Showing posts with label upper echelon management. Show all posts
Showing posts with label upper echelon management. Show all posts

Saturday, July 15, 2023

The Screen Actors Guild Strike: American Capitalism Is Inherently Unbalanced

On July 14, 2023, Hollywood actors joined the writers in going on strike against the studios, which had changed the business model in ways, according to the Screen Actors Guild (SAG), that were leaving the vast majority of actors out financially. At the time, AI (artificial intelligence) was the red-hot buzzword, promising unheard of advances but also baleful clouds on the horizon. The president of SAG sounded the alarm on not only the threat of AI given the studios' new business models predicated on ubiquitous streaming and digital technology, but also the more long-standing and ingrained American corporate system of Capitalism wherein upper managements get away with not sharing the surplus of corporate wealth due to an inherent or institutional conflict of interest. Indeed, Fran Drescher, the president of SAG, was not far from calling into question the taken-for-granted assumption in Capitalism that residual profits should go to stockholders exclusive. Questioning that default (as well as claiming that CEOs get to set their own compensation by controlling their respective boards of directors) would have made Drescher's announcement of a strike truly revolutionary. She was so close. 

Regarding AI, even Drescher's position can be perceived as short-sighted even though it was an improvement on the studios' new business model. The ability of studios to use the likenesses (images) of actors who have been bodily scanned (creepy) in one project for use as computer-generated “acting” in future movies in which the actors themselves are neither compensated nor participate was among the issues to be arbitrated in which the studios and SAG were far apart. To an actor, the loss of control over one’s image can complicate or even detract from one’s efforts to construct a public image. To be sure, not being paid for such extended likenesses being used was noxious to the actors even though no additional work on their part would be required. This just means, however, that royalties, or residuals, rather than pay for the use of the images would be appropriate, and thus fair. Furthermore, rather than being able to pressure actors on a project to agree to their respective likenesses being used in perpetuity, studios should be required to get permission for the specific uses (rather than a general permission) at the time of each future project. Actors would not feel that they might lose their existing work if they refuse to give a general permission in perpetuity. Even such an arrangement, incorporated into the studios' new business models, might not last long. A student of AI suggested to me that just as non-profit organizations have open-source libraries of written works, such organizations in the film industry might make available, royalty-free, images of volunteers that start-up film companies, students, and even Hollywood studios could use. Extras, or background actors, could conceivably be used only in shots in which mere images won't do. 

Of greater significance, SAG’s position extended to challenge a basic tenet of Capitalism itself. Were the strike a true inflection point, as Fran Drescher, the president of SAG claimed, the union had an opportunity to make the dogmatic, or arbitrary, tenet transparent if for no other reason that Drescher was aware and critical of the long-held assumption that had long before become embedded as a “necessary” plank in the economic system.

I contend that it is arbitrary to set the owners of a corporation as the receivers of the residual from the surplus of revenues over expenditures (i.e., profit), whereas banks and labor get only a fixed amount classified as expenses. All three groups can be thought of as providing inputs, or resources, that a management can use to make a profit. From this perspective, it seems arbitrary to say that only one of the group has a right to the residuals from the profits. The philosopher John Locke claimed that a person “mixing” one’s labor with land gives rise to a property right on said land. Centuries later, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a maker of wedding web-sites could refuse to have same-sex couples as clients because she had expressed herself in her work. It seems rather obvious that screenwriters and actors are also in an expressive profession. In “mixing” their self-expressive labor in a film, writers and actors can be said to have an ownership interest in what is typically referred to as art. Painters, after all, sign their paintings. It is possible that the writers and actors of a film have more of a claim on the profits than do the studios. In depicting the strike as occurring at an “inflection point,” the president of SAG had the opportunity to make such a claim, thus challenging the monopoly on profits hitherto enjoyed by the owners of the studios.

In announcing the strike in 2023, Drescher called attention to the large gap in compensation between the CEO’s of the studios and 99% of the members of the SAG union who were struggling financially. To be sure, the inclusion of “extras,” or background non-speaking roles that are on a per-project pay basis, means that the 99 percent were not depending on acting as a full-time job. Even so, the astounding pay of “A-list” movie actors may give people outside of the industry the misimpression that acting constitutes a wealthy profession.

The impression left by films grossing hundreds of millions of dollars that studios are wealthy is more accurate. The studios plead poverty, the SAG president exclaimed in astonishment, and yet somehow they have the money to pay tens of millions of dollars to their CEOs. In fiscal 2022, for example, the CEO of Disney made $24 million just before the company laid off 7,000 employees.[1] Drescher could have added that Netflix co-CEOs earned $43.2 million and $39.3 million in 2020—when the company raised the monthly price of its subscription.[2] Doubtless the management claimed that the company had no choice but charge customers more. It is interesting that managements can so easily put their companies in convenient straightjackets.

The union president must have sensed an opportunity to challenge the greed of American CEOs more generally as evinced in the increasing inequality between their compensation and the average of their respective workforces. “High seven figures, eight figures, this is crazy money that they make,” she said.[3] Implying that a basic shift in wealth distribution between upper managements and workers was justified, she stated, “What’s happening to us is happening across all fields of labor. . . . When employers make Wall Street and greed their priority, and they forget about the essential contributors that make the machine run, we have a problem.”[4] A basic problem in the American system of Capitalism.

The ratio of CEO compensation to that of the average worker in the U.S. in 2020 was 299.[5] Just one year later, the ratio was nearly 400, according to Statista. Even as the coronavirus shuttered or hampered many businesses, which meant mass layoffs, CEOs made out well nonetheless. Some CEOs made a thousand times that of the average worker. The annual ratios in the E.U. were much lower than in the U.S. That CEOs of American corporations had typically reached complete control of their respective boards of directors, which are technically to function in part as a check on their managements, presents not only accountability issues more generally, but also a situation in which the CEOs can set their own compensation and that of their managerial cadres. At one major corporation in 2023, the stockholders voted to deny the management’s proposed compensation package. Astonishingly, the resolution was nonbinding and the board approved the package anyway. This points to the existence of a major structural flaw in corporate governance in the U.S.

In pointing to the greed of CEOs of American companies in general, Drescher expanded her union’s agenda beyond the immediate financial interest of the members. She was making a societal contribution in claiming that the huge disparity of wealth between managements and workers was by then so large that an inflection point had been reached wherein SAG would try to set an example for other unions to follow in objecting to the arbitrary feature of American Capitalism wherein CEOs do not have to share the surplus of corporate wealth. She could have gone a step further by taking the opportunity to question the underlying assumption that stockholders should get the residual of profits that are not retained or invested. Even though the business model of studios had changed due to AI, the greed of American CEOs and their ability to set their own compensation packages had existed for some time and was finally too much for workers to take. That is to say, it was time for an enduring yet arbitrary (rather than necessary) aspect of American Capitalism to be changed. The system had been broken for some time, and the advent of AI meant that the harm would soon become even more unbearable.


Monday, May 20, 2019

NASA and It's Contractors: The Challenger Disaster

Roger Boisjoly was a booster rocket engineer at a NASA contractor, Morton Thiokol. Boisjoly blew the whistle both within the company and to NASA regarding the danger of the rubber in the o-rings, which seal the connections in the shuttle’s rockets, being insufficiently elastic in cold weather. Although The Challenger Disaster (2019) is not a documentary, the film’s narrative, which centers on Roger, or "Adam," is oriented to understanding why the Challenger space shuttle exploded after being launched on January 28, 1986. In other words, although some names are different and the conversations are not verbatim in the film, the factors that contributed to the actual explosion are presented. In fact, the film leans too much on technical details before the disaster and legal arguments afterwards without adequate entertaining elements to make the film enjoyable. However, the film's political function in informing a mass market of why part of the government-business system was broken is valuable. In fact, this mission demonstrates that the medium of motion pictures is capable of aiding in social, political, economic, and religious awareness and education, and thus development. 

The full essay is at "The Challenger Disaster."

Wednesday, February 13, 2019

Johnson’s “Reinvention” of JC Penney: Too Much and Too Little

In April 2013, JC Penney’s board wished the CEO, Ron Johnson, “the best in his future endeavors.” His effort to “reinvent” the company had been “very close to a disaster,” according to the largest shareholder, William Ackman. During Johnson’s time at the company as its CEO, shares fell more than fifty percent. In February 2013, Johnson admitted to having made “big mistakes” in the turnaround. For one thing, he did not test-market the changes in product-line and pricing-points. The latter in particular drove away enough customers for the company’s sales to decline by 25 percent. Why did Johnson fail so miserably?
Ron Johnson's short tenure as CEO of JC Penney was disastrous, according to Altman.   Source: Reuters
Some commentators on CNBC claimed that JC Penney’s board directors should have known better than hire someone from Apple to have so much responsibility right off the bat in a department store. However, Johnson had been V.P. for merchandising at Target before going over to Apple. Therefore, Penney’s board cannot be accused of ignoring the substantive differences between sectors. Even so, Target and Walmart are oriented to one market-segment, whereas JC Penney, Kohls and Macys are oriented to another. Perhaps had he taken the time to have market tests done at JC Penney, any error in applying what he had learned at Target could have been made transparent.
Although as the former CEO Ullman who would be replacing Johnson pointed out, customer tastes are always changing so you can’t go back to worked in the past, to “reinvent” a company goes too far in the other direction. For one thing, it is risky for a retail company to shift from one market-segment to another, given the company's image. Additionally, to “reinvent” something is to start from scratch to come up with something totally new. Even if that were possible for a retail chain, the “new front” would likely seem fake to existing customers. “They are trying to be something they are not,” such customers might say. Put another way, Ron Johnson might have gotten carried away.
In an interview just after Johnson’s hiring at JC Penney had been announced in June 2011, he said, “In the U.S., the department store has a chance to regain its status as the leader in style, the leader in excitement. It will be a period of true innovation for this company.” A department store is exciting? Was he serious? Perhaps his excitement got the better of him in his zeal for change. Were the changes really of “true innovation?” Adding Martha Stewart kitchen product-lines was hardly innovative—nor was getting rid of clearance sales and renovating store designs and the company logo.
Renovation generally-speaking is rather superficial, designed perhaps to give customers an impression of more change than s actually the case. Is a given renovation an offshoot of marketing or strategy? Ron Johnson may have been prone to exaggeration, as evinced by his appropriation of faddish jargon, while coming up short in terms of substantive change. In an old company trying to be something it's not (i.e., going from a promotional to a specialty pricing strategy), too much superficial change can easily outweigh too little real change. Sometimes even upper-level managers can get carried away with their own jargon in trying to make their respective companies something they are not. It is like a person trying to be someone he or she is not. In "reinventing" JC Penney, Ron Johnson was trying to make an old woman come off as young by applying make-up and new clothes.
Sources:
Stephanie Clifford, “J.C. Penney Ousts Chief of 17 Months,” The New York Times, April 9, 2013.

Joann Lublin and Dana Mattioli, “Penney CEO Out, Old Boss Back In,” The Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2013.

Monday, January 14, 2019

Protecting Minority Stockholder Rights: On a Conflict of Interest at Revlon

The principle of majority rule is a staple of democratic theory. Typically the victor of a close election is quick to proclaim that “the people” have spoken. That “the people” corresponds to 51% of those who voted is beside the point. What about the 49% who voted against the victor? What about the minority’s rights? In the U.S. Senate, the fact that it takes 60 out of 100 votes to end a filibuster means that a large minority can halt a majority’s bill. In the European Council, the qualified majority rule means that for a bill to pass, the states in the majority must be at least 55% of the total number of states and must have at least 55% of the E.U.’s population between them.  A large minority can therefore stop a small majority. In both of these “intergovernmental” bodies, the implication is that 51% of a vote is not as significant as the principle of majority rule suggests. What about the rights of a minority of shares of stock in corporate governance? When a majority stockholder has control of management, the interests of the minority stockholders can be shirked. This is particularly true when a majority stockholder proposes a going-private transaction with the aid of management.
“Going-private transactions create opportunities for shareholder abuse and can have coercive effects on minority shareholders,” Antonia Chion, a director in the S.E.C.’s enforcement division insists. A majority shareholder can propose a buy-out that is unfair to other stockholders, and a collusive management can keep those shareholders in the dark concerning independent assessments. This is not the case of a CEO who is controlling the board at stockholder expense; rather, the majority stockholder uses the management to circumvent the board and other stockholders at their expense and even that of the company.
On June 13, 2013, Revlon “agreed to pay an $850,000 penalty to settle accusations that it deceived shareholders and its independent directors in connection with” Ronald Perelman’s attempt to get the other stockholders to convert their common stock to preferred in what is called an exchange transaction.[1] As in the case of Perelman’s earlier attempt to take the company private, an independent assessment found that the other stockholders as well as the company would lose out in the deal. Perhaps because the other stockholders had had access to the information to reject the first proposal, Revlon, undoubtedly at Perelman’s urging, “went to great lengths to hide” the bad news of the assessment on the exchange transaction from the minority stockholders.[2] In fact among “other deceitful maneuvers,” Revlon “altered the agreement with the trustee to ensure that the trustee would not share the advisor’s opinion with” the minority stockholders.[3] In its filings with the S.E.C., the management lied that the board’s process had been “full, fair and complete.”[4] In actuality, the company’s board was “unable to fairly evaluate the adequacy of the exchange offer.”[5] The controlling stockholder, Ronald Perelman, had used the management of the company to go against the company’s own interest! That is, the company was acting against its own best interest simply because doing so was in the controlling stockholder’s interest. Surely this suggests that the majority stockholder had too much influence. Given the conflict of interest, having such influence at the expense of other stockholders and the board can be regarded as unethical.
Perhaps it could be argued that because Perelman’s investment firm, MacAndrews & Forbes, controlled about three-quarters of Revlon’s shares at the time, the company’s management had a fiduciary duty to act in Perelman’s interest even if it was not in the company’s interest. Stockholders are the owners, after all.
However, Perelman’s investment firm did not control all of the stock. It cannot be assumed that the interests of the other stockholders mirrored that of the stock Perelman owned or controlled. Furthermore, that the exchange transaction would have helped Revlon pay off a loan to Perelman’s investment firm only added to the majority stockholder’s conflict of interest. According to the New York Times, because “Perelman stood on both sides of the deal, there was a question about the transaction’s fairness.”[6] This is the reason the company asked its independent board members to assess the exchange transaction in the first place. For the company to turn around and require the independent assessor to hide the findings from the board is utterly contradictory, as well as unfair to the independent directors (as well as the other stockholders).
Therefore, even if the principle of majority rule applied to corporate governance supports Perelman’s influencing the management to the benefit of the stock that he controls, the conflict of interest suggests that the principle should not completely shut down the property rights of the other stockholders. Interestingly, not even the U.S. Senate’s 60 votes or the European Council’s qualified majority voting applied to corporate governance could have stopped the 75% of the shares that Perelman controlled at the time from directing the company’s management. Because the independent directors are designed to be free of pressure from management, they could be controlled by a majority stockholder in such a case.
Perhaps independent directors ought to be tasked with not only checking the corporation’s management, but also protecting the interests of the minority stockholders when those interests differ from that of the majority. At the very least, a majority stockholder should not be permitted to be situated in a conflict of interest with regard to the company. Merely being so situated can be argued to be unethical because even having the opportunity to exploit a conflict of interest causes harm (e.g., anxiety) to those who would be harmed financially. Additionally, the temptation is just too great, given the influence that the majority stockholder has over the company’s management. Even in terms of democracy, majority rule is not an absolute.

For more on conflicts of interest in business (and government), see Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon.

1. Peter Lattman, “To Perelman’s Failed Revlon Deal, Add Rebuke From S.E.C.,” The New York Times, June 14, 2013.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.