Two Sizes Fit All: America’s Two-Party-System Stranglehold

A Rasmussen Reports poll conducted in early August 2011 found that “just 17% of likely U.S. voters think that the federal government . . . has the consent of the governed,” while 69% “believe that the government does not have that consent.”[1] Yet an overwhelming number of Congressional incumbents is reelected. Is it that many Americans stay away from the polls on election day, or does the two-party system essentially force a choice? Voting for a third-party candidate risks the defeat of the candidate of the major party closest to one’s views. Such a vote is typically referred to as a protest or throw-away vote. Is it worth driving to the polls to do that?
A poll of 1,000 Americans conducted by Douglas E. Schoen LLC in April 2011 found that a solid majority of Americans were looking for alternatives to the two-party system. A majority of the respondents (57%) said there is a need for a third party. Nearly one-third of the respondents said that having a third party is very important. In the next month, 52% of respondents in a Gallup poll said there is a need for a third party. For the first time in Gallup’s history, a majority of Republicans said so. These readings point to more than simply a desire to vote against the closest major party without merely being a protest or throw-away vote.
Even as Republican and Democratic candidates were at the time in tune with their respective bases, these two segments of the population were becoming two legs of a three-leg stool, rather than remaining as the two defining pillars holding up the American republics. In fact, with the number of independents growing, the two bases combined no longer made up a majority of the citizens able to vote.
To be sure, the electoral systems of the American states and the federation itself have been rigged against  aspiring third parties. For example, a Green Party presence in the U.S. House of Representatives would require one of that party’s candidates to snag the highest percentage of the vote in one of the 435 legislative districts. Were fifteen percent of Floridians vote for Green Party candidates in every House district, Florida's delegation would still not include any Green Party presence. In terms of the Electoral College, many of the states have a winner-take-all system in selecting electors. Furthermore, a third-party candidate doing well in electoral votes could keep none of the candidates from getting a majority, in which case the U.S. House of Representatives would elect the U.S. President (each state delegation getting one vote). A third party would have to be dominant in that chamber, or at least in a few of the state delegations, to have any impact. The proverbial deck, ladies and gentlemen, is stacked against any third party, so merely getting one started is not apt to eventuate in much of anything, practically speaking. For fundamental reform, one must think (and act) structurally, and Americans are not very good at that, being more issue- and candidate-oriented.

The real elephant in the room is the fact that the two animals are the only ones allowed in the room. Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

If the American political order has indeed been deteriorating and disintegrating, its artificial and self-perpetuating parchment walls might be too rigid to allow the vacuum to be filled by anything less than whatever would naturally fill the power-void in a complete collapse. The two major political parties, jealously guarding their joint structural advantages, have doubtlessly been all too vigilant in buttressing the very walls that keep real reform—real change—from happening at the expense of the vested interests. As a result, the electorate may be convinced that it is not possible to venture outside of the political realities of the two major parties that stultify movement. If a majority of Americans want a third party, they would have to apply popular political pressure to the two major parties themselves to level the playing field. A huge mass of dispersed political energy would be necessary, however, given the tyranny of the status quo. Indeed, such a feat might require going against the natural laws of power in human affairs. If so, the already-hardened arteries will eventually result to the death of the "perpetual union." Sadly, the determinism is utterly contrived rather than set by the fates.

1. Patrick H. Caddell and Douglas E. Schoen, “Expect a Third-Party Candidate in 2012,” Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2011.

When Partisanship Takes on Science on Global Warming: The Part before the Whole

Thomas Jefferson and John Adams concurred on the following preference—namely, a natural aristocracy of virtue and talent over the artificial sort of birth and wealth. Talent here is not merely skill, but also knowledge. Hence the two former U.S. presidents agreed that citizens ought to be given a broad basic education in free schools. The corollary is that as a citizenry lapses in virtue and knowledge, decadence will show up in public discourse and consequently public policy. If kept unchecked, the tendency is for the republic to fall.
Therefore, as governor of Virginia, Jefferson proposed a Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge in 1779. His rationale was that because even “those entrusted with power” who seek to protect individual rights can become tyrants, popular education is necessary to render a republic secure. Jefferson’s hope was that by teaching “the people at large” examples of despots in history, the electorate would be more likely to recognize despots in their own time and throw the bastards out on their noses. As for those whom voters put in public offices, Jefferson believed that “laws will be wisely formed, and honestly administered, in proportion as those who form and administer them are wise and honest.” Hence, “those persons, whom nature hath endowed with genius and virtue, should be rendered by liberal education worthy to receive, and able to guard the sacred deposit of the rights of their fellow citizens.” This is why, beginning at around 1900, law schools in the American states began to admit applicants to the undergraduate degree in law (LL.B. or J.D.) who had already earned an undergraduate degree in the liberal arts and sciences. It was not as though the undergraduate degree in law had been promoted to graduate status.
Having had largely self-governing, popularly-elected colonial legislatures for much of the seventeenth century, the nascent American republics would stand on the two pillars of virtue and talent (including knowledge) instilled in the self-governing peoples themselves as well as their elected and appointed public officials. It is said that the only constant is change, as in the extent to which an electorate is virtuous and generally knowledgeable, as well as in the related rise and fall of republics. One notable example is ancient Rome, which went from being a republic to a dictatorship under the purported exigencies of war. Lest the rise and fall of republics seems a bit too dramatic to be considered realistic, I offer the more modest thesis that a decline in virtue and knowledge among an electorate renders the public policy increasingly deficient in dealing with contemporary problems. The matter of climate change is a case in point.

According to a study at Yale in April 2013, Americans’ conviction that global warming was happening had dropped by seven percentage-points over the preceding six months to 63 percent. The unusually cold March—quite a reversal from the previous March—explains the drop, according to the poll’s authors. The cold may actually have resulted from a loosening in the artic jet-stream southward—like a rubber-band whose elasticity has been compromised—due to more open water in the arctic ocean and thus less temperature differential in the air. Even so, only 49% of Americans believed that human activities were contributing to global warming. In fact, only 42% of Americans believed at the time that most scientists had concluded that global warming is really happening. Thirty-three percent of Americans were convinced that “widespread disagreement” exists among scientists.
In actuality, a study showed of more than 4,000 articles touching on human-sourced climate change, 97% of the scientists having written the articles conclude that human-caused change was already happening. Less than 3% either rejected the notion or remained undecided. “There is a gaping chasm between the actual consensus and the public perception,” one of the study’s authors remarked. “It’s staggering given the evidence for consensus that less than half of the general public think scientists agree that humans are causing global warming. This is significant,” the author concludes, “because when people understand that scientists agree on global warming, they’re more likely to support policies that take action on it.” Going back to Jefferson and Adams, ignorance among the electorate in a republic can be sufficient to divert enough political will that legislation needed to fix a societal (or global) problem is sufficiently thwarted.
Perhaps some of the apparent ignorance on global warming in 2013 could actually have been partisan angst. If President Obama favored policies predicated on the assumption that human-sourced global warming was then already underway, just his support alone could have been enough for some Republicans to hold firm in their denial of even other-sourced global warming. In holding knowledge hostage to score cheap partisan points, citizens and their representatives do not demonstrate much respect for knowledge as well as virtue; the vice of partisanship subdues the good of the whole in preference for the good of a part.
If Jefferson and Adams were correct that a virtuous and knowledgeable citizenry is vital to the continuance of a republic, the extent of ignorance and partisan vice related to global warming in spite of the nearly unanimous scientific conclusion and the huge stakes involved may suggest that the American republics and the grand republic of the Union may be on borrowed time (and money). Moreover, that the ignorance and vice pertains to global warming enlarges the implications to include the continuance of the species. That is to say, a virtuous and educated species may be necessary for its very survival.

See this PSA on global warming: http://www.thewordenreport.blogspot.com/2013/05/global-warming-psa.html


Academic Sources:

Philip Costopoulos, “Jefferson, Adams, and the Natural Aristocracy,” First Things, May 1990.

Yale Project on Climate Change Communication, “Americans’ Global Warming Beliefs and Attitudes in April 2013,” Yale School of Forestry and Environomental Studies, 2013.

John Cook, Dana Nuccitelli, Mark Richardson, et al, “Quantifying the Consensus on Ahthropogenic global warming in the scientific literature,” Environmental Research Letters, 8 (2013) (2), pp.

Press Source:

Tom Zeller, “Scientists Agree (Again): Climate Change Is Happening,” The Huffington Post, May 16, 2013.

Does a Supermajority Undercut Constitutionalism?

How “extreme” can a legislative supermajority get in its legislation? Can constitutional safeguards act as a check where a legislative supermajority can enact amendments at will? A judiciary protecting the rights of individuals as well as a people against over-reaches by a government is limited by constitutional provisions presumably set in stone yet actually in erasable parchment. Complicating an answer, the term extreme may be applied to a piece of legislation by one person and refused by another. I come from a medium-sized city in the Midwest, where extreme has been thought to apply to commuting to work by bicycle. Where a pathological fear of change grips a town, you don’t have to go far to find someone proscribing something or other as too extreme At the level of the U.S. governmental institutions, one political party might deem universal health insurance through extant private insurance companies as extreme—tantamount to demonic European socialism—while another party might view continuing to use private insurance companies as merely reformist rather than extreme. A supermajority can take advantage of such a difference in descriptive judgments to argue that a significant constitutional change is actually a minor change and thus not worth worrying about. 

It follows that it is extremely difficult to determine whether a supermajority has gone too far in legislating its will through a government. Concluding the resultant legislation is too extreme, given the legitimacy that comes with the democratic process, is subject to critique and repudiation. What limits exist on a supermajority’s legislative prerogative? What limits should exist? Should any exist?

In the E.U., states have certain planks in their basic law that cannot be changed by amendment. This represents a limit on what a supermajority can do. The American states have no such permanent basic law; any part of a constitution can be changed through amendment. Of course, both the E.U. and U.S. contain limitations on what can be in a state constitution. For instance, an E.U. state cannot add a plank to its constitution nullifying all E.U. laws while remaining a member of the union. South Carolina tried such a move in 1830 only to be rebuffed by Andrew Jackson in the White House. So being in a political union can act as a limit on a supermajority in a state legislature. In the E.U., states have certain planks in their basic law that cannot be changed by amendment. This represents a limit on what a supermajority can do. The American states have no such permanent basic law; any part of a constitution can be changed through amendment. Of course, both the E.U. and U.S. contain limitations on what can be in a state constitution. For instance, an E.U. state cannot add a plank to its constitution nullifying all E.U. laws while remaining a member of the union. South Carolina tried such a move in 1830 only to be rebuffed by Andrew Jackson in the White House. So being in a political union can act as a limit on a supermajority in a state legislature.

Additionally, having to satisfy other parties in the governing coalition in a parliament can act as a constraint on any one party getting too extreme. Furthermore, having a bicameral (i.e., two chamber) legislature can permit divided government. Two-party systems tend to rely on this constraint. When a supermajority controls both chambers and the executive’s veto pen, the courts become the final constraint other than possibly the next election. In the American context after the 2010 election, Republicans had a supermajority controlling the legislatures and chief executives in several of the republics. The question of limits moved to the fore.

For example, the Republican Party enjoyed a supermajority of 124 to 41 in the Kansas legislature—plus control of the executive branch. Rather than contending coalitions checking each other within the party, a conservative bloc guaranteed a united supermajority. As a result, a series of anti-abortion bills were quickly made law. Enter the federal court in the summer of 2011. The judges imposed injunctions preventing two of the new laws from taking effect pending the outcome of suits against them. The New York Times observes that “in a year in which expanded Republican majorities in many states have been able to operate without the usual obstacles presented by divided government—threat of veto from a governor, split chambers or even minority opposition large enough to force compromise—these court challenges amount to the first real efforts to slow the crush of conservative legislation.” The paper goes on to note that such efforts are no guarantee that the crush would necessarily be lessened.

In Wisconsin, the republican legislative and executive branches pushed through limits on collective bargaining of government employees, including teachers. The Wisconsin Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the legitimacy of the law. One might say that the Republican Party had an insurmountable majority in all three branches of government. Where this is the case, one might wonder how—in James Madison’s language—the minority can be protected from the tyranny of a majority. The judiciary has the role of protecting individual rights against a government, but that branch can effectively be controlled by the same party that holds the supermajority. Also, were the judiciary is at the union level, the effect can be one of political consolidation, which creates pressures particularly when the union is on the empire scale (e.g., U.S. and E.U.). This must be weighed against the power of local elites in the judiciaries of the states. The abortion cases in Kansas demonstrate how the rights of individuals can hang in the balance (i.e., not just of minority political parties).

Lest divided government be lauded as the answer, however, one might recall that gridlock can bring inaction more than compromise when different parties control the legislative chambers (and/or executive branch). An intractable problem, such as having over $14 trillion in government debt (the U.S.), may require significant governmental action that can be stymied by stubborn gridlock. The cost of partisanship was evident in July 2011 as Congress’s “handling” of the debt-ceiling resulted in a AA rating from AAA by Standard & Poors and a public approval rating of only about 20 percent.

Moreover, a patchwork of laws, each based on particular compromises made by the contending parties, may enervate the economic or political system itself. So rather than preventing one party from being able to enact its program by relying on divided government, Americans might want to consider structural limitations that are not triggered before any legislation is passed. Making the judiciary less partisan by how judges are selected might be a step in this direction. Also, making it easier for more than two political parties to be represented in a two-party-system legislature might temper the impact of any one party’s ideology from carrying the system too far—too extreme—in one direction. Such constraints are better than the alternative of gridlock paralysis, particularly at the state level—given the extent of political consolidation in the U.S.

Divided government can be less relied on at the state level that at the federal level. This differential alone would structurally “push” more domestic government back closer to the people and accommodate the innate cultural differences that exist across a continent and beyond. Oklahoma is not Vermont (even if most Europeans tend to mesh them vaguely as “American”). Systemic thinking, such as is evinced in allowing—by structural design—for divided government more in Washington than in Austin, is urgently needed in America. Even so, Americans are more oriented to going from issue to issue—even while observing that the system is somehow fundamentally broken—than looking at the system itself and proffering and voting on systemic proposals apart from any particular partisan issue.

Source:

A.G. Sulzberger, “Courts Put the Brakes on Agenda of G.O.P.”, New York Times, September 6, 2011. 

De-Funding Obamacare

It is odd that even after a bill becomes a law, it can be defunded, thereby effectively killing it even though it has not been voted down.  One would think that it would be required to pass the funding that is required by the law. The Republican Party has strategized on how to deconstruct Obama’s health-insurance law through various means.

Republicans could turn to the annual appropriations and budget process or push stand-alone bills to delay or stop funding for provisions of the law they dislike, including the individual mandate, the health insurance exchanges and the Medicaid expansion. They might also work to weaken provisions in the bill that deal with Medicare physician reporting requirements that some physicians find onerous and block the creation of a nonprofit research institute to examine the effectiveness of various medical treatments. Mandatory funding, which comprises much of the health measure that began in 2014, will continue unless Republicans can change current law. Discretionary funding must be approved each year but differences between House and Senate versions of appropriations measures must be ironed out and that generally produces a compromise package. Why all of the law’s funding would not be mandatory as part of the law defies logic and government functioning. Also, how the mandatory funding could comprise much of the law when the individual mandate, the exchanges, and the medicaid expansion can be defunded, is also beyond me.

A major problem with the defunding strategy is that since so much of the bill is inter-related, trying to dismantle it piecemeal could lead to unintended consequences. While the individual mandate is unpopular, “you can’t pull it out of the law without all sorts of other elements falling apart,” Reischauer says. And scrapping the mandate, which requires most people to have coverage or pay a penalty, would anger health insurers — a core GOP constituency. Insurers have agreed to abide by new consumer protections, such as not denying coverage based on a pre-existing medical condition, in exchange for 32 million new customers. Hospitals agreed to payment cuts on the premise that more people would have health care and hospitals would have less uncompensated care. In other words, because the health insurance industry got basically what it wanted—the mandate without a public option—it would be highly unlikely that certain parts of the law would be defunded unless it were in the interest of the health insurance companies.  Therefore, the mandate is not apt to be defunded unless the rest of the law is to go down too.

I contend that law should not be allowed to be defunded. That is, upon passage, the law should have its required funding established as a matter of law.  Secondly, I contend that private companies with a vested interest in a law should not be allowed to have such power that they can tailor the law to their liking. Extant industries have too much power in the US Government.  As a reflection of this condition, we over-rely on private companies and the market—ignoring their downsides. Where basic necessities such as access to basic health-care is concerned, our over-reliance can be fatal.

Source: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39295110/ns/health-health_care/

Corporate Money in Politics: Undue Influence and Conflicts of Interest

Indications of “the pervasive influence of corporate cash in the democratic process, and the extraordinary lengths to which politicians, lobbyists and even judges go to solicit money” can be seen in sealed but leaked court documents in Wisconsin.[1] This glimpse in to the real money-game in business and government shows just how much corporate money is in play. “The files open a window on a world that is very rarely glimpsed by the public, in which millions of dollars are secretly donated by major corporations and super-wealthy individuals to third-party groups in an attempt to sway elections.”[2] In addition, the files show just how easy it is for public officials to deny having been subject to conflicts of interest. The combination of a lot of money and the ability to get away with exploiting a conflict of interest is toxic to a viable representative democracy (i.e., a republic).

The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

U.S. House Majority Leader Cantor’s Election Loss: On the Corporate Connection

It is not every day that the majority leader in the U.S. House of Representatives loses—and badly at that—to a primary challenger in an intra-party contest. In the wake of Jim Cantor’s defeat in June, 2014, journalists wasted no time in reducing the defeat to one issue: immigration. Such a reductionist ex-post facto divination of voter intent—as if an electorate were one monolithic mind writ large—is fraught with difficulties. Beyond the sheer artifice, such an interpretation offers an easy cover for less convenient, subterranean political shifts underway and expressed in the vote.

Leaping to the immigration rationale whereby arch-conservative, or “Tea-Party” Republican voters punished Cantor for having been willing to work with Democrats on a compromise involving amnesty in some form, Ali Noorani of an immigration lobbyist group opined that the primary’s result would make it tougher to get a bill through the U.S. House in the current session.[1] Frank Sharry of America’s Voice, “said Cantor’s loss blows up a last-minute attempt by Republicans to organize support for an immigration bill.”[2] No doubt both Noorani and Sharry were going off media reports as early as election night that immigration reform had brought the majority leader down.

To be sure, more elaborate analyses, such as one by The Washington Post, broadened the explanation to include Cantor’s votes in general and his lack of attention to his district.[3] Preoccupied with gaining power over his colleagues by raising money, Cantor missed the warning signs, and this alone could have annoyed Republican voters back home. Additionally, as put by Jamie Radtke, co-founder of the Virginia Tea Party, Cantor had “made an enemy of his friends.”[4] Put another way, pundits wanting to extrapolate the primary results onto the national stage may be overlooking the idiosyncratic elements that do not generalize or go forward.

For all the points needlessly cut off by the reductionism to immigration or even Cantor’s willingness to compromise with Democrats, the most important received scarcely any media coverage. Specifically, interviews with some voters suggest that Cantor lost in part because he had done the bidding of big business at the expense of the small businesses in Richmond. Stung by bailouts without strings to the large Wall Street banks that had dangerously over-leveraged themselves on risky mortgage-backed securities and a dearth of prosecutions on fraud, Republican voters could not have missed the apparent collusion between corporate and campaign coffers; Cantor had raised nearly $5.5 million to have a 27-to-1 financial advantage over his challenger.[5] As astonishing as Dave Brat’s win is, given this financial disparity, the real lesson from the primary may be that elected officials willing to cut the financial strings to corporate America may actually do better at home because the positions and votes would be more closely tailored to the constituents.

Put another way, voters may be hungry for political courage that shakes the conventional “wisdom.” Teddy Roosevelt must have discovered as much when he went after the mighty trusts like Standard Oil in the early twentieth century, and Andrew Jackson nearly a century earlier when he refused to fund the Second Bank of the United States for fear of encroaching federal power. This is a message that the powers that be in 2014 doubtless would not want getting out, and the media dutifully complied with the subterfuge of immigration reform being in all probability dead for the time being.

---

[1] Alan Gomez, “Immigration Bill Looks Doubtful,” USA Today, June 12, 2014.

[2] Ibid.

[3] David Fahrenthold, Rosalind Helderman, and Jenna Portnoy, “What Went Wrong for Eric Cantor?” The Washington Post, June 12, 2014.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Susan Davis And Catalina Camia, “Contests Loom for Top GOP Posts,” USA Today, June 12, 2014.

Obama Caved to the Agribusiness Lobby

Faced with political pressure from Republicans and farming groups, the White House decided in April 2012 not to go ahead with rules that would have prevented children from “operating heavy machinery, handling tobacco crops, working in grain silos or performing other jobs considered potentially dangerous.”[1] The Labor Department issued a statement indicating it was withdrawing the rules due to concern from the public over how they could affect family farms. “The Obama administration is firmly committed to promoting family farmers and respecting the rural way of life, especially the role that parents and other family members play in passing those traditions down through the generations,” the department announced.[2] I contend that this rationale was a ruse intended to cover up the true source of the political pressure. Family farms were actually exempted from the proposed rules.

"Although family farms were actually exempted from the proposed rules, many opponents cast them as an assault on family farms and rural traditions, saying the White House wanted to keep children from doing even small chores. In fact, the rules would only have affected minors who were formally employed and on farm payrolls.”[3] To get at why Republicans would have stressed the family farm ruse, it is necessary to go to the funding—for motivation tends to follow it.

From 1996 through at least 2012, agribusiness has given much more to Republicans than to Democrats.[4] The disproportionate giving gave Republican lawmakers a financial (and political) incentive to protect agricultural corporations from regulations they do not want. Because the family farm has a much better reputation in society, it makes political sense that Republicans (and even the farm groups) would claim to be protecting the family farm when the real intent is to keep agribusiness free of unwanted regulations. What is surprising is not the subterfuge; rather, the surprise lies with the Democrat in the White House who caved into the agribusiness interest in spite of where that sector was directing its political contributions. Given the political maxim that perception can become reality, it is likely that the family farm subterfuge worked and Obama felt he had to acquiesce to it or be viewed as against the rural family in the midst of his re-election campaign.

See Related Essay: “Oil and Gas Companies: Citizens Buying Government”

1. Dave Jamieson, “Child Labor Farm Rules Scrapped by White House under Political Pressure,” The Huffington Post, April 27, 2012.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Dan Froomkin, "Corporate Campaign Contributions Show Some Industries Giving Up Appearance of Bipartisanship,”  The Huffington Post, April 26, 2012.

Oil and Gas Companies: Citizens Buying Government

“Corporate campaign contributions have historically been split among incumbents of both political parties, with a decided advantage for whichever controls Congress and the White House.”[1] From 2008 to 2012, however, “companies in some major industries that [saw] a threat from federal regulations—most notably the energy sector—[appeared] to have deepened bonds with the Republican Party, with which they share increasingly indistinguishable goals.”[2] One implication is that the party would block regulations to protect the regulated even at the expense of the public safety.

For example, the disproportionate donations by the oil and gas industry to the Republican Party could explain why Republicans in Congress argued for deregulation of deepwater oil drilling even in the wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico. Financial contributions can explain why the obvious reaction for greater regulation was ignored by those members of Congress. In other words, financial incentive can create blindspots or lapses that are seemingly inexplicable.

Besides the compromised public safety, the financial largess of an industry going predominantly to one party can distort the political “playing board” such that the competition between parties (and between incumbents and challengers) is compromised or distorted. In other words, baleful effects on democracy itself may be part of the mix.

Lastly, the “right” of companies to make political contributions, as if they were “corporate citizens,” can be challenged on the basis that a company is an association rather than a citizen. Lloyd Avram, a spokesman for Chevron, claimed in a written statement that "Chevron exercises its fundamental right and responsibility to participate in the political process. We make political contributions where permitted by law and, consistent with Company policy, to support political candidates, political organizations and ballot measures committed to economic development, free enterprise and good government." Rather than being a fundamental right and responsibility for a company to participate in the political process, it may be an overreach.

On one level, the “fundamental right and responsibility” evinces anthropomorphism: the projecting of human qualities onto non-human entities. Humans exercise their rights of citizenship. It does not necessarily follow that what holds for human beings also applies to our associations themselves. Even though a company consists of people, the entity itself is an organization with its distinct interests. It is not necessarily so that those interests have the rights and responsibilities enjoyed by citizens. To the extent that the interests between a company and its members do not diverge, the citizens in the company have a multiplied influence that other citizens do not have. The principle of fairness is thus relevant too.

In short, giving corporations the fundamental rights and responsibilities of (human) citizens opens the political system up to significant risks. In being able to buy a political party thereby made hegemonic, large concentrations of private capital can effectively protect their interests in staving off regulation at the expense of the public interest. In effect, one faction is able to buy a government. Beyond the conflict of interest in having the regulated be in a position to use its public agents to obviate unwanted regulation and the democracy deficit in the polity as a whole, the attribution of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship on companies evinces a fallacy or category mistake caused, most likely, by the usual suspect of corporate political contributions. Unlike corporations, (human) citizens don't buy themselves citizenship. The concept naturally applies to human beings rather than to our associations. That we have freedom of association does not somehow turn our associations into citizens themselves.

1. Dan Froomkin, “Corporate Campaign Contributions Show Some Industries Giving Up Appearance of Bipartisanship,” The Huffington Post, April 26, 2012. 
2. Ibid.

The Payroll Tax Cut: A Luxury?

As U.S. deficits and thus the federal government's debt had been increasing since the Clinton Administration in the late 1990s, proposals for a payroll tax-cut entailed risking the financial condition of the U.S. Government. To be sure, increasing government spending above inflation was risky too. Here, though, tax policy as it relates to deficits, and thus debt, is analyzed. 

During the summer of 2011, Rep. Eric Cantor (R-Va), the U.S. House's Majority Leader, opposed continuing a tax cut. It was not the tax cut that had been enacted under George W. Bush that disproportionately benefitted the top brackets. That tax cut was sold to the American public as good under the supposition that the growth of jobs would result. The tax cut opposed by the Majority Leader in 2011 pertained to the payroll tax. Workers’ contributions to social security were to be cut from 6.2% to 4.2% until the end of 2011. A spokesman for the Majority Leader argued that if “the goal is job creation, Leader Cantor has long believed that there are better ways to grow the economy and create jobs than temporary payroll tax relief.”[1] However, it could be argued that whereas the tax cuts at the upper-income brackets tend to be saved because the wealthy already have the means to purchase what they want, workers tend to spend any extra disposable income precisely because they don’t have the means to buy even all that they need, particularly in the case of families. Moreover, workers would feel the end of a tax cut more than a rich person would.

It does appear that the Republican party’s support of tax cuts hinged on the financial interest of the rich—tax cuts are not created equal. This asymmetry eclipses the party’s ideological goal of smaller government, for otherwise any tax cut would be sought because it would mean less government taking as well as the possibility of starving government spending. Furthermore, the asymmetry trumped a priority on reducing a deficit that had been over $1 trillion in 2010. A deficit is the annual addition to the U.S. Government’s debt, which was around $14 trillion at the start of 2011. On the heels of S&P downgrading that debt to AA, continuing any tax-cut, even to prop up the economy, can be reckoned as foolhardy unless the money that taxpayers would otherwise pay in taxes is spent or invested sufficiently to boost the economy enough that the government would take in more tax revenue than the amount lost due to the tax-cut.

It is possible that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae could have done more for the economy by allowing homeowners in trouble to refinance to the lower interest rates in 2010 and 2011 than would have been lost from ending the tax cuts. If so, it could be that we could do better in lowering deficits while stimulating the economy. Even with some drag on the economy, the numbers on the baby boomers retiring suggests that the social security fund could not afford the payroll tax cut in 2012. In fact, it could be that the fiscal impacts of government policy are less significant on the overall economy than on the deficits and debt, which are more immediate to the government's financial position. Debating whether to continue tax cuts with respect to economic growth (and even jobs) may reveal a lack of attention on reducing public debt as a priority if the tax revenue given up by the Internal Revenue Service is more than additional tax revenue to be obtained from the added economic growth from the tax-cuts. Indeed, analysis of the Bush tax cuts had shown that the tax revenue given up was more than the induced take. In technical language, the Laffer Curve had already been discredited by 2011. Therefore, ignoring the cost of a tax cut in terms of tax revenue, and thus higher deficits, is negligent and irresponsible, whether by Congress, the media, or the citizenry itself.

1. Jennifer Steinhauer, “For Some in G.O.P., a Tax Cut Not Worth Embracing,” The New York Times, August 26, 2011.

A Self-Inflicted Compromise on the Debt-Ceiling in the U.S.

On August 1, 2011, the Republican and Democratic Congressional leaders and the Democratic President came to an agreement--a compromise of sorts--on raising the debt-ceiling and spending. According to the deal, cuts of roughly $920 billion over ten years would be followed either by adopting a twelve-member Congressional committee's recommendations (including possible cuts and revenue increases) or watching another round of automatic across-the-board spending cuts. Structurally, this arrangement is unbalanced with respect to the nature of compromise between the two parties. In short, it proffers a relatively easy out for the Republicans.

Specifically, the "enforcement mechanism" that would automatically activate should the "super" committee's recommendations not be voted and signed into law contains only cuts even though the Democratic position is for a mix of cuts and revenue. In other words, the mechanism itself is biased to the default of one of the parties. The only incentive the Republican party would have to accept the committee's recommendation would be to avoid the military cuts in the automatic cuts. To obviate any revenue increases, even if only for the wealthy, the Republicans in Congress need only scuttle the committee's work or vote it down. The mechanism being counted on as "teeth" for the committee's work to be adopted should have included both across the board cuts AND revenue increases (including on the very rich). The incentive would have been on BOTH parties to work something out in committee.

Therefore, if I am correct, the structure, or arrangement, of the compromise is itself unbalanced, at least from the standpoint of incentives. It would seem that even with the possible cuts to defense, the compromise itself is a win for the Republicans. Once again, Democrats can be left wondering why their representatives gave up the store, or at least kept the door unlocked. In terms of the public option in the health-insurance reform, the matter of breaking up the biggest banks (too big to fail), and finally in permitting a spending-cuts-only outcome to the debt problem, Democrats, it seems to me, have real cause in withholding their votes from "their" man in the White House in 2012. Yet they have no practical alternative absent a primary challenger. They may be in a very tight box in "staying the course," lest they want to risk seeing the keys of the White House store formally change hands to the other party.

In Defense of the Tea Party

In the wake of the U.S. House’s “Tea Party” caucus in the Republican caucus on July 28, 2011, which effectively delayed the Speaker’s bill for raising the debt ceiling, it might be useful to row against the current for a moment if only to present a defense of the Tea Party’s agenda. To be sure, problems exist in it, but a defense can be made. I submit that the media has not been particularly accurate, or fair, concerning the movement or its involvement in the U.S. Government.

Most notably (but not obviously), Tea Party representatives are correct that August 2^nd does not necessarily bring with it default, for that refers only to the Treasury department not making the required interest and principal payments on the debt. That some government agencies have to shut down does not constitute default, for the latter pertains ONLY to serving debt. Indications are that the U.S Government could service its debt August from incoming tax revenue. If so, default would only be voluntary—if the Treasury should decide to use the tax revenue for other uses.

It is more accurate to say that delaying raising the debt-ceiling would increase the likelihood that the U.S. Government’s credit rating will be lowered to AA from AAA. On this front, the refusal to compromise can be excoriated. For its part, the Tea Party might say that it is worth risking if a structural re-alignment could occur.

What does the Tea Party really want: a reduction in government or a reduction in the federal government? Or both? Other things equal, I suspect that the party would prefer a given domestic program to be at the state level, but even there the spending (and taxing) would receive some ire. If the goal is primarily to restore federalism, the Tea Party is on firmer ground. Since the CSA-USA war (1861-1865), the United States has been trending toward political consolidation at the expense of the innate diversity coming with an empire-scale. Nothing—not even Ronald Reagan and his Supreme Court—could turn the tide. One could not blame the Tea Party for saying: if not now, when? Indeed, the existence of a $14.3 trillion U.S. Government debt—roughly the amount of the annual GNP—can be viewed as a manifestation, or symptom, of the imbalance.

So it makes sense to pick the debt-ceiling as the matter on which structural adjustments can be made. However, what if the majority of the people, or branches, prefer consolidation to federalism in any meaningful sense? Is it fair to foist a structural shift on the majority? Would not it be fairer to promote a constitutional amendment directed on the question of federalism?

Of course, the Tea Party representatives could simply be opposed to the debt, and therefore of increasing it. If it is unsustainable already, then raising the debt ceiling might make matters worse even if it assuages short-term difficulties. If the leverage possible in a debt-ceiling decision is given up, there might not be another chance to stop the trend of more and more debt being added to what is already unsustainable. Rather than force massive short-term spending cuts in federal programs and agencies, however, the leverage could be used to agree to longer-term cuts, say over ten years. This is what the Tea Party has been for, though at the risk of short-term shock.

However, it could be countered that were the Tea Party really focused on reducing the debt, the objection to increasing tax revenue, especially for the rich whose effective rate is eighteen percent, would not exist. That is to say, even if citizens and residents are being taxed too much, it is not too much relative to the debt (past spending that was borrowed). This is different than saying that spending should be cut, for that applies to current and future deficits. An enhanced Tea Party position would be to come down hard on the debt (and further deficits), and thus be for both spending and revenue means of closing the gap. Even combined, it will be difficult to pay off the $14.3 trillion.  From this perspective the spending/revenue debate is premised on a false dichotomy wherein one or the other is assumed to be sufficient. The magnitude of the debt relative to GNP—the highest since the end of WWII in the twentieth century—suggests that the Tea Party is not radical enough.

Amtrak’s Conflict of Interest

On June 15, 2011, U.S. House Republicans called for the breakup of Amtrak’s de facto monopoly of intercity and interstate passenger-rail transport in the United States. Specifically, Republican lawmakers proposed that the lucrative northeast routes be opened to private providers. For example, Richard Branson’s Virgin Trains had been seeking to provide service between Boston and Washington. Of course, letting one of the providers build and own the tracks even as other providers use the tracks would put that owner-provider in a conflict of interest in charging the other providers for their use of the track, so it would be preferable to have the U.S. Government supply the tracks and charge all of the private providers of train service.


The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Partisan Journalism at Fox News: Stockholders and Democracy

Roger Ailes “is the most successful executive in television by a wide margin, and he has been so for more than a decade. He is also, in a sense, the head of the Republican Party, having employed five prospective presidential candidates and done perhaps more than anyone to alter the balance of power in the national media in favor of the Republicans. ‘Because of his political work’—Ailes was a media strategist for Nixon, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush—‘he understood there was an audience,’ Ed Rollins, the veteran GOP consultant, [said in 2011]. [Ailes] knew there were a couple million conservatives who were a potential audience, and he built Fox to reach them.’ For most of his tenure, the roles of network chief and GOP kingmaker have been in perfect synergy. Ailes’s network has dominated the cable news race for most of the past decade, and for much of that time, Fox News attracted more viewers than CNN and MSNBC combined. Throughout the George W. Bush years, the network’s patriotic cheerleading helped to marginalize the Democrats. . . . The problem wasn’t that ratings had been slipping that much— [Glenn] Beck’s show declined by 30 percent from record highs, but the ratings were still nearly double those from before he joined the network. It was that, with an actual presidential election on the horizon, the Fox candidates’ poll numbers remain dismally low (Sarah Palin is polling 12 percent; Newt Gingrich and Rick Santorum, 10 percent and 2 percent, respectively). Ailes’s ­candidates-in-­waiting were coming up small. And, for all his programming genius, he was more interested in a real narrative than a television narrative—he wanted to elect a president.”[1] The last sentence of the quoted passage is particularly revealing: “(H)e wanted to elect a president.”  With Beck’s 30% drop in ratings still leaving him with a profitable rating, Ailes’ motive was not commercial, neither was it to improve the network’s journalism. Typically, news networks are criticized for sacrificing good journalism for commercial interests. Here, journalistic integrity and profit played second fiddle to partisan objectives. 

To be sure, this case can be used to illustrate a point regarding stockholder (property) rights. Were Ailes’ political strategy that of his network's stockholders, this case could be used to point out that the default that profit enjoys in corporate governance can be nudged aside as another use of the wealth is given preference.  A corporation’s owners can legally and ethically decide that their collective corporate wealth can be used in the service of political or social objectives. The owners of Ben & Jerry’s, for example, made selling ice cream not just about profits. Theoretically, a company could limit profit to that which is necessary for the company to continue—with the remaining profits to be spend on whatever aims the stockholders choose. Even "sustenance" profits could be held in abeyance as non-economic objectives are pressed--for example, at Fox News during a U.S. presidential election season. 

In terms of journalistic ethics, however, Ailes' claim to "fair and balanced reporting" even as the editor wants to use the news network to elect a president is internally inconsistent. To the extent that the American media became partisan (e.g., MSNBC as liberal and Fox as conservative), the mission of journalism to report the news in an unbiased way so views and readers can make up their own minds has been compromised in the United States. This can be seen by contrasting American news coverage with its European counterparts in the E.U. 

The trajectory in the American case since Ailes' comments in 2011 had admittedly been so gradual and without the perspective of a Walter Cronkite or Harry Reasoner that Americans could be left with taking the new normal as journalism itself rather than as containing a subtle decadence. Put another way, if a viable republic must have a virtuous and informed/educated citizenry of the self-governed to be viable over the long term as Thomas Jefferson and John Adams agreed, then the onslaught of ideological demigods in journalistic seats ostensibly informing the public can be regarded as the proverbial canary in the coal mine. "Bad air!", Nietzsche would say of the feckless, self-serving instinctual urges running rampantly under the subterfuge of objectivity.  

1, Gabriel Sherman, “The Elephant in the Green Room,” New York Magazine, May 22, 2011.

Political Ideology in a U.S. Federal Healthcare Budget: Disentangling Redistribution, Government and Federalism

A shift in power from the U.S. Governments to those of the states is distinct from a redution in the size of government. These are distinct, albeit not disparate, unrelated, goals. Shifting power does not in itself imply or mandate a reduction in the size of government. For example, in shifting public health-care policy, an expansion of government could result if enough states develop programs further-reaching than what Congress had enacted.  Of course, as per the nature of federalism, particularly in an empire-scale instance, the resulting health-care programs would differ from republic to republic, given the innate heterogeneity that exists at such a scale.

There is a saying in politics: Elections have consequences. In 2011, the impact of the 2010 election was particularly obvious in that the Republicans had gained control of the legislatures of Wisconsin and Ohio as well as the U.S. House of Representatives.  While the governments of Wisconsin and Ohio were going after public-sector unions (or restricting them to reduce government deficits), the House Republicans had their eyes on health-care.  Rep. Paul Ryan, an up and coming Republican from Janesville Wisconsin—a town with high unemployment after the auto plant there closed—was producing a budget that he claimed would cut $5 trillion over 10 years. His proposal reflected, or conflated, two salient traditional Republican aims: to shift power from the U.S. Governments to those of the states and to reduce the size of government.

Because restoring a balance of power to a federal system is distinct from decreasing (or increasing, for that matter) the size of government, it is important to distinguish them in Rep. Ryan’s proposal. The New York Times points to the two aims in observing that “while saving large sums for the federal government, the proposals on Medicaid and Medicare could shift some costs to beneficiaries and to the states.”[1] Shifting costs to the beneficiaries involves or implies a reduction in the size of government, while shifting costs to the states impacts the balance of power in the federal system. It is in the public interest for such items to be distinguished in debate and legislative votes because the people could want one without the other.

Under Ryan’s proposal, according to the paper, “Medicaid would be transformed into a block grant, with a lump sum of federal money given to the states to care for low-income people. States would be given more discretion over use of the money than they have under the current federal-state partnership.”[2] Even though increased discretion adds to the power of state governments relative to the federal, or general, government, block grants maintain state dependence. In fact, if health-care is not among the enumerated powers of the U.S. Government, it could be argued that lump sum payments to the states for health-care are unconstitutional; otherwise, spending for the general welfare would eviscerate even having enumerated powers at all.

Regarding the “size of government,” The New York Times reports that “(f)or future Medicare beneficiaries — people now under 55 — Mr. Ryan’s proposal calls for the federal government to contribute a specified amount of money toward the premium for private health coverage. Under the traditional Medicare program, the government reimburses doctors and hospitals directly.”[3] The “specified amount” element is “less government” than is an open-ended entitlement.

At the time of Rep. Ryan’s proposal, Medicaid and Medicare were open-ended entitlements. Anyone who met the eligibility criteria was entitled to benefits. Under a fixed lump sum, Republicans say the federal government could better predict and control its costs under Medicaid and Medicare, which as of the beginning of 2011 insured more than 100 million people and accounted for more than one-fifth of the federal budget. Unless the states would pick up the added costs (which would shift the taxing and spending federal balance), beneficiaries of these programs would be at risk for more of the costs if health-care costs rise.

Rep. Jan Schakowsky, a Democrat and a former executive director of the Illinois State Council of Senior Citizens, said “Mr. Ryan and the Republicans are declaring war on entitlements — and war on the elderly and the poor. . . . Beneficiaries will end up paying more.” The New York Times also reports that as of 2011, “(a)bout half of Medicaid recipients are children. Nearly two-thirds of the money spent on Medicaid benefits is [sic] for low-income people who are 65 and older or disabled.”[4] For his part, Rep. Ryan said “he was not cutting Medicaid and Medicare, but rather slowing their growth rate. Furthermore, he insisted that if health costs for a group of patients exceeded the federal payment in a given year, the insurer would have to absorb the cost.”[5] Finally, Rep. Ryan “claimed his proposal is equitable because Medicare would pay less on behalf of higher-income beneficiaries, and they would pay more of the cost of their health coverage.”[6]

Whether the beneficiaries or insurance companies pick up the slack, the fact that public funds would not be used means that government would be reduced from what it otherwise would be. Yet if the states pick up the slack, the balance of federalism rather than the size of government would be changed. Moreover, in addition to the size of government (and federalism) elements, the matter of redistributive justice is involved. It is no wonder that these elements are conflated in the public sphere.

I contend that legislative representatives have an obligation to more clearly distinguish the elements of federalism, the size of government, and redistribution in public policy proposals. A desire to shift power to the states can be better distinguished from the questions of redistributive justice and the related matter of the size of government (and latter two can be better distinguished, since, for example, government could be expanded in a way that helps or hurts the poor, for example). Democracy itself would be improved were the people, either directly via a referendum or indirectly through representatives, able to decide on the three elements one by one. In fact, a decision for greater federalism would mean that questions of the size of government and redistribution would be decided on both the state and the federal level.

1.Robert Pear, "G.O.P. Blueprint Would Remake Health Policy," The New York Times, April 4, 2011. 

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

The Republican Congress and Health Insurance Companies: The Real Agenda

According to Wendell Potter, a former health-insurance company lobbyist, “the new law props up the employer-based system that insurers and large corporations benefit from so greatly. It also guarantees that private insurers will get billions of dollars in new revenue.”[1]  It is no accident that Obama’s health-insurance law works out this way. Potter points out that Republicans will back off from repealing the mandate, but will push for other changes. The reason is that the mandate is in the health-insurers’ interest whereas some other features of the law are not. Private insurance companies would like to keep the mandate that will guarantee them more customers.  At the same time, the insurers would like to go back to refusing to cover kids with preexisting conditions, canceling policyholders’ coverage when they get sick, and setting annual and lifetime limits on how much the insurers have to pay for medical care. Also, the insurance companies do not like having to spend eighty percent of their revenue from premiums on medical care, and the insurers would like to get more from the US government for private medicare plans.

Potter makes the point that it is not in the Republicans’ interest to take out the mandate; they will put on a show—acting against the mandate while being unsuccessful—while working behind the scenes to take out planks deemed unprofitable by the insurance companies. In fact, the Republicans could actually strengthen the mandate because the insurance companies want to increase the penalties for not becoming one of their customers. Interestingly, even if the courts throw out the mandate, the entire law must be deemed unconstitutional.  This caveat was undoubtedly drafted by industry lobbyists so they would not be constrained by the law without the benefit of the guaranteed expanded customer base.

Potter’s major point is that the Republicans will go with the interests of big business in a stealth manner (similar to the stealth lobbying done by the insurance lobbyists). The insurance lobbyists have already used surragates to fearmonger “death panels” to kill any reform that might hurt the bottom line. So we can now suspect that Sarah Palin’s Facebook post in August, 2009, accusing the Obama administration of creating “death panels” as part of health-care reform was not an accident even if it has been reported in Newsweek as an “offhand remark.” According to Newsweek, that remark was “as inaccurate as it was incendiary.” Furthermore, in what we can now surmise stemmed from the power of the industry with a vested interest, the remarked “helped incite weeks of embarrassing town-hall meetings for Democrats, which in turn nearly brought down” health-care reform (Newsweek, p. 58). The real power behind this roadblock was that of the health-insurance companys’ lobby. The combination of the industry with such a vested interest having the ability to sway the public and exact leverage over members of Congress and the President (witness Obama’s change on a mandate and the public option) ought to worry those people who believe in having a republic as the form of government and love liberty. Devious subterranean private corporate power is undoing our republic without us knowing it, but this is how the lobbyists such at Potter have designed their strategies. We are not supposed to see it.

1. Wendell Potter, “Repeal and Replace?” Newsweek, November 15, 2010, pp. 42-43; see also Jay Newton-Small, “What Does She Want?” Newsweek, December 20, 2010, pp. 38-47

Military Sacred Cows: A Matter of Contrived Camulflage

"The most significant threat to our national security is our debt."

Micheal Mullen, Jount Chiefs of Staff Chairman, August, 2010.

The defense budget in 2010--$664 billion (not counting the Iraq and Afghanistan wars)--equalled that of the rest of the world combined.  One dollar of every five spent by the U.S. Government was for defense. The amount spent represents 80% growth since 2000. Why?  One reason: the big weapon systems oriented to fighting other empires (e.g., Russia and China). For example, $600 million for the littoral combat ship and $13 billion for amphibious landing vehicles (whose purpose has even been questioned by Sec. of Defense William Gates).  It would seem that the military contractors--the military industrial complex, moreover--are firmly entrenched and in control. That is to say, the defense spending is indicative of the influence of big business over government in the United States.  That this influence goes unhampered may tell us something about the leanings of our societal norms.

The House Republicans' "Pledge to America" formulated in 2010 promises to exempt the military from any cost-cutting that might be entailed in reducing deficit spending. Even so, Sen. Tom Coburn wrote, "Taking defense spending off the table is indefensible. We need to protect our nation, not the Pentagon's sacred cows."  This statement is significant because it gets at the problem of the debt and the influence of big business in government.  That is to say, it kills two birds with one stone.  Indeed, these two birds may well be the achilles heel of the United States as a viable entity or going concern.  The fatal flaw may well be within, rather than from an external threat.  This is the meaning of Micheal Mullen's statement above. To be sure, Republicans believe that defense is government's core function. Along with regulating interstate commerce, this is particularly true of the federal government.  It is less true, I would argue, of the state governments.  So the plank can be viewed as primarily federalist rather than in terms of limited government itself.  The probably-unfixable $14 tillion US Government debt and the consolidation of public governance in the U.S. into the federal government at the expense of federalism (and the checks therein) are related; both are indications of a basic inbalance that is unsustainable. In the face of this state of affairs, it is telling that the question in late 2010 was who should continue to get a tax.

Source: Michael Crowley, "The Sacred Cows," Time, December 13, 2010, pp. 55-58.