Saturday, June 21, 2025

The E.U. Stance on Tariffs: Pressure from the States

After the U.S. took the decision to impose reciprocal and car tariffs on the E.U., it did not take long for several of the E.U. states to pressure the federal executive branch, the European Commission, to punch holes in the E.U.’s counter-tariffs so favored industries in the E.U. would not face higher prices on supplies from the United States. As in U.S. states, E.U. states have their own dominant industries, whose financial interests it is only natural for government to protect, as jobs translate into votes. But pressuring the E.U.’s federal government to carve out exceptions for imports desired by favored industries at the state level, such as automobiles in the E.U. state of Germany, would deny the E.U. the full benefit of a united front that federalism can provide against other countries. For maximum leverage in trade negotiations, unilaterally removing counter-tariffs is not wise; it is like a person intentionally tripping over himself while trying to get to the grocery store. Given the regional pressures, trade is rightfully one of the enumerated powers, or exclusive competencies, of the E.U. rather than a shared competency or a power retained by the states.

At a basic level, first of all, to pretend that the E.U. is merely a confederation, in which governmental sovereignty still resides exclusively with the state governments, is a much more subtle way of enervating the E.U., whether out of denial or a desire by federal officials to appease purblind Euroskeptic governors, such as Viktor Orban of the E.U. state of Hungary. Fortunately, though for some people regretfully antagonistically, transparency is valued by truth-tellers. Both qualified majority voting and the exclusive and even shared competencies enjoyed by the E.U. government are incompatible with a confederation, not to mention a mere “bloc” or economic treaty like NAFTA. Correctly “mapping” the E.U. is a prerequisite to being able to get “maximum bang for the buck” (an American expression, wherein “buck” strangely means “dollar”) in terms of collective action at the federal level.

On the summer solstice, 2025, which by the way is not the first day of climate summer as some American meteorologists were claiming as if they were deer in headlights or cows chewing cud, the E.U.’s Commission warned state governments that some of their “sensitive goods” would not be shielded “from planned retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods” because the E.U. was “weary of undermining its negotiating hand in high-stakes trade talks with President Donald Trump, three E.U. diplomats and officials” said.[1] Not to resist the pressure would unilaterally weaken the E.U.’s negotiating leverage even before sitting down to negotiate with the Americans. In a confidential meeting at the Commission, it was determined that acceding to all of the state requests would mean that the E.U. “would only target €25 billion worth of U.S. exports . . . instead of the €95 billion” that the E.U. “initially targeted as a response”.[2] The sheer difference between €25 billion and €95billion attests to the leverage that collective action at a federal level has over the negotiating power that an aggregation of European countries would have. In other words, the dollar value lost in the shielding can point to the power that is gained by collective action from an exclusive competency residing at the federal rather than state level.

In seceding from the E.U., the former E.U. state of Britain lost any future benefits that can be gained from collective action at the federal level of an empire-scale union of states, for even a secessionist state is commensurate in scale and polity-type with the remaining states rather than the union of such states. A leap in scale from (early-modern) kingdom and empire, and a qualitative difference in polity-type between a state and federal union of such states are why Britain is not equivalent to the European Union. In other words, the United Kingdom is not a small E.U.

In conclusion, subtly letting air out of the tire by insisting that the E.U. does not have a federal system or intentionally allowing states to shield certain imports from America at the expense of the federal stance is not exactly putting the best foot forward in arriving at the negotiation table. Given the sheer amount of benefit that would be lost were the Commission to acquiesce to every state request on carve-outs, proposals to expand the federal competencies subject to qualified majority vote instead of unanimity should be considered with greater urgency, and additional enumerated domains of power federalized from the states. Fears of a leviathan “central state” can be allayed by realizing that the E.U. has a federal system of divided sovereignty and that the state governments have significant access to policy-making at the federal level in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. even though the executive branch, the European Parliament and the E.U.’s supreme court provide less access and thus can protect federal prerogatives and thus the benefits obtainable from collective rather than associative action. Unity need not mean uniformity; collective action is possible at the federal level while states can retain the ability to reflect their own interests and cultures as long at the benefits from collective action are not unduly compromised.


1. Camile Gus and Ari Hawkins, “Brussels Resists Pressure from E.U. [State] Capitals to Shield Exports in U.S. Trade Fight,” Politico.com, June 20, 2025.
2. Ibid.

Thursday, June 19, 2025

The E.U. on Anti-Trust Enforcement: The Case of Google

On June 19, 2025, when the European Court of Justice, the E.U.’s supreme court, received a nonbinding opinion from the advocate general, Juliane Kokott, recommending that Google’s appeal against an anti-trust fine of €4 billion be dismissed by the court. The E.U.’s executive branch, the Commission, had found in 2018 that the company had “used the dominance of its mobile Android operating system to throttle competition and reduce consumer choice.”[1] I contend that the company’s written statement in response can be characterized as “stone-deaf” or oblivious to the issue at hand. Such is not an effective way of managing threats in the environment of business. Moreover, the response itself illustrates why governmental action on anti-trust on behalf of market competition is valid and necessary. I contend that the invisible-hand mechanism of a restored competitive market is more reliable than depending on managerial intentions even if they are to be based on motivation that is social-engineered from fines.

The fine of €4 billion is part of a total of €8 billion against Google for anti-trust violations over a decade, including on the company’s digital ad unit. So, a pattern of restraint of trade can be inferred. As if obvious to it, the company statement in reaction to Kokott’s recommendation included, “Android has created more choice for everyone and supports thousands of successful businesses in Europe and around the world.”[2] That the advent of android technology had given consumers another option says nothing about whether Google was also curtailing other options. That many businesses were using android technology is not a rebuttal to the government’s claim that Google was operating in restraint of trade. In fact, that many businesses were using Google’s technology means that the company’s market share, and thus market power, were enough for the company to be able to restrain competition in the industry. In wanting to brag (or advertise), the managers at Google who wrote and approved the statement were unwittingly making the government’s case. Unsuccessful companies do not have sufficient market-power to restrict or curtail competition as John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil did in the U.S. until that company was broken up (rather badly) by the U.S. Supreme Court on anti-trust grounds. This example begs the question of whether merely slapping Google with fines is sufficient to arrest the company’s pattern of restraining trade. Both the pattern and the bragging illustrate the tone-deaf feature of greed that narrows cognition and perception. In applying a fine to Google, the E.U. regulators would be naïve in believing that the company’s managers would then be motivated to stop curtailing competition. At the very least, the Commission’s commissioner for competition would still need to watch Google like a hawk.

I contend that it is vital to the public interest, or common good, of a society that competitive markets be protected and even created out of oligopolies by governments; this is a legitimate role for government because price-competition forces suppliers to be price-takers rather than price-setters. Only as the former are suppliers oriented to demand. This crucial role of price in a competitive market was arguably Adam Smith’s best contribution, or “value added,” to economic theory. The “invisible hand” by which buyers and sellers are both price-takers can be understood as an impersonal mechanism that constrains self-interest and even gives rise to unintended beneficial consequences of self-interest as goods and services are allocated efficiently rather than according to the self-interested will of a monopolist.

Even more abstractly, self-interest stems from the sin of self-love, which is the putting of one’s own happiness above love directed to God, so constraining especially narrow self-interest is important so as to obviate the baleful effects from greed that is oriented only to one’s own private benefit. In other words, that such self-interest is based ultimately on the sin of self-idolatry (i.e., worshipping one’s own happiness even at the expense of loving God) means that a society is wise at the very least to constrain even self-interests that are economically aggregated with unintended beneficial consequences. Smith’s “invisible hand” impersonal mechanism, if protected by government anti-trust enforcement, is more reliable, I submit, than even intended beneficial consequences that are conditional on human intention and thus motivation. This is why downsizing Google in the E.U. is preferable to trying to motivate Google’s management to stop restraining competition in its industry by means of fines.

Pierre Nicole, a Jansenist priest in the seventeenth century, argued that self-love can have beneficial consequences. The consequences are intended, but only in so far as the benefits going to others are in one’s own self-interest. Courtesy, for example, although rooted in self-love and thus fully in accord with self-interest, constrains immediate or narrow self-interest that runs unfettered in Hobbes’ state of nature. Simply put, we can get more by being social with other people than by taking their food and even killing them. Smith’s impersonal market mechanism also constrains narrow (or immediate) self-interest, such as raw greed, even though the untended aspect of the invisible hand differs from Nicole’s intended courtesy, and the impersonal aspect of Smith’s market mechanism differs from Nicole’s personal motive to extend courtesy to others because it is in one’s interest to do so. Also, whereas the invisible hand constrains self-interest itself, though competition may ultimately be in a company’s long-term best financial interest, extending courtesy to others only constrains narrow (or immediate) self-interest. In other words, narrow self-interest, in which only private benefits to oneself are sought, is constrained by both approaches and so they can be compared. But courtesy can easily be turned off, as it depends on intention, whereas the invisible hand’s operation does not depend on market participants intentions to constrain their own self-interest. As self-love is a manifestation of the foundational sin of pride, according to Augustine, a person’s intentions to constrain one’s own self-interest in actions cannot be relied upon even though it is laudable when a person assumes an enlightened self-interest and even acts altruistically. In assuming a managerial role in a company, a human being comports oneself to one’s narrow economic role, which willows one’s intentions that go beyond immediate or medium-term financial interests, both in terms of salary and company profitability.

It bears remembering that even though part of the literature on corporate social responsibility in the twentieth century includes ethical principles, CSR programs have become largely marketing. Indeed, the fiduciary duty of managers to the stockholders as a group mandates that the managers be oriented to maximizing profit (and thus dividends and the stock price). This legal infrastructure encases narrow self-interest, which benefits from restraining trade in order to increase market power and profit. Therefore, it should not be surprising that Google’s written reaction to the judicial opinion of the advocate general bears no traces of responsibility to uphold a competitive market for the good of society, but can instead be interpreted as sheer marketing. Lots of businesses use our product! Rockefeller could have said the same. That titan, who viewed himself as a “Christ figure” and a Noah in saving rival refiners from destructive competition in the 1860s by forcing them abord his “combination,” was also found guilty of restraint of trade. His self-deluded intentions certainly could not be trusted by the Supreme Court justices who ruled in favor of breaking up his company. In the 2020’s, the E.U. was surpassing the U.S. on anti-trust enforcement, but even so, I submit that motive-triggering fines are not sufficient to restoring and protecting market competition once there is an egocentric giant in the room.

Wednesday, June 18, 2025

American Federalism and Equal Protection: Transsexual Children in Tennessee

On June 18, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a Tennessee law blocking transsexual children from being able to undergo puberty-blockers and gender-changing surgeries does not violate the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court’s 6-3 opinion in U.S. v. Skrmetti was reported at the time to fall “largely along conservative-liberal lines.”[1] By this is mean ideological lines, both moral and political in nature. Such is grist for the mill for the broad judgment of an electorate, in what is otherwise known as popular sovereignty, which is superior to governmental sovereignty in a republic. Add in the fact that Tennessee is a member-state in a federal system in which the U.S. Supreme Court is on the federal level, and the broad judgment of the electorate takes on more significance to the extent that a federal system of an empire-scale union is in part supposed to take into account and protect interstate ideological differences that defy one-size-fits-all union-level policies. In other words, as cultural heterogeneity can be expected in going from state to state in an empire-scale union-of-states, efforts “from the top” to impose a single policy on every state do not allow the federation to breath. Political pressure could be expected to build over time if such a suffocating tendency eventuates, with the risk of dissolution increasing over time as if depreciation.

Because the U.S. Supreme Court can (and has) contributed to a one-size-fits-all compromising of federalism in favor of the General (i.e., federal) Government, Chief Justice Roberts wisely resisted the temptation (if he felt any) to decide the issue not only for the people of Tennessee, but also for the entire Union. “The voices in these debates raise sincere concerns; the implications for all are profound. The Equal Protection Clause does not resolve these disagreements. Nor does it afford us license to decide them as we see best.”[2] He was deferring to popular sovereignty. Because he did not find discrimination based on sex to exist in the Tennessee law and thus that it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution, he was able to not only defer to an electorate to use its broad judgment, but also allow Tennessee some breathing room within the Union.

It is arguably more likely that the majority of the electorate in Massachusetts, for example, would be against the Tennessee law being adopted in Massachusetts, than that a majority of Tennessee’s citizens would vote to repeal the law. Both of these collective value-judgments being able to be codified into law is vital to the endurance of a federal system in an empire-scale union of states. Therefore, the strict scrutiny that sexual discrimination requires of any court should not be used as a crutch by which to “federalize” law in the United States or to replace the value-judgments of majorities of voters with those of justices. The fact that the decision fell along ideological lines means that value-judgments apart from jurisprudence were also involved in the decision, and thus that Roberts is correct that the contesting “sincere concerns” should not be resolved by fiat, but rather by means of ballots.

This is not to say that a federal court should sidestep cases that do involve significantly harmful sexual, religious, or racial discrimination on a minority, for majority rule is not absolute. Rather, the interests of an electorate and of federalism itself should be considered by judges and justices, especially when the law under the microscope has a legitimate purpose. In the present case, stopping children from blocking puberty is a legitimate societal goal because children are especially vulnerable to not being of mature mind on even themselves. Surgeries are of such consequence that this part of the law was not even contested. This means the law had at least some merit of intent and thus could not be rightly claimed to be intended to discriminate. Although historically some state governments have enacted laws intentioned to discriminate against Black Americans, that such laws were so blatant can be used as a litmus test for federal judges and justices to assess whether a law is inherently and intentionally discriminatory. Just because a particular law impacts only a group rather than everyone does not mean that the law necessarily violates the Equal Protection Clause. Put another way, just because a law costs or benefits only people who meet certain criteria, such as having a disease such as gender dysphoria, does not mean that unless everyone meets those criteria the law is unconstitutional.

In fact, the value of broad value-judgments being made by voters as the basis of a republic and the importance of not succumbing to one-size-fits-all-states trends by federal governmental institutions arguably warrant shifts in federal policy and jurisprudence. For instance, the use of referenda by governments so an electorate can assume an increased role on the level of value-judgments would solidify that foundation of American democracy, with elected representatives taking their cues from the broad strokes to implement them into specifics, whether laws or regulations. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court could set a precedent whereby it is more difficult for that court to declare a state law unconstitutional under the federal constitution. That that court is a branch of the federal government means that there is at least an implicit conflict of interest on matters bearing on federalism, since justices are both nominated and confirmed by branches of the federal government. I once asked Sandra Day O’Conner why the court had not done more to counter this institutional conflict of interest. She replied, “It takes five,” meaning five justices to agree to do it, and that was a Republican-majority court!  That the U.S. is not a France or Germany with a large back yard, but, rather, of the same scale and federal-type as the E.U., is reason enough for the American state governments to flex their respective wings more so as to reflect or match the broad value-judgments of their electorates. On June 18, 2025, Chief Justice Roberts resisted the temptation to clip Tennessee’s wings and thus incrementally strengthened the federalism of the empire-scale union.


1. Josh Gerstein, “Supreme Court Upholds Tennessee’s Ban on Gender-Affirming Care for Minors,” Politico.com, June 18, 2025.
2. Ibid.

Sunday, June 15, 2025

The E.U. as a Bystander on the Global Stage: A Self-Inflicted Wound

Why has the E.U. been sidelined amid the military tensions in the Middle East? The answer lies with the E.U.’s federal system, rather than the size of its economy or of its population. The E.U. certainly could have more geopolitical sway abroad were it not for a vulnerability being exploited within its own federal system. The vulnerability stems from a refusal by some state officials to recognize and respect the qualitative and quantitative differences between the federal and the state levels of the E.U. Specifically, when the governor (i.e., chief executive and/or head of state) of a state operates as if a federal-level official, especially that of a federal president, the authority of the actual federal president is undercut, hence weakening that person’s ability to convince the heads of foreign governments to include the E.U. president or foreign minister in multilateral negotiations centered on the Middle East, for example. Even unconsciously, foreign leaders may say to themselves, why should we respect the president of the E.U. if she is so easily upstaged by the leader of an E.U. state who is acting as if he were president of the European Commission?  To speak with one voice, and to be able to speak for the E.U. rather than just one state thereof, an E.U. official must be the speaker. Macron of the E.U. state of France cannot speak for the E.U., but Von der Leyen could, provided her space is respected by the governors of the states. This is not to say that this is the only reason why the E.U. has been sidelined from negotiations on Middle East warfare; rather, my contention is that this reason is typically overlooked due to the Euroskeptic ideological delusion that the E.U. does not have a federal system of government even though since 1993, governmental sovereignty has indeed been split between the states and the Union. Perhaps the underlying question here is whether continuing to clutch at the anti-federalist ideology is worth the E.U. continuing to be weakened unnecessarily from within, and thus sidelined from international negotiations that do not center on Europe. Making such blind-spots transparent is indeed a valuable occupation, even if it can be infuriating to people whose interests and ideology are served best if societies look the other way.

In June, 2025, Claude Moniquet, a European formerly in the field of intelligence, told a journalist that the E.U. had been left “sitting on the sidelines” as Israel pummeled Gaza and commenced a bombing in Iran.[1] “Europeans have been pretty much excluded from all major diplomatic manoeuvres around the war in Gaza or the war in Lebanon,” he added.[2] So even though the president of the E.U.’s executive branch, Ursula Von der Leyen, wrote on 13 June 2025, “Diplomatic efforts are crucial to preventing further escalation,” after having spoke with Israel’s president, Isaac Herzog, words are just words if they are from the sidelines rather than after having been dealt a hand of cards at the power-table.[3] I submit that the irrelevance of Von der Leyen’s words is partly due to Emmanuel Macron of the E.U. state of France having “stolen the thunder” by putting himself up as speaking for the E.U. on Gaza.

For instance, during a three-hour televised interview in early May, 2025, Macron said that Europe should consider sanctioning Israel over the humanitarian situation in Gaza, where “hundreds of thousands” were thought to be “facing starvation.”[4] Even though he was understandably frustrated by the lack of sanctions at the federal level, the president of France had no place to speak for Europe, as he was not an E.U. official at the time. To be sure, the thorny problem of the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of Ministers on foreign-policy matters was a factor in the E.U.’s internal-weakness at the federal level, but Macron’s proper orientation was to contend that France should consider sanctioning Israel, if this had not already been done. Indeed, Macron said publicly on 30 May 2025 that France could harden its position on Israel. “The humanitarian blockade is creating a situation that is untenable on the ground,” he said.[5]

Yet two weeks later, Macron was visiting Greenland to represent Europe’s—not just France’s—objection to U.S. President Trump’s desire to make Greenland a U.S. territory. “The situation in Greenland is clearly a wakeup call for all Europeans,” he said as if he were president of the E.U. rather than the governor of an E.U. state.[6] This manner of situating the French president may seem harsh, but I submit that I have properly stated his role from the vantage point of the E.U. and particularly in terms of its federal system, wherein states are both qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from the federal level officials and governmental branches. Von der Leyen could have spoken for E.U. citizens rather than merely residents of the state of France were she to have visited Greenland, but Macron relegated such an opportunity for the E.U., and thus the collective clout that it potentially could have that a state could not. There is a cost, in other words, in a state official refusing to apply self-control when going into the spotlight is tempting. Were the U.S. president to try to invade Greenland, the E.U. president would have more economic clout than France could have with which to pressure Trump to cease and desist in his imperial designs.


This photo, from Euronews.com, illustrates Macron's usurption and how this impacts how the actual E.U. Commission president (pictured on the right) is viewed from abroad as compromised or weakened as a result..

Admittedly, involving state officials in foreign policy is arguably one way in which the E.U.’s federal system is a better case of federalism than the top-heavy American counterpart, but such involvement requires also giving E.U. officials, especially its (executive branch) president and foreign minister, enough authority with which to block state leaders from stealing the show on the societal stage. Although the U.S. had taken the doctrine of federal preemption of state action too far, some preemption would be justified in the E.U., especially as the governors do have a formal role even at the federal level in the European Council and through their ministers in the Council of Ministers on foreign policy. The proclivity to go beyond those federal institutions conflicts with the roles of the E.U. president and foreign minister in being able to lead the E.U. on foreign policy. A similar case of state overreach occurred when the prime minister of Italy sought to manipulate representatives in the European Parliament, which represents E.U. citizens rather than states.  Likewise, a governor of one of the republics in the U.S. can justifiably pressure a U.S. senator representing that governor’s state at the federal level, but the House representatives even in districts located in that state serve the U.S. citizens in those districts rather than the state government.

In short, political overreaching should be guarded against for a federal system to function optimally, such that benefits internationally from collective action at the federal level can be realized while the cultural and ideological interstate differences can be accommodated by there being policy domains retained by the state governments. Stealing the limelight of someone else is not conducive to a federal system being able to work both internally and as a political unit to the outside world. Put bluntly, if France’s Macron wants so to be president of the E.U., let him go through the process of candidacy at the end of Von der Leyen’s second term rather than usurp her role before then.


1. Jeremy Fleming-Jones, “Europe Left on Diplomatic ‘Sidelines’ in Israel Iran Conflict,” Euronews.com, June 15, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Gavin Blackburn, “Macron on ‘Crusade against Jewish State,’ Israel Says Following Criticism of Gaza War,” Euronews.com, 30 May 2025.
5. Reuters, “France May Toughen Stance on Israel If It Continues Blocking Gaza Aid, Macron Says,” Reuters.com, May 30, 2025.
6. Emma De Ruiter, “Macron Reaffirms Support for Greenland during Visit Ahead of G7 Summit,” Euronews.com, 15 June, 2025.

Is Healthcare a Human Right?

Humanity still has not come to a consensus on what are entailed specifically within the rubric of human rights. Even in terms of those specifics that have come to be generally held to be human rights, such as in designated war crimes and crimes against humanity by international agreement, the lack of de jure and de facto enforcement render such agreement nugatory in practice. As a result, calls for human rights are in effect calls for warring to stop. The enforcement that goes along with laws legislated by governments render any consensus on what constitutes human rights more substantive in practice. This is undercut, however, in empire-scale polities of polities, such as the E.U. and U.S., to the extent that human rights are carved out at the federal level to applied across differing cultures. Such ideological diversity between the American member-states has triggered drastically-different notions of just what are included as human rights to be played out in Congress. The debate over the government-financed health-insurance program for the poor in 2025 illustrates such a lack of consensus, which in turn suggests that the member-states should play more of a role in how or even whether to provide free insurance to the poor. Sometimes, one size doesn’t fit all. In short, the matter of federalism is very relevant up front, before matters of the proper role of government itself and of human rights are decided. In other words, the qualitative and quantitative differences between a union of states and a state are very relevant up front, lest states eventually peel off in utter frustration with a one-size-fits-all approach to policy-making to fit an empire composed of member-states.

As the U.S. Senate considered changes to the Medicaid program, Republican Sen. Josh Hawley acknowledged “that the main cost-saving provision in the bill—new work requirements on able-bodied adults who receive health care through the Medicaid program—would cause millions of people to lose their coverage. All told, estimates are 10.9 million fewer people would have health coverage under the bill’s proposed changes to Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act.”[1] Millions would be relegated to not getting medical attention or going to the emergency rooms of hospitals mandated to treat the uninsured, who would be strapped with unaffordable medical bills and thus bad credit-reports.

That a significant number of poor people in the United States would lose health-insurance was known and anticipated by the legislators. Speaking on the bill as it was taking shape in the U.S. Senate, Sen. Hawley said, “I know that will reduce the number of people on Medicaid.”[2] What, then, justifies the loss of health coverage? The senator answered this question by adding, “But I’m for that because I want people who are able bodied but not working to work.”[3] In other words, being able to have access to medical services should be conditional on having a job. The conditionality itself means that health care is not a human right because such rights are inherently unconditional.

Some or even many of Sen. Hawley’s constituents doubtless favored excluding medical services from being included among other human rights, perhaps in the belief that people who are able to work but refuse to work do not deserve to be kept alive if they fall sick, which in turn can be based on a belief that only the strong of any species should survive. Sen. Hawley represents Missouri, when is generally conservative. Sen. Warren of Massachusetts, on the other hand, would find that the conditionality and thus the exclusion of medical care from human rights much less popular in her member-state. Such a wide divide by state on this question would be unlikely in the E.U., even between the states of Hungary or Poland and Sweden or the Netherlands. The European notion of subsidiarity would thus be more applicable in this case to the U.S. than the E.U., given the greater diversity of ideology on the question in the United States. In other words, federalizing universal healthcare would come with less ideological tensions between E.U. citizens in different states than between U.S. citizens in different states; there was more consensus within the empire-scale European Union than within the American bloc.

The imposition of work requirements as a condition for the poor having access to medical treatments may be just fine with most people in Texas and Utah, for example, and yet be very objectionable to most people in Vermont and Connecticut. To conflate these various member-states as being ideologically and culturally homogenous is suboptimal and comes with political costs as opposition pressure is likely to result where the federal policy is unpopular; more optimal politically would be transferring the program of Medicaid to the member-states so their respective peoples could tailor the program—or even cancel it—according to their respective political ideologies. The notion that policy in another state should reflect one’s own views is anathema to federalism, and even to there being empire-scale unions of states. Toleration within a union is thus necessary lest one size be applied throughout and eventually republics break off in frustration, as Britain did from the European Union due primarily to anti-federalist sentiment.

In short, finding a large gap from consensus in Congress (or in the E.U.’s legislature) can be an indication that a policy question would be better resolved by the member-states than at the empire-level, given the heterogeneity between states on the question. Congress and the federal president applying work requirements on what most people in some states regard as an unconditional human right may be intolerable emotionally to those people, but so too, Obamacare had been viewed as an intolerable overreach of government to most people in some other states. Behind this chasm, ideological and thus as emotional as cognitive, lies a basic disagreement on just what should constitute human rights, and thus be an obligation of government. In other words, besides different political philosophies of the proper role of government, different moral principles are involved on the question of whether government should pay for healthcare for the poor. In a federal system, the matter of where such a divisive policy question should be decided should be decided before both the proper-role-of-government and the human-rights questions are decided, or else the federal system itself would be compromised and thus put at risk.


1. Leah Askarinam, “The GOP’s Big Bill Would Bring Changes to Medicaid for Millions,” Apnews.com, June 15, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

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