Political and Economic Elites

I submit that in virtually every political party, a distinction can be made between the “rank and file” and the political elite. Kamala Harris may have lost to Donald Trump in the 2024 U.S. federal-presidential race in part because Harris had not spoken out enough on economic issues amid soaring inflation on groceries and rents to gain traction with Democratic and Independent voters who had had enough of the “woke” ideological agenda, which includes, for example, moral pressure and even demands that people announce their “pronouns” before speaking. Although President Biden had initiated some anti-trust judicial action, the industry-oligopoly of meat producers, for example, was left untouched. So too were the mega-grocery-store chains. Kroger was later found to have spiked egg and milk prices above the increased costs with impunity, yet Harris did not suggest that the Sherman or Clayton anti-trust acts should be taken out of the garage for spin on the American judicial highways that connect the rank-and-file party-members to party elites mainly in New England, New York, and California. I contend that U.S. Senator Bernie Sander’s anti-oligopoly speeches in conservative Congressional districts gained such numbers in 2025 precisely because the Democratic Party’s elite had lost touch with the party’s “rank and file” voters on economic issues.[1]

In early May, 2025, Faiz Shakir, a top advisor to Sanders, castigated elected Democrats who want “to talk down to” voters as if ordinary people are “just too dumb to understand the general notions of powerful elites running” the show, presumably both in politics and business.[2] I don’t think it is lost on many Democratic voters that Democratic office-holders taking campaign donations from oligopolistic companies have been less than willing to urge the U.S. Department of Justice to prosecute large companies on the basis of restraint of trade. Virtually no elected official in government who takes a significant amount of “corporate cash” would be willing to propose a law strengthening anti-trust law such that governments in the U.S. would have a duty to restore monopolistic and oligopolistic industries to market-competition even if the existing firms are not colluding on price or other matters.

For example, since its early days, Facebook (then Meta) has actively bought out budding potential competitors. Social media became an oligopolistic industry in part because of that strategy. Whether or not Meta has engaged in restraint of trade, the U.S. Department of Justice could be given the legal mandate to break up the large American social-media companies in order to bring about a competitive industry. A monopolistic or oligopolistic industry cannot be counted upon to metamorphosize itself naturally into a competitive market; rather, the reverse tends to occur. Hence the need for government to act to perpetuate competition in industries.

This is not to say that Democratic and Independent voters would or should accept Sanders’ platforms of “Medicare for All” and free college-tuition at public colleges and universities. Rather, his “relentless focus on economic policy” could have improved his party’s chances to retain the federal presidency by countering “swing voters’ belief [that] Democrats are too close to feckless institutions and too obsessed with culture war issues.”[3] U.S. Senator Chris Murphy, also a Democrat, observed about six months after the 2024 election, “We viewed people like Bernie as an outlier threat to the institutional Democratic Party, when in fact what he was talking about and is still talking about is the crossover message. And it pulls Trump voters back into the Democratic coalition.”[4] Both the Hilary-Clinton-dominated party elite in 2016, which was rather unfair to Sanders, and the Kamala-Harris presumptive-nominee fiat in 2024 demonstrate the lack of willingness of the party’s elite to select its nominees for president by competitive (and fair, open) contests. This lack of political competition mirrors the lack of economic competition that has continued to plague many American industries at the expense of consumers.

Lest the attention on price-spikes from President Trump’s tariffs monopolize the public discourse on prices that American consumers must pay to have even staple products, another, more widespread, reason for higher prices may be right under their proverbial noses and yet many Americans, both as voters and consumers, may continue to be oblivious to the bad odor of greed that has fueled collusion not only within industries, but also between business and government. An anti-elite populism preached by Democratic candidates and office-holders who refuse corporate donations could really make a difference in setting the Democratic Party apart from not only Trump’s Republican Party, but also the status quo itself, whose gravitas can be likened to that of the Earth in its magnitude and relentlessness. Elites may have such a foothold in American politics and business that many party-members and consumers may be left with only a vague instinctual sense that “the gig is rigged.” For the powers that are able to frame the contours of debates on issues, including on which issues will be debated publicly, do so with a keen eye on retaining and even gaining power and wealth. Hence making the contours explicit, and uncovering the underlying vested interests, is vital to restoring bottom-up democracy and competitive markets in the United States. Faith in American democracy may boil down to the precipitate of ordinary people resisting entrenched, powerful interests even in their own political parties.

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1. An oligopoly is an industry in which a few companies dominate. An oligopoly is between a monopoly and a competitive market. Prices on products can be higher than necessary, the surplus revenue going to profits. Sellers are price-takers rather than price-setters in a competitive market, whereas companies in an oligopolistic industry have sufficient market-power to set prices because consumers have few choices.

2. Igor Bobic, “Bernie Sanders: Resisting Trump Is ‘Not Good Enough’,” The Huffington Post, May 6, 2025.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

E.U. Statehood for Canada: Not So Fast

Even as the federal president of the U.S., Donald Trump, campaigned in 2024 in part on Canada becoming a member of the U.S., statehood in the E.U. was being discussed in 2025 on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Besides being perhaps a knee-jerk political reaction against Trump, the prospect of Canada becoming an E.U. state faced a few major hurdles—one of which being the E.U.’s Basic (aka constitutional) Law. Accordingly, working instead toward a closer trading relationship was a more realistic route.

Firstly, that U.S. President Trump had “taunted and provoked Canadians with talk” of statehood for Canada in the U.S. and even that 46% of Canadians in a February, 2025 poll favored accession in the E.U. instead of the U.S. are not sufficient rationales for Canada to become an E.U. state.[1] One reason for representative rather than direct democracy is that having a term of office protects elected representatives from having to capitulate politically to momentary passions held by the most impassioned in a population. Because Trump’s invitation to Canada to join the other states in the U.S. would likely go unheeded, and, moreover, Trump’s term in office would presumably end at some point, the Canadian interest in accession in the E.U. would likely dissipate rather than continue to build. I submit that such a momentous political change should not be made on the basis of a momentary political context.

Secondly, the Canada is “the most European of non-European countries,” given the “French and British roots” as evinced in Quebec and Newfoundland, for example, is not a sufficient reason, as the same could be said of Australia regarding its British roots.[2] In fact, that Quebec and Newfoundland are so culturally different is an argument that Canada could split up and be more than one state in the E.U. or U.S., since inter-state differences are supposed to be greater than intra-state differences in a federal system.

Thirdly, during a briefing in March, 2025, “a Commission spokeswoman pointed to Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union which stipulates that ‘any European State’ can apply to become a state—“in other words, ONLY European states” can become E.U. states.[3] Canada lacks the geographical proximity to the E.U. necessary to satisfy Article 49. So whereas Cyprus is technically in Asia, the proximity to the E.U.—not just being culturally European—renders that state different than Canada with respect to the Article. 

Ironically, Hawaii as a member state of the U.S. is not only not in North America, but is arguably more Asian than American culturally. Not even Alaska, which is in North America, is contiguous with “the lower 48.” Europeans who like to point out the cultural differences between E.U. states while assuming that the other union, which stretches across a continent and then some, is culturally homogenous miss not only the tremendous differences between a member-state like Mississippi and that of Massachusetts, but also the distinctive culture and location of Hawaii! So, I’m not sure that Europeans are the best judges of how European Canadian culture is. Certainement, French speakers in the E.U. have strong opinions on the way the language is spoken in Quebec.

In a parliamentary question to the E.U.’s executive branch in 2025, Rep. Streit, a member of the Reform party, argued that Canadian statehood would “expand [the E.U.’s] single market, create sales opportunities, facilitate the exchange of goods and services, and be better able to withstand threats of tariffs and global security risks.”[4] A good trade agreement with Canada would satisfy all but the last benefit, and NATO could handle the last one without risking stretching the E.U. too thin, especially given the staying power of the principle of unanimity in the European Council.

Neither the U.S. or the E.U. evinces regional governance in the sense of covering a global region, as if a stepping stone on the way to a world government. Furthermore, both unions faced significant internal political strains in 2024, and enlarging either union rather than being focused on addressing internal pressures could be foolish rather than prudent. For instance, before adding more Eastern European states, the E.U. could be strengthened on the federal level by applying qualified majority rule to more E.U. competencies in the European Council and the ministerial Council of the E.U., and giving the E.U.’s Parliament more authority so it could be a check on state governments exploiting conflicts of interest through the councils.

Fourthly, allowing Canada to apply to become an E.U. state would open the door to Israel doing the same, which would embroil the E.U. in Middle East politics. That “Israel’s security cabinet . . . approved a plan to expand its military offensive” in Gaza after more than month of blocking humanitarian aid such as food and medical supplies from entering the enclave and in spite of rulings against Israel by the International Criminal Court and the U.N.’s International Court of Justice may suggest that negotiating with Israel in the European Council and the council of ministers could result in stalemate rather than decisions.[5] In other words, if you think Viktor Orbán is stubborn, try Ben Netanyahu. Given the staying power of the principle of unanimity, flexibility on the state level is a highly valuable commodity at the federal level, given the extent of state power there. Even giving Turkey the go-ahead would have introduced a Middle Eastern culture into the E.U. at the councils, and E.U. decision-making would have been much more difficult because of exogenous values would have to be recognized and respected even if they conflict with European culture. Moreover, no limit would exist as to how large the E.U. could become. At some point, diseconomies of scale could take a toll on the federal level in being able to realize benefits from collective action as distinct from merely aggregated benefits from states acting unilaterally, such as in foreign policy and defense.

Lastly, the British monarch is, at least as of 2025, the head of state of Canada. Even though the lack of geographical proximity renders that royal role difficult, that the United Kingdom had seceded from the E.U. renders Canadian accession both awkward and difficult. Although the royal role does not render Canada subservient to the British government, the question of Canada's loyalty to the E.U. could conceivably be raised by federal and state officials in the union because of the head of state is an official role in Canada. Perhaps the loyalist Canadians could push for Canada’s provinces, except for Quebec, to be made equivalent to Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland as regions in the United Kingdom instead of Canada becoming a state in the European Union. Does not having the king or queen as head of state mean that Canada is essentially within the monarch's kingdom, even if not subject to the British government? Of course, neither Canadian provinces becoming regional governments in a European kingdom nor Canada becoming a state in an empire-scale union is very realistic, given the sheer gravitas of the status quo. Radical political change is seen as momentous not only for its platforms being very different, but also because such change is rare. Nevertheless, in analyzing possibilities for significant change in how various scales (and scale-types) of polities are related, the prerequisite of relating stepwise regions, kingdoms, and empire-scale polities around the world is best done without category-mistakes foisted by political ideology (e.g., nationalism).[6]

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1. Stefan Grobe, “Meet the MEP Who Wants to Bring Canada into the European Union,” Euronews.com, 5 May 2025.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. David Gritten, “Israel Security Cabinet Approves Plan to ‘Capture’ Gaza, Official Says,” BBC.com, 5 May 2025.

6. See Skip Wroden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire: A Basis for Trans-Atlantic Comparisons (Seattle: Amazon, 2017).