Showing posts with label France. Show all posts
Showing posts with label France. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 31, 2025

A Big-State Governor Usurps the Role of the European Council's President

The governor of a large state, if speaking for the E.U., risks not only undercutting federal officials who can speak for the E.U., but also subtly orienting federal policy in the interest of that state rather than the entire union. It is important, therefore, that the president of the European Council be tasked with speaking publicly for the Council, rather than usurped.

On December 19, 2025, the president of the E.U. state of France stood at the European Council podium to announce, presumably speaking for the Council, “Either a robust and lasting peace is reached, with the required (security) guarantees, or we will need in the weeks ahead to find ways for Europeans to re-engage in a fulsome dialogue with Russia, and in complete transparency.”[1] Because Macron was not the chair, or president, of the European Council, it is impossible to know whether he is expressing his own opinion or that of the Council; his decision to make the announcement rather than defer to the Council’s president thus weakened the Council. President Putin of Russia had grounds to dismiss Macron’s statement direct talks between Europe will be needed if the American peace proposal falters. Simply put, Macron did not have standing to speak for Europe in terms of talks. Alternatively, he could have stated that his E.U. state would try to have direct talks with Putin, but the downside to that is that Putin could play the E.U. state governments against each other. Hence distinctively E.U. foreign policy would be worthwhile.

At the end of December, 2025, European Commission President Von der Leyen was on firmer ground in insisting that Ukraine’s accession to the European Union as a state was “a key component” of the security guarantees that Ukraine was then seeking as part of a deal with Russia. According to Von der Leyen, who unlike Macron can speak for the E.U., accession represents “a key security guarantee in its own right.”[2] Even though accession requires unanimity in the European Council, I contend that there is value in having a federal official speak for the E.U. on Ukraine becoming a state in the Union. For one thing, it provides a vision which the leaders in the state governments can either accept or reject. For another, Putin can count on Von der Leyen’s statement as coming from the E.U. itself, rather than just from a state government, whether pro or con on Ukraine entering the Union.

In short, the difference between Macron’s opportunism and Von der Leyen’s attempt to bolster Ukraine’s chances in becoming a state is significant. That the state governments hold so much power in the E.U.’s federal system renders making space for E.U. officials especially important, lest one or two big states essentially take over the Union in pursuit of their own geo-political interests. The E.U. has been vulnerable to this because it was, even in 2025, too bottom-heavy.


Monday, December 15, 2025

On the E.U.’s Mercosur Deal: State Obstructionism

After 25 years negotiating with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, the E.U.’s Commission sought to secure passage of the massive trade-deal in the European Council and the Parliament by the end of 2025. Even though the vote is by qualified-majority voting rather than unanimity in both chambers, one state that was against the treaty sought to delay the vote in the Council, which represents states rather than E.U. citizens. The Commission rightly pushed back on the tactic because for one state in opposition to be able to put off a vote is tantamount to having a veto, which a mechanism only for E.U. competencies that are subject to unanimous approval in the Council.

Due to concerns of possible unfair competition voiced by farmers in the E.U. state of France, that state’s government was “demanding strong safeguards to suspend tariff reductions if imports disrupt EU markets, so called ‘reciprocity clauses’ that align Mercosur’s environmental and agricultural standards with EU standards, and tougher EU sanitary and phytosanitary controls.”[1] Without a veto, making a demand would be too strong, and even presumptuous. So too is the statement that was made by the office of the state’s prime minister’s office: “While a Mercosur summit is scheduled for 20 December, It is clear that . . . the conditions are not in place for any vote by the EU Council on authorizing the signing of the agreement.”[2] This sounds a lot like a statement that the vote could not take place.

The Commission’s deputy chief spokesperson, Olof Gill, cut down the state’s claim that conditions were not in place. In fact, Gill told reporters that in “the view of the Commission signing the deal now is a matter of crucial importance economically, diplomatically, and geopolitically, but also in terms of our credibility on the global stage.”[3] The Parliament was due to vote the next day on a safeguard amendment, with some representatives set to add an amendment on reciprocity. With half of the month of December ahead, the only condition relevant to there being a vote in the European Council was whether the Parliament would vote in favor of the treaty. Whether or not the safeguard and reciprocity amendments pass in the Parliament is a legitimate concern to whether the state of France votes for or against the treaty in the Council, but whether the amendments pass should not pertain to whether the Council holds a vote. In short, the government of France was overreaching even if only in its rhetoric.

The problem of too many E.U. exclusive and shared enumerated competencies, including changes to the E.U.’s basic law, being subject to unanimity in the Council and thus contingent on no state wielding its veto in that upper chamber was already hampering the E.U., especially in the areas of foreign and defense policy even as Russia was invading Ukraine; the E.U. didn’t need the Council to set a precedent of delaying or cancelling a vote just because a state in opposition objects even to there being a vote. Such a precedent is as if each state would have a veto on matters subject to qualified-majority voting rather than unanimity. Even use of language that connotes or implies that the state of France could unilaterally control the European Council is troubling, given the power that the state governments continued to have at the federal level through the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Put another way, the E.U. was already “state-heavy” in terms of obstruction at the federal level; the E.U. could least afford a state in opposition deciding whether conditions for a vote in either of the councils have been met. Moreover, focusing too much on individual pieces of legislation without keeping an eye out for any negative impact on the federal system itself from how the legislative process is being carried out is short-sighted.



1. Peggy Corlin, “European Commission Turns Up Pressure on France over Mercosur,” Euronews.com, 15 December 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Monday, October 20, 2025

Corruption at the Top in France and Illinois

An important implication of the saying, a fish rots from the head down, is that it is important that corrupt heads be swiftly punished so underlings get the message that crime in public office carries considerable risk. In the matter of Ukraine’s possible accession (not merger!) into the E.U. as a new state, the old, deeply entrenched, culture of corruption in the potential state has been of particular concern in the E.U.’s executive branch, the European Commission. In both the E.U. and U.S., it’s worth asking whether some states are more corrupt than others. It is a mistake to treat all states alike in terms of where to direct federal resources and how much of a given state’s resources should be devoted to investigations of state officials. At least in 2025, Illinois and France could be said to have been “problem children” in this regard, and this doesn’t mean that Hawaii and Sweden, for example, also had as sordid corrupt cultures.

In September 2025, a state court in Paris “found Sarkozy guilty of criminal conspiracy in connection with the alleged Libyan financing of his victorious 2007 presidential campaign . . . and sentenced him to five years in prison.”[1] A day before going to prison in mid-October, Sarkozy said he would be taking a biography of Jesus and The Count of Monte Christo with him to prison, so it seems that he was continuing with his innocent-victim role in spite of the conviction and sentencing. Short of any contrition or even public recognition by Sarkozy of his own corruption, it fell on Hollande of the Socialist group to praise “the independence of the judiciary,” especially given that the incumbent, Macron, spent an hour with the convicted ex-president on the day before the Sarkozy, of the same political group, was to show up at a prison.[2] In a corrupt culture, it is natural to worry about whether judges might be persuaded that it is in their interests to reduce or rescind the sentence of a powerful political figure.

Admittedly, in notoriously corrupt Illinois, by 2025 four former heads of state had spent substantial time in prison. Otto Kerner, for example, was convicted in 1973 on 17 counts of mail fraud, conspiracy, perjury, and other charges related to a bribery scheme and was sentenced to three years. Dan Walker was convicted in 1987 of bank fraud and perjury related to fraudulent loans that he had obtained after leaving the high office. George Ryan was convicted in 2006 on fraud and racketeering charges related to bribes; he served five and a half years. Last but hardly least, Rod Blagojevich was impeached and removed from office in 2009, and convicted in 2011 on 18 counts of corruption. Whereas the president of the E.U. cannot pardon state officials, the president of the U.S. can, and U.S. President Trump pardoned “Blago’s” sentence in 2020 after the former head of Illinois had served eight years; the former head of France could only hope in vain for a pardon from E.U. President Von der Leyen, but corruption at the state level could end up appreciably shortening Sarkozy’s sentence, and the meeting with Macron could be a sign that their shared political group might work behind the scenes to free the convicted former leader.

Once begun and allowed to spread throughout a state, whether Illinois or France, political corruption involving money is much more difficult than a fire to put out. Companies such as Enron, Wells Fargo Bank, Arthur Andersen, and even Uber came to be known for their deeply dysfunctional organizational cultures. This does not mean that manager-groups at every or even most companies are that unethical.

It is fortunate that not every company is corrupt mentally, for changing an entrenched sordid organizational culture is very difficult at best, with plenty of strategic firings being just one part of the cure. A so-called “coach” hired by Starbucks, for example, to change the attitudes of the executives towards the employees (especially those who try to unionize) would have a full plate. Such a “coach” would find it very frustrating to “drive” talking-points; the obscenely stretched use of jargon wouldn’t get the consultant very far up against the entrenched acerbic attitudes that had come to dominate the organizational culture. Let’s just say the Pike’s Peak blend of coffee was hardly the only thing that was known for being bitter at Starbucks by 2025.




Sunday, June 15, 2025

The E.U. as a Bystander on the Global Stage: A Self-Inflicted Wound

Why has the E.U. been sidelined amid the military tensions in the Middle East? The answer lies with the E.U.’s federal system, rather than the size of its economy or of its population. The E.U. certainly could have more geopolitical sway abroad were it not for a vulnerability being exploited within its own federal system. The vulnerability stems from a refusal by some state officials to recognize and respect the qualitative and quantitative differences between the federal and the state levels of the E.U. Specifically, when the governor (i.e., chief executive and/or head of state) of a state operates as if a federal-level official, especially that of a federal president, the authority of the actual federal president is undercut, hence weakening that person’s ability to convince the heads of foreign governments to include the E.U. president or foreign minister in multilateral negotiations centered on the Middle East, for example. Even unconsciously, foreign leaders may say to themselves, why should we respect the president of the E.U. if she is so easily upstaged by the leader of an E.U. state who is acting as if he were president of the European Commission?  To speak with one voice, and to be able to speak for the E.U. rather than just one state thereof, an E.U. official must be the speaker. Macron of the E.U. state of France cannot speak for the E.U., but Von der Leyen could, provided her space is respected by the governors of the states. This is not to say that this is the only reason why the E.U. has been sidelined from negotiations on Middle East warfare; rather, my contention is that this reason is typically overlooked due to the Euroskeptic ideological delusion that the E.U. does not have a federal system of government even though since 1993, governmental sovereignty has indeed been split between the states and the Union. Perhaps the underlying question here is whether continuing to clutch at the anti-federalist ideology is worth the E.U. continuing to be weakened unnecessarily from within, and thus sidelined from international negotiations that do not center on Europe. Making such blind-spots transparent is indeed a valuable occupation, even if it can be infuriating to people whose interests and ideology are served best if societies look the other way.

In June, 2025, Claude Moniquet, a European formerly in the field of intelligence, told a journalist that the E.U. had been left “sitting on the sidelines” as Israel pummeled Gaza and commenced a bombing in Iran.[1] “Europeans have been pretty much excluded from all major diplomatic manoeuvres around the war in Gaza or the war in Lebanon,” he added.[2] So even though the president of the E.U.’s executive branch, Ursula Von der Leyen, wrote on 13 June 2025, “Diplomatic efforts are crucial to preventing further escalation,” after having spoke with Israel’s president, Isaac Herzog, words are just words if they are from the sidelines rather than after having been dealt a hand of cards at the power-table.[3] I submit that the irrelevance of Von der Leyen’s words is partly due to Emmanuel Macron of the E.U. state of France having “stolen the thunder” by putting himself up as speaking for the E.U. on Gaza.

For instance, during a three-hour televised interview in early May, 2025, Macron said that Europe should consider sanctioning Israel over the humanitarian situation in Gaza, where “hundreds of thousands” were thought to be “facing starvation.”[4] Even though he was understandably frustrated by the lack of sanctions at the federal level, the president of France had no place to speak for Europe, as he was not an E.U. official at the time. To be sure, the thorny problem of the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of Ministers on foreign-policy matters was a factor in the E.U.’s internal-weakness at the federal level, but Macron’s proper orientation was to contend that France should consider sanctioning Israel, if this had not already been done. Indeed, Macron said publicly on 30 May 2025 that France could harden its position on Israel. “The humanitarian blockade is creating a situation that is untenable on the ground,” he said.[5]

Yet two weeks later, Macron was visiting Greenland to represent Europe’s—not just France’s—objection to U.S. President Trump’s desire to make Greenland a U.S. territory. “The situation in Greenland is clearly a wakeup call for all Europeans,” he said as if he were president of the E.U. rather than the governor of an E.U. state.[6] This manner of situating the French president may seem harsh, but I submit that I have properly stated his role from the vantage point of the E.U. and particularly in terms of its federal system, wherein states are both qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from the federal level officials and governmental branches. Von der Leyen could have spoken for E.U. citizens rather than merely residents of the state of France were she to have visited Greenland, but Macron relegated such an opportunity for the E.U., and thus the collective clout that it potentially could have that a state could not. There is a cost, in other words, in a state official refusing to apply self-control when going into the spotlight is tempting. Were the U.S. president to try to invade Greenland, the E.U. president would have more economic clout than France could have with which to pressure Trump to cease and desist in his imperial designs.


This photo, from Euronews.com, illustrates Macron's usurption and how this impacts how the actual E.U. Commission president (pictured on the right) is viewed from abroad as compromised or weakened as a result..

Admittedly, involving state officials in foreign policy is arguably one way in which the E.U.’s federal system is a better case of federalism than the top-heavy American counterpart, but such involvement requires also giving E.U. officials, especially its (executive branch) president and foreign minister, enough authority with which to block state leaders from stealing the show on the societal stage. Although the U.S. had taken the doctrine of federal preemption of state action too far, some preemption would be justified in the E.U., especially as the governors do have a formal role even at the federal level in the European Council and through their ministers in the Council of Ministers on foreign policy. The proclivity to go beyond those federal institutions conflicts with the roles of the E.U. president and foreign minister in being able to lead the E.U. on foreign policy. A similar case of state overreach occurred when the prime minister of Italy sought to manipulate representatives in the European Parliament, which represents E.U. citizens rather than states.  Likewise, a governor of one of the republics in the U.S. can justifiably pressure a U.S. senator representing that governor’s state at the federal level, but the House representatives even in districts located in that state serve the U.S. citizens in those districts rather than the state government.

In short, political overreaching should be guarded against for a federal system to function optimally, such that benefits internationally from collective action at the federal level can be realized while the cultural and ideological interstate differences can be accommodated by there being policy domains retained by the state governments. Stealing the limelight of someone else is not conducive to a federal system being able to work both internally and as a political unit to the outside world. Put bluntly, if France’s Macron wants so to be president of the E.U., let him go through the process of candidacy at the end of Von der Leyen’s second term rather than usurp her role before then.



1. Jeremy Fleming-Jones, “Europe Left on Diplomatic ‘Sidelines’ in Israel Iran Conflict,” Euronews.com, June 15, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Gavin Blackburn, “Macron on ‘Crusade against Jewish State,’ Israel Says Following Criticism of Gaza War,” Euronews.com, 30 May 2025.
5. Reuters, “France May Toughen Stance on Israel If It Continues Blocking Gaza Aid, Macron Says,” Reuters.com, May 30, 2025.
6. Emma De Ruiter, “Macron Reaffirms Support for Greenland during Visit Ahead of G7 Summit,” Euronews.com, 15 June, 2025.

Monday, February 17, 2025

A European Army: A More Perfect Union

At the Munich Security Conference in February, 2025, Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy bluntly asserted, “I really believe that the time has come that the armed forces of Europe must be created.”[1] He could have said in 2023 after Russia’s President Putin had sent tanks and bombs into Ukraine; instead, the inauguration of President Trump in the U.S. that was the trigger. “Let’s be honest,” Zelenskyy continued, “now we can’t rule out that America might say ‘no’ to Europe on issues that might threaten it.”[2] At the time, Trump was planning to meet with Putin to end the war without Britain and a number of E.U. states at the table. After all, they had failed to push Putin off Crimea in 2014, and even in 2025, they were not on the same page on how to defend Ukraine militarily. Amid the political fracturing in Europe, Ukraine’s president was urging that the E.U. itself have an army, rather than merely the 60,000 troops for which the union was dependent on the states. Even on being able to borrow on its own authority, the E.U. was hamstrung by the state governments that were more interested in retaining power than in benefitting from collective action. It is difficult to analyze Zelenskyy’s plea without including the anti-federalist, Euroskeptic ideology that was still eclipsing the E.U. from realizing a more perfect union.

 

The full essay is at "A European Army."


1. Joshua Posaner, “Zelenskyy: ‘The Time Has Come’ for a European Army,” Politico, February 15, 2025.
2. Ibid.

Saturday, November 23, 2024

Territorial Economic Inequality: On the Impact of Ideological Category-Mistakes

Why do some countries have more inequality in terms of wealth or economic development, whether between big cities and urban areas, or just from region to region, than do other countries? I contend that in comparing the internals of one state/country to those of another, as much “all else equal” should be satisfied as possible. This can be accomplished to a large extent by resisting the error, or temptation, to make category mistakes, such as in comparing Singapore with China—a city-state to an empire-scale country—or in likening an E.U. state to the entire U.S. European scholars of comparative politics tend to make this category mistake, and non-European scholars are so used to the ideological aggrandizement that they do not typically even recognize the category mistake of treating an early-modern(rather than Medieval) kingdom-scale state of an empire-scale federal union as equivalent to another such union, as if a state in one such union, or a comparable sovereign state, were itself an empire-scale union. Resisting the ideologically-driven urge to begin with a category mistake would do wonders in studying comparative politics and political economy and providing more accurate and beneficial conclusions and recommendations.

Illinois, for example, has fifteen economic regions, yet the one containing Chicago dwarfs the other regions, with are either rural or sport a medium-sized city like Springfield, Rockford, and Peoria, none of which is known for its wealth. How does this compare with Switzerland in contrasting Zurich, and to a certain extent Geneva, which is half the population of Zurich, to the counties, or cantons, that are mainly rural? Both in territory and population, Illinois is larger than is Switzerland, and Chicago relative to the rest of Illinois has a higher population and greater metro-territory than Zurich has to the rest of Switzerland; perhaps comparing Paris in France to Chicago in Illinois would be a closer comparison. Unlike Switzerland, neither Illinois nor France has a federal system, and both are semi-sovereign states in federal systems, the U.S. and E.U., so in comparing Illinois and France, a scholar would better able to “hold all else constant,” except in terms of population, than is the case in comparing Illinois and Switzerland. In that regard, comparing Arizona and Switzerland would be better, as the respective populations are around 7 to 8 million people.

Avoiding the temptation to make category mistakes, such as in claiming that Switzerland is a United States of Europe, with county-sized cantons be likened to red and blue American states, is a prerequisite to being able to make accurate comparisons. At a talk at the Center for European Studies, a Swiss junior scholar acted on the urge during a talk on this topic in November, 2024, to ignore this point even though it had been made by a senior scholar and the scholar from MIT visiting to give his talk that E.U. and U.S. states are comparable with respect to contrasting large cities with rural areas. Ideology, whether States’ Rights in America or the Euroskeptic, or “nationalist,” ideology in Europe, can entrap even scholars, such that their scholarship may be compromised from their decision on an axis of comparison. Hawaii, Alaska, or Texas becoming a member-state in the U.S. is not comparable to one of Switzerland’s county-scale cantons.

After avoiding category mistakes that are based on ideology rather than reason, we can investigate whther too much power being given by a government to localities and regions increases the economic inequality from region/locality to region/locality because there tends to less economic redistribution to less developed regions or urban areas, and because they tend to compete with each other for direct investment by companies. How can we reconcile the cities competing against others to economic equality between regions and cities within a country?

Moreover, there is not only an economic divide between big cities and rural “left behind” places; there are social and cultural differences too; for example, anti-urban sentiment can be non-economic barrier to moving to a big city for school or a job. In some states/countries, the chasm may be more cultural whereas in other cases the difference may be more economic.  To claim that cultural differences within a European state are comparable to those between certain U.S. states, such as Hawaii and Alabama, even ignoring the fact that different languages are spoken to a considerable extent in those two U.S. states and even dismissing the non-linguistic differences that can exist between two distant and large geographical territories, such as Hawaii and Alabama (or Louisiana!), reflects the convenient imprint of a European ideology.

In short, category mistakes, whether spuriously using political, economic, or cultural factors, can doom a study of comparative politics and economics from the start. Much of what is concluded by reason once such a mistake has been made is likely to be faulty. Perhaps the largest cost in doing so in many studies may be in the loss of scholarly reputation of the fields of comparative politics and political economy. Judging from the talks at Harvard’s Center for European Studies, the ideological motivate is salient even among scholars, and this prompts me to ask whether the results of their scholarship is in fact academic in nature or too compromised by the common instinctual-urge to put one’s own ideology in the driver’s seat. To Nietzsche, the content of ideas is instinctual urges, and reasoning is the process in a brain whereby those urges compete with each other for dominance.  


Sunday, May 26, 2019

Democracy Impaired in the E.U.: The State-Level Vortex

In interpreting exit polls released on May 26, 2019 on the E.U.’s Parliament election, The New York Times pointed to two issues, only one of which pertained to the federal level. “Observers looked to [the election] to gauge the popularity of the various anti-immigration, anti-elite, Euroskeptic parties across the union.”[1] Had the E.U. electorate focused on such a matter so central to the European Union itself, democracy at the federal level would have been nearly perfect. However, the encroachment of state-level politics in the federal election, the other point, contributed to the democratic deficit at the federal level. This takes away from the viability of the federal system itself.

Looking at the exit data pertaining to the federal-level issue, E.U. voters did not vote as much for the states’ rights parties as predicted. Even so, those parties made gains in the Parliament. On the left, the Greens did well. This means the mainstream E.U. parties lost some ground. To the extent that voters voted on the federal-level issue, the message was that the status quo was not working at the federal level. The states’ rights, or Euroskeptic, gain probably reflected the E.U.’s response to inflows of immigration during the previous session. The far-right also argued that their state-level needs were being too often overlooked at the federal level. I submit that a more serious problem at the federal level was that federal-level issues were being too often overlooked by E.U. citizens. It could be that the far-right gained in the E.U. because democracy was stronger at the state level. Ironically, this was true in part because even in democracy’s repository at the federal level, the European Parliament, the elections have not been predominately about federal issues!

In the E.U. state of France, for example, the unpopularity of the state’s governor, Emmanuel Macron, had an impact. His far-right rival, Marie Le Pen, called the federal election result “a vote for France, and for the people.”[2] The election was not about their state, but the European Union. Macron nonetheless “had put a lot of chips down on beating the far-right party led by Ms. Le pen, which was once known as National Front.”[3] The election was about Macron or Le Pen, two state leaders. Furthermore, that Macron got involved politically in the federal election doubtlessly muddied the water concerning the difficult task of voting on the basis of federal issues rather than to punish or “send a message” to the incumbent governor in France.

Regarding the state of Germany, The New York Times brazenly interpreted the exit polls in state-wide rather than federal terms. Even though people often confuse Lander with Staaten, Germany itself is a state from the perspective of the E.U. Deutschland ist ein Staat. At any rate, the Times reported the following concerning the federal election: “(T)the Greens did very well, becoming the main party on the left, while the Social Democratic Party did very badly, according to exit polls.”[4] Was the Green Party the main party on the left in the European Parliament, in Germany, or among the E.U. citizens residing in the state? The only one of these that is relevant to the election itself is the first. The Times went so far as to claim that the election results “will be seen as a judgment on the center-left Social Democrats, on the far-right Alternative for Germany and the new leader of the Christian Democrats, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, who hopes to succeed Chancellor Angela Merkel.”[5] If true, the E.U. citizens residing in the state tended to vote on the basis of state politics rather than a federal-level issue. Ironically, as the election was for the E.U.’s Parliament rather than the German Bundestag, focusing so much on state-level politics was a waste of time, with a huge opportunity cost—what was lost in terms of democracy at the federal level by voters not voting principally on matters pertaining to the Parliament. 

If far-right E.U. voters were disappointed with the E.U., their own prerogative that, as Le Pen said, the election was a vote for France (or Germany) led to the self-fulfilling verdict. If E.U. citizens want more democracy at the federal level, then a certain amount of self-discipline will be needed to resist the temptation to cave into the usual state-level preoccupation and vote instead on which party in the Parliament has the most fitting platform on issues pertaining to the E.U. itself or its competencies.



1. Steven Erlanger, “European Election Results: The Mainstream Loses Ground,” The New York Times, May 26, 2019.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

Monday, May 28, 2018

Free Speech in the E.U.: Criminalizing Denials of Genocides

While the world continued to look on—like an impotent rich man who cannot afford Viagra—as a genocide was taking place in Syria (i.e., the systemic killing of a group—in this case, of pro-democracy demonstrators), France’s state senate approved a bill on January 23, 2012 criminalizing the denial of officially recognized genocides, which according to the state includes the Nazi Holocaust and the Turkish killing of Armenians beginning in 1915. In the twenty-first century, fining people and putting them in prison for not wanting to remember things so horrible evinces the same kind of nationalist thinking that had led the twentieth to be the bloodiest century. In contradistinction to that decadent century, turning a new leaf following the Arab spring in the twenty-first is a far better strategy.

Beyond the obvious matter of free speech, which admittedly is not absolute even in America, it should be asked whether law is an efficacious means of barring or changing thoughts. On the day of the vote, a study was released at the Bundestag in Berlin reporting that twenty percent of that state’s population was still anti-sematic. I don’t believe penalizing that prejudice itself (i.e., as a belief apart from any conduct) by the state’s police power forces any change at that level. At most, people would simply hide it—and how would such repression burst out in conduct? I submit it would be better simply to ignore the thoughts and concentrate on conduct.

Europe has had a tendency to codify thoughts as if they belong to the state. In America, that realm is province of the “thought police” that sprang up (as self-appointed) during the 1990s as “political correctness.”  At least with political correctness (such as in saying humankind rather than mankind, and Native American rather than American Indian), the self-appointed enforcer can be told to go to hell. The natural reaction to being accosted in such a presumptuous and pernicious way is to say precisely that which is not desired by the aggressor. Adding the police power of the state to enforce certain beliefs by penalizing others is dangerous not only for society itself, but also for individuals in terms of our quality of life free from anxiety. The over-reaching may even be immoral; it is certainly weakness.

A person may be able to control one’s own conduct more than one’s ideas or beliefs. Besides the futility of law in going after a person’s interior mental life, that domain is inherently beyond the unwanted control of another person. The French law would include up to a year in prison and a fine of about $58,000 for anyone who denies an officially-recognized genocide. Is the reach of the law limited to public speeches or published writings, or are people of France to feel anxious at private parties in their own home? In terms of general anxiety, the law could cost the state’s entire population. Is effectively adding the Turkish killings nearly a century before to the German Holocaust worth this in France? It is not as if that E.U. state borders Turkey.

Therefore, behind the 127 to 86 vote is a rather basic category mistake with respect to jurisprudence. Taking the law beyond its native domain to enforce one’s agenda using the police power of the state undercuts law itself, and thus contributes to the downfall of its legitimacy, even in its proper realm. In other words, in over-reaching, a government can wind up with even less influence over its people through even criminal law.

Additionally, a refusal to respect another’s inalienable right to have certain ideas or beliefs is to treat the rational nature (i.e., thoughts or beliefs) itself as merely a means to one’s own designs, rather than as an end in itself. According to Kant, this is immoral because of the value that is rightfully in reason because it is the assigner of value and thus has absolute value. Treating that which has essentially undefined value (as the source thereof) as having value only in so far as it fits with one’s own ideas or beliefs is wrong.

Might it be, Nietzsche would surely add, that modern moralizers are immoral rather than what we take ourselves to be? Who are the aggressors—les esprits méchants et perniceux? Might it be that human beings are far too presumptuous in what we think we know to venture into any other man’s head with impunity? Am I understood? This medicine is not meant for the weak, Nietzsche warns, who nonetheless have an uncontrollable urge to dominate. These new birds of prey are not entitled to dominate, and yet they somehow convince the strong—through thou shalt not—to be ashamed of those thoughts come out of their innate, self-confident strength. Be ashamed of who you are. The strong self-overcome their most willful instincts in order to experience the pleasure of power that naturally goes with their strength. The weak who seek to dominate, on the other hand, are driven by their instinct to overcome the resistance of others by passive aggression (owing to the weakness of the instinct, which they can’t seem to resist anyway) and cruelty (including genocides). Hitler was weakbut so too is the presumption to punish others for their beliefs in retaliation. Birds of a feather, these new birds of prey most certainly are. It is amazing they can even fly.

“By aiming at more [in pride],” Augustine proclaims in City of God (bk 14, ch.13), “a man is diminished.” Pride, by the way, is not self-confident strength, for self-overcoming is blocked by self-idolatry. Perhaps expressing the belief in over-reaching, which is an idea of the immoral and weak, should itself be punishable by a year in prison. This would probably only strengthen the belief, which in turn would weaken the believer even as he or she presumes to be more moral as a self-denying martyr. Lest the advocates of victims become ourselves victimizers (e.g., the Crusaders), it is a good policy for a general population to keep an eye on us too, for we can get quite carried away as moral zealots without realizing how we are affecting others (i.e., rational nature of others). That there have been (and will be) victims of horrible things in the world, does not give anyone the right to punish others for their thoughts or beliefs, for such intangibles are our inner castles, not to be treated like sand by pushy waves.

Fortunately, good sense prevailed and the French Constitutional Council struck down the law that would have criminalized the denial of the Armenian genocide by the Ottoman Turks. “We consider the annulment of the legislation by the Constitutional Council as a step that complies with the principles of freedom of expression and research, the rule of law and international law in France,” the Turkish Foreign Ministry said after the Council’s decision. This statement is ironic, given that the accession of Turkey into the E.U. had been held up in part out of concern in Europe that Turkey was not yet sufficiently ensconced in Western values. Perhaps it should have been asked whether France should be a state of the E.U.


Sources:

Scott Sayare and Sebnem Arsu, “Genocide Bill Angers Turks as It Passes in France,” The New York Times, January 23, 2012. 

Scott Sayare, “French Council Strikes Down Bill on Armenian Genocide Denial,” The New York Times, February 29, 2012. 

Friday, March 2, 2018

Contagion Beyond the Headlines in the E.U.

The E.U. states of Greece and Italy were grabbing headlines during the first two weeks of November 2011, given the dramatic resignations of Papandreou and Berlusconi. The only other state to get some attention was France. The Wall Street Journal noted on November 12th that concerns had been quietly building about France. According to the paper,“French bond yields rose to four-month highs, one day after Standard & Poor's Ratings Services erroneously issued a message saying it had cut France's triple-A credit rating. The yield on France's benchmark 10-year bond climbed 0.02 percentage point to 3.46%. That was 1.66 percentage points over yields on comparable German government bonds. France now has the highest government bond yields among its triple-A-rated peers in the region.” However, it seems overly dramatic to say that a .02 percent increase evinces a climb. Moreover, 3.46% is well under 7 percent, which is the level that was presumed at the time to signify the need for a bailout. Relative to the changes in the Italian yield, those of the French bonds could be viewed as relatively moderate, The French yield was still closer to that of Germany. Although not a red herring, the concern over France masked some real sleepers that were poised to take a hit in 2012. 


Eclipsed by the headlines, Portugal’s expected GDP for 2012 was revised downward by the E.U.’s executive branch in November from the May estimates of around -1.8% to -3% with an expected unemployment rate of nearly 14 percent. The 2011 numbers were also revised downward, from about -1.9% to around -2.1 percent. Meanwhile, Portugal’s semi-sovereign 10-year bond yield was at just over 12 percent, well over Italy’s “point of no return” rate of 7.5 percent, which was hit for a day during the second week of November. With an expected contraction of 3% in 2012 and a 12% yield in November of 2011, Portugal could be expected to face stronger head-winds in being able to make its interest payments in 2012. I suspect that the press had become so captivated with the circus of personalities in Greece and Italy that the iceberg lying in front of Portugal was simply not seen.

Besides Portugal, some of the states in Eastern Europe faced icebergs of their own—though not necessarily of their own making. These too were receiving too little press coverage in November of 2011. Specifically, the state leaders of the “euro zone” had decided in October to give the “zone’s” major banks until the following summer to raise their capital reserves. With that amount of time, the banks could avoid issuing new stock (which would dilute the holdings of their existing stockholders) and get the added reserves together by cutting back on lending to Eastern E.U. state governments instead. Morgan Stanley figures that Poland, Romania, and Hungary are most vulnerable to a loss of “euro zone” bank lending. Roughly 1 trillion euros of “euro zone” bank assets were in Eastern Europe at the time of the change in governments in Greece and Italy. Hungary’s exposure was the largest, with loans held by the banks amounting to about 37% of GDP. According to the Wall Street Journal, any hit to the E.U.’s eastern states, whose economic growth had been powered the global recovery, would only worsen the E.U.’s economic outlook and its ability to service its debts. That is to say, enabling the “euro zone” banks to raise additional reserve capital by reducing lending rather than raising equity may have been in the banks’ interest, but choking the eastern states could already in November be expected to make it more difficult for Greece, Italy, and Portugal to service their respective debts from reduced economic output in 2012. 

It would have been wiser on the journalists’ part to put France in perspective and take a look at Portugal and Eastern Europe than to have fixated so much on the plights of Papandreou and Berlusconi as they struggled to maintain power only to ultimately lose it.

For more on this topic, see Essays on the E.U. Political Economy

Sources:
Matthew Dalton, “Europe Slashes Its Growth Forecast,” The Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2011. 

Kelly Evans, “Eastern Europe Vulnerable in Debt Crisis,” The Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2011. 

Neelabh Chaturvedi, Stelios Bouras, and Liam Moloney, “Europe Pulls Back From Brink,” The Wall Street Journal, November 12-13, 2011. 

Sunday, January 28, 2018

Westboro Church's Anti-Gay and John Galliano's Anti-Semitic Opinions: The U.S. and E.U. Contrasted

The First Amendment protects free speech in the U.S. even if it is as hurtful as signs at a Marine funeral proclaiming "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 2, 2011. The Westboro Baptist Church celebrated the death of Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder in Iraq with signs such as "God Hates You," along with anti-gay messages at his funeral in Maryland in 2006. The late Marine's father sought damages for emotional distress. An appellate court had reversed the $5 million award granted by a district court, and the U.S. Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court's decision.  The Wall Street Journal notes that "Chief Justice Roberts nodded to the wrenching set of facts in the case, writing that 'the applicable legal term— 'emotional distress'—fails to capture fully the anguish Westboro's choice added to Mr. Snyder's already incalculable grief.'"  Crucially, however, the justices of the majority opinion would not fall to the temptation of acting on the emotion that naturally follows hearing of such harm.

Interestingly, on the same day as the American high court's decision, the designer John Galliano was being fired by Dior's CEO and investigated by the French police (for inciting racial hatred with anti-semitic statementsm, which is illegal in at least the French and German states of the EU) for having made anti-semitic insults to a couple with whom he was arguing late at night in a trendy bar (cafe) in Paris. There, the emotions got the best of both the designer and those who reacted to the video posted of his comments (albeit showing only a part of the argument). Perhaps a grieving father at his son's funeral reading signs that thank God for dead American soldiers can be likened to a Jewish couple at a bar hearing that they are lucky their grandparents or parents were not exterminated by the Nazis. It is difficult for the rest of us to know how either feels, or how to compare the pain.

In any case, that any human being would want to hurt another so much is truly a sad commentary on our species that otherwise vaunts itself as being in the image of God. Perhaps the question is what kind of God is being envisioned here. A vengeance is mine, sayth the Lord sort, which Nietzsche condemns in his writings as already discredited on account of having such a sordid divine attribute as vengeance?  The deed is done, according to Nietzsche.  So too, the pain has already been inflicted on the grieving parents and the Jewish couple.  The rest is merely mopping up. 

I contend that the impulsive reaction in Europe to the fashion designer's drunken anti-semetic slurs is inferior to the majority opinion of the American court in the Westboro case because the tolerance of reason is more in keeping with a free society than is vengeance or retribution against a disliked opinion. Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that speech on public issues (of which gays in the military is one) "cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt," USA Today reports. Roberts pointed out that the jury at the district court level of the case had been told that Westboro could be held liable for the intentional infliction of emotional distress if the picketing was "outrageous." The chief justice argues that that test is "highly malleable," which is to say, it can change according to what a given person happens to think is outrageous. An old man might think noice in an apartment hallway at midnight is outrageous while a few college students down the hall might simply assume that the party has begun. In such a case, outrageous may have a physiological determinant and thus be innately different depending on the person. Quoting the 1988 case of Hustler Magazine v. Fallwell, Roberts said that liability cannot be imposed on "the basis of jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression." Rather, reason must trump passion in such matters. Regarding the Synder case, Roberts said that the small Topeka-based church's messages "may fall short of refined social or political commentary," but discussed "matters of public import," such as the nation's morality and gays in the military and thus are protected by the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees free speech.  A free society is only really free to the extent that we protect even the opinions of those we loath. Otherwise, society reduces to a primitive matter of excluding those we don't like. Such banal convenience is too decadent for a vibrant republic and society. Reason tells us this. The question is whether we have sufficient impulse-control to proffer the degree of tolerance that is requisite. So actually, the matter pivots on us--Americans and European generally--rather than on Westboro and Galliano. They can make us stronger in spite of themselves if we permit ourselves to rise to the occasion rather than satisfy our immediate gratification.  In the end, it is up to us, not them, what kind of societies we have.

In terms of federalism, the chief justice noted that states can regulate the time and place of the protests, and the church was already contesting some as too restrictive. As of the date of the court's decision, forty six states had enacted laws to minimize picketing near a cemetery during funerals. In terms of federalism, it might be that the states' respective Supreme Courts might have been the proper venue in interpreting the U.S. Constitution in such cases. Generally speaking, if there can be fifty different sets of regulations on protests, there can be fifty different decisions interpreting free speech. It would not be like fifty different foreign policies. As it is, even with fifty different regulations, the final decider is centralized in the U.S. Supreme Court.

Sources:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703559604576176323629295598.html?KEYWORDS=first+amendment+protects

http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2011/mar/04/john-galliano-dior-brand

Joan Biskupic and Kevin Johnson, "Westboro free-speech ruling has its limits," USA Today, March 3, 2011, p. 2A.

Wednesday, January 24, 2018

Balancing Company Rights and Worker Security through Public Policy

It would be a cruel joke were an airline to keep the extendable corridor back as the plane’s front door is opened and passengers are pushed out. Not even having a safety net below would neither be sufficient nor fair. When a government gives companies the flexibility to fire workers without yet having in place vocational safety nets, said government acts negligently and perhaps even with partiality to one side of the labor-management duality. At the very least, the flexibility to fire should be held off until the matter of economic security is finalized.
With the largest automaker in the E.U. state of France announcing the firing of 1,300, the largest supermarket-chain in the state set to cut 2,500, and 200 at a major clothing retailer in January, 2018, companies were already “taking advantage of new rules that make it easier to hire and fire. But the other changes, those designed to help cushion the blow like retraining programs,” were not yet in place, “leaving workers vulnerable to a coming wave of downsizing” in a state whose unemployment rate had been “persistently stuck at more than 9 percent for more than a decade.”[1] The Times goes on to point out that “the initial imbalance between employer rights and workers’ protections means the economic picture could get worse before it gets better.”[2] This way of expressing the matter highlights the possibility that the government officials were biased in favor of the business lobby (and cash).
I submit that protections for citizens—providing a safety net even if only for workers in transition—is more important than employer rights (i.e., property rights) because even just risking sustenance is a greater harm than holding on for a while to old rigid rules on firings. The case of an impending bankruptcy may be different, as firing some employees could save the jobs of the majority.
In this analysis, I am drawing on Bentham’s utilitarian ethical theory, wherein the greatest good in terms of pleasure (less pain) is the criterion. Generally, a public policy that restricts the choices of a company’s management creates less pain than the corresponding pleasure (without pain of losing sustenance) for the workforce. Opening up the choices creates pleasure (and reduces pain) for managements and stockholders, but the pain of being unemployed is more. Even given Bentham’s claim that such pleasure and pain could be put in quantitative terms, the pain from losing the means of livelihood and possibly having to do without even on the basics (food, shelter, and medical care) is high indeed—so high that even comparing it to the pleasure obtained by the companies seems an injustice. This is not a justification for regulation or socialism (i.e., the state owns the means of production); rather, I submit that balance, such as in the timing of the public policies on firings and worker-security, is a ripe additive to Bentham’s theory.




[1] Liz Alderman, “Newfound Freedom . . . to Fire,” The New York Times, January 24, 2018.
[2]Ibid.

Monday, April 24, 2017

On a New Era Dawning in the E.U. State of France


With Emmanuel Macron finishing first on the first-round of voting for the head of state in the E.U. state of France, the media declared a new era in the state politics was already a foregone conclusion. Yet the support of the political elites at both the state and federal level could be read as tempering any such landmark announcement.
With 97 percent of the vote counted, Emmanuel Macron had 23.9 percent, Marine Le Pen followed closely with 21.5 percent, “the mainstream right candidate Francois Fillon had nearly 20 percent, and the far-left candidate Jean-Juc Melenchon had 19.6 percent.”[1] The Socialist Party’s candidate came in with only 6 percent. With just 4.3 percent between Macron and Melenchon, it can hardly be said the traditional parties, except for the disappointingly ruling Socialists, succumbed to “a new era” in the state’s politics.[2] Indeed, even “before the official tallies were announced, the political establishment was rallying behind” Macron, suggesting that the political elite would have considerable pull with the independent. “There is a sigh of relief, said Jan Techau of the Holbrooke forum at the American Academy in Berlin.[3] To be sure, the E.U.’s political elite was pleased that a federalist would be in the running against the anti-federalist, secessionist Le Pen in the state’s runoff for governor on May 7, 2017. Even so, that the state and federal political elites were rallying for the “independent” candidate” could be taken as a powerful indication that news of a “new era” in the state’s was being vastly overblown by the media—whose sensationalist bias needs no explanation.
The similarity to Ross Perot, a politically independent Texan businessman who received 18.9 percent of the popular vote, had he won the U.S. presidency in 1992 is simply bad comparative politics. Besides there being no run-off beyond intra-party primaries and caucuses, no “dangerous” alternative on the far-right had a credible chance. Additionally, an electoral structure taking account of the semi-sovereign republics in the Union does not apply to a state-level system in another such union. Specifically, the Electoral College, whose electors are by state and whose allocation of electors reflects the point that each republic, no matter how small, should have a significant role, as per the fact that each state has enumerated and residual sovereignty, in the selection of the federal executive. None of this applies to a state-office race in the E.U.
Eliminating the implied category mistake in likening a state-race in the E.U. to a federal race in the U.S., Emmanuel Macron is actually closer to Jesse Ventura, who was elected head of state and chief executive of Minnesota in 1998. Although he ran affiliated with the Reform Party that Perot had founded, the independent shed that party shortly into his term. The two traditional parties in Minnesota did not cheer on his campaign, so he was not beholden to them. The case of Macron in France is more nuanced. Hence, from this comparison we may conclude that the preachment of a new era in one of the E.U.’s big states to be hyperbolic rather than substantive.



[1] Alissa J. Rubin, “Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen Advance in French Election,” The New York Times, April 23, 2017.
[2] NPR news reported on the election night that the traditional parties’ demise in the first-round election signaled a new era in French politics.
[3] Steven Erlanger and Alison Smale, “After French Vote, Mainstream Europe Breathes a Sigh of Relief,” The New York Times, April 24, 2017.

Friday, February 3, 2017

Can an Electorate Hold Its Political Elite Accountable: The Case of François Fillon


Can a political elite hold itself accountable? Left to its own devices, absent a virtuous citizenry, a political elite is able to exploit a conflict of interest in both wielding the authority of government and using that power even to constrain the elite itself. Unfortunately, even where an electorate is virtuous, the dispersed condition of the popular sovereign is an impediment to galvanizing enough popular will to act as a counter-power to that of a political elite, which is relatively concentrated and well-informed. In early 2017, the problem was on full display in the E.U. state of France, with little the federal government could do given the amount of governmental sovereignty still residing at the state level. So the question is whether an electorate can galvanize enough power to counter that of a political elite.

  François Fillon in trouble for corruption (Christian Hartmann/Reuters)

Just months before the election, France’s leading presidential candidate was “in deep trouble” for payments of nearly €831, 440 “from the public payroll to his wife and children” over the 30 years in which François Fillon employed them.[1] Penelope Fillon “was paid with taxpayer money for a bogus job as a parliamentary assistant to her husband and his deputy” in the state Assembly.[2] Because her husband had “fashioned himself as a stern and honest politician,” the sordid odor of hypocrisy was in the air, yet the practice itself, which was legal at the time, was to “many French politicians” no “big deal.”[3] So from the press and the public came “a wellspring of anger” calling into question the standard operating procedures of the political class.”[4] In short, the response was: “They just don’t get it.”[5] C’est vraiment incroyable. Really incredible.
A political class cannot police itself if its culture is so ensconced in the misuse of funds, even if legal, that the ubiquitous practice is not even recognized as being unethical in nature. On an organizational scale, I have witnessed a university’s culture so dysfunctional—with such passive aggression from the non-academic staff—that the offending creatures would not even recognize themselves in the mirror; even to question them would be perceived as a provocation. Accountability is impossible in such a sordid organization. So, too, a political class with an ingrown sense of presumptuous entitlement cannot possibly hold itself accountable. A perception of wrong-doing is requisite to holding oneself accountable. The decisive question is therefore whether a “wellspring of anger” in a public-at-large can be sufficient to “throw the bastards out.”
Even if a sizable proportion of an electorate votes to “throw the bums out,” other rationales for voting doubtless exist and can dilute the effect such that the culture of the political class can survive. Furthermore, even intense anger today can quickly dissipate, such that the results of an election even just months away show little sign of the earlier sizzling headlines. Even major protests do not necessarily translate into the ballot box. At the time Fillon was facing a harsh reaction in France, more than 250,000 irate people in the state of Romania were protesting after Liviu Dragnea’s governing Social Democratic Party passed a law on January 31, 2017 making “official misconduct punishable by prison time only in cases in which the financial damage is more than 200,000 lei, or about $47,000”—Dragnea himself facing “charges of abouse of power involving a sum” less than 200,000 lei.[6] Here we can see the conflict of interest on full display: Dragnea was using the power of his party in the state legislature such that he would essentially be above the (constraint of) law. Yet even such a blatant case cannot be expected to be punished when the next election comes around. Something more is needed to address the inherent conflict of interest.



1. Adam Nossiter, “Fillon Scandal Indicts, Foremost, France’s Political Elite,” The New York Times, February 3, 2017; Aurelien Breeden, “Graft Allegations Grow Against Francois Fillon, French Presidential Hopeful,” The New York Times, February 1, 2017.
2. Aurelien Breeden, “Graft Allegations Grow Against Francois Fillon, French Presidential Hopeful,” The New York Times, February 1, 2017
3. Adam Nossiter, “Fillon Scandal Indicts, Foremost, France’s Political Elite,” The New York Times, February 3, 2017
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Palko Karasz, “Protests Rock Romania After Government Weakens Corruption Law,” The New York Times, February 2, 2017.