On Democratic Accountability in a Republic: The Pentagon Papers

The publication of portions of the Pentagon Papers despite President Nixon’s threats of treason highlighted the fact that four presidents successively lied to the American People on build-up of U.S. involvement in Indochina (most notably, Vietnam) and the Nixon administration lied on the prospects for victory in the Vietnam War—a war that had not even been declared by Congress. Clearly, democratic accountable extends to foreign policy at least in broad outline, such as in whether or not to continue an active engagement militarily in another region of the world. Even in U.S. presidents being able to get away with effectively declaring war even as one of their roles is that of commander-in-chief—a huge conflict of interest!—democratic accountability by the popular sovereign, the People—is important, even vital should the legislative and judicial branches fail as checks in the separation-of-powers feature of the U.S. Constitution.

The first article in the New York Times reported that the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations “built up the American political, military and psychological stakes in Indochina, often more deeply than they realized at the time, with large‐scale military equipment to the French in 1950; with acts of sabotage and terror warfare against North Vietnam beginning in 1954; with moves that encouraged and abetted the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam in 1963; with plans, pledges and threats of further action that sprang to life in the Tonkin Gulf clashes in August, 1964; with the careful preparation of public opinion for the years of open warfare that were to follow; and with the calculation in 1965, as the planes and troops were openly committed to sustained combat, that neither accommodation inside South Vietnam nor early negotiations with North Vietnam would achieve the desired result.”[1]

Meanwhile, the American electorate was being kept in the dark—lied to—in spite of the fact that the People in a republic are tasked with holding the elected representatives and their respective appointees accountable.

“The Pentagon study also ranges beyond such historical judgments. It suggests that the predominant American interest was at first containment of Communism and later the defense of the power, influence and prestige of the United States, in both stages irrespective of conditions in Vietnam.”[2] The U.S. Government’s defense of the escalation, however, was limited to the containment of Communism such that it would not take over the world as Marx had foretold and thus threaten even the U.S. itself. During the Johnson and Nixon administrations, American troops were being killed and taken prisoner increasingly for the prestige of the United States and irrespective of the intractable conditions on the ground in Vietnam. Crucially, these administrations kept the American people in the dark on these points, such that no electoral correction could be effected. Ironically, the administrations were claiming to protect democracy even as they were undermining it by using power to subvert democratic accountability by the popular sovereign (i.e., the electorate).

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1. Neil Sheehan, “Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces 3 Decades of Growing U.S. Involvement,” The New York Times, June 13, 1971.

2. Ibid.

Federalizing State Warheads in the E.U.: The Problem of Excessive State Power in a Federal System

Only months after Donald Trump became the federal president in the U.S., an idea, “once unthinkable,” was “gaining attention in European policy circles: a European Union nuclear weapons program.”[1] The arsenal in the state of France would be “repurposed”—which is to say, federalized in American terms—to protect the European Union rather than merely one of its states. The command of the weapons, as well as the funding plan and defense doctrine, would be federal. Even though the question of whether the E.U. could continue to count of American protection—there being dozens of American nuclear weapons in the E.U.—was at the time most tantalizing, I submit that the matter of federalism in the case of the E.U. is salient too.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

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[1] Max Fisher, “Fearing U.S. Withdrawal, Europe Considers Its Own Nuclear Deterrent,” The New York Times, March 6, 2017.

On the U.S. Government’s Fiscal Imbalance: Federalism to the Rescue?

At the outset of the Trump administration in the U.S., real economic output was projected to grow at an annual rate of 1.9 percent over the next decade.[1] The new federal president was hoping his proposals of tax cuts and $1 trillion in additional infrastructure spending over a decade would bump up the annual growth to 4 percent. I submit, however, that just over 2 percent more in the growth rate would not alter the stark “budget reality” facing the new president and the American people.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

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[1] Alan Rappeport, “Federal Debt Projected to Grow by Nearly $10 Trillion Over Next Decade,” The New York Times, January 24, 2017.

Narrowing Public Debate: Political Narrative as Fact

For ordering his men at Gettysburg to keep firing at over 10,000 Virginian infantrymen in what is now known as Pickett’s Charge, Alonzo Cushing—who died in the battle—was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor by President Barack Obama on November 6, 2014. As a result of that charge, Pickett lost his entire division. In the 1984 film, Gettysburg, General Lee tells Pickett after the battle to look after his division. “General Lee,” Pickett declares, “I have no division.” Suddenly Lee is confronted with the true magnitude of his military blunders at Gettysburg. 

From this point of view, Cushing’s military honor looks rather different than from Obama’s point of view. As conveyed by the media, that vantage point enjoyed a virtual monopoly, and thus the interpretation could easily be taken as true rather than relative. I submit that much from the political discourse as sourced or conveyed by the media is projected as truth when it is highly subjective and thus subject to question and debate.

At the ceremony, President Obama said, “I’m mindful that I might not be standing here today as president, had it not been for the ultimate sacrifices of those courageous Americans.”[1] Hardly a partisan comment, the statement is nonetheless partial even if it seems indisputably true. Firstly, whereas Lincoln referred to all of the fallen when he spoke at Gettysburg to commemorate the national cemetery, Obama was likely referring only to the Union troops. What of the courageous men under Pickett who walked more than a mile over open field as canon-fire came from the hills on the sides and from directly ahead where the Union’s artillery fired shots from behind a stone wall? Considering that the entire division was slaughtered during that “charge,” is it even ethical to honor a man who ordered his troops to keep shooting? My point is that what we take as a given may be anything but.

Even the Union’s battle cry during the CSA-USA war that the USA would cease to exist should it lose the war is faulty. The CSA never put a claim on the states that remained with the Union, or the Union itself; rather, the Confederate states formed their own federal system. So it is erroneous to claim that the U.S. would not exist in the twenty-first century had the Union army not beaten the CSA in 1865. So it is odd that Barack Obama thought he would not be president. If he was referring to his multi-racial makeup, the U.S. without the “Southern” states would hardly be more racist in the twenty-first century.

I realize that the winner of a war gets to write the history, but that account should at least be coherent. Even such an account would be partial, but it would be conveyed as tantamount to fact by the source as well as the media. I submit that both elected officials and journalists have an ethical responsibility to represent partial or ideological statements as such. For example, the media could add alternative takes in the reportage, hence widening the window of interpretations held to be viable. In short, I contend that the American political discourse tends to be very narrow, especially when possible policy prescriptions are being debated. Having a duopoly of two major parties contributes to this tunnel vision, but so too does the confounding of partial and full accounts by candidates, elected officials, and the media.

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[1] Gregory Korte, “Union Soldier Honored for Gallantry at Gettysburg,” USA Today, November 7-9, 2014.

Budget Austerity in the E.U.: Turning the Russian Invasion of Ukraine into an Advantage

With economic growth in the E.U. flat-lining in mid-2014 after a modest recovery, pressure mounted to relax the federal "austerity" constraints on the state budgets. According to The New York Times at the time, "(p)olitical and financial instability related to Russia's confrontation with Ukraine and the effects of escalating economic sanctions between [the E.U.] and Russia have further clouded the economic outlook."[1] Mired in the austerity vs. fiscal stimulus dichotomy, E.U. leaders may have been missing an opportunity here.

With yet another round of sanctions in the works on the heels of a recent Russian invasion and unemployment at a stubborn 11.5 percent, and the threat of runaway deflation hitting wages in particular, the E.U.'s economy looked poised for an ongoing onslaught of stag-deflation. The E.U. "is menaced by long and possibly interminable stagnation if we don't act," Francois Hollande of the state of France warned.[2]  He had in mind some movement along the ongoing relaxation vs. austerity dichotomy in the direction of larger state deficits--something the governor over in Germany was still fiercely resisting. We "really must question whether we can go on receiving less than we spend, so that our debts keep on growing. Indeed," Angela Merkel pointed out, "a whole crisis of confidence has grown out of that."[3] Such a basic imbalance in state finance undercuts the equilibrium that is so vital to the survival of the macro system in the long run.

So, it would appear that the well-worn dichotomy had reached a dead-end, or the proverbial brick wall. I contend that in such a case thinking beyond the either/or strictures is advisable. To illustrate my point, I present a thought-experiment of sorts (i.e., unrealistic, but it gets the point across).

Let's imagine that the president of Ukraine met with the European Council as Russian troops were crossing the border into Ukraine with the eventual aim of separating the eastern half of the independent state from Kiev.

"I come before you with an admittedly unorthodox suggestion," President Poroshenko might have told the Council. "Without a massive infusion of support from the E.U., my country will split apart and Russia will gain the eastern half."

"What kind of support do you have in mind," the Council's Van Rompuy might has asked.

"Well, the sort that would make your fast-track accession process look like a snail's pace," Ukraine's head of state might have replied with a curious grin that told of something very new coming. "Make Ukraine a state; my government will accept all of your conditions without reservation. Send in your Commission's bureaucrats right away to implement the conditions. To protect them, I recommend that you send along military troops from your state militias as well as the small federal army you have. We could even request that U.N. peace-keepers come along. Putin is already in hot water at the U.N. for continuing his KGB tactics as president."

"What if he keeps sending in Russian troops?" Merkel might have asked.

"This is why speed would be so vital, both in Ukraine's accession, which could be of a limited term if that is easier for you, and the influx of bureaucrats and others doing the E.U.'s business and protecting them. Ukraine would agree to the Schengen Agreement on open borders, and I would request that the E.U. attend immediately to the external border--meaning that which we share with Russia. Securing that border has precedent for the E.U., does it not?" In fact, the need to protect the E.U. bureaucrats pouring into the eastern parts of Ukraine with troops from the state armies would mean that NATO would be relevant. This point, if made explicit, could deter Putin from sending in still more military hardware and troops.

"Please excuse us as we discuss this proposal," Van Rompuy might have politely yet curtly told the Ukrainian head of state. After all, the E.U. leaders do their best work behind closed doors. The point is that their minds need not be closed either. Lemons can indeed be made into lemonade.

Even if this scenario is too outlandish to be taken seriously in a world so wetted to the status quo as its default, thinking in such terms "outside the box" could stimulate more realistic policy prescriptions going beyond the austerity vs. fiscal stimulus dichotomy. For example, the notion of troops and hardware from state militias in the E.U. going along to protect federal bureaucrats might prompt an E.U. leader to suggest that the state armies transfer even more to the small federal army of 60,000 troops. Doing so would enable the state budgets to accommodate both more fiscal stimulus and lower deficits as less military spending would be needed. I am assuming the E.U. would pick up the tab for the operation of the added hardware and the salaries of the additional troops. From the perspective of the E.U., the shift would mean less duplication. How likely is it really that Belgium and Portugal, for example, would need to use their respective armies anyway? In the context of continued stag-deflation, such nationalist luxuries are difficult to justify, especially considering the opportunity cost in terms of stimulating the economy.

In short, the E.U. need not have faced a future of stagnation. Ideas hitherto undiscovered can indeed have great value in practical results. The key is to think beyond the confines of what are presumed to be the only possibilities. The human brain has a tendency to shrink the possible in a way that cuts off many potentially fruitful possibilities without any recognition of doing so. The advisable condition of receptivity is to welcome such ideas into the public discourse rather than going with the knee-jerk reaction of "that's too radical!" or "that would never see the light of day." We might be surprised what could see the dawn and beyond.

1. Liz Alderman and Alison Smale, "Divisions Grow as a Downturn Rocks Europe," August 29, 2014.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.