With the European Council,
which represents the E.U. states, having passed the Mercosur free-trade treaty
by qualified-majority voting, the legislation went on to the European Parliament,
which represents E.U. citizens, to vote on final passage before being sent to E.U.
President Von der Leyen for her signature. From the standpoint of this standard
legislative procedure, it is significant that immediately following the vote in
the Council, which is roughly equivalent to the U.S. Senate, efforts were being
made to essentially side-step the Parliament, which is equivalent to the U.S.
House of Representatives. Von der Leyen’s plan to sign the treaty once it passed
in the Council reflects both the disproportionate power of the state
governments at the federal level in the E.U. and the fact that the U.S. House
is excluded from voting on treaties, whereas the U.S. Senate votes to give its
consent to them before the U.S. president ratifies them (or not).
On 9 January, 2026, the
European Council voted by a super majority representing 65% of the E.U.’s
population and 55% of its states to approve the Mercosur free-trade treaty with
four countries in South America. President Von der Leyen had completed the
negotiations on the treaty two years earlier so E.U. companies could “gain
access to a market of 280 million consumers . . . where some 30,000 E.U. firms”
were already operating.[1]
A massive free-trade area with a combined population of 700 million inhabitants
would dwarf NAFTA (the North America Free Trade Agreement). It is no wonder that
on the heels of the Council’s vote, President Von der Leyen wrote in an
official statement, “I greatly look forward to signing this landmark deal . . .”[2]
Not so fast. The approval procedure “also requires the consent of the European
Parliament.”[3] In
the Parliament, a contingent of the Renew party saw an opportunity to scuttle
the proposed treaty because of the fears of European farmers, mostly in
the state of France, that free trade in agriculture could harm the E.U.’s farmers
financially if enough European consumers buy agricultural products from the Mercosur
countries rather than domestically.
Admittedly, getting the consent
of the Council by even just by qualified-majority voting had been viewed as the
challenge. A contingent of the Renew party could presumably be easily outvoted
in the Parliament. Nevertheless, the focus on the Council is in line with the
inordinate power wielded by the states at the federal level in the European
Council and the Council of Ministers. Put another way, being slighted doubtlessly
came as no surprise to the representatives in the Parliament. The chamber of
the people had typically played second fiddle to the chamber of the states.
Even in the U.S., where the
two federal legislative chambers have been viewed as equals since their
founding, the U.S. House of Representatives is excluded from the procedure in
which treaties proposed by the federal president are sent to the U.S. Senate
for advice and to be confirmed (or rejected). If confirmed, the president can
either ratify or refuse to do so. Such ratification is required for a treaty to
go into effect. The U.S. House of Representatives is excluded.
Resonating with the exclusion
of the U.S. House, the E.U. state chairing the Council at the time “used a
legal procedure” just after the vote “to enable the provisional implementation
of the agreement without a parliamentary vote.”[4]
Although the Parliament’s upcoming vote could derail the treaty, the
provisional implementation would make it more difficult for representatives to
vote against the treaty because it would already be underway. Even if President
Von der Leyen would sign the treaty before the Parliament’s vote, the treaty
would be rendered invalid, but in setting up a fait accompli, the
Commission and the Council were making use of momentum such that voting against
the treaty would be more difficult. Furthermore, that the U.S. House is excluded
from the legislative consent and ratification of U.S. treaties implicitly
implies that maybe the European Parliament, which also represents citizens
rather than states, should not be involved in the passage of E.U. treaties with
other countries. In federal unions in which governmental sovereignty is
divided, regardless of the proportions, the legislative chamber in which the
semi-sovereign states are represented can be argued to be more important in
international treaties precisely because of the sovereignty still reserved by
the states in their political union should have a say, even if by qualified
majority voting (in the E.U. Council) or a two-thirds majority (in the U.S.
Senate). Put another way, both of these
bars, being higher than a simple majority, reflect the fact that the states in
the E.U. and U.S. are semi-sovereign.
In tension with the argument
that the E.U. Parliament and the U.S. House should also be included so the
respective federal citizens could also have a say, the states might object that
a defeat in either of those chambers would nullify what the semi-sovereign state
governments have agreed to, and that such sovereignty, together with the limited
sovereignty of the respective unions, should not be denied domestically with
respect to relations with other countries. The tension here reveals a judgment
call, which is of such a magnitude and indeterminacy to be properly determined by
popular sovereignty—that which is reserved to the people themselves as an
electorate. Moreover, this comparison of the E.U. and U.S. works so well that
the equivalency of the two unions, even with the very different proportions of
governmental sovereignty delegated by basic law to the federal level, can be easily
grasped even by Euroskeptics and anti-federalists.
2, "Statement by President Von der Leyen on the Council's Decision to Endorse the EU-Mercossur Trade Agreement," The European Comission, 8 January, 2026.
3. Peggy Corlin, “E.U. Member States Back Mercosur Deal, French MEPs Vow Fight in Parliament,” Euronews.com, 9 January, 2026.
4. Ibid.
