.

6. Erik Hayden, “Republicans Believe in ‘Climate Change,’ Not ‘Global Warming’,” The Atlantic Wire, March 3, 2011.

7. Tom Jacobs, “Wording Change Softens Global Warming Skeptics,” Pacific Standard, March 2, 2011.

8. Ibid.