Columbia: The United States of South America?

On March 8, 2026, The Associated Press reported on the voting in Columbia that took place that day “for a new Congress and to select candidates . . . in a primary-style contest ahead of a presidential election in May.”[1] This description could hardly be more “American,” in the sense of referring to the United States. I contend that this allusion to the U.S. is overdrawn. Were Columbia to apply for membership in the U.S., the accession would pertain to becoming a state, rather than to Columbia as a United States of South America merging with the other United States. Put another way, even though Columbia appropriated from the federal level of the U.S. in creating a presidency, a Congress that in turn consists of “The Senate” and “The House of Representatives,” and a presidential election process that includes something akin to primaries, Columbia corresponds to the American states (only without being members of a union as they are) rather than to the United States. Columbia’s accession into the U.S. as a state would not instantiate an empire within an empire.

One way of distinguishing Columbian politics from politics at the national level in the U.S. is to point out that the timespan for presidential campaigning in Columbia in 2026 between the “primaries” and the presidential general election was just months. Whereas that is plenty of time to campaign across Columbia, much more time is needed for U.S. presidential candidates to campaign in 50 states. Accordingly, the U.S. presidential campaign “season” is much longer—with the primaries themselves taking place over about 6 months. This is a great way to grasp the qualitative leap (i.e., rather than being a matter of degree) that separates and distinguishes a state from a union that is composed of many such states. Although only a few months are between the nominating political conventions and the general presidential election in the U.S., and only a few months are between the Columbian “primaries” and that presidential election, the American presidential campaign “season” is significantly front-loaded in part because the U.S. is an empire-scale federal system wherein the states play a role in the election of the federal president and thus should at least theoretically be campaigned in. It is not enough to campaign in an area the size of Columbia, for example.

Shifting from process to institutional analysis, Columbia’s system of government as unitary can be distinguished from the U.S.’s federal system. Although imitation has been said to be the highest form of flattery, referring to Columbia’s upper and lower legislative chambers as together being a Congress is misleading. In the United Colonies, which predates the United States, the Continental Congress was so named because it was viewed as international meetings rather than as a domestic legislature. So too, the Congress during the Articles of Confederation was understood to be an international body because the states were then sovereign countries. Although this changed in 1789 when the three branches of the federal government went into effect, the U.S. Senate was understood to be founded on principles of international law. Although the states were then only semi-sovereign (some governmental sovereignty having been delegated to the federal government), that polities rather than individuals would the members of the Senate and that the member-polities all would have the same number of votes meant that the U.S. Senate is an international chamber (i.e., founded on such principles, rather than national principles). The latter principles apply to the U.S. House of Representatives, so with the Senate, the Congress can be construed as a hybrid national-international institution. In utter contrast, Columbia’s Congress is solely domestic in nature—not a thread of international fiber being mixed in. This is so, too, of the legislatures of the U.S.’s member-states. So, in this way too, Columbia can be seen to correspond to a state in the U.S. rather than to the U.S. itself.

Indeed, one reason why federalism fits so well for the U.S. is because of its empire-scale and the related interstate cultural heterogeneity. Massachusetts is very different than Oklahoma, culturally speaking, and Texas is very different than Hawaii. The claim that the regions of Columbia differ culturally to such an extent is based in part on the category mistake of treating a state-scale polity as being commensurate with, or equivalent to, a union of such states.

One implication of seeing Columbia in this light is that it and its neighbors could form a United States of South America, whose Congress would be hybrid-based on international and national principles of government. The Senate of such a Congress would represent Columbia and the other states rather than individual citizens (the direct election of U.S. senators by citizens of the respective states may thus be problematic). Were such a United States of South America in existence, a federal check on power-abuses at the state level would be possible (though not guaranteed). The need for and lack of such a check when the Columbians went to vote in March, 2026 is clear from the assertion made at the time by Columbian Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez “that a group of at least 2,400 people ‘allegedly heading to vote’ were detected trying to enter Columbia at an illegal border crossing with Venezuela in Norte de Santander, despite announced border closures during the election process.”[2] Sixty buses were waiting to take the people to voting stations. Columbia’s simple rather than federal polity did not include such safeguards as would surely come from the U.S. federal government were citizens of one state sent into another state as campaign volunteers to attempt to vote there. In the words of Sánchez, an “avalanche of illegal voting” happened in Columbia on March 8, 2026.[3] Whereas claims of widespread electoral fraud in some of the U.S. states in the 2020 presidential election were met with investigations by Congress and the U.S. Justice Department, which crucially are distinct from any of the state governments, the Columbian government had only itself to investigate why busloads of foreigners allegedly voted for candidates for president even though that government may have been blameworthy. It is not as if Columbia constituted a United States of South America. Of course, political corruption can occur at virtually any scale; the U.S. Federal Government is hardly immune, and neither is the government of the tiny polity of Rhode Island, for instance.

My point is merely that even though Columbia’s legislature is called a Congress and includes a chamber called a senate, Columbia does not have the checks and balances that are built into an empire-scale federal polity such as the United States. Even if some of the U.S. states had federal systems, those states would not thereby be equivalent to the U.S., or, more generally, to an empire-scale and international-national hybrid federal government.

---

1. Astrid Suarez, “Colombians Are Electing a New Congress and Choosing Presidential Candidates,” The Associated Press, March 8, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Behind Political Culture: U.S. President Clinton’s Lying under Oath

The stature that comes with occupying (and even having occupied) public office, whether elected or appointed and especially if high office, combined with the ability to attract the attention of the media such that the (former) official’s statements have the credibility of pronouncements, and thus of being true rather than false statements, is rarely examined for what the stature and societal “mouth-piece” imply (i.e., veracity). A very high former elected representative who has even admitted lying under oath in a court proceeding back while in office can very easily be assumed decades later to be making a true statement by the public even though that statement is practically identical to the statement known (and admitted) to have been false. Even published photos that are strong evidence that the second statement is false can be dismissed by a public too liable to being beguiled by clever political birds of prey. I have in mind here the twin statements of Bill Clinton, who was the U.S. President for two terms in the 1990s and went on to associate with Jeffrey Epstein, the infamous head of the child-prostitute sex-ring, and at least one of his paid girls.

At least three compromising photos of Clinton with girls in close proximity were released by the FBI to my knowledge in 2026. In one photo, Clinton is situated between Maxwell, who was Epstein’s accomplice, and an under-aged girl in an indoor pool at a resort (not in the U.S.). Maxwell would later be convicted (and imprisoned) for her role in arranging girls for Epstein’s clients. In another photo, Clinton is sitting in a hot-tub with an underaged girl. In a third photo, he is seated with one arm (and hand) low around the waist of a girl in what appears to be Epstein’s private jet. To be sure, even though the positioning of Clinton’s arm (and his hand) low around the girl’s waist connotes sexual rather than paternal interest, and that a girl is with Clinton in the hot-tub photo (and the pool photo) are together highly suggestive, none of those photos is evidence that Clinton raped (i.e., had sex with) one or more of Epstein’s girls. Moreover, anyone accused of a crime is assumed to be innocent in any of the United States unless or until the accused is convicted in a court of law of having broken a law.

Even though the arm being around a girl’s waist and being in a pool with an under-aged girl and an adult whom we can now say definitely arranged Epstein’s girls for sex may bring to mind the old phrase, “where there is smoke, there is fire,” I bring up the matter of the photos merely as context to show just how misguided it was for the American public to assume that Clinton was testifying honestly before a Congressional committee in 2026 on his relationships with Epstein and the child-prostitutes. That Clinton was recognizable (i.e., fame) and had political stature as a former U.S. president are not sufficient for the default-assumption to be that even what he has said under oath is truthful rather than mendacious. This is the idea.

Asked under oath while testifying before a Congressional committee if he had had “sexual relations” with the woman in the hot-tub photo, Clinton answered, “No.”[1] Even if the photos make his answer difficult to believe, that he also “denied knowledge of Epstein’s crimes” may be so incredulous that a person could reasonably toss out all of Clinton’s testimony for being deceitful throughout.[2] It is possible that he rationalized lying because, as he had claimed, he believed that the Congressional subpoena, which he had unlawfully ignored, had been politically motivated.  Because Clinton claimed to have been unaware of Epstein’s business (i.e., prostituting girls to the rich and/or famous) in spite of spending leisure time with the criminal and his accomplice, and because Clinton knowingly violated the law by ignoring a Congressional subpoena, a rational basis can be laid for leaning at the very least toward concluding that Clinton lied under oath about having committed statutory rape.

Clinton being asked whether he had had sexual relations with a child-prostitute ought to ring a bell for anyone who was following U.S. politics toward the end of Clinton’s time in the White House. Back in January, 2001, the media reported that in “an 11-hour deal to avoid criminal charges over his sex-and-lies fling with Monica Lewinsky, President Clinton . . . admitted ‘knowingly’ lying under oath.”[3] Clinton had to surrender his Arkansas law license and pay a $25,000 fine. Stating, “certain of my responses to questions about Ms. Lewinsky were false,” on his last day in office, Clinton was referring to his responses made under oath in a deposition to questions including, “Did you have sexual relations” with Lewinsky? His answer under oath was a perjurious “No.” Sound familiar? Why would anyone lend any credence to Clinton’s answer to the same question decades later in regard to a child-prostitute? Why would his answer be reported as though his earlier answer to the same question in regard to another woman were truthful?

I contend that a person who has admitted to having lied, under oath, in answering a question of having had inappropriate sexual relations (with an intern) and is asked the same exact question (regarding a child-prostitute) should at the very least be viewed as questionable in terms of whether his second answer can be believed to be true. At the very least, the media should have inserted a footnote to remind readers that Clinton had lied, “I did not have sexual relations with that woman,” in speaking to the American people about Lewinsky’s “oral” contact with Clinton in the Oval Office. To the extent that the American public’s reaction to reports of Clinton’s Congressional testimony in 2026 was muted rather than publicly raising the obvious point that especially on the matter of sexual relations, Clinton was not to be believed, the undue credit that is implied or inherent in holding (or having held) public office and having a mouthpiece in the established, “main-stream” media can be surmised and judged to be problematic in themselves.

Societal credibility enjoys a certain default that, even if dislodged once as in the case of Clinton, can exist without any real foundation based in the character of the office-holder celebrities.  This is not to say that if they are caught “red-handed,” such as U.S. President Nixon was, and members of Congress have been more commonly, societal credibility can be difficult to regain. My point is that the public tends to swallow too easily that which should at the very least be held as suspect in terms of veracity. That Clinton lied under oath and to the American people about having had sexual relations with Lewinsky in the 1990s should have registered on the media’s radar screen and in popular reaction to Clinton’s answer, again under oath, to the same question, to Congress in 2026. An old dog can indeed learn new tricks, but personal ethical development should not be assumed as if the proverbial dog had not done the old, sordid deed once already.

---

1. Leo Briceno, “WATCH: Bill Clinton Grilled on Shirtless Hot Tub Photo amid Swirling Questions on Epstein Relationship,” Foxnews.com, March 2, 2026.
2. Ibid (on the quoted material).
3. Marilyn Rauber, “Finally Admits He Lied under Oath: Dodges Criminal Charges with a Last-Minute Deal,” California Post, January 19, 2001.

The U.S. Supreme Court Reining in Regulatory Agencies: Implications for the Imperial Presidency

In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 28, 2024, a majority of the justices overruled Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, which had been the precedent giving regulatory agencies considerable discretion in coming up with specific regulations, given the penchant of the Congress to write vague laws. In the overturning case, a group of fishermen had objected to having to pay for government observers to board the fishing boats to monitor the fishing. On the merits, it does seem unfair for regulatory agencies to charge the regulated to be regulated. In overturning Chevron, however, Loper has much broader implications, chief among them being in terms of separation of powers—specifically in reining in the expanding power of the executive branch, here at the expense of the judiciary.   

Chevron had “required courts to give deference to federal agencies when creating regulations based on an ambiguous law.”[1] Loper could stimulate thought on whether Congress must necessarily promulgate law using vague language. Certainly Congress is capable of being quite specific when writing in loop-holes, or “carve outs,” for particular companies or industries in exchange for political campaign contributions. Moreover, from hearings, Congressional committee staff are surely capable of narrowing the discretionary area in which regulators can exercise considerable power that is essentially that of law-making. So one effect of Loper could be a shift of power from the executive to the legislative branch.

The decision also stood to “shift the balance of power between the executive and judicial branches.”[2] Although CNN goes on to claim that the decision “hands an important victory to conservatives who have sought for years to rein in the regulatory authority of the ‘administrative state’,” strengthening the role of the judiciary to look at administrative rulings is not in itself pro-business, as a judge could come down on an agency as being too lenient to an industry. The notion of regulatory capture, wherein whether from relying on data from a regulated industry or in exchange for lucrative future jobs in the industry for regulators, especially given government salary levels, means that giving courts more of a role in being able to evaluate and overrule agency rule-making and decisions could be a needed check against compromised regulators. At the same time, it is true that because the Supreme Court is the head of the judicial branch of the federal government, a decision that shifts power from one or two of the other branches to the judiciary puts the Court in an institutional conflict of interest (and the justices in personal conflicts of interest as their power would likely increase). Perhaps Congress should have been the branch to decide on the role of the judiciary with respect to the agencies in the executive branch.

Shifting power from the executive branch to the two other branches, especially the judiciary in this case, can also be viewed as a mild correction to the steadily increasing power of the U.S. presidency. In The Imperial Presidency, Arthur Schlesinger traces the increasing power that has come at the expense of the other two branches. The claim of such a correction may be problematic, as reining in regulatory agencies is not the same as reining in a president’s power, such as in exercising the bully pulpit in being able to speak directly to the American people directly as well as through a president’s surrogates. Also, a president as commander in chief and in promulgating foreign policy is unaffected.

It can even be argued that as presidents have typically been oriented to proposing broad policies for Congress to enact through law, that a president’s attention has been minimal in running the administrative agencies—essentially in supervising the cabinet secretaries in their administrative roles at their respective agencies. Such overseeing geared to specific regulations is, I submit, a function that presidents should attend to even more than proposing policies for Congress to enact. In other words, presidents should resist the sensationalistic allure of forming and publicly and privately “selling” policies or ideas for new programs to the extent that the time and effort of a president is monopolized thereby such that functioning as head of the executive branch, which implements law, is slighted. It could even be argued that the latter function should be primary. Were it in fact primary, then Loper would indeed be capable of redressing the historical trend of the imperial presidency to some extent because taking an active role at the regulatory stage would be a significant part of the actual power exercised by presidents. As of 2024 at least, Loper did not really touch the problem of the imperial presidency increasingly compromising the balance of power between the three branches of the U.S.’s federal government.

If democracy is ever at risk in the U.S., it would likely succumb to the hubris of an imperial president rather than to lawmakers in Congress writing laws with more specificity or judges overruling regulatory rulings. According to General Haig, President Nixon considered sending military forces to the Capitol to stave off impeachment during Watergate. Decades later, in December, 2023, protestors of the Congressional counting of the presidential votes of the states’ electoral colleges headed over to the Capitol from President Trump’s rally at the White House and successfully delayed the counting. On the very same day as its Loper decision, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a ruling on another case—a decision that “limited the power of prosecutors to pursue obstruction charges” against the January 6^th protesters at the Capitol.[3] To the extent that that ruling could enhance the imperial presidency itself, June 28, 2024 at the Court may actually have been a net-gain for the presidency.

---

1. John Fritze, “Supreme Court Overturns 1984 Chevron Precedent, Curbing Power of Federal Government,” CNN.com, June 28, 2024 (accessed June 29, 2024).
2. Ibid.
3. John Fritze et al, “Takeaways from the Supreme Court’s Decision on January 6 Charges and What It Means for Donald Trump,” CNN.com, June 28, 2024 (accessed June 29, 2024).

.U.S. Constitutional Checks and Balances Under Threat: Congressional Oversight

Ambition checked by ambition. The assumption that political ambition can be counted on is the key to the “checks and balances” feature of the U.S. Constitution. Each of the three “arms,” or “branches,” of the federal government is checked by at least one other. This is not to say that the other arm takes over the function or even has greater competence; rather, the other arm is oriented here to providing accountability on abuses of power and investigating cases of gross negligence or incompetence. An offended branch should thus not be permitted to claim that oversight is not appropriate because it interferes with the function the branch. Treating oversight by another arm of the federal government as inherently partisan or illegitimate eviscerates the vital “check and balance” aspect of the U.S. Constitution. 

In disputes on oversight between two branches, the benefit of the doubt ought to go with the overseeing branch because it is only natural for human beings to resist being held accountable and so accountability itself needs a boost. I have in mind the case the director of national intelligence, Joe Maguire, blocking the inspector general from sharing an intelligence-whistle-blower’s complaint with Congress in September, 2019.

The contents of the complaint included a phone call between President Trump and another national leader in which Trump made a commitment. Ukraine was relevant. Rep. Adam Schiff, chair of the House Intelligence Committee, had been concerned that Trump’s delay in assistance to Ukraine had been politically motivated. The Democrats had planned to investigate whether Trump’s withholding of military assistance was not to get the Ukrainian government to reduce corruption, but, instead “to coerce the Ukrainian government into pursuing politically motivated investigations” into Joseph Biden, President Obama’s former VP and a contender to run against Trump in 2020 for president.[1]

Providing the U.S. House Intelligence committee with the contents of whistleblower complaint was “generally required by law.”[2] The executive branch insisted that the requirement must involve the funding, administration or operations of an intelligence agency, whereas Democrats maintained that the law did indeed apply. Regardless, Congressional oversight of the executive branch goes beyond particular statutes mandating the providing of whistle-blower complaint information to Congress. Nevertheless, the inspector general, Michael Atkinson, wrote to the committee that the complaint fell within the jurisdiction of the director of national intelligence and “relates to one of the most significant and important of the D.N.I.’s responsibilities to the American people.”[3] Atkinson was conflating a jurisdiction within the executive branch with oversight by another branch of the government. Put another way, oversight does not in itself rid the director of his jurisdiction; rather, oversight investigates the contents within that jurisdiction. Furthermore, that the director of national intelligence has an important job does not mean that it is immune Congressional oversight of the executive arm. I submit that the importance of the job is an argument for a greater need for oversight—not less.

It is as if Atkinson believed that the intelligence agencies were immune from such oversight, and thus from the vital checks-and-balance feature of the U.S. Constitution. For oversight to be viable, the branch of the government being overseen cannot decide whether oversight is allowable. Rather, the branch doing the overseeing can make that assessment and the other branch can contest it in the courts. The judiciary arm would serve as a check against the overseeing arm. In other words, the prerogative in the executive branch of somehow being beyond Congressional oversight stands in the way of the functioning of the checks-and-balances constitutional design. Ambition should not be allowed to bar contending ambition. What employee of a company would claim, “I can’t do my job if there is any supervision of my work!”? What department would claim that it is exempt from oversight from the company’s management because of the nature of the work being performed? Rather than cohere, such a company would eventually break apart.

---

1. Julian E. Barnes et al, “Whistle-Blower Complaint Sets Off a Battle Involving Trump,” The New York Times, September 19, 2019.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

U.S. Attorney General Barr's Decision on the Mueller Investigation of President Trump: On the Invisible Personal and Institutional Conflicts of Interest

On March 24, 2019, U.S. Attorney General William Barr sent to Congress his summary of Robert Mueller's report on whether President Donald Trump's 2016 campaign had colluded with the Russian government and whether the president had obstructed justice. According to Barr, Mueller had found no evidence of collusion. As for obstruction, Barr wrote that Mueller "did not draw a conclusion one way or the other as to whether the examined conduct constituted obstruction."[1] On this point, Mueller himself had written that 'while this report does not conclude that the president committed a crime, [the report] also does not exonerate him."[2] Mueller had laid out evidence and arguments on both sides of the question of obstruction, and Barr determined that the "evidence fell short of proving [that the president] illegally obstructed the Russia inquiry."[3] The New York Times went on to call this "an extra-ordinary outcome."[4] 
Barr did not detail his reasoning in deciding the matter of obstruction. According to the New York Times, he "appeared to be focusing on the question of whether investigators could prove that [President Trump] had 'corrupt intent' in instances where the available evidence about his motivations was ambiguous."[5] But in focusing on a lack of evidence that the Trump campaign reached any agreement with the Russian government on sabotaging the election, legal experts said," Barr "left out other reasons the president may have had for wanting to stymie a wide ranging investigation: It could uncover other crimes and embarrassing facts."[6] In other words, Barr's parameters may have been too narrow. 
The way Barr framed the contours for his decision might not have been an accident, given his personal conflict of interest. More important than this, I submit, is the continuing institutional conflict of interest facing the Justice Department in investigating its boss, the chief executive. After Congress had received Barr's summary, U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham pointed on Fox News to former Attorney General Jeff Session's personal conflict of interest (Sessions had been part of Trump's campaign that was being accused of collusion with the Russians). Unfortunately, the senator mentioned neither Barr's personal conflict of interest or the broader institutional one facing the Justice Department. Such denial may have been partisan in nature, but I contend that institutional conflicts of interest tend to get a pass in American society. In the case of the Mueller investigation, Americans as a people put the conflicts of interest aside in looking forward to the conclusions from within the Department of Justice. This point, I submit, ought to be viewed as extraordinary. I turn now to the conflicts of interest.
According to The New York Times, when Barr "stepped in to make the determination," he brought "the specter of politics back into the case."[7] I submit that any Attorney General would, and I submit should trigger partisan suspicions in making a determination on a matter in which the chief executive (i.e., the president) is being investigated. 
As for the personal conflict of interest, even though Barr "had taken over the Justice Department [just a month earlier] pledging to defend its independence," he "ended up clearing a president who [had installed] him in the post."[8] This is significant not just because President Trump had been emphasizing loyalty (and dismissing the disloyal) from his subordinates in the executive branch; any pledge of independence represented a personal conflict of interest for Barr and an institutional conflict of interest for the Justice Department, as neither were legally independent of the chief executive, the boss. 
In fact, President Trump's choice of Barr was likely tied to the Mueller investigation. Barr had written a memo as a private citizen to Justice Department officials in June, 2018 insisting that special council Mueller's obstruction inquiry was "fatally misconceived." [9] A president's use of executive powers are beyond the reach of criminal law, regardless of the motive.[10] Such uses include firing a subordinate and directing the Justice Department to close a case. It is just human nature to be motivated to direct the department to close a case against the person himself. Even so, Barr argued that "Trump asking then-FBI Director James Comey to let go of the investigation into former national security advisor Michael Flynn and later firing Comey [were] within [the president's] powers as head of the executive branch." and thus not subject to being investigated, according to Trump's Attorney General before he was nominated.[11]
That Barr's memo would have gone unnoticed in the Trump administration and especially in President Trump's subsequent decision to nominate Barr for Attorney General is too incredulous to be taken seriously. In appointing Barr, the president was essentially securing his rightful control of the branch under him. This point alone gives us an indication of the gravity of the institutional (and constitutional) conflict of interest in the Justice Department investigating its boss, the president--the chief executive, which includes chief law enforcer. 
It stands to reason that none of the departments under the chief enforcer can enforce the law on the chief. I contend that President Trump was exploiting this conflict of interest to give the public the appearance of a credible investigation having been done with the president coming out clean. This appearance, if taken seriously, ignores the underlying conflict of interest that should be recognized as blatant. 
The Justice Department cannot investigate its boss, the president, without risking the extortion of the institutional (and perhaps personal) conflict of interest. That is, the executive branch investigating its boss constitutes a conflict of interest that essentially eliminates that branch as being able to perform such an investigation, at least in terms of credibility. Unfortunately, the American people ignored or dismissed the conflict of interest by relying so much on Mueller's report and Barr's subsequent determination. 

To be sure, Congressional oversight exists when another party controls the U.S. House or Senate (or both), but this renders the judgment subject to political forces, or at least as being viewed as partisan. Facing the conflict of interest within the Justice Department and the political oversight of the U.S. House, Mueller may have chosen the latter anyway, laying out whatever evidence he had for and against obstruction. He doubtlessly knew of Barr's memo, which likely reflected the attitude at the top of the department towards the investigation of any obstruction of justice. 
In general, the American people have risked a corrupting government structure in being so naive about institutional conflicts of interest within the U.S. Government. Simply put, corruptible conflicts should be deconstructed. For example, an alternative to department in the executive branch should be created or chosen when the chief executive is the subject of the investigation. Congressional oversight could be used if another party than the president's controls at least one chamber. An alternative would need to be created should Congress lack the political will to launch an oversight investigation. That this has not been done says something unfortunate about how Americans view even constitutional conflicts of interest.   

See Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon.

1. Eli Watkins, "Barr Authored Memo Last Year Ruling Out Obstruction of Justice," CNN.com, March 24, 22019.
2.Mark Mazzetti and Carol Benner, "Mueller Finds No Trump-Russia Conspiracy but Stops Short of Exonerating President on Obstruction," The New York Times, March 24, 2019.
3. Charlie Savage, Mark Mazzetti, and Katie Benner, "Barr's Move Ignites a Debate: Is He Impartial?" The New York Times, March 26, 2019.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9.Watkins, "Barr Authored Memo."
10.Savage, Mazzetti, and Benner, "Barr's Move Ignites a Debate."
11.Watkins, "Barr Authored Memo."