The Electoral College: A Check on Excess Democracy

As a delegate in the U.S. constitutional convention, Governeur Morris stated on July 19, 1787 that the proposed National Executive (i.e. the U.S. President) should be “a firm guardian of the people and of the public interest.” (1)  Given this role, Morris maintained that it “cannot be possible that a man shall have sufficiently distinguished himself to merit this high trust without having his character proclaimed by fame throughout the Empire.” (2)   In other words, presiding requires a requisite credibility or stature that may be difficult to find in a territory on the scale of an empire.

The E.U. has obviated this problem by having presidencies of particular E.U. governmental bodies the a state government serving in the E.U. Presidency, a figure-head “office” based on a six-month rotation. The U.S., on the other hand, put all of their eggs in one basket in terms of having one president with substantial power in being commander in chief and having a legislative veto as well as a “bully pulpit.” Considerable emphasis is thus placed on the office’s selection process.

In the constitutional convention, Morris believed that the people at large “would be as likely as any that could be devised to produce [a President] of distinguished Character.” (3) Morris was assuming that at least one candidate can be found whose character has been proclaimed by fame throughout the Empire. Differing from Morris, Gerry argued on July 19 in the convention that the “people are uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing men. He urged the expediency of an appointment of the Executive by Electors to be chosen by the State Executives.” (4)  In other words, suitable candidates could exist, but the people would not be sufficiently aware of their characters to discern the wheat from the chaff.

Electors selected by the governors and presidents of the States would be of lesser number and thus able to come to know the candidates and thus avoid electing a lemon. However, Williamson, also on July 19, “had no great confidence in the Electors to be chosen for the special purpose. . . . They would be liable to undue influence.” (5) Even so, the convention voted that the President would be appointed by electors to be chosen by the State legislatures.

Williamson turned out to be right; the political parties have had tight influence on the States’ electors. The electors would also prove to be excessively subject to the influence of the  citizens who vote for them, rather than being a check on the passions and ignorance of the wider public.  In other words, the selection process has come to enervate an intended check on the democracy of the moment (e.g., the flavor of the month).  Presidential elections have become virtual popularity contests.  The matter of finding someone with sufficient maturity and credibility to preside over the common good has been lost.  Accordingly, the presidents have been highly partisan—even going against their campaign promises for political expediency. My point is that we can look beyond the individual presidents and find that the selection process itself is perhaps biased against producing good governance.

It seems to me that a better alternative would be to have the governors of the States meet together to select the U.S. President. The governors are apt to know the candidates (or can meet them), and could assess them from the standpoint of presiding and executing law. Lest this alternative be thought to slight representative democracy, it could be pointed out that governors are popularly elected and thus accountable to the people.

In actuality, the alternative is both rooted in democracy and capable of providing a check on some of its drawbacks (e.g., popularity contests). Perhaps having the governors select the office would prompt voters to take their governor races more seriously. Additionally, this alternative might provide a needed check on the encroachment of the Federal Government onto the domains of the States (i.e., beyond the enumerated powers in the US Constitution), since the State governments lost their involvement in the U.S. Government in 1913 when U.S. Senators were no longer appointed by the State governments.

In short, the move would strength democracy as well as federalism. This is merely one alternative; doubtless other good ones exist as well.  My main point is that such alternatives should be dug up and debated using the American media and our representatives as conduits. We ignore the bias in the selection process at our own peril. Slighting the problem is itself indicative of the danger in the current process.

1. James Madison, Notes in the Federal Convention of 1787. New York: Norton, 1987, p. 324.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 327.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., pp. 328-29.

A Bit of Federalism in ObamaCare

Senator Ron Wyden has written to government officials of Oregon to encourage them to “come up with innovative solutions that the Federal government has never had the flexibility or will to implement.” This is significant because he is a democrat. As long as a state covers the same number of uninsured and keeps coverage as comprehensive, the following can be waived:

1. the individual mandate to purchase insurance (i.e., what Virginia and Florida are suing over)

2. regulations about business taxes

3. federal standards for minimum benefits

4. allocation of subsidies in the insurance “exchanges.”

These are called section 1332 waivors. There is also some flexibility on medicaid--but how much flexibility do these waivors proffer? The states might be able to determine how the uninsured are to be insured. For instance, they could go single-payer. Or could they?The federal allocation of subsidies in the insurance “exchanges” can be waived, but can the “exchanges”?

There is a trade-off involved in federal standards and state waivors. If the federal standard is too high (e.g., the number of uninsured covered and the amount of minimum coverage), then not much freedom is involved in the waivors because the standards must be met regardless. Given the diversity within the Union and our system of federalism, the US Government should have been oriented to coming up with minimum standards for health-care rather than trying to make it a federal responsibility. By minimum, I mean that below which is unacceptable for a state in this union. For instance, it could be that universal health-care is a minimum if health care is to be considered an American right. The states, rather than the general government, would then be required to pass laws to implement the minimum standard in any way they preferred. They could determine the means, whether single-payer or exchanges. I’m not sure that the existing waivors, which do not begin until 2017, allow for such flexibility as would accommodate the various political ideologies of our states. Once power is grasped, it is very difficult indeed to let go of some of it.

Source: Wyden Defects on ObamaCare, WSJ, September 3, 2010, p. A16.

The U.S. House of Representatives: An Aristocratic or People’s House?

“Between 1984 and 2009, the median net worth of a member of the House rose by more than 2 ¹/₂ times, according to the analysis of financial disclosures, from $280,000 to $725,000 in inflation-adjusted 2009 dollars, excluding home ­equity. Over the same period, the wealth of an American family has declined slightly, with the comparable median figure sliding from $20,600 to $20,500, according to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from the University of Michigan.” This comparison excludes home equity because it was not included in congressional reporting.
These statistics support the view extant in the U.S. Federal Constitutional Convention that relative to all of the representatives in the legislatures of the several states, the “few” in the U.S. House of Representatives gave that body an aristocratic quality. This fear did not necessarily translate into a belief that the federal system itself would be consolidated as a consequence. Even so, aside from the growing economic distance between the U.S. House reps and their constituents, the increasing wealth can be taken as a baleful indication of a funneling of wealth and political power in ever tighter circles. In other words, the statistics support those who urge that more governmental power be shifted from Congress back to the semi- and residual-sovereign state legislatures.
While it is true that the delegates at the federal convention feared excess democracy, which was notably against the interest of creditors such as themselves, in the state legislatures (e.g. Massachusetts), it can be argued that his bias left them (and the constitution they drafted) vulnerable to political (and economic) consolidation, with Congressional power (and wealth) effectively setting its own limits. The statistics may give an unsuspecting public pause in taking seriously the proposition that the federal system should be readjusted so as to achieve better balance, which in turn enables more viable checks on the abuse of power—whether in Washington, D.C. or Topeka.

Source:

Peter Whoriskey, “Growing Wealth Widens Distance Between Lawmakers and Constituents,” The Washington Post, December 26, 2011.

The Veto Power of the U.S. President

On September 12, 1787, in the U.S. Constitutional Convention, Gerry claimed that the "primary object of the revisionary check on the President is not to protect the general interest, but to defend his own department" (Madison, Notes, p. 628). Gerry was stressing the value of maintaining the separation of power that was to exist between the three branches of the U.S. (General, or federal) Government. I believe he was inordinately fixated on his point--missing the presiding function of the U.S. President. Also on September 12, Madison averred that the "object of the revisionary power is twofold. 1. to defend the Executive Rights 2. to prevent popular or factious injustice" (Madison, Notes, p. 629). In addition to be an advocate of the separation of power within the U.S. Government, Madison was concerned that a large faction in the majority might oppress a minority faction and he viewed the expanded republic of the union as a means to minimize such tyranny. He too was slighting the presiding role of the president. 

At the end of the convention, George Washington, who had been presiding over it as one controversial point after another were debated, noted the problems inherent in both presiding and advocating on particular issues. Madison reports that when "the PRESIDENT rose, for the purpose of putting the question [of the Constitution], he [Washington] said that although his situation had hitherto restrained him from offering his sentiments on questions depending in the House, and it might be thought, ought now to impose silence on him, yet he could not forbear expressing his wish that the . . . smallness of the proportion of Representatives [in the U. S. House] had been considered by many members of the Convention an insufficient security for the rights &; interests of the people. . . . he thought this of so much consequence that it would give [him] much satisfaction to see it adopted. No opposition was made . . . it was agreed to unanimously" (Madison, Notes, p. 655). Washington believed that as he was presiding over the Convention it was necessary for him to remain silent on all of the particular points being debated throughout the Convention; even on the last day he hesitated in expressing his desire that there be no less than 30,000 people per House Rep. rather than 40,000 as the Convention had decided. 

The silence of a presider places him or her in good position to weigh in on a point "of so much consequence."  In other words, a presider literally sits before, rather than participates, so as to be able to protect the whole from dangers from points of large consequence.  Weighing in on every partisan point, such as most U.S. Presidents have done, not only keeps them from seeing the forest through the particular trees, but also detracts from their credibility with which they could push through the few matters of such consequence that the system would succumb otherwise. 

It follows that the veto should be used not to give the President a share in every piece of legislation, but to enable him or her to stop bills that would otherwise compromise the system as a whole.  In the U.S. Constitution as it was drafted by the Convention, the U.S. House was the only democratically elected body or branch in the U.S. Government.  Neither the U.S. Senators nor the U.S. President were elected by the people. The Senate represented (and protected) the state governments, and special electors were chosen by the state legislatures to select the U.S. President.  The quality of representative democracy in the U.S. House was therefore vital to the Government having a balance within which democracy was a part. Compromise democracy in the House and the U.S. Government might become an aristocracy or monarchy.  These terms were used by many of the convention's delegates. 

George Washington understood the nature of presiding, which can be gleamed from Madison's report of what the PRESIDENT said on the last day of the convention. It is a pity that his example has been lost on so many U.S. Presidents.

Source: James Madison, Notes in the Federal Convention of 1787 (New York: Norton, 1987).

The Keynesian Drug: America’s Achilles' Heel

Keynes posited that government deficit-spending could boost an economy’s output of goods and services when it is short of full-employment. In the context of an economy near full-steam, tax cuts and/or more government spending could trigger inflation while adding little to GDP. To maintain balance in the government accounts, government surpluses during the ensuing upswing are used to pay off the accumulated debt. This is the theory. Unfortunately, it seems to be at odds with representative democracy. Specifically, a systemic bias exists in favor of recurrent deficits, and thus accumulating debt.

As one example, the surpluses in the U.S. Government in the late 1990s were not devoted entirely to debt reduction; even if they had been, the debt would not have been wiped out, given the economic downturn in 2001. Clinton’s assumption of 15 years of surpluses turned out to be wildly idealistic, and his decision to spend portions of the surpluses in the late 1990s imprudent. Besides the natural human preference for immediate gratification over paying down debt and the associated enabling by elected representatives who are easily distracted by other goals, the tendency of an economy to stay well below full-employment means deficits will continue to be called for more often than surpluses. In other words, on economic terms alone, Keynesianism is inherently unbalanced, and political dynamics rooted in human nature extenuate the imbalance.

The propensity of government officials to supervene other agenda items such as “size of government” and “jobs” in the face of deficits over $1 trillion and an accumulated debt of over $14 trillion boggles the mind. To be sure, those other items are important; but if they are allowed to eclipse or block the achievement of fiscal balance, it can be asked whether a people (and elected representatives) are sufficiently mature for to manage public debt.

For example, referring to the two-year extension of the Bush tax cuts in 2010 in the midst of a huge deficit (and accumulated debt), Alan Simpson (WY-R) bemoaned, "It's a great disappointment, a tremendous disappointment, because—what is it, $858 billion in two years added to the deficit? I mean, that just breaks your heart. What the hell do you think we've been talking about?" The former U.S. Senator was pointing to the immaturity involved in placing other priorities, even his own (i.e., smaller government), above reducing deficits running over $1 trillion and a debt of over $14 trillion. He was being an adult, bracketing other priorities dear to him while talking to irresponsible children who ought not be allowed to play with debt, especially when it is at a dangerous level.

Speaking on the possibility of the Chinese pulling out as a creditor of the U.S. Government Treasury bonds, Alan Simpson warns, "It will be precipitous. It won't be six months, might not even be six weeks. It might be six days when they suddenly start the flight. And I know how bankers are: once the flight starts, and the money and rumors, it'll be fast and difficult. . . . We don't know the tipping point. But the tipping point will come if you fail to address the long-term problem of debt, deficit, and interest." Given this danger, it is foolish, in other words, not to throw everything we have—including more revenue and lower spending—at the problem and then debate jobs and the size of government later.

In short, the American people ought to stay away from the Keynesian drug—finding a better way—or we must enact mechanisms by which we will enforce fiscal balance on ourselves. A balanced budget amendment would disallow Keynesianism rather than apply balance by limiting deficits to what a government stipulates itself to paying off in a few years’ time.

Even if modern Americans are in a convenient denial, the Anti-federalists saw the danger in sustained government borrowing (and the possibility of an associated increase in the U.S. Government’s power). Brutus (p. 151), for example, observes: “The power to borrow money is general and unlimited . . . By this means, they may create a national debt, so large, as to exceed the ability of the country ever to sink. I can scarcely contemplate a greater calamity that could befal this country, than to be loaded with a debt exceeding their ability ever to discharge. If this be a just remark, it is unwise and improvident to vest in the general government a power to borrow at discretion, without any limitation or restriction. (I)t would certainly have been a wise provision in this constitution, to have made it necessary that two thirds of the members should assent to borrowing money—when the necessity was indispensible, this assent would always be given, and in no other cause ought it to be.” War stemming from being invaded is likely what Brutus was thinking of—rather than stimulating the economy. Lest it be assumed that the latter would necessarily be excluded, two-thirds of the U.S. House members and U.S. Senators could vote for borrowing to stimulate the economy to create jobs that are necessary. To be sure, the likelihood of such a vote would be less than under the hurdle of a mere majority, but Keynesianism would not be theoretically excluded. The matter of enforcing balance in using the Keynesian drug is difficult in terms of design because of the gravity of the addiction and the associated enabling rationalization of slippage.

Sources:

Brutus, Letter 8, January 10, 1788, 2.9.95, in Herbert J. Storing, ed., The Anti-Federalist, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

Alan Simpson, Newsweek, December 27, 2010, p. 28.