Terms of Office in a Representative Democracy: Greek Austerity

In September 2012, the E.U. state of Greece was in the process of working out a 11.5 euro austerity plan that would involve forced retirements in public sector and pension cuts so the E.U. would approve another installment of the bailout to the state. One resident remarked at the time, “Mark my words. In the coming months, there will be a revolution, and this government will fall.”[1] This sounds a bit like “buyer’s remorse” concerning the election the previous June  in which the anti-bailout/austerity party barely lost. What about all the Greeks who voted for Samaras, the pro-bailout/austerity leader? It cannot be assumed that they, too, had buyer's remorse even as the additional cuts went into effect. Even if the electorate shifted in the direction of anti-austerity as the forced retirements and pension cuts occurred, the ingrediants of representative democracy includes terms of office to protect the elected officials by giving time for their policies to work. Representative democracy does not reduce to the momentary passion of the masses. According to Plato, mob rule is the bad form of democracy. 
What if conditions significantly deteriorate and the representatives elected to office refuse to change course? Does this justify truncating the term? The German-led “austerity-only” approach to the Greek debt crisis clearly exacerbated the Greek fiscal condition. Austerity cuts resulting in further contractions of the economy meant more unemployment payouts by the Greek government even as it had to cut spending. Had Samaras' voters anticipated this? Is this question even relevant? The failure to anticipate how a policy once enacted will affect the economy does not nullify the votes cast or justify depriving the office holder of his or her the full term. 

                                                                                   

Terms of office enable elected representatives to do the right thing even when the masses at the moment are exerting tremendous pressure on the representatives to do what is politically expedient but not in the people's best interest. This can be distinguished from stubborn office-holders who rigidly hold to their ideology at the expense of the people's best interest. Because the term-of-office protects both good and bad office holders, rather than rewarding the courageous representatives and penalizing the office-holders who use their term be able to go too far, the term element of representative democracy is not enough.  
In 2012, Samaras needed some time to do what might not match the momentary passions of the mob as retirements and pension cuts were being inflicted. Had the additional cuts triggered a meltdown in the state's economy with Samaras holding firm on the state budget cuts, a snap election could have been necessary not only to stop the meltdown, but also to prevent a revolution. 
Is it a good idea that representative democracies have terms of elected office? The answer can only be vague or indeterminate. In parliamentary systems, a legislative vote of no confidence can of course trigger an election. The term is truncated. Ideally, this is not due to office-holders withstanding political pressures that would put political expedience above the best interests of the state and its people. The problem is that we cannot be sure. 

See related: Skip Worden, Essays on the E.U. Political Economy: Federalism and the Debt Crisis.

1. Liz Alderman, “Greek Government and Public at Odds Over New Cuts,” The New York Times, September 6, 2012. 

Raising Retirement Ages in the E.U.: The Case of Spain

The New York Times reported in 2012, “Spain has a stubbornly high budget deficit, its banks require tens of billions of euros in rescue loans and the government may soon have little choice but to request bailout funds” from the E.U.’s “TARP” program. Nevertheless, the state government’s “budget would actually increase pension payouts 1 percent [in 2013]. The money includes not only pensions for former public employees, but also the social security payments that go to all retired [residents].”[1] Pension expenditures represented nearly 40 percent of the state's budget and 9 percent of the state’s economic output, so one would think that line-item would have been first up on the chopping block. To be sure, cutting sustenance programs such as pensions could actually exacerbate a government's debt because if a resulting decline in demand adds to unemployment. In this case, the politics in the state seems to have gone along with the economics. I submit that Spain could have gone further economically were it not for entitlement politics interlarding the retirement-age issue.
Delaying the increase in the retirement age in Spain from 65 to 67 until 2027 could be seen as a case of politics operating at the expense of what was most needed economically. Given the advances in modern medicine and the universal health-care systems in the E.U., even 67 have been too low and too late. 
Firstly, in the 2010's, the E.U. would struggle with immigration even as more workers were needed. The failure of politics in the state of Spain to jack up the retirement age significantly as early as 2013 may therefore have been a contributing factor in shortchanging the local residents from satisfying the state's need for labor. 

Do the state governments have too much power at the federal level? If so, are Greece and Spain paying the price of the self-interest of more dominant states?  

The E.U. state of Greece demonstrates that going just from 65 to 67 can indeed be accomplished legislatively in a year, even with political protests. “For Greece, the longtime generosity of its pension system — in which large numbers were previously allowed to retire at 50 and younger — came to define the bankrupt condition of the Greek state. In the years before the crisis hit, pension payments in Greece totaled as much as 14 percent” of the state’s economic output.[2] Spain too could have used the decrease in pension costs that a relatively quick raise to 67 would have engendered. Raising the age is distinct from cutting pension amounts, yet the austerity-bred entitlement politics may have spilled onto the age issue. 
Raising the retirement age can be distinguished from the cuts in monthly entitlement programs, such as in the lender-imposed austerity program in Greece. If heath-related exceptions can be made to a higher retirement age based on a generally longer human lifespan, then cutting entitlement programs more than raising the retirement age puts lives at risk. This difference may have been lost in the politics of raising the retirement age in Spain.

1. Landon Thomas, “Pension Dilemma in Europe’s Debt Crisis,” The New York Times, September 30, 2012.
2. Ibid.

Monetary and Fiscal Policy and Structural Reform: Each Had a Role to Play after the Financial Crisis

With fiscal policy hamstrung by public debt in both the E.U. and U.S., monetary policy was a major beneficiary of the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing state-debt crisis that stammered on at least until 2013 in Europe. Lest it be concluded that central bank policy had reached an unassailable peak of salvation, the expanded role actually made its limitations transparent, at least in financial circles.
Speaking to Charlie Rose on March 11, 2013, Jeremy Grantham of a Wall Street firm argued that the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank's extremely low interest-rate policy would be unlikely to spark an increase in employment even in the severe recession following the financial crisis. In fact, a low interest rate is a transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich. Fiscal policy, such as the Conservation Civilians Corps of U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal in the 1930s, is a much better tool to achieve full employment. Yet even the New Deal did not have enough fire-power to bring the U.S. economy out of the Great Depression; it took the breaking out of a second world war to get America's military-industrial complex to create enough jobs. One implication is that a competitive market alone is not sufficient to reach full employment. Even though such a market can sport great efficiency if kept competitive by the enforcement of anti-trust law, natural consumption levels have been unable to spark enough jobs for full employment to be achieved. Not even low interest rates can do that, as per the decade of the 2010's. We ought to accept that a lot of fiscal stimulus is needed to achieve full employment, even if it is not optimally efficient. 
Meanwhile, Jens Weidmann, the president of the Bundesbank, argued that monetary policy in the E.U. “can only buy time at best..” He went on to say he was “a bit concerned about some of the expectations around the power and potential of monetary policy.”[1] In other words, the ECB should have gotten back to monetary policy in a stricter sense, rather than trying to spark economic growth and employment through low interest rates and buying state-government bonds.
Behind the view of interest-rate, or monetary, policy as being capable of giving us economic salvation was the paralysis of fiscal policy determination in both federal unions.  Divided government at the federal level stymied fiscal policy in the U.S. after President Obama’s insufficient “stimulus” package in 2010. In the E.U., the vetoes retained by the fiscally- and debt-conservative state governments such as Germany at the federal level through the European Council put pressure on state governments strapped fiscally to take on even more debt even just to avoid defaulting on existing debt, not to mention keeping their fiscal policy-levels sufficient that their residents would not be imperiled. Increasing debt-loads for fiscal reasons did not serve states like Greece and Spain well. Fiscal redistribution at the federal level is one of the benefits of federalism, and yet the E.U. was stymied because each state government had too much power at the federal level (quite unlike the states in the U.S. at its federal level). 
In short, much of the allure of monetary policy actually came from fiscal frustration at the federal levels of both unions. Alternatively, both fiscal and monetary policy could have been used, and pointed in the same direction: toward full employment. Using low interest rates and the issuance of debt, respectively, to pull up an economy out of severe recession and even as political coverage (in the U.S.) or leverage (in the E.U.) for needed structural reforms of a financial system and indebted states, respectively, may not have been sufficient or even smart. Taking on a corruption-induced financial system in the U.S. required a lot of political guts, which not even the Obama administration had, for the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 did not go far enough in deconstructing the conflicts of interest in the system. Also, feeding Wall Street with infusions of government money appropriated by Congress and much more created by the Federal Reserve Bank, with no strings attached, did not make the bankers at the big banks any more willing to accept structural reforms even though they would have protected the banks by fixing the system. Not even fiscal stimulus plus low interest rates could keep the U.S. out of a severe recession, though arguably the U.S. could have entered a severe depression otherwise. Both fiscal and monetary policy and going politically after dysfunctional systems, whether that of Wall Street or those of heavily-indebted E.U. states, all must be used so none of the tools is over-relied upon and thus overused.  

See Institutional Conflicts of Interest, Essays on the Financial Crisis, and Essays on the E.U. Political Economy. All are available at Amazon.

1. Katy Barnato, “Central Banks Alone Can’t Fix Europe: Weidmann,” CNBC, March 12, 2013.  

Greek Austerity: Pressure on the Environment

“While patrolling on a recent cold night, environmentalist Grigoris Gourdomichalis caught a young man illegally chopping down a tree on public land in the mountains above Athens. When confronted, the man broke down in tears, saying he was unemployed and needed the wood to warm the home he shares with his wife and four small children, because he could no longer afford heating oil. ‘It was a tough choice, but I decided just to let him go’ with the wood, said Mr. Gourdomichalis, head of the locally financed Environmental Association of Municipalities of Athens, which works to protect forests around Egaleo, a western suburb of the capital.”[1] Tens of thousands of trees had disappeared from parks and forests in Greece during the first half of the winter of 2013 alone as unemployed Greeks had to contend with the loss of the home heating-oil subsidy as part of the austerity program demanded by the state’s creditors. As impoverished residents too broke to pay for electricity or fuel turned to fireplaces and wood stoves for heat, smog was just one of the manifestations—the potential loss of forests being another. On Christmas Day, for example, pollution over Maroussi was more than two times the E.U.’s standard. Furthermore, many schools, especially in the north part of Greece, had to face hard choices for lack of money to heat classrooms.

Greek forests were succumbing  in 2012 to the Greeks' need to heat their homes as austerity hit.   source: Getty Images

Essentially, austerity was bringing many people back to pre-modern living, perhaps including a resurgence in vegetable gardens during the preceding summer. At least in respect to the wood, the problem was that the population was too big—and too concentrated in Athens—for the primitive ways to return, given the environment's capacity. 
To be sure, even in the Middle Ages, England had lost forests as the population (and royal plans) grew. In December 1953, many Londoners decided to use their fireplaces to burn wood, resulting in pollution blanketing the city. As a result, thousands died and the city outlawed the use of fireplaces. No one probably thought to ask whether the city had gotten too big—and too dense. No policy was enacted that would result in a shift in population out of the region.
Generally speaking, human population levels made possible by modern technology and medical advances have become too large for a return to pre-modern ways of life. Because of the extraordinarily large sizes of the modern city, including Athens, suddenly removing modern technology, which includes government subsidies, it is especially problematic when many people are forced to fend for themselves to meet basic needs. The efficiency of modern technology, including in regard to utilities and food distribution, is often taken for granted, even by governments, so the impacts on the environment when masses of people “return to nature” can be surprising. Nature has become "used to" seven billion humans on the planet in large part because we have economized via technology so the full brunt of the population-size is not felt. Particularly in industrial countries, societies are reliant on modern technology because without it the bulging population is unsustainable. 
Put another way, we have distanced ourselves from nature, and our growth in numbers in the meantime has made it impossible for us to “get back to nature” in a jolt, especially by many people. It is in this sense that governmental austerity programs that cut back on sustenance are dangerous not only for society, but also the ecosystems in which humans live. Accordingly, by mid-January, 2013, the Greek government was considering proposals to restore heating-oil subsidies. It is incredible that the financial interests of institutional creditors, including other governments, were even allowed to put the subsidies at risk.
In ethical terms, the basic sustenance of a people takes priority ethically over a creditor’s “need” for interest. The sin of usury is sourced back to the origins of lending as an instance of charity rather than money-making either from the plight of the poor or profit-uses.[2] When a person in antiquity was in trouble financially, someone with a bit of cash would lend some with the expectation that only that sum would be returned. The demand for interest on top was viewed by the historical Church as adding insult to injury (i.e., the bastardization of charity into a money-making ruse). Then exceptions were made for commercial lending, wherein a creditor could legitimately demand a share of the profit made from the borrowed money in addition to the return of the principal. As commercial lending came increasingly to characterize lending, the demand for interest became the norm, even on consumption loans when no profit would ensue to pay off the loan with interest. The notion that interest is conditional on a borrower having enough funds was lost, causing much pain to many in the name of fidelity of contract, as if it or the creditor’s financial interest were an absolute. Put another way, the default has swung over from the borrowers to the lenders to such an extent that society may look the other way as people literally have to cut down trees to heat their homes because creditors have demanded and won austerity touching on sustenance programs.
Therefore, especially in Christian Europe, putting people out by pressure being applied to state governments in the E.U. to make payments even in the context of a financial crisis can be considered to be untenable, ethically speaking. I am not suggesting that states should be profligate with borrowed funds. Rather, just as Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations is bracketed by his Theory of Moral Sentiments, so too an economy (and financial system) functions best within moral constraints. 

1. Nektaria Stamouli and Stelios Bouras, “Greeks Raid Forests in Search of Wood to Heat Homes,” The New York Times, January 11, 2013.
2. Skip Worden, God's Gold, available at Amazon. 

Contagion Beyond the Headlines in the E.U.

The E.U. states of Greece and Italy were grabbing headlines during the first two weeks of November 2011, given the dramatic resignations of Papandreou and Berlusconi. The only other state to get some attention was France. The Wall Street Journal noted on November 12^th that concerns had been quietly building about France. According to the paper,“French bond yields rose to four-month highs, one day after Standard & Poor's Ratings Services erroneously issued a message saying it had cut France's triple-A credit rating. The yield on France's benchmark 10-year bond climbed 0.02 percentage point to 3.46%. That was 1.66 percentage points over yields on comparable German government bonds. France now has the highest government bond yields among its triple-A-rated peers in the region.” However, it seems overly dramatic to say that a .02 percent increase evinces a climb. Moreover, 3.46% is well under 7 percent, which is the level that was presumed at the time to signify the need for a bailout. Relative to the changes in the Italian yield, those of the French bonds could be viewed as relatively moderate, The French yield was still closer to that of Germany. Although not a red herring, the concern over France masked some real sleepers that were poised to take a hit in 2012. 

Eclipsed by the headlines, Portugal’s expected GDP for 2012 was revised downward by the E.U.’s executive branch in November from the May estimates of around -1.8% to -3% with an expected unemployment rate of nearly 14 percent. The 2011 numbers were also revised downward, from about -1.9% to around -2.1 percent. Meanwhile, Portugal’s semi-sovereign 10-year bond yield was at just over 12 percent, well over Italy’s “point of no return” rate of 7.5 percent, which was hit for a day during the second week of November. With an expected contraction of 3% in 2012 and a 12% yield in November of 2011, Portugal could be expected to face stronger head-winds in being able to make its interest payments in 2012. I suspect that the press had become so captivated with the circus of personalities in Greece and Italy that the iceberg lying in front of Portugal was simply not seen.

Besides Portugal, some of the states in Eastern Europe faced icebergs of their own—though not necessarily of their own making. These too were receiving too little press coverage in November of 2011. Specifically, the state leaders of the “euro zone” had decided in October to give the “zone’s” major banks until the following summer to raise their capital reserves. With that amount of time, the banks could avoid issuing new stock (which would dilute the holdings of their existing stockholders) and get the added reserves together by cutting back on lending to Eastern E.U. state governments instead. Morgan Stanley figures that Poland, Romania, and Hungary are most vulnerable to a loss of “euro zone” bank lending. Roughly 1 trillion euros of “euro zone” bank assets were in Eastern Europe at the time of the change in governments in Greece and Italy. Hungary’s exposure was the largest, with loans held by the banks amounting to about 37% of GDP. According to the Wall Street Journal, any hit to the E.U.’s eastern states, whose economic growth had been powered the global recovery, would only worsen the E.U.’s economic outlook and its ability to service its debts. That is to say, enabling the “euro zone” banks to raise additional reserve capital by reducing lending rather than raising equity may have been in the banks’ interest, but choking the eastern states could already in November be expected to make it more difficult for Greece, Italy, and Portugal to service their respective debts from reduced economic output in 2012. 

It would have been wiser on the journalists’ part to put France in perspective and take a look at Portugal and Eastern Europe than to have fixated so much on the plights of Papandreou and Berlusconi as they struggled to maintain power only to ultimately lose it.

For more on this topic, see Essays on the E.U. Political Economy

Sources:

Matthew Dalton, “Europe Slashes Its Growth Forecast,” The Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2011. 

Kelly Evans, “Eastern Europe Vulnerable in Debt Crisis,” The Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2011. 

Neelabh Chaturvedi, Stelios Bouras, and Liam Moloney, “Europe Pulls Back From Brink,” The Wall Street Journal, November 12-13, 2011. 

Democracy and the Courts: Alternative Checks on Austerity in Greece

In May 2011, “Athens agreed to impose a new $9 billion round of tax increases and spending cuts and speed up nearly $75 billion in promised privatizations.” In early June, a new round of tightening was being planned by the Greek government. It was feared that those cuts would deepen the recession and thus further shrink the tax base, making it even harder for the government to cut its deficit. Meanwhile, Reuters reported, “Greeks are showing signs of reaching the limits of their endurance as budget cuts imposed under Greece's first bailout a year ago have helped to push unemployment close to 16 percent.” The news service cited police reports of more than 80,000 people packing the main Syntagma square outside parliament on June 6^th—the 12^th consecutive day of protesting there.

                                              Reuters

Reuters reported that George Papandreou, the Prime Minister of the parliamentary state government, “used his parliamentary majority to ram through successive rounds of austerity including cuts to pensions and civil servants' salaries. But faced with the popular anger, some PASOK lawmakers [were] becoming uneasy.” The extent of protests suggests that the cuts may have been hitting up against bone. Short of a coup, however, protests do not in themselves arrest a government.

Interestingly, pressure from the E.U. on the Greek state to get its public finances in order has not been countered by intervention by the ECJ or a state court to protect constitutional obligations of the state toward civil servants, the unemployed, and the poor. In the case of some of the American states that have been instituting rather severe austerity programs, the governments have been reminded of their respective constitutional obligations in ways that have forced the governments to back off on some of their cuts. Specifically, the republics’ respective constitutional courts have been stepping in on behalf of the people (and the constitutions). North Carolina, Kansas, and New Jersey illustrate this dynamic, which is curiously lacking in the case of Greece.

The New York Times reports that in June 2011, “A judge in North Carolina has scheduled a hearing . . . to examine whether education cuts there violate previous court orders. ‘The current financial difficulties of the state do not relieve, justify or excuse the State of North Carolina from its constitutional obligation to provide each and every child in North Carolina an equal opportunity to obtain a sound basic education,’ the judge, Howard E. Manning Jr. of Wake County Superior Court, wrote in announcing the hearing.” How is Greece doing on its constitutional obligation?

The newspaper adds, “School districts in Kansas have filed a lawsuit arguing that with recent cuts in education spending, the state has effectively reneged on the promises it made to abide by old court rulings — a charge the state denies. ‘Just because the checkbook is empty doesn’t mean that the constitutional standard is swept away,’ said John S. Robb, a lawyer for the school districts, adding that Kansas had cut taxes as it cut education spending. ‘Especially if you are cutting taxes and claiming poverty,’ he added.” In the case of Greece, part of the problem may be tax evasion rather than a tax cut “solution” to deficits. Both Kansas and Greece should raise as much revenue as possible without sparking a recession; a tax cut or looking the other way in tax collecting is a luxury that neither state can afford.

Finally, “’Like anyone else,’ the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled, ‘the state is not free to walk away from judicial orders enforcing constitutional obligations.’ The court ordered the state to spend another $500 million in those districts. . . . Governor Christie of New Jersey, a Republican, complained after the schools ruling that ‘as a fundamental principle, I do not believe that it is the role of [New Jersey’s] Supreme Court to determine what programs the state should and should not be funding, and to what amount.’” At the same time, Christie could blame the high court for having to institute tax increases as he thanks the justices for relieving him of the political fallout from the cuts that he would have had to make. As of early June 2011, Papandreou could not avail himself of such a cover, and he had the other European states breathing down his back through the E.U. (and the world through the I.M.F.). Consequently, he was facing mass protests, whose utility in pushing back on the cuts does not have the force of a judicial ruling. It is ironic that the least democratic of the governmental branches may be the ultimate protector that a people can call on to counter lapses by their own government.

Sources:

Michael Cooper, “Courts Upend Budgets as States Look for Savings,” The New York Times, June 7, 2011.

George Georgiopoulos, “Greek Austerity Plan Draws 80,000 to Athens Square,” Reuters, June 5, 2011.

“Kicking the Can,” The New York Times, June 6, 2011.

Essays on the E.U. Political Economy: Federalism and the Debt Crisis

The collection of essays comprising The E.U. Political Economy looks broadly at the E.U.'s federal system, with particular attention to the states, including the matter of "Brexit," which refers to the secession of Britain from the Union. The text then turns more narrowly to the government-debt and banking crisis that occurred in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. The backdrop of federalism is meant to convey the point that weaknesses in that political system hampered the E.U.'s handing of its states and banks that were in trouble with debt. Lastly, several essays are presented on some more general aspects of the E.U.'s political economy. Rather than being heavily theory-oriented, the essays draw on contemporaneous news reports to quote from practitioners from business and government.

Essays on the E.U. Political Economy is available at Amazon.

The Greek Proposal on the Heels of the Referendum on Austerity: A Case of Avoidable Betrayal

Only days after appealing to the will of the people, Greece’s prime minister put forward a proposal to the state’s creditors that contradicts the people’s rejection of further austerity. To be sure, the referendum was nonbinding, and the need for compromise was well justified by the seizing up of the state’s banking system and economy after the “No” vote. Furthermore, one of the virtues of representative as distinct from direct democracy is that officeholders can pursue policies contrary to the immediate will of the people but in line with their best interest. Alexis Tsipras faced immanent economic catastrophe, and so he can reasonably be credited with acting in his constituents’ best interest. Nevertheless, the sting of betrayal (and the larger theoretical point of governmental sovereignty being subordinate to popular sovereignty) warrants attention in this case.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

A Greek Referendum on Creditor Demands: Orchestrated Impediments to Reaching the People

On June 27, 2015, Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras announced a referendum on whether Greece should accept additional austerity in the form of tax increases and pension cuts as demanded by the state’s creditors. Putting the ultimatum from lenders to a popular vote translates into political theory as governmental sovereignty—the portion retained by the E.U. state—voluntarily submitting to the popular sovereign, which is the more fundamental sovereignty in any democracy. “Our responsibility is for the future of our country. This responsibility obliges us to respond to the ultimatum through the sovereign will of the Greek people,” Tsipras said in a televised address.[1] More abstractly, deferring to the people on a major policy question is the responsibility, or duty, of any democratically-elected government. Sadly, few heads of government and legislatures even acknowledge this duty, let alone act on it. In this essay, I address the Greek case as a way of illustrating a few of the drawbacks of appealing to popular sovereignty through a referendum, while still holding that the duty itself is valid. I contend in particular that Tsipras’s Greek opponents, E.U. officials, and the state’s lenders (through government officials in other E.U. states) intentionally sought quite disrespectfully to manipulate Greece’s popular sovereign by distorting the question on the referendum to get a “yes,” or “oxi” result. That is, federal and state officials in the E.U. sought to scare and confuse the popular sovereign of one state—bullying, in effect, the basis of democracy itself for power and money.

 Greece's PM Tsipras looking rather fatigued after meetings on the bailout. (John Thys AFP/Getty)

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

Conflicts of Interest in Europe’s Greek-Austerity Impasse

At the conclusion of the European Council session in March 2015, all 19 of the state governors in attendance still wanted the state of Greece to remain with the euro. As for whether Greece should continue its austerity program and reform its economy as per the ongoing agreement on continued bailout funds, the tally was 18 to 1. Although both federal and state officials in the E.U. overwhelming believed that the austerity program had been behind the growth in the Greek economy in 2014, the Greek finance minister and most Keynesian economists disagreed, pointing to the fact that the state had lost a quarter of its GDP under the austerity. Besides this honest difference of opinion on the effectiveness of the strategy, conflicts-of-interest compromise the “club of 18” and thus its position.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

Syriza Party Governing in Greece: Austerity and the E.U.

Clarion calls of confrontation roiled through the E.U. after the state election in Greece on January 25, 2015. Would the E.U., heavily dominated by its largest state, and the European Central Bank (ECB) accept a larger public deficit (i.e., more government spending to alleviate the austerity) and continue the cheap loans, or would Alexis Tsipras, the new Greek prime minister, have to choose between continued austerity and default? 

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

Tsipras against Austerity: Merkel Bends on Stimulus

Under pressure to join a unity government in Greece with the New Democracy and Socialist parties, Tsipras of a “radical left” Syriza party was holding firm as of May 13, 2012. Even as the resulting prospect of new elections and a possible reneging on the agreement by Greece, there is something to admire in Tsipras’ position.

Greek president Karolos Papoulias meeting with leaders of the three main parties (Tsipras on right) AP

The full essay is in Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Anti-Austerity in Greek Government

The Socialists and then the New Democracy Party told Greeks that sacrifices were necessary to avert default on the state’s debt. This position came at a high political cost on May 6, 2012, when both parties lost seats in the state’s legislative election. “The established parties collapsed — they had too much pressure from Berlin and Brussels and the I.M.F.,” said Nikos Xydakis, an newspaper editor and a political commentator, referring to Greece’s foreign lenders.[1] In other words, the leaders of the two mainstream Greek parties sold out their compatriots, having caved in to ultimatums from Merkel operating at the E.U. level. “In a meeting with President Karolos Papoulias, the leader of the leftist party, Alexis Tsipras, ridiculed the leaders of the two main parties whose coalition lost its majority in the parliamentary elections.”[2] Tsipras added that his party would not be forming a government with either party. The New Democracy Party had been unable to form a government in the wake of the election, so it was then Tsipras’ turn to try.

Alexis Tsipras  and Greek President Papoulias   NYT/Kostas Tsironis

The full essay is in Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1.. Rachel Donadio and Niki Kitsantonis, “Greek Leftists Rule Out Coalition with Incumbents,” The New York Times, May 8, 2012.
2. Ibid.

Europeans Vote against Austerity in 2012

On May 6, 2012, elections took place in six E.U. states. The most significant in terms of the debt crisis were those of France and Greece. In France, Francois Hollande narrowly beat Nicolas Sarkozy. Sarkozy “is the latest of a string of European incumbents, from both the left and the right, to lose in a larger popular revolt against budget-cutting and tax increased during a time of recession and high unemployment.”[1] Hollande said “he intends to give ‘a new direction to Europe,’ demanding that a European Union [amendment] limiting debt be expanded to include measures to produce economic growth.”[2] After midnight, Hollande spoke against austerity to a crowd gathered at the Bastille. To be sure, an anti-Sarkozy-arrogance vote doubtlessly benefitted Hollande. This makes it difficult to treat this (or any other) election as a mandate policywise. Even so, the center of gravity on austerity at the E.U. level had shifted, given the important role of state officials there.

                 François Hollande addressed supporters in Tulle, France.      Philippe Desmazes/Agence France-Presse

Meanwhile, voters in Greece were shifting the political landscape in that state, “bolstering the far left and neo-Nazi right in a wave of protest against the dominant political parties that they blame for the country’s economic collapse.”[3] In other words, the two main parties that had agreed to the austerity/bailout agreement lost ground to other parties—essentially splintering the vote. An exit poll “indicated that center-right New Democracy party was in first place with 19 to 20.5 percent of the vote, much less than the 34 percent it won in 2009. But in a major shift, the Socialists, who dominated for decades, won 44 percent of the vote in 2009 and were in power when Greece asked for foreign aid in 2010, appeared to have 13 to 14 percent of the vote, putting them behind the Coalition of the Radical Left, called Syriza, which opposes Greece’s agreement with its foreign lenders. Syriza appeared to be drawing 15.5 to 17 percent of the vote.”[4] New Democracy and the Socialist Party had agreed to the austerity, and they paid a price at the polls.

The shifts in both states undoubtedly provided federal officials (including state officials active at the federal level) with a message: more and more E.U. citizens were opposing the austerity-only approach. Lest it be concluded that Hollande and the Greek legislature trigger a change of E.U. policy, incumbents including Angela Merkel were still a force to be reckoned with. Generally speaking, actual political change occurs in graduate steps rather than all at once after an election. The status quo is never entirely defeated by a few replacements; it takes several elections for a sea-change to gain the upper hand in governmental channels.

Even so, May 6, 2012 suggests that the forces of such change were gaining.  Even if it would take more elections for the austerity-emphasis to be changed, it was already clear that a majority of the people were willing to vote as if they were opposed to the approach.  In relying so much on austerity in their agreement with Greece, state leaders making policy at the E.U. level had gone beyond the center of gravity. In a representative democracy, doing what is right or in the people’s best interest at the expense of popular anger or disapproval has value. However, this leash does not extend very long and it must be tailored to the amount of time until the next election. This is both a disadvantage and advantage of representative democracy: officials cannot get too far from their basis in the popular center of gravity, even if a crisis warrants a long-term solution that is generally unpopular at the grass-roots level.

1. Steve Erlanger and Nicola Clark, “Hollande Ousts Sarkozy in French Presidential Election,” The New York Times, May 6, 2012. 
2. Ibid.
3. Rachel Donadio and Nici Kitsantonis, “Greek Voters Punish 2 Main Parties for Economic Collapse,” The New York Times, May 6, 2012. 
4. Ibid.

Justice as Fairness: Writing Down Greek Debt

In 2012, 80% of Greece’s private creditors agreed to “voluntarily” convert their Greek debt into debt of a bit less than half the face-value (plus a lower interest rate). With such a proportion having agreed to the swap without triggering credit default swap insurance payouts, Greece could get the E.U. to agree to force the remaining 20% to involuntary write-downs. That would trigger the credit default swaps, at least in theory.

The full essay is at "Justice as Fairness: Greek Debt."

A Rigid Refusal to Renegotiate: Blaming the Greeks

As Greek party leaders struggled to put together a government in May 2012 after a splintering election, a major (and contentious) issue was whether to demand a renegotiation of the bailout agreement. Alexis Tsipras, leader of the Coalition of the Radical Left known as Syriza (which made large gains in the election), was declaring the agreement null and void given the mandate implied by the gains made on the far right and left (both being opposed to the austerity program). Tsipras believed he “had changed the debate to the point that the formerly dominant parties that had signed the loan agreement were . . .  indicating they might agree to demand it be renegotiated.”[1] His statements were enough to prompt a firm Nein! from Angela Merkel in Berlin and a related “tightening of the screws” from the committee of the European Financial Stability Facility.

The full essay is at Essays on the E.U. Political Economy, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1. Rachel Donadio and Niki Kitsantonis, “ContinuingLeadership Deadlock in Greece as Its Lenders Watch and Wait,” The New York Times, May 9, 2012.

Democracy and State Governments at the E.U. Level

In mid-February 2012, Mario Monti of the E.U. state of Italy addressed the European Parliament. In his speech, he advocated increasing the legislative body's power. The Parliament's 754 representatives represent E.U. citizens just as the members of House of Representatives represent U.S. citizens. The representatives in both of the legislative chambers are democratically elected to represent the people in local or regional districts rather than states more generally. The chambers are “national” in that they bypass the state governments. The latter are represented in the European Council of Ministers and in the U.S. Senate, both of which are legislative in nature and thus can be stylized as the “upper chamber” in federal lawmaking.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

Monti and Papadernos in the E.U.: Leadership in Technical Expertise or Democratic Deficit?

“The moment of truth has come.”[1] This was said by the head of state of the E.U.’s third largest state, Italy, in a televised address just after Berlusconi had resigned as the prime minister. Although the statement could be interpreted as referring to the need to reign in the Italian profligate system of public-sector patronage (which includes private contractors), Giorgio Napolitano could also have been referring to the credibility of his state at the E.U. level. “We need to restore confidence with investors and European institutions,” he continued before turning to the more tangible point that the state would need to refinance nearly 200 billion euros in government bonds before May, 2012.[2]

 Monti and Barroso (Thys/Agence France-Presse/Getty)

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

1. Alessandra Galloni and Christopher Emsden, “Italy’s Monti to Form New Government,” The Wall Street Journal, November 14, 2011.
2. Stephen Castle and Liz Alderman, “Under a New Prime Minister, Italy’s Star May Rise at the European Union,” The New York Times, November 23, 2011.

Europe's Political Elite Takes on Popular Sovereignty in Greece

As October 2011 was coming to an end, George Papandreou, prime minister of Greece, “stunned Europe by announcing a referendum” on the latest bailout from the E.U. and set the vote for January 2012. Shocked E.U. leaders were doubtless shaking their heads with a mix of incredulity and frustration, as they had not even been consulted on the prime minister’s proposal. Meanwhile, the yields on Italy’s bonds continued to increase, as did the spread between German and Greek 10-year bonds. The world was left to whether the Greek voters would reject their government’s austerity plans and, relatedly, whether the E.U. would augment its bailout of the state as per the agreement reached only days before the prime minister’s announcement.

 Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou announcing the referendum    AP

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

Greece & Italy: Undercutting Market Confidence in the E.U.

As a federal system, the E.U. can be expected to contain a certain amount of economic disparity. The state bond yields in October 2011, for example, were—one could say—“diversified.” Investors relishing high risk-return could partake in Greek bonds while retired investors could safely stick to the German variety. A healthy federal system proffers something for nearly every taste, while constraining the outliers for the sake of unity. It does not require uniformity. However, too much diversity can cause a federal system to come apart due to divergent pressures seeking more expression. Also, if the high-risk “end” is sufficiently risky, the ensuing atmosphere of uncertainty can undo the federation’s financial system. Uncertainty, like anxiety, can subtly eat away at a system to the point that it cannot pull itself out of its funk.

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.