Salary Averages in the E.U. and U.S.

It can be misleading, even illusory, to cite an average statistic on the entire E.U. and U.S. when their respective member-states differ significantly in their own averages. To be sure, overall averages, such as pertain to an empire-scale union of states covering many subunits are useful in comparison with the overall average of another comparable union. Additionally, in cases in which the state averages do not differ much, the overall average for all of the states aggregated is not misleading. Abstractly, an average of numbers that ranges from 50 to 50,000 is less reflective of the facts on the ground than is an average of numbers that ranges from 50 to 60 because neither of these outliers is much different than, say, an average of 55. In contrast, especially if most of the data from 50 to 50,000 clusters around these poles, then to say that an average of 23,000 represents something actual is dubious and even misleading. It is also misleading to compare the average pertaining to one empire-scale union of states with the average of a state in another such union. Such a category mistake regarding scale and polity-types and levels is commonly made in comparing and contrasting the E.U. and U.S. In an effort to rectify the recurrent cognitive-ideological lapses bearing on trans-Atlantic comparisons and contrasts, a proper comparison of salary averages can serve as an illustration of how to compare “apples with apples, and oranges with oranges” in institutional political analysis that is comparative in application.

As for the E.U., Eurostat reported that in 2023, “the average annual full-time adjusted salary per employee ranged from €13,503 [$14,853] in Bulgaria to €81,064 [$89,170] in Luxembourg, with the EU average standing at €37,863 [$41,649].”[1] I submit that the difference of the state averages from high to low justifies using the state averages rather than citing the E.U. average except for comparing the E.U. to other empire-scale polities, such as the U.S., India, and China. As for the U.S., the average annual salary per employee ranged from $45,180 (€41,073) in Mississippi to $76,600 (€69,636) in Massachusetts, with the US average standing at was $59,384 (€53,986). Again, the difference of the state averages from high to low justifies using the state averages, except in comparing the U.S. as a whole to the E.U. as a whole. The U.S.’s $59,384 (€53,986) average is higher than the E.U.’s €37,863 ($41,649). To be sure, comparing union-to-union has its drawbacks, for the overall conclusion that salaries were on average higher in the U.S. than in the E.U. in 2023 masks the fact that Luxembourg’s average of €81,064 [$89,170] is higher than the average of $76,600 (€69,636) in Massachusetts.

I submit that the intellectual beauty in this sterling symmetry is essentially that of logic absent any distortive ideology that would push someone into comparing the average of a state in one union with another union overall. As an example of an illogical category mistake, making a list of averages on salaries per worker by listing Luxembourg as number 1 and the U.S. as #6 after Austria would omit the averages of U.S. states such as New York, California, and New Jersey whose 2023 averages are higher than those of Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, and Austria. If member-states are to be included, the states from both the E.U. and U.S. must be included to avoid a misleading and distortive category mistake. Similarly, if the U.S. average is included, so too must be that of the E.U., whether or not the state averages are included.

Having demonstrated how the common category mistakes regarding trans-Atlantic political and economic comparisons can be rectified logically, I am under no illusion that such pristine logic will gain any traction, given the sheer intractability of the Euroskeptic, or state’s rights, ideology in Europe even into the 2020s in spite of state-nationalism having spawned two long wars that went global in the preceding century. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn masterfully explains why scientific revolutions as paradigm changes are typically resisted so much by scientists who are entrenched in the paradigm enjoying the inertia of the status quo. Both personal interests and emotional as well as intellectual investment in an existing paradigm play a role in elongating the existing paradigm’s life-span artificially. So too, clutching onto political and economic comparisons between a state in one empire-scale union of states and another such union had become more ideological than based in fact by 2024, with denial of logic being just one of the implicit casualties. Old Kant must be rolling in his grave.

---

1. Servet Yanatma, “Average Salary Rankings in Europe: Which Countries Pay the Highest,” Euronews.com, December 24, 2024. I added the dollar equivalents using the December 30, 2023 euro/dollar exchange rate of 1.1. The highest rate in 2023 was 1.12 and the lowest was 1.05.

Pardons in Mississippi: On the Role of the Supreme Court

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled in 2012 that pardon procedures lay outside of its constitutional authority—that to interfere even in cases where those procedures were flouted would violate the separation of powers. Section 124 of Mississippi’s Constitution “gives pardon power exclusively to the governor, but also requires applicants to have their petitions for pardon ‘published for 30 days, in some newspaper in the county where the crime was committed.’”[1] This is constitutional language, and yet the Supreme Court refused to determine whether Haley Barbour had acted unconstitutionally in all but 22 of the 200 pardons he had granted in his last days in office. In other words, the Court’s function in interpreting the constitution is at odds with the principle wherein the three branches of the Mississippi government are separate—none being directed by any of the other two.

In his majority decision, Justice Jess Dickinson wrote, “While this court clearly has the constitutional duty to interpret the content of laws passed by the Legislature and executive orders issued by the governor, we decline—as we have so many other courts before us—to assume for ourselves the absolute power to police the other branches of government in fulfilling their constitutional duties to produce laws and executive orders, unless there is alleged a justifiable violation of a personal right.”[2] In a dissent, Chief Justice William Waller argued that the Constitution puts limits on the governor’s pardon power, and the court is obliged to make sure those limits are not crossed.  As those limits are set in the constitution rather than by statute, the Supreme Court as interpreter of the Constitution is justified—indeed even obligated—to determine whether an executive order violates the language and is thus unconstitutional.

If judicial review were subject to the separation of powers doctrine, then the Supreme Court of Mississippi could only assess the constitutionality of the judiciary’s decisions and protect the rights of individuals from governmental action—though even here such protection could be interpreted as being at the expense of the legislative or executive branch and thus violating the separation of power between the three branches. Furthermore, assuming that the chief executive of Mississippi might somehow police the constitutional limitations on himself puts him in a conflict of interest with respect to himself. A conflict of interest is also in play, by the way, in Haley Barbour pardoning prisoners who worked at the governor’s mansion.

To be sure, a conflict of interest also applies when a Court applies constitutional interpretation to itself. It would be advisable, therefore, for Mississippi to create a constitutional court whose role is only to interpret the Constitution. Such a court could thus apply constitutional scrutiny to other courts in Mississippi without so much of a conflict of interest (there still being some, the Constitutional Court being in the same branch).

In short, the referee should not do anything else with respect to the game, and none of the game rules should be off limits simply because it applies to one of the other players. To rely on the legislature to keep itself within constitutional bounds or likewise in the case of a joint figurehead and chief executive of a government does not take seriously the function of a constitution to keep a government within certain limits of power. To expect power to police itself is sheer folly.

1. Campbell Robertson, “Highest Court in Mississippi Upholds 9 Pardons,” The New York Times, March 9, 2012. 
2. Ibid.

Europe's Political Elite Takes on Popular Sovereignty in Greece

As October 2011 was coming to an end, George Papandreou, prime minister of Greece, “stunned Europe by announcing a referendum” on the latest bailout from the E.U. and set the vote for January 2012. Shocked E.U. leaders were doubtless shaking their heads with a mix of incredulity and frustration, as they had not even been consulted on the prime minister’s proposal. Meanwhile, the yields on Italy’s bonds continued to increase, as did the spread between German and Greek 10-year bonds. The world was left to whether the Greek voters would reject their government’s austerity plans and, relatedly, whether the E.U. would augment its bailout of the state as per the agreement reached only days before the prime minister’s announcement.

 Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou announcing the referendum    AP

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.