Showing posts with label chief executive. Show all posts
Showing posts with label chief executive. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

Independent U.S. Regulatory Agencies: Undermining the Chief Executive

On June 29, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the federal president has the authority to terminate the employment of heads of independent federal agencies at will, rather than only for cause. The latter requirement (i.e., due cause) would still hold for the Federal Reserve, which raises the question of whether a central bank should be distinguished from regulatory agencies. The value in buffering monetary policy from political pressure is why the Federal Reserve is not part of the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the U.S. government, but is instead an independent central bank within that government. As a consequence, monetary policy does not require approval from either the U.S. president or the Congress. Hence, the “for cause” requirement for removing someone from the Fed’s board of governors cannot be disagreement with the person’s preferences or decisions regarding monetary policy. As for independent regulatory agencies in the executive branch, their independence undermines the unitary executive as well as the president’s role in implementing existing law.

As with virtually any institutional arrangement in government, drawbacks are paired with benefits. In the case of the Federal Reserve, the main drawback lies in the difficulty in coordinating fiscal and monetary policy because Congress and the White House decide fiscal policy while monetary policy is decided by the Federal Reserve, which is buffered from pressure from all three branches of the federal government. So a fiscal policy could be in place to stimulate the economy even though high interest rates slow down economic growth. In the 1970s, for example, the term “stagflation” was coined because high inflation existed along with economic stagnation. During that decade, fighting inflation by monetary policy would have run counter in its economic effects to stimulating the economy by fiscal policy. Typically, inflation and stagnation alternate rather than occur at the same time. Paul Volker, as chairman of the Federal Reserve in the early 1980s, used monetary policy to reduce inflation even though the high interest rates exacerbated economic stagflation and, without sufficient fiscal stimulation to counter the higher interest rates, quickly produced a recession in President Reagan’s first years in office. So there is value economically in coordinating monetary and fiscal policy, and buffering the Federal Reserve from pressure from Congress and the White House (as well as not allowing a Federal Reserve chairperson to dominate those two branches) comes with a price. An iconic line from a European in the film, The Godfather, Part III, is relevant: “All our ships must sail in the same direction.” Separating monetary and fiscal policy institutionally comes with a cost in that ships could be going in opposite directions, producing chaos.

The Federal Reserve is a central bank, and therefore it is not an independent regulatory agency in the executive branch. The very notion of an independent regulatory agency is problematic constitutionally because if such an agency is free of a president’s control and yet still within the executive branch, then separation of powers prohibits direct control by Congress or the judiciary. The Court “held that presidents have free rein to fire agency heads at will, despite federal laws that require a cause for such dismissals” and a 1935 Supreme Court case known as Humphrey’s Executor that held that presidents could not fire heads of federal agencies without cause.[1] That precedent, which the Court overruled, is problematic because assuming a regulatory head does nothing for cause, the person would be free to make regulatory policy at will even if the chief executive officer of the government, the president, disagrees. Because the federal presidency is an office elected by electors of the member-state held to the popular votes in the respective states whereas the head of a regulatory agency is appointed, regulatory agencies being independent of the president incurs a democracy deficit. In other words, the head of an independent agency has too much power given the amount of accountability that is available if termination of employment for cause is not an option due to good behavior.

Furthermore, carving out independent turfs within the executive branch denies the unitary nature of that branch that is implied by the president’s title as chief executive officer. Because the presidency is an elected office, heads of independent regulatory agencies within the executive branch who resist presidential pressure obstruct the “will of the people” from being implemented. Ideally, besides presiding as a neutral figure-head representing the United States of America, the presidency is tasked with implementing law, including defense. Hence it is Congress that has the constitutional power to declare war, for example, and the president is obliged to implement that declaration as the commander in chief. The role of implementing is hardly glamorous, and it has tended to be given insufficient time and energy by presidents who have been more interested in influencing the enactment of law, which is the task of the legislative branch, even though the veto is a negative power and thus designed to be a check on Congressional abuses of power rather than a mandate to legislate in a positive sense.

Ironically, the very existence of independent regulatory agencies with directors free from presidential pressure has freed up presidents from their implementing role, and thus enabled them to spend more time and energy on legislating new law rather than implementing existing law.  Unlike formulating new law, implementing existing law, including declarations of war, is consistent with the neutrality that a figurehead needs to be credible and thus to represent the United States as a whole. That such neutrality politically has been disregarded is evinced when American citizens state that a sitting president “is not my president.” The baleful warnings of expansive presidential power made by Arthur Schlesinger in his seminal 1973 book, The Imperial Presidency, would be less of a concern were presidents willing to constrain themselves to focus on being a figure-head uniquely credible enough to represent the United States as a whole rather than just one political party, and implement existing law by running the executive branch (including the defense department), rather than usurp Congress’s legislative prerogative as per the separation of powers. The Court’s 2026 decision allowing presidents to fire heads of previously independent regulatory agencies in the executive branch is a step in the direction of presidents attending more to functioning as the chief executive of the U.S. federal government when not called upon to preside.  


Tuesday, May 12, 2026

Managerial Capitalism: Being and Becoming

At first glance, Friedrich Nietzsche’s pro-capitalist stance on private property and the process of accumulating profit (or wealth) may seem to extend a vote of confidence to the business manager as a type. After all, managers manage the private property of stockholders (which can include themselves) with a fiduciary duty to do so to increase shareholder value by maximizing profit. The notion of profit-seeking by maximizing revenue and minimizing cost is arguably too simplistic. Squeezing a workforce too much, for example, can backfire in the long term. Nietzsche was concerned about such a thing happening even though he claims that the vast majority of laborers must be kept to subsistence wages for culture to be possible. He castigates petty, short-sighted managers who do not look out for the spiritual and economic welfare of workers, and yet holds that those workers must be slavish in the sense of being exploited by employers so culture can emerge and be sustained by the rich. To be for such exploitation and yet against petty cost-cutting managers renders Nietzsche’s socioeconomic philosophy interesting as well as useful in terms of keeping a capitalist economy from being reduced to the mentality of its bottom-feeder producers. I first discuss the matter of exploitation and then turn to how Nietzsche addresses his wider socio-economic philosophy more specifically to human-resource management. Within the wider subject-heading of exploitation, very different approaches, or mentalities, to human resource management can be discerned. In dichotomous terms, there can be said to be a pathos of distance between enlightened self-interest and selfish, short-sighted greed.

Nietzsche claims that capital accumulation and economic inequality are necessary for adequate investment in culture, such that not everyone must be oriented to satisfying basic needs. Moreover, private property and accumulating money serve a more fundamental function in terms of human being and becoming, the latter being construed in terms of, growing. Nietzsche’s use of this term can be thought of in terms of Aristotle’s appropriation from the natural world for his philosophy.

It has seemed to me in life that some people may have a static orientation, whereas other people may be inherently oriented to change, as in self-development. The static orientation is based on being, whereas the default of dynamism can be said to be based on valuing becoming. It may be that people wetted to a static state of being feel threatened psychologically by change-oriented people because the latter typically want the former to work on themselves too. In a dysfunctional family in which most of the people value stasis, for example, the person who values development may ironically be scapegoated precisely because any change is rejected, even that which would make the family healthy. Translated into Nietzsche’s socioeconomic philosophy, possessing assets, or private property, applies to a person’s static nature, whereas accumulating wealth means that a person is dynamic—changing.

To Nietzsche, capital accumulations by titans, and those by wealthy people more generally, have permitted the advent of culture in terms of there being adequate investments in it—something that we moderns may take for granted even though much of human (pre) history our species was oriented to meeting survival needs. Regarding a society having some individuals rich enough to develop a cultural scene, Nietzsche insists that what Marx calls the surplus value of labor of the vast majority of workers must be transferred to the few—the capitalists—so they have enough money to invest in culture. A city benefits even though most laborers work for subsistence wages. Nietzsche relates capitalist enterprise to culture as follows:

“In order for there to be a broad, deep, fertile soil for the development of art, the overwhelming majority has to be slavishly subjected to life’s necessity in the service of the minority, beyond the measure that is necessary for the individual. At their expense, through their extra work, that privileged class is to be removed from the struggle for existence, in order to produce and satisfy a new world of necessities. Accordingly, we must learn to identify as a cruel-sounding truth the fact that slavery belongs to the essence of culture. . . . The misery of men living a life of toil has to be increased to make the production of the world of art possible for a small number of Olympic men.”[1]

Slavery here is in the sense that the laborers are held to such a minimum monetary compensation that they cannot free themselves from working so their basic survival needs are met. For the privileged class—the capitalists—to be removed from the struggle for existence is a late-arriving novelty for our species, and thus the advent of culture can be construed as a luxury rather than as an intrinsic aspect or manifestation of human existence. Put another way, even though the dominance of the capitalists over labor, which I submit is a better description than is the word slavery, “belongs to the essence of culture,” culture does not belong to the essence of our species. So even though culture raises the entire species from being oriented to satisfying subsistence needs, the scaffolding that is constructed to reach the rarified air can be viewed as artificial.

Neither is the exploitation that is necessary for culture natural. Landa argues that the relevance of Nietzsche for capitalism lies precisely in slavish exploitation. Even though Nietzsche claims to have “stood far above any strictly material concerns, the basic fact cannot be ignored that, if his ‘aesthetics’ necessitate slavery, . . . if the production of ‘culture’ means the ruthless material subjugation of the vast majority of people to the benefit of an elite, then a socioeconomic theory of exploitation is inscribed into the very core of his aesthetic theory of noble culture. And it precisely here, I argue, that Nietzsche’s pertinence for capitalism lies, in the dreary fact of exploitation . . .”[2] Although the economic elite undoubtedly benefit, however, it is the species that benefits from culture. Put in terms of socioeconomics, a city benefits by having some buildings devoted to culture rather than to the means of production. Although this point renders the exploitation somewhat better morally, Nietzsche’s criticism of modern morality means that he rejects the normative objection that economic exploitation is unethical. Considering that the benefits of accumulated wealth for culture benefit not just the rich and the exploitation (i.e., economic “slavery”) is spared a damning ethical verdict, it is not difficult to see why Nietzsche would be in favor of culture. Of course, apart from Nietzsche, the holding of the vast majority of a workforce to subsistence wages while an economic elite gets rich off the transferred surplus value of labor is ripe for ethical castigation. Even if we reject Nietzsche’s socioeconomic account of culture as a result, Nietzsche presents another rationale for being wealthy—one that is existential in nature.[3]

Private property and accumulating wealth correspond to being and becoming, respectively. As such, Private property and capital accumulation are “firmly established by Nietzsche as representing the rudiments of life itself.”[4] Nietzsche claims that “those who have possessions are of one mind on one article of faith: ‘one must possess something in order to be something.’”[5] Does this mean that the subsistence-limited worker bees do not exist? Surely not. Perhaps Nietzsche means to count as something rather than to be something. This interpretation is in line with the businessman’s value-set wherein to count as someone is a matter of how much one possesses (i.e., how wealthy one is).

The capitalists would perhaps be less familiar with Nietzsche’s rationale for the act of accumulating possessions, including money: “But this is the oldest and healthiest of all instincts: I should add, ‘one must want to have more than one has in order to become more.’ For this is the doctrine preached by life itself to all that has life: the morality of development. To have and to want to have more—growth, in one word—that is life itself.”[6] Here, becoming is put in terms of growth as a natural process of life.[7] The will to power is for Nietzsche the will to life, and strength is the self-confident embrace of the fullness of life in overcoming obstacles in order to feel the pleasure of power. According to Landa, Nietzsche claims that to “live truly and properly is therefore to Exploit, Possess and Accumulate . . . Under this light, the will to power reveals itself as the metaphysical extension of the will to money.”[8] But do counting as something in virtue of having material possessions and growing as a plant does count as metaphysical? Moreover, what use did Nietzsche have for speculative metaphysics? Rather than being grounded in existentialism, Nietzsche’s view of being and becoming may bear a family resemblance to Heidegger’s claim that a person as a dasein, or one that is, comes to realize oneself hammering in an open field; only in action does a person realize oneself as one is as a that (i.e., an entity). The action to which Nietzsche refers is only open to the capitalist, however, in accumulating wealth, for the worker bees are enslaved to meeting their subsistence needs and thus are cut off from becoming in the sense of growing.

Lest it be concluded that Nietzsche’s view favors business managers, including executives, rather than stockholders who are oriented to the long-term value of their stock, Nietzsche spanks down the typical managerial primacy of immediate profit: “No doubt, the wide-ranging, multi-faceted perspective of the philosopher, as compared with the narrow view of the standard market-apologist intent on immediate gains, endowed the former a much more flexible class position. . . . Since the preservation of the class hierarchy and the prevention of a comprehensive socialist alternative was the foundation of Nietzsche’s social vision, he was at times perfectly willing to criticize naked exploitation of labor when that meant dangerously exacerbating class enmity to the point of imperiling the overall stability of the system. As in the following example: ‘What we now refer to as justice, is from this point of view a highly refined usefulness, which does not take into consideration only the present moment and exploits the opportunity, but rather reflects with responsibility on the lasting consequences, therefore taking care of the well-being of the worker as well, of his physical and spiritual satisfaction, in order that he and his descendants will continue to work for our descendants, and will be available for a longer period of time than a single individual’s life. The exploitation of the worker was, as one now understands, a stupidity, a ruthless enterprise at the cost of the future, which endangered society. Now we have before us almost a war, and the price for achieving peace, for sealing contracts and wining trust, will at any rate be very high, since the foolishness of the exploiters was great and long-lasting.’”[9] A company’s management that can be characterized by the short-sighted, petty greed of its managers is sub-optimal from the standpoint of maximizing stockholder wealth in the long-term, and thus is not in line with being and becoming. Even in terms of the wealth of non-stockholder executives, cutting labor benefits that are already trivial so as to boost next quarter’s bonus detracts from being able to retain workers whose efficiency can “grow” the company, and whose sons and daughters may decide to work for the company. In short, to the extent that the manager as a type cannot master (i.e., overcome) the instinctual urge of greed manifesting as short-sighted, selfish pettiness, Nietzsche’s pro-capitalist philosophy is not in favor of managers of such a pathetic mentality of weakness. The philosopher’s (amoral) approbation is reserved for managers who apply enlightened self-interest to management of stockholder wealth concentrated as a company by looking after non-supervisory employees in order that they will (and their offspring, if hired) continue to produce such that stockholder wealth can grow like a tomato plant on a vine during a warm, wet summer.

It is ironic that it is a philosopher who “chides economic liberalism on strictly pragmatic grounds and promotes, against the irresponsible zeal to maximize profits at the immediate present, the contraceptive measure of a ‘highly refined usefulness’ whose purpose is to ensure that the very principle of profit will survive on an enduring basis. To the extent that the ruthless practices of economic liberalism, by over-exploiting the worker, become themselves a potentially destabilizing factor jeopardizing the future, Nietzsche is willing to show his teeth to the masters as well, and recommend what one commentator readily celebrated as ‘an enlightened labour policy.’”[10] Nietzsche’s esteem for the will to money as possessing and accumulating goes not include the greedy zeal to maximize profits without adequate attention being placed on resisting expedient measures that are oriented to temporarily boosting quarterly profits and the stock price.

Beyond taking away employee perks such as complimentary gym memberships even though exercise can elongate how long an experienced employee can work, managers can detract from the long-term monetary value of a company (and stockholder wealth) by being petty with customers. When grocery-store companies decided to charge customers for paper bags, customers rightly perceived the managers as petty. When petty managers of airlines figured out that they could boost revenue by charging customers for seats with extra leg-room and for checked luggage—even applying a weight-limit to each suitcase—the business judgment was that any business lost in the long-run from customers feeling “nickeled and dimed” by a greedy management would be made up for by the more immediate revenue gained from the fees. An example of a viable substitute in the long-term in North America could be high-speed trains.

In contradistinction to banal, incrementalist managers, Nietzsche’s esteem for self-confident strength, which says in terms of its natural rather than contrived, self-interested generosity, what are the parasites to me? A person having an overflowing surplus of power (and wealth) and is oriented to life can be contrasted with the new bird of prey—the weak who seek to dominate by petty cruelty. Whereas the self-confident, strong business titan is oriented to the pleasure that is obtainable from a large, successful business deal, the weak manager greedily clutches at cutting costs budget-item by budget-item. Whereas courageous titans can be likened to the Greco-Roman conquerors whose nature it was to gain land and captured slaves, petty, control-obsessed managers can be likened to ascetic priests whose weak nature it is to inflict “Thou Shalt Not!” as a weapon to beguile the self-confident strong.

Managers who market themselves as leaders rather than managers while actually micro-managing subordinates are nonetheless innately weak rather than strong. The “leadership versus management” dichotomy itself may be a guise wherein petty managers seek to rebrand banal management as something that is enlightened in terms of self-interest. To be sure, Nietzsche points to the possibility of such self-interest being adopted by managers in order to meet the spiritual and (basic) material needs of workers so the best of them do not leave. Indeed, such economic self-interest should extend to take into account generations of workers.

Therefore, even though Nietzsche’s philosophy can be regarded as pro-capitalist because private property and accumulating wealth enable a sense of being and becoming, respectively, it cannot be said that the philosophy lauds the business manager as a type. Rather, it depends on the underlying mentality of a particular manager and even of a company’s management. Organizational culture can play a large role in forming and maintaining managerial values, norms, and practices. The culture of Enron was dramatically different than that of Ben and Jerry’s, for example. Just because Nietzsche’s philosophy can be reckoned as pro-capitalist does not mean that he would support any management. In fact, capitalism itself need not be defined in praxis by its lowest common denominator. Nietzsche’s philosophy can be utilized to keep that from happening, or to raise an economy based on private property and the market-mechanism above the squalid mentality of its bottom-feeder producers.



1. Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Greek State,” in On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 178-79.
2. Ishay Landa, The Overman in the Marketplace: Nietzschean Heroism in Popular Culture (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), p. 28.
3. This is not to say that Nietzsche was an existentialist. The Leibniz scholar, Patrick Riley, once asked me whether I thought Nietzsche’s philosophy falls under existentialism; he didn’t think so either. Neither is the philosophy nihilist; Nietzsche asks, “what is nihilism today if it is not” being “weary of man.” Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library1968), p. 480.
4. Ishay Landa, The Overman in the Marketplace: Nietzschean Heroism in Popular Culture (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), p. 28.
5. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Marion Fabor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 77.
6. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p.  77.
7. Here Nietzsche is in line with Aristotle.
8. Ishay Landa, The Overman in the Marketplace: Nietzschean Heroism in Popular Culture (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), p. 29.
9. Ishay Landa, The Overman in the Marketplace: Nietzschean Heroism in Popular Culture (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), p. 30. Translating from Friedrich Nietzsche, Samtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Einzelbanden (Herausgegeben von Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), Vol. 2, pp. 681-82.
10. Ishay Landa, The Overman in the Marketplace: Nietzschean Heroism in Popular Culture (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), p. 31. Landa quotes from Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker—The Perfect Nihilist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 91.

Saturday, June 28, 2025

The U.S. Supreme Court Clipping Judicial Overreach

The separation of powers that characterizes governments in the United States assumes that each branch will act to further its own interests, given the salience of self-interest (and self-preservation) in human nature. It is assumed that the checks and balances between legislative, judicial, and executive branches will keep any one branch from dominating the other two, and, moreover, the government itself from becoming tyrannical at the expense of the liberty of the citizenry. It is not assumed or relied upon that a branch will prune itself without external pressure from one of the other branches. Yet the U.S. Supreme Court may have done so in ruling on June 27, 2025 to limit “the ability of lower-court judges to block executive branch policies nationwide.”[1] I contend that any real wing-clipping by 6 of the 9 justices is illusory rather than indicative of the federal judiciary unilaterally restricting itself.

“With their decision, the justices appeared to upend the ability of single federal judges to freeze policies across the country,” according to The New York Times.[2] The appearance is belied by the fact that the ruling would not go into effect for 30 days and “the justices laid out a potential path for challengers, saying that district court judges could consider whether to take up class-action suits seeking to bar enforcement of the executive order on a statewide, regional or even national basis.”[3] The latter basis would essentially enable a district-court federal judge to block an executive order from going into effect anywhere in the United States.  Groups that had challenged the executive order at issue—invalidating birth-right citizenship for children of illegal immigrants—quickly filed class-action suits in Maryland and New Hampshire, with others expected in the following week—well within the 30 days. As for the validity of the executive order itself, the court would decide that in a case scheduled in the court’s next term.

It is interesting that the justices “split along ideological lines” on a matter of judicial process rather than on the substance of the executive order.[4] Perhaps political ideology has more of an imprint on judicial rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court than most people realize. After all, Justice Sandra Day O’Conner wrote the majority opinion for Bush v. Gore (2000) before oral arguments were heard. Might it be that the conservative justices on the bench wanted President Trump to see a win for him even though the national judicial block of his executive order would likely continue uninterrupted? That president had been very critical of Justice Amy Barrett for another ruling, and she wrote the majority opinion on the case on whether district federal judges could block an executive order nationally. Indeed, the president declared himself the winner from the ruling even though the six conservative justices left open a way for district court judges to be able to continue wielding nationwide injunctions to block the president’s policies issued as executive orders.



1. Abbie Vansickle, “Justices Put Limit on Judges’ Power, In Win for Trump,” The New York Times, June 28, 2025.
2. Ibid., italics added.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Tuesday, January 28, 2025

On the U.S. President as Chief Executive

As the chief executive of the U.S. Government, the president is tasked with executing the law—the passage thereof involving both the Congress and the presidency. It follows that a president cannot legally stand in the way of appropriated federal funding of projects and programs once such allocations have become law. For otherwise, a president could simply ignore appropriations passed by the Congress and signed into law by a previous president. The powers of the unitary executive would reach dictatorial proportions. Within roughly one week of being sworn into office for his second term in 2025, U.S. President Trump decided to pause all foreign aid, and “grants, loans and other federal assistance . . . to ensure spending is consistent with Trump’s priorities.”[1] Those priorities, I submit, would properly have influence on bills in Congress that were not yet laws, as per the legislative veto-power of the presidency and the ability of a president to put pressure on members of Congress by speaking persuasively directly to the American people. The value of leadership available to a presiding role should not be ignored. In terms of symbolic leadership befitting a presider in chief, refusing to enforce laws sends the wrong signal. To be sure, delaying rather than cancelling funding that has already been appropriated as law may fall within reasonable discretion that goes with the executing, and thus executive, function. However, the size, or magnitude, of the federal spending being held up but not cancelled may test the test of reasonableness. This may also be so if the political dimension—that is, the salience of political judgment in the issues involved—is significant.

President Trump “issued an executive order for a 90-day pause in foreign development assistance pending a review of efficiencies and consistency with his foreign policy.”[2] At the time, the United States was the world’s largest international-aid donor; in 2023, $68 billion was spent for this purpose. That number includes “everything from development assistance to military aid.”[3] Interestingly, military funding for Israel was exempted from the delay even though the ICC had issued a warrant for Israel’s sitting prime minister for decimating the civilian population of Gaza, the International Court of Justice (the UN’s court) had ruled the occupation and military attacks by Israel to violate international law, and Amnesty International had found sufficient, credible evidence of genocide perpetuated by the Israeli government. If this exception to the U.S. president’s 90-day delay—and Trump unfroze Biden’s hold on the delivery of the 2000lb bombs to Israel because, Trump said, that country had bought them—reflects Trump’s foreign-policy priorities, then the matter of selectively delaying foreign aid cannot be reckoned as merely technical in nature; rather, the salience of the political dimension means that even a 90-day delay could be unreasonable without Congressional consent in the enacting of resolutions or even law.

With regard to pausing grants, loans and other federal assistance—excepting Medicare and Social Security benefits—again the sheer scale of the funding involved and the salience of politics in the decision to delay test the limits to what is and is not within the reasonable purview of executive discretion in executing federal law that includes federal spending. “Diane Yentel of the National Council of Nonprofits said the order could stop cancer research, food assistance and suicide hotlines.”[4] If so, even a significant delay could be unreasonable as well as contrary to the law concerning SNAP (federal food-assistance to 42.1 million individuals as of the fiscal year 2023) because—to put it bluntly—an awful lot of people need to eat on a daily rather than a monthly basis. Again, the president’s political-ideological judgment here is arguably debatable (hence suggestive of a Congressional legislative role even in the delay): delaying food assistance to Americans while exempting military aid to Israel from delay. Both, and especially juxtaposed, are contentious politically (i.e., ideologically). Furthermore, the memo delaying domestic financial assistance, “signed by acting OMB chief Matthew Vaeth, calls on government agencies to temporarily pause their financial assistance [programs], so they can review spending that could be impacted by the various orders Trump has signed” relating to diversity programs, “woke gender ideology, and the green new deal.”[5] It is difficult to square such overtly political reasons with a technocratic delay in the execution of laws. Of course, this is a judgment call, for the length of the delay is also a relevant factor. Aside from the financial assistance to Americans bearing on sustenance, a few month’s delay may be reasonable, but both the scale of the foreign and domestic funding and especially the political rationales for the delay arguably make the delay a significant political matter rather than merely an executive function in implementing law.

My assessment should not be assumed to be in line with my own political ideology, for I oppose affirmative action programs as being contrary to merit and woke “thought-police” as being repugnant to free-speech liberty; I am not obliged to “give my personal pronouns” (in fact, “one” is the neuter third-person singular pronoun in English). I assume, moreover, that we are all human, all too human in fact, and thus that none of us have a monopoly on truth to be imposed on others. My point here is that the use of reason to dissect even a controversial issue, such as presidential power in the U.S., should not cower to the bullying force of the mind’s own ideology. Incidentally, this point is vital in distinguishing between scholarship and opinion-pieces.



1. James Fitzgerald and Ana Faguy, “White House Pauses Federal Grants and Loans,” BBC.com, January 28, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

Saturday, May 25, 2019

Executive Compensation Tied to Firm Performance: A Critique

With robust economies in America boosting companies’ sales, corporate tax cuts, and an increase in stock buybacks lifting stock prices in 2018, the default mantra in executive compensation circles that high CEO pay is justified if it is tied to firm performance could be questioned. Similarly, the typical assumption that high pay would have to get higher for a CEO to be motivated to do the basics of the job, including overseeing mergers and acquisitions, (or that doing the basics warrants a raise) could be questioned. Particularly in 2018, the comfortable, self-serving ways of the business elite in the U.S. were ripe for critique.

An analysis by The New York Times shows that the medium compensation for CEOs in 2018 was $18.6 million, which represents a raise of $1.1 million, or 6.3%, from 2017.[1] Meanwhile, the average private-sector worker got a 3.2% raise, which translates into 84 cents per hour. In short, the CEO compensation increased at almost twice the rate of ordinary wages. The question is whether the increase was justified or a matter of the American business elite taking care of their own.

Years earlier, Congress had given shareholders of American companies a “special but nonbinding vote” on the ratio of a CEO’s pay to that of the medium employee.[2] The nonbinding feature meant, however, that populism would have no weight in corporate boardrooms. If lawmakers had been motivated by corporate campaign contributions, the nonbinding nature of the vote suffered from the start from a conflict of interest exploited by the political and business elites.

Even the (pro-active?) response of corporate boards to pressure from some shareholders and advisory firms is problematic even though it seems to make sense from business perspective. Boards have been tying more of a CEO’s pay to the company’s financial performance as if the CEO has a big impact as distinct from structural forces such as a good economy or a tax cut that help companies’ bottom lines and stock prices. Boards “continue to act as if C.E.O.s have unique powers to deliver better returns.”[3]  

For example, Testla’s board approved compensation as much as $2.3 billion for Elon Musk, the CEO. To be sure, the company’s market value would have to increase 18 times to $650 billion for Musk to see get all “the options in the award.”[4] The board members tied the high compensation to company performance so he would “devote his time and energy” in Tesla rather than “wander to his other ventures, like SpaceX, or that he could leave Tesla altogether.”[5] As pointed out by the Times, this logic is flawed, for he already “owned roughly a fifth of Tesla, [so] his financial interests were already strongly aligned with the company,” according to Analysts for Institutional Shareholder Services.[6] Additionally, a highly paid CEO (without counting the 2018 award, had it been awarded) should be expected to be motivated by the high pay alone (without a 6% raise) to devote a lot of time and energy to the job. To be sure, Musk was at the time considered a visionary at the company. However, using tied-to-firm-performance to motivate him to show up each workday suggests that the criterion or basis undergirding executive compensation is problematic—and this doesn’t even take into account the matter of getting compensated more because of a tax cut or a strong economy, neither of which a CEO should get credit unless he or she had made the political contribution that got the corporate tax cut passed.


[1] Peter Eavis, “It’s Never Been Easier to Be a C.E.O., and the Pay Keeps Rising,” The New York Times, May 24, 2019.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.

Sunday, March 24, 2019

U.S. Attorney General Barr's Decision on the Mueller Investigation of President Trump: On the Invisible Personal and Institutional Conflicts of Interest

On March 24, 2019, U.S. Attorney General William Barr sent to Congress his summary of Robert Mueller's report on whether President Donald Trump's 2016 campaign had colluded with the Russian government and whether the president had obstructed justice. According to Barr, Mueller had found no evidence of collusion. As for obstruction, Barr wrote that Mueller "did not draw a conclusion one way or the other as to whether the examined conduct constituted obstruction."[1] On this point, Mueller himself had written that 'while this report does not conclude that the president committed a crime, [the report] also does not exonerate him."[2] Mueller had laid out evidence and arguments on both sides of the question of obstruction, and Barr determined that the "evidence fell short of proving [that the president] illegally obstructed the Russia inquiry."[3] The New York Times went on to call this "an extra-ordinary outcome."[4] 
Barr did not detail his reasoning in deciding the matter of obstruction. According to the New York Times, he "appeared to be focusing on the question of whether investigators could prove that [President Trump] had 'corrupt intent' in instances where the available evidence about his motivations was ambiguous."[5] But in focusing on a lack of evidence that the Trump campaign reached any agreement with the Russian government on sabotaging the election, legal experts said," Barr "left out other reasons the president may have had for wanting to stymie a wide ranging investigation: It could uncover other crimes and embarrassing facts."[6] In other words, Barr's parameters may have been too narrow. 
The way Barr framed the contours for his decision might not have been an accident, given his personal conflict of interest. More important than this, I submit, is the continuing institutional conflict of interest facing the Justice Department in investigating its boss, the chief executive. After Congress had received Barr's summary, U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham pointed on Fox News to former Attorney General Jeff Session's personal conflict of interest (Sessions had been part of Trump's campaign that was being accused of collusion with the Russians). Unfortunately, the senator mentioned neither Barr's personal conflict of interest or the broader institutional one facing the Justice Department. Such denial may have been partisan in nature, but I contend that institutional conflicts of interest tend to get a pass in American society. In the case of the Mueller investigation, Americans as a people put the conflicts of interest aside in looking forward to the conclusions from within the Department of Justice. This point, I submit, ought to be viewed as extraordinary. I turn now to the conflicts of interest.
According to The New York Times, when Barr "stepped in to make the determination," he brought "the specter of politics back into the case."[7] I submit that any Attorney General would, and I submit should trigger partisan suspicions in making a determination on a matter in which the chief executive (i.e., the president) is being investigated. 
As for the personal conflict of interest, even though Barr "had taken over the Justice Department [just a month earlier] pledging to defend its independence," he "ended up clearing a president who [had installed] him in the post."[8] This is significant not just because President Trump had been emphasizing loyalty (and dismissing the disloyal) from his subordinates in the executive branch; any pledge of independence represented a personal conflict of interest for Barr and an institutional conflict of interest for the Justice Department, as neither were legally independent of the chief executive, the boss. 
In fact, President Trump's choice of Barr was likely tied to the Mueller investigation. Barr had written a memo as a private citizen to Justice Department officials in June, 2018 insisting that special council Mueller's obstruction inquiry was "fatally misconceived." [9] A president's use of executive powers are beyond the reach of criminal law, regardless of the motive.[10] Such uses include firing a subordinate and directing the Justice Department to close a case. It is just human nature to be motivated to direct the department to close a case against the person himself. Even so, Barr argued that "Trump asking then-FBI Director James Comey to let go of the investigation into former national security advisor Michael Flynn and later firing Comey [were] within [the president's] powers as head of the executive branch." and thus not subject to being investigated, according to Trump's Attorney General before he was nominated.[11]
That Barr's memo would have gone unnoticed in the Trump administration and especially in President Trump's subsequent decision to nominate Barr for Attorney General is too incredulous to be taken seriously. In appointing Barr, the president was essentially securing his rightful control of the branch under him. This point alone gives us an indication of the gravity of the institutional (and constitutional) conflict of interest in the Justice Department investigating its boss, the president--the chief executive, which includes chief law enforcer. 
It stands to reason that none of the departments under the chief enforcer can enforce the law on the chief. I contend that President Trump was exploiting this conflict of interest to give the public the appearance of a credible investigation having been done with the president coming out clean. This appearance, if taken seriously, ignores the underlying conflict of interest that should be recognized as blatant. 
The Justice Department cannot investigate its boss, the president, without risking the extortion of the institutional (and perhaps personal) conflict of interest. That is, the executive branch investigating its boss constitutes a conflict of interest that essentially eliminates that branch as being able to perform such an investigation, at least in terms of credibility. Unfortunately, the American people ignored or dismissed the conflict of interest by relying so much on Mueller's report and Barr's subsequent determination. 
To be sure, Congressional oversight exists when another party controls the U.S. House or Senate (or both), but this renders the judgment subject to political forces, or at least as being viewed as partisan. Facing the conflict of interest within the Justice Department and the political oversight of the U.S. House, Mueller may have chosen the latter anyway, laying out whatever evidence he had for and against obstruction. He doubtlessly knew of Barr's memo, which likely reflected the attitude at the top of the department towards the investigation of any obstruction of justice. 
In general, the American people have risked a corrupting government structure in being so naive about institutional conflicts of interest within the U.S. Government. Simply put, corruptible conflicts should be deconstructed. For example, an alternative to department in the executive branch should be created or chosen when the chief executive is the subject of the investigation. Congressional oversight could be used if another party than the president's controls at least one chamber. An alternative would need to be created should Congress lack the political will to launch an oversight investigation. That this has not been done says something unfortunate about how Americans view even constitutional conflicts of interest.   

See Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon.

1. Eli Watkins, "Barr Authored Memo Last Year Ruling Out Obstruction of Justice," CNN.com, March 24, 22019.
2.Mark Mazzetti and Carol Benner, "Mueller Finds No Trump-Russia Conspiracy but Stops Short of Exonerating President on Obstruction," The New York Times, March 24, 2019.
3. Charlie Savage, Mark Mazzetti, and Katie Benner, "Barr's Move Ignites a Debate: Is He Impartial?" The New York Times, March 26, 2019.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9.Watkins, "Barr Authored Memo."
10.Savage, Mazzetti, and Benner, "Barr's Move Ignites a Debate."
11.Watkins, "Barr Authored Memo."


Sunday, January 14, 2018

Hierarchy Hampered Down in American Business

Without going into either the labor or management camp, a person can viably critique the operation of hierarchy itself in business organizations. The notion is typically associated with the concentration of power at “the top,” rather than the relation of middle-level managers to “retail” managers and their subordinates. Efficiency of power at a corporate headquarters does not necessarily translate into “downward” efficiency at the level of middle management. I submit that precisely this efficiency is rather severely compromised in American business.
“The word hierarchy derives from ancient Gree (hierarchia, literally the ‘rule of a high priest’) and was first used to describe the heavenly orders of angels and, more generally, to characterize a stratified order of spiritual or temporal governance.”[1] The early focus on the situs of a high priest rather than all priests, and the heavenly orders rather than the relation between them and the earthly orders set the tone: the top matters most in a hierarchy. I am guilty in that my theory of organizational leadership applies exclusively at the top: the leadership of an organization. Supervisory management is in my view another animal. Yet it too is important, and I contend that it is woefully neglected in American business.
Customers, for example, of retail businesses will recognize the frustration in dealing with not only  a rude or stubborn employee—even acting at odds with a company policy!—but also that employee’s gatekeeping, or outright refusal to get a supervisor as requested. The sense of entitlement that a non-supervisory employee may have rivals the sense of importance of a CEO. Getting to a store manager can nonetheless require a lot of effort and patience; typically an assistant manager is sent to put out the little brush fires. Employees may know how to exploit this gap that exists between what the employees and a store manager are doing, such as by insisting that aggrieved customers first inform the indolent employee of what will be said to the manager (a conflict of interest to be sure!).
In short, retail-level managers tend not to be involved enough where customer-meets-employees; management by walking around is too easily sidelined by the endless list of things needing to be done behind a desk. Put another way, I contend that retail management is generally interpreted as being akin to upper management, rather than something unique. The situs one or even two levels above non-supervisory employees on the front line should be actively involved on that line, and the complaint access can be greatly improved such that customers do not have to depend on problematic employees for it and spend much time and effort in reaching accountability. Hierarchy is made for efficient accountability, whereas networks (e.g., organic organizational structures and flat inter-organizational relationships) may be overrated.[2] Yet the “lower” half of a company’s hierarchy is, I submit, underutilized and perhaps even unwittingly compromised in part due to the common association of hierarchy with “the top.”
Starbucks, for example, has a centralized customer service number, which can be used to register a complaint against a store employee. The offended customer may get a gift card for a few free drinks to compensate—and such compensation, rather than an apology alone, is important—but what about the distance from the centralized unit at headquarters and the store-level employee? The unit sends a communication to a regional or district manager, who in turn is supposed to communicate with the store manager, who in turn is supposed to have a talk with the employee. Considering the sheer number of links, and the distance involved, the intended message could be compromised both intentionally and unintentionally. A district manager, for instance, may just do enough to make it seem that a real correction has been made. A store manager might dismiss the charge, as it reflects badly on the store’s management. Rarely, perhaps, would a store manager tell a shift manager to listen to what the employee is saying to customers. I also doubt whether the typical complaint results in any actual and substantive negative consequences for the employee, especially if attitude is the culprit (which is not likely re-trainable).
For all that Howard Schultz’s CEOship of Starbucks has been lauded, I have been surprised at the number of times I have witnessed rude, close-minded behavior of employees at the store level. This is not to say that good employees have not worked in the stores. My point is rather that in the company’s hierarchy, the part between the district managers and the store employees seems weakest. In my booklet Bucking Starbucks’ Star, I argue that Schultz’s corporate social responsibility ventures “at the top” do not make up for managerial and employee deficiencies further “below.” I have never seen a store or even a shift manager “working the room” in stores to see how the customers were actually served, and such managers can confront centralized reports of complaints by rationalizing, the customer got free drinks, so there’s no need for me to take action against the employee. Management as walking around, even by district managers scheduling time to work along side the crews at the various stores, and in having direct access to complaining customers, could make a dent in shoring up hierarchy in business organizations where patching is most needed. Hierarchy can be a good thing, provided it is thought through in its various, distinct levels.


See: Cases of Unethical Business, Walmart: Bad Management as Unethical, and Bucking Starbucks' Star.



[1] Niall Ferguson, “In Praise of Hierarchy,” The Wall Street Journal, January 5-6, 2018.
[2] Ibid.

Saturday, January 14, 2017

The Age of the Imperial CEO: The Case of Fred R. Johnson at RJR Nabisco

Fred R. Johnson, former CEO of RJR Nabisco, was known “for the fleet of corporate jets that ferried him to celebrity golf events and other luxurious perks he awarded himself.”[1] The key words here being awarded himself, for Johnson epitomized the sort of imperial CEO that made an oxymoron out of the notion that the corporate board is to serve as an overseer of corporate management in corporate governance. Awarded himself should be the oxymoron, for such a conflict of interest runs against the logic of any viable business calculus.

That Johnson had “scant interest in the daily corporate grind” should also be an oxymoron, for the principle role of a CEO is to manage business.[2] “He was not strategic,” said John Greeniaus, who ran the Nabisco business under Johnson.[3] This too should be regarded as an oxymoron, given the salience of strategic management in a CEO’s role. At some point, the business under such a CEO had to have taken a hit. For example, that offices “were abruptly moved, [and business] units [were] suddenly sold” could not have been good for the bottom-line.

How could such a condition be permitted to go on in a major company? The corporate governance was undone, as Johnson handed out free plane rides, lucrative fees, and consulting contracts—each one representing a conflict of interest for the board members. Even though the board finally said no to Johnson’s attempt at a leveraged buyout because in part he would “reap outsized profits from the deal,” he received $53 million in golden parachute payments after he resigned as the board went with another takeover bid.[4] The golden parachute should have been regarded as an oxymoron, and yet the payments attest to just how easy the CEO had had it.

My point is simply to ask, at what expense? How is it that a major company would even hire a man who was little interested in strategy. Wouldn’t this have shown through in the interviews? When he put cigarettes and cookies together in the same company, wouldn’t it have dawned on the board that the two areas were not a good fit? To be sure, the snacks and cigarettes were broken apart in 1999, but wouldn’t such an acknowledgement have naturally reflected on the CEO? Even so, he received $53 million in golden parachute payments. 

Clearly, this case suggests that the system by which corporations are governed is vulnerable from a business standpoint.  To be sure, decreasing marginal utility means that it would take a lot of money to improve the happiness of a rich CEO, but does a board need to pay so much heed to this dynamic, which flies in the face of sound compensation management. As for Johnson, Greeniaus describes the man as being “like a really intelligent six-year-old in a sandbox.”[5] Just because it would take a lot of money to interest a spoiled rich kid does not mean that boards should become enablers; it is not as if adults would not take the job.




[1] James R. Hagerty, “F. Ross Johnson,” The Wall Street Journal, January 7-8, 2017.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.

Tuesday, May 26, 2015

Wasteful Agency-Spending: Employee Bonuses as a Solution

Use it or lose it. I am referring to “the habit of [U.S. Government] agencies spending all surplus funding at the end of the fiscal year in order to avoid budget reductions the following year.”[1] By spending the entire amount allotted for the budgetary year, a federal agency can avoid a lower base-line for the following year’s allotment from Congress. The incentive in this system is to spend every dollar in the budget, whether efficiently or profligately. The challenge is how to replace that incentive with another—one that results in efficient public budgeting. Unfortunately, relying on an incentive presupposes discretion, and one person can never be sure what lies behind another person’s use of it.

In May 2015, a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators proposed to “give agency inspectors general the ability to grant $10,000 bonuses to federal employees who identify surplus or unneeded funding at their agencies.”[2] According to one the senators, “the bill helps combat the perverse incentive to spend leftover money by offering employees a positive incentive to help IGs save money.”[3] That perverse incentive is what made the U.S.S.R. so inefficient economically, as state-owned (i.e., socialist) and controlled (i.e., regulated) enterprises (as well as government agencies) operated likewise. In that political economic system, quotas both in budgets and widgets were the currency by which the system operated. Such bloat, inefficiency and mismanagement that weakened the Soviet Union from within also hampers good government at the federal level in the United States.

The proposed law would amend the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, which gave Congress more authority in the budget process. “The Act was inspired by Richard Nixon’s refusal to disburse nearly $12 billion of congressionally-appropriated funds in 1973-74 through the executive power of impoundment.”[4] Nixon cited the impact of the federal budget deficit on inflation as the reason for refusing to spend appropriated funds. The rationale is problematic prime facie because the U.S. president is tasked with enforcing the law rather than selectively enforcing it. Not contradicting the law would have meant going back to Congress with a recommendation that a law be passed withdrawing the surplus funds.

Even though the proposed law in 2015 would place the discretion with civil-service employees rather than politicians, a Democratic U.S. Senate aide said “that the amendment’s language may [allow] federal government administrators to defund key agency functions for ideological or political reasons.”[5] Civil servants are human too, and, besides, they can be subject to pressure from politicians higher up the food chain. In other words, we are back to the same problem—that which is inherent to discretion. Sen. Mike Enzi can have all the faith in the world in “the people holding the shovel who really know how to solve problems”—that “the folks responsible for administering individual programs know where the money is, what is needed and what is being wasted”—but all this does not necessarily mean that the civil servants would flag a budget item as “surplus” because it really would be wasteful to spend the money. Even a bureaucrat holding a shovel could provide an efficiency rationale for cutting one budget-item so as to get out of having to do a boring  ideologically-objectionable task or program. The bonus would be, well, a bonus. That is to say, a perverse incentive.



[1] Andy Medici, “New Bill: Point Out Surplus Funds, Get a $10,000 Bonus,” Federal Times, May 21, 2015.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Regional Oral History Office, “1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act,” The Bancroft Library, University of California-Berkeley, March 7, 2011 (accessed May 23, 2015).
[5] Daniel Marans, “Rand Paul Amendment Would Increase Executive Branch Power,” The Huffington Post, May 22, 2015.

Tuesday, June 3, 2014

President Obama as Chief Executive: Missing the Fraud at the Veterans Administration

Buffeted with a whirlwind of criticism in the wake of revelations of widespread fraud in VA Hospital and outpatient clinic wait times, President Obama somewhat sheepishly admitted during a news conference on the matter that he had heard nothing of the practice on his travels around the country. With at least one instance of false scheduling at 65% of the facilities between September 30, 2013 and March 31, 2014 and 13% of schedulers being instructed in how to falsify wait-times,[1] it is odd that word had not reached the president’s ear. Maybe this is not so odd after all, for the president’s domestic trips tended to be oriented to campaign fundraisers and speeches oriented to proposed legislation. In other words, the president—and Barak Obama is hardly alone here—put his legislative role above that of his office as chief executive.

It is worth noting that the legislative role of the American federal president is negative in that the power is exercised by vetoing legislation. To be sure, the president is constitutionally encouraged to make recommendations through the State of the Union report made to Congress. Even so, the extent of time and attention that presidents have directed to pushing favored legislative bills go beyond making recommendations, and thus the opportunity cost (i.e., foregone attention to other matters, such as managing the executive branch of the U.S. Government) is not justified. Put another way, having two branches focused at the top on legislating is not only redundant, or overkill; the joint focus leaves the executive branch without a chief except in parchment.

This is not to say that proactive rather than veto-based presidential involvement in the legislative process cannot bear fruit. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the president for much of the Great Depression in the 1930s, expended tremendous effort in seeing to it that his New Deal programs were legislated into actuality. In an “exit-interview” at the conclusion of decades in the U.S. House of Representatives, Rep. John Dingell (D-Michigan) calls FDR, “The Giant, one of probably the three greatest” presidents in American history.[2] In dull contrast, Dwight Eisenhower was a “fine chairman of the board, . . . but didn’t do much.”[3] This stinging critique implies that the managerial imprint translates into lethargy or at least a lack of accomplishment.

Relatedly, Dingell criticizes Jimmy Carter for not being able to see the forest even as he could see every tree in the woods.[4] While a president as presider should have his or her eyes on the big picture, protecting society and the systems of business and government as wholes from actualizing systemic risk, the president as chief executive should focus on trees relative to society as a whole—that is, relative to the orientation in presiding. To be sure, the focus of the particular agencies is considerably narrower, and no CEO rightfully gets hung up at that level—but neither does a CEO focus on society at the expense of the business itself. Carter took micromanaging to the extreme, personally approving even the White House Christmas cards. As dysfunctional as this is for a chief executive, equally problematic is a president who acts as if he or she were a Congressional leader, or else privileges his own presiding over managing. Yet legislating and presiding have come to swallow up the very notion of the American presidency—Rep. Dingell’s comments illustrating this default.

It hardly bears mentioning that for a politically-oriented person, running around the member states making speeches oriented to a vision of society is unquestionably more exciting than exercising executive responsibilities. As a result, it has been all too easy for the campaign-oriented people who have occupied the Oval Office to effectively leave the mammoth executive branch without a CEO or managerial chairperson—a decision that tacitly enables the sort of widespread fraud as was found in the Veterans Administration in 2014. It is fanciful to suppose that word of even such a widespread managerial practice would somehow show up on a rope-line as a celebrity president is passing by. Yet in his news conference on the fraud at the VA, President Obama saw no such disjunction. Instead, he sought to appear as managerially on top of the intricacies of the VA scheduling process.

I suspect that the encroachment of campaigning over governing has a correlate in the White House, wherein legislating has come to crowd out the executive functions. Perhaps the Electoral College was established in part so a good executive rather than a good campaigner would have a chance at the office; the increasing salience of the popular vote being like a storm’s wave washing over everything else and thus effectively establishing the sort of person who would get the prize. Relatedly, the underlying problem doubtlessly includes the character flaw that too easily ignores some of a job’s responsibilities in selfishly favoring others. In other words, we can indeed blame Barak Obama and many of his predecessors for slighting their managerial responsibilities across the executive branch in order to have more influence (i.e., legislatively). Ironically, fewer speeches on pending legislation would have much more currency and free up the president to manage the executive branch. As for the quite legitimate presiding role that is literal to the presidency itself, catastrophic threats to the systems of business, government, and society do not arise every day; the role does not “eat” a lot of time on a daily basis if understood correctly instead of applied to every symptom that pops up on an oversensitive radar-screen. Leaving legislating largely to Congress, a presiding president would likely find that he or she has enough time to manage the executive branch effectively, assuming an optimal mix of direct supervision and delegation is applied. Generally speaking, balance and proper boundaries would do a lot of good, yet unfortunately human nature may be more schizogenic than homeostatic—more maximizing (e.g., desire) than oriented to equilibrium.



[1] Meghan Hoyer and Gregg Zoroya, “Fraud Masks VA Wait Times,” USA Today, June 3, 2014.
[2] “John Dingell Rates the Presidents,” USA Today, May 2, 2014.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.