On the Role of Socialism in American Political Polarization

In a stunning upset in the 2012 Republican U.S. Senate primary in Indiana, Indiana's Treasurer, Richard Mourdock, beat incumbant veteran Richard Lugar by 22 percent (61-39%). Even though Lugar's 36 years of experience in the Senate had seasoned him into a statesman in foreign policy, the Tea-Party-backed Mourdock was able to portray the aged senator as out of touch and too willing to compromise with Democrats. Mourdock had no intention of extending any hand across the aisle. Is such polarization worth the loss of experience in international relations? Moreover, what is the role of socialism in the political polarization? 

"While Lugar advised in his concession speech . . . that Mourdock would need to work together with lawmakers in the Senate, the new nominee stuck to the belligerent tone he [had] maintained in the campaign, warning that Democrats and socialists were destroying the nation."[1]  Even if Democrats were for government ownership of the means of production (i.e., companies), which is socialism, it does not follow that those Democrats were also attempting to sabatage the U.S. in its foreign relations. Especially given Lugar's expertise in that area, working across the iasle would only make sense. Nevertheless, Mourdock saw a link. 
"Today," he said, "we see the Obama White House and we see a Senate chaired by Harry Reid that's doing everything it can -- though perhaps not intentionally -- to turn our dreams, to turn our great national hope and our dream into the nightmare of ever-growing government, to make us that … western European-style nation,’ Mourdock said. ‘Just yesterday, France elected a socialist,’ he continued. ‘There are those I'm sure in the administration and in the left side of the Democratic Party that were cheering for that. But we're not going to stand for that in Indiana because the supporters of Barack Obama are not going to win!”[2] In other words, Mourdock expected the Democrats to cheer on and perhaps even aid "socialist" governments around the world, the spread of which could isolate the U.S. and the related interests of private property. In 2019, for example, the World Trade Court ruled against the E.U. for having unduly (i.e., unfairly, in terms of free trade) subsidized Airbus. The government ownership of a company goes beyond such subsidization of a corporation like Airbus, which, as of 2019, was owned by EADS, which in turn was owned by a mix of private companies and a few E.U. states. 

What about those supposed socialist countries? To be sure, Francois Hollande ran under the Socialist Party banner. However, the “socialist” policies that he had campaigned on were redistributionist. He did not advocate that the state own more of the means of production. Hollande was redistributionist in that he suggested that la dette (government debt) that Sarkozy had doubled should not be cut only by austerity (i.e., budget-cuts), which hurt the poor disproportionately; rather, the rich should be taxed what they had been taxed before the top tax rate was lowered. 
In fact, Hollande was in a position fresh from his victory to push for federal (i.e., E.U.) economic stimulus spending to complement the federal austerity programs in debt-ridden states, including Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. Using tax increases and budget cuts to reduce government debt is hardly socialism. 
So, Mourdock's lack of knowledge on socialism as an economic system as well as on European governments, combined with his refusal to reach across the aisle, were misplaced, and thus not worth the loss of Lugar's expertise in foreign policy. 

1, Michael McAuliff, “Dick LugarLoses to Tea Party’s Richard Mourdock in Indiana Republican Senate Primary,” The Huffington Post, May 9, 2012. 
2. Ibid.

A U.S. Senator Aiding a Contributor While Averting a "Fiscal Cliff": Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity

The law passed by Congress on January 3, 2013 to avert the across-the-board tax increases and “sequester” (i.e., across-the-board budget cuts) was “stuffed with special provisions helping specific companies and industries.” While many of the provisions would increase the U.S. Government’s debt, at least one would decrease it. Is the latter any more ethical because it is in line with the more general interest in reducing the federal debt? Put another way, does the end justify the means?  Do good consequences justify bad motives?  These are extremely difficult questions. The best I can do here is suggest how they can be approached by analysis of a particular case study.

In the legislation, a provision reduced the Medicare reimbursement rate for a radiosurgery device manufactured by the E.U. company Elekta AB. The cut was pushed by a competitor, Varian Medical Systems. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid asked Sen. Max Baucus, chair of the Senate Finance Committee, to write the cut into the legislation. While both senators could point to the public interest in the debt-reduction result of the cut, their relationship with Varian makes their motives suspect. Specifically, they may have exploited personal conflicts of interest that eclipsed a more expansive duty to the wider (i.e., not private, or personal) public interest. 

While it is perhaps simplistic to relate campaign contributions to a senator’s subsequent action, it is significant that Varian spent  $570,000 in 2012 on lobbying. The company added Capitol Counsel, which had contacts to Sen. Baucus. Vivian already had connections to Reid through Cornerstone Government Affairs lobbyist Paul Denino, a former Reid deputy chief of staff. Additionally, the leading beneficiary of the contributions of Varian executives and the company’s PAC over the previous four years was Sen. Reid, whose committees received $21,200. Varian’s lobbyists added $42,700 more to Reid’s campaign.[1] While Sen. Reid’s subsequent urging of the reimbursement rate cut could have been unrelated to these contributions and contacts, the senator’s involvement compromises him ethically. Put another way, it is at the very least bad form, or unseemly. It implies that companies making political contributions and hiring lobbyists connected to public officials do so (or worse, should do so) to have special access to those particular officials to turn upcoming legislation to the companies’ financial advantage. Even if the public also benefits, it can be asked whether the companies deserve their particular benefits. In the case of Varian, it may be asked whether the company deserved the cut in the reimbursement rate going to Elekta.

As could be expected, spokespersons at both companies sought to argue the merits of their respective cases in the court of public opinion.  It is more useful to look at the regulators’ rationale for increasing the reimbursement rate for Elekta’s  “Gamma Knife” in the first place. Originally, the knife and Varian’s linac machines were lumped together by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) under the same CMS code. In 2001, the Centers separated the devices in terms of data collection so an analysis could be conducted on whether the devices should receive different reimbursement rates. The Huffington Post reports that the reimbursement rate for the Gamma Knife was increased because “it typically requires only one treatment, while the linacs often require multiple treatments.” Also, “Gamma Knives machines are more expensive to obtain and maintain due to the storage of radioactive cobalt and regulation by both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Homeland Security. Linacs don’t use nuclear material and are regulated by the Food and Drug Administration.”[2] So, due to the cost and use differential, CMS  increased the Gamma Knife reimbursement in 2006 to $7000. From the standpoint of the criteria of regulators, the data-collection and analysis method and the rational rationale are legitimate. In contrast, because neither the use or cost differential had changed by January 2013, the cut in the reimbursement rate cannot enjoy such legitimacy. Hence it is possible that exogenous factors, such as the political influence of Varian’s lobbyists and campaign contributions, were behind the change. From the standpoint of the previous rate differential, the change cannot be justified. Neither Sen. Reid nor Sen. Baucus could justify their actions (and motives) by the substance of the case. However, they could still appeal to the salubrious budget-cutting effect as justifying their involvement.

The question here is whether the favorable consequences of the cut on the government’s subsequent deficits mitigates or reduces the shady scenario of a senator acting on behalf of a company that had contributed to his or her campaign. I would advise a member of Congress to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest. If the result in this particular case is in the public interest (i.e., reducing the deficit), does this positive consequence justify the senators’ actions and even the questionable appearance?  It’s a no-brainer that the senators would immediately point to the public interest in the consequence, but does it effectively remove the taint of immoral political conduct (and perhaps motive)?

The link between the company-senator relation, the senators’ action in which the company stands to benefit financially in a material way, and the financial benefit to the company can be distinguished ethically from a good consequence to the public. A bystander would naturally view the consequence to the public as salubrious even while having a sentiment of disapprobation toward the company’s own benefit as well as the senators’ action and relation to the company. In other words, the favorable impact on the public does not remove the stain on the company and the senators. To be sure, that stain would be greater were the public harmed rather than helped, but even with the positive general consequence the senators may have acted for the private benefit. Also, their action could have come from other senators, hence obviating the ethical problem. In short, the public interest does not remove either senator from the ethically problematic situation in which they decided to occupy.  Even if their motive had been solely for the public interest, they violated the appearance of unethical motive and conduct.

“The end justifies the means” is a slippery slope in terms of what the human mind can rationalize as legitimate. Great harm has been seemingly justified by great ideals. Even in the face of the ideals, the harms provoke a sentiment of disapprobation by the observer (excepting sociopaths). This suggests that the ideals cannot completely justify unethical means.  It may indeed be that unethical means are necessary in some particular cases, but this does not render the devices ethically pure. Ethical principles do not know practical compromise. Rather, people do.

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1. Paul Blumenthal, “Varian Medical Systems Used Fiscal Cliff Deal to Hurt Competitor,” The Huffington Post, February 8, 2013.

2. Ibid.

Protecting Minority Stockholder Rights: On a Conflict of Interest at Revlon

The principle of majority rule is a staple of democratic theory. Typically the victor of a close election is quick to proclaim that “the people” have spoken. That “the people” corresponds to 51% of those who voted is beside the point. What about the 49% who voted against the victor? What about the minority’s rights? In the U.S. Senate, the fact that it takes 60 out of 100 votes to end a filibuster means that a large minority can halt a majority’s bill. In the European Council, the qualified majority rule means that for a bill to pass, the states in the majority must be at least 55% of the total number of states and must have at least 55% of the E.U.’s population between them.  A large minority can therefore stop a small majority. In both of these “intergovernmental” bodies, the implication is that 51% of a vote is not as significant as the principle of majority rule suggests. What about the rights of a minority of shares of stock in corporate governance? When a majority stockholder has control of management, the interests of the minority stockholders can be shirked. This is particularly true when a majority stockholder proposes a going-private transaction with the aid of management.
“Going-private transactions create opportunities for shareholder abuse and can have coercive effects on minority shareholders,” Antonia Chion, a director in the S.E.C.’s enforcement division insists. A majority shareholder can propose a buy-out that is unfair to other stockholders, and a collusive management can keep those shareholders in the dark concerning independent assessments. This is not the case of a CEO who is controlling the board at stockholder expense; rather, the majority stockholder uses the management to circumvent the board and other stockholders at their expense and even that of the company.
On June 13, 2013, Revlon “agreed to pay an $850,000 penalty to settle accusations that it deceived shareholders and its independent directors in connection with” Ronald Perelman’s attempt to get the other stockholders to convert their common stock to preferred in what is called an exchange transaction.[1] As in the case of Perelman’s earlier attempt to take the company private, an independent assessment found that the other stockholders as well as the company would lose out in the deal. Perhaps because the other stockholders had had access to the information to reject the first proposal, Revlon, undoubtedly at Perelman’s urging, “went to great lengths to hide” the bad news of the assessment on the exchange transaction from the minority stockholders.[2] In fact among “other deceitful maneuvers,” Revlon “altered the agreement with the trustee to ensure that the trustee would not share the advisor’s opinion with” the minority stockholders.[3] In its filings with the S.E.C., the management lied that the board’s process had been “full, fair and complete.”[4] In actuality, the company’s board was “unable to fairly evaluate the adequacy of the exchange offer.”[5] The controlling stockholder, Ronald Perelman, had used the management of the company to go against the company’s own interest! That is, the company was acting against its own best interest simply because doing so was in the controlling stockholder’s interest. Surely this suggests that the majority stockholder had too much influence. Given the conflict of interest, having such influence at the expense of other stockholders and the board can be regarded as unethical.
Perhaps it could be argued that because Perelman’s investment firm, MacAndrews & Forbes, controlled about three-quarters of Revlon’s shares at the time, the company’s management had a fiduciary duty to act in Perelman’s interest even if it was not in the company’s interest. Stockholders are the owners, after all.
However, Perelman’s investment firm did not control all of the stock. It cannot be assumed that the interests of the other stockholders mirrored that of the stock Perelman owned or controlled. Furthermore, that the exchange transaction would have helped Revlon pay off a loan to Perelman’s investment firm only added to the majority stockholder’s conflict of interest. According to the New York Times, because “Perelman stood on both sides of the deal, there was a question about the transaction’s fairness.”[6] This is the reason the company asked its independent board members to assess the exchange transaction in the first place. For the company to turn around and require the independent assessor to hide the findings from the board is utterly contradictory, as well as unfair to the independent directors (as well as the other stockholders).
Therefore, even if the principle of majority rule applied to corporate governance supports Perelman’s influencing the management to the benefit of the stock that he controls, the conflict of interest suggests that the principle should not completely shut down the property rights of the other stockholders. Interestingly, not even the U.S. Senate’s 60 votes or the European Council’s qualified majority voting applied to corporate governance could have stopped the 75% of the shares that Perelman controlled at the time from directing the company’s management. Because the independent directors are designed to be free of pressure from management, they could be controlled by a majority stockholder in such a case.
Perhaps independent directors ought to be tasked with not only checking the corporation’s management, but also protecting the interests of the minority stockholders when those interests differ from that of the majority. At the very least, a majority stockholder should not be permitted to be situated in a conflict of interest with regard to the company. Merely being so situated can be argued to be unethical because even having the opportunity to exploit a conflict of interest causes harm (e.g., anxiety) to those who would be harmed financially. Additionally, the temptation is just too great, given the influence that the majority stockholder has over the company’s management. Even in terms of democracy, majority rule is not an absolute.

For more on conflicts of interest in business (and government), see Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon.

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1. Peter Lattman, “To Perelman’s Failed Revlon Deal, Add Rebuke From S.E.C.,” The New York Times, June 14, 2013.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.