The European Union at Risk: The German High Court Undercut the European Court of Justice on the Role of the European Central Bank

If a dispute between an E.U. state and the European Central Bank (ECB) on one of its programmes could come to challenge the European Court of Justice (ECJ) itself and the very sustainability of the E.U.’s federal system, then that system itself could be said to be severely impaired, and thus facing a high risk of being destroyed.  Yet in the Judgment of the Second Senate of May 5, 2020, the constitutional court of Germany did exactly that in throwing out an earlier ruling of the E.U.’s supreme court (ECJ) on the legality under E.U. law of an ECB programme.[1]

The primary objective of the  European System of Central Banks, which includes the European Central Bank and those of the States using the euro currency, to be the maintenance of price stability. In 2015, the ESCB “adopted a programme for the purchase of government bonds on secondary markets . . . , with the aim of returning inflation rates to levels below, but close to, 2%.”[2] According to the European Court of Justice, the E.U.’s supreme court within the federal judiciary (CJEU), the ECB’s rationale was that the large-scale purchase of government bonds—90% of which by the state banks—would facilitate “access to the financing that is conducive to boosting economic activity, by promoting a reduction in real interest rates and encouraging commercial banks to provide more credit.”[3] With the supply of goods and services fixed in the short-term, the increased lending by banks due to the lower interest rates would mean more euros relative to the E.U. goods and services, and thus an increase in inflation. However, the ECB’s stated purpose for the program was primarily to boost economic activity by means of lowering interest rates. Yet price stability was the ECB’s objective, hence not to be a byproduct of the pursuit of another objective.

(Source: Trading Economics)

To be sure, the central bank’s mission was an inflation rate to levels below, but close to 2 percent, and the inflation rate in the “euro area” was .24% in 2015, with a period of deflation.[4] By 2019, the inflation rate stood at 1.76 percent, which was within the ECB’s objective. The programme had worked. Whether it should of worked—whether money supply should be increased to increase inflation—is debatable, for deflation and inflation should arguably be determined by relationship of GDP to the money supply. Otherwise, a pro-inflation mandate would mean that prices would continue to increase rather than reflect the market relationship of money and GDP. After a sustained period of inflation, balance would dictate a corrective period of deflation.

Answering questions submitted by the state of Germany’s top court, the European Court of Justice issued a press release in 2018 stating that the “purpose of the PSPP programme is to encourage a return of inflation rates to levels below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.”[5] Yet, as stated above, the ECB’s own stated reason for its programme was to boost economic activity (by decreasing interest rates). The ECJ states that “a monetary policy [i.e., decreasing interest rates to increase inflation] cannot be treated as equivalent to an economic [i.e., fiscal] policy [e.g. for boosting economic activity] for the sole reason that it may have indirect effects that can also be sought in the context of economic policy.”[6] In plain English, increasing or decreasing money supply is not an equivalent option to fiscal policy in boosting economic activity just because this is an indirect effect of the monetary policy. Therefore, even if boosting economic activity were an indirect effect, or byproduct, of the ECB’s primary intent to increase inflation, the ECB could not justify its programme on the basis of its indirect fiscal effect. Yet the ECB’s stated objective of the programme was to boost economic activity! The E.U. should have used a fiscal rather than a monetary policy if the primary aim, as the ECB stated, was to boost economic activity. The groups in Germany that had instigated the German court’s questions to the ECJ had a good argument that the ECB had been acting beyond its mandate in this narrow sense. However, that the ECB had achieved its inflation target by means of the programme suggests that the central bank could be viewed as having acted within its mandate. The question is perhaps whether the ECB pursued its program even after the inflation target had been achieved. That the rate in 2018 was still below 2% suggests that this was not the case. The problem, therefore, was that the ECB stated boosting economic activity as its primary objective, with lower interest rates serving only as a means.

Unfortunately, the constitutional court of the state of Germany took its objection too far. Even though groups that had brought constitutional objections to the Bundesverfassungsgericht (the German constitutional court) had claimed that because the PSPP programme exceeded the ECB’s mandate, the E.U. failed “to observe the division of competencies” between the E.U. and its states, the German court violated the supremacy of the ECJ, the federal supreme court of the E.U., over the state courts by directing the state’s central bank not to comply with the ECB’s programme by buying back German bonds. Such a long sentence, by the way, is in keeping with German, though my words do not reach such a length.

The Nullification Crisis in U.S. history can provide us with a context. In November, 1832, the South Carolina Government passed a law declaring the U.S. tariffs laws of 1828 and 1832 null and void in South Carolina. The underlying problem was “the constitutional theory that upheld the right of states to nullify federal acts within their boundaries.”[7] Had the member states still been sovereign, as they had been from 1776 to 1789 (including under the Articles of Confederation), the doctrine would have had a solid basis (i.e., the full sovereignty of the new republics within the U.S.). However, once the U.S. itself (i.e., the federal level) had been delegated some governmental sovereignty, the doctrine would have eviscerated that sovereignty. States would have been able to pick which federal law to recognize, hence any federal law could easily have been vitiated or compromised. The states would have been able to trample on the federal sovereignty with impunity and the federal system itself would have lost coherence, and thus the ability to function viably.

On May 5, 2020, the constitutional court of the state of Germany ruled against the legality of the ECB’s programme within the state, much as South Carolina’s legislature had voted against the legality of the tariff laws. It was a direct challenge to the E.U.’s central bank and supreme court (ECJ). Were the ECJ to let the state court’s ruling stand, other states would surely follow in opting out of whatever federal laws they do not like. The Government of Germany had been against the bond buy-backs in the euro area because of the shared losses. In short, the powerful northern state didn’t want to pay for the losses of poorer southern states through the programme. Likewise, the matter of shared state debt had been a hot topic during the Washington administration in the 1790s in the United States. There too, the state governments who had incurred less debt in fighting the Revolutionary War did not want the higher debts of other states to be pooled through the federal government.

The resistance in Germany since the European debt crisis during and after the financial crisis of 2008 to covering the massive debts of Greece, Spain, and Italy found a footing in the German court even though the ruling meant the possible vitiation (i.e. end) of the E.U’s competencies (i.e., governmental sovereignty), and thus of the federal system itself.  “Given the influence Germany wields as the largest [State in the euro area of the E.U.], the [ECB] can’t afford to ignore the [German] court’s decision, in part because it would be all but impossible for” the programme to continue without the participation of Germany’s central bank.[8] Moreover, other state governments (and courts), such as in Poland and the Czech Republic, would likely follow in challenging the E.U. unilaterally.

The German chancellorin (prime minister), Angela Merkel, had been urging a stronger E.U. after the secession of euro-skeptic (anti-federalist) Britain, yet her state’s interest in staving off shared debt through the ECB resulted in her state’s high court throwing an arrow directly at the core of the E.U.’s federal system (of dual or divided sovereignty). “At a time of growing tension in the EU over German reluctance to embrace ambitious plans to resuscitate southern European economies hit hardest by the coronavirus by issuing mutualized debt, known colloquially as corona bonds,” the German court’s ruling added fuel to the argument that the E.U. itself was being compromised by the power of its largest state in pursuing its own interests at the expense of the common good, or general welfare, in the Union as a whole.[9] Abstractly stated, no part should have sufficient power over the whole that the latter’s power is eviscerated because it is a mere reflection of  the interests of the part operating at the expense of the whole.

(Source: Politico)

As for the ruling of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (the German constitutional court), Justice Andreas Vosskuhle said that the ECJ had approved the programme that “was obviously not covered” by the ECB’s mandate.”[10] The ruling did not apply to the corona bonds during the pandemic in 2020. Nor was the ECB’s purchasing of state debt (i.e. quantitative easing) during the financial crisis. Even though the court did not find enough evidence to rule that the programme amounted to monetary financing (i.e., the ECB funding state budgets), the court did decide that the ECB had overstepped its inflation-objective mission.[11] The German government had been against pooling money through the ECB to fund the government budgets by pooling the debt of the more indebted states going back to the financial crisis of 2008. Regarding the programme at issue here, the German court’s claim that the ECB had overstepped its mandate does not succeed because the programme did not push inflation above 2% in trying to boost economic activity. In other words, the ECB had not over-shot its inflation target, even if the bank erroneously was primarily oriented to increase GNP. Inflation was so low in 2015 that an inflation rationale was justified. 

 

The impact of the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s ruling went beyond the ECB itself. The viability of the ECJ and the federal system itself was suddenly under threat. Dismissing a 2018 ECJ decision to allow bond buy-backs, the state court “ordered the ECB to provide Germany with adequate justification for the program within the next three months. Should it fail to do so, the Bundesbank [the state’s central bank] would no longer be permitted to participate in the program.”[12] The ECB was at the time “an independent EU institution [that] does not have to take orders from the German court, and the government in Berlin.”[13] In reply, the ECB told the German court that the ECJ had already determined the legality of [the programme]. In dismissing the ECJ’s earlier conclusions, the German court, by a 7-1 majority, declared the reasoning by the ECJ to be “not comprehensible” and “objectively arbitrary” and the decision itself to be untra vires (i.e., beyond the court’s authority).[14] Yet the German court presumed itself to have the authority to overrule the federal supreme court!

Even were the ECJ to deliver a bad ruling, or one injurious to a particular state’s policy, the ECJ would be protected by the precedent of its superiority over state supreme courts. The ECJ had ruled in Costa v ENEL (1964) that the states had transferred sovereign rights to the ECJ on E.U. law and furthermore that such law could not be overridden by state law. The ECB being a federal institution, the matter of whether the programme breached the central bank’s mandate was within the purview of the federal supreme court, the ECJ, rather than any state court. In stating that the gravity of the question at hand merited going up against the ECJ ruling and the ECJ itself, the German court had, I contend, lost perspective. Buying back bonds through a federal program, unlike something infringing on basic human rights, for example, does not have sufficient weight to justify imperiling the federal system itself. It is ironic that just months after the state of Britain seceded in part out of dislike for the extant governmental sovereignty of the E.U. in relation to that of the state governments, the German state court threw a bomb from within.

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1. BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 05 May 2020 – 2 BvR 859/15-, paras. (1-237).

2. Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No 192/18, December 11, 2018.

3. Ibid.

4. Statistica.com (accessed May 10, 2020).

5. Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No 192/18.

6. Ibid.

7.  The Nullification Crisis, Britannica.com (accessed May 10, 2020).

8. Matthew Karnitschnig, “German Court Lays Down Law in Defiance of European Union,” Politico, May 5, 2020 (accessed May 10, 2020).

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

Anticipating a Recession: Economic and Political Indicators in the E.U.

Anticipation in August, 2019, at least among bond purchasers on Wall Street, of an impending recession in 2020 had at least in part to do with the E.U. In particular, a large state, Germany, had a disappointing second quarter in terms of contracting economic output, and the increasing prospect of Britain seceding from the Union was thought to result in the E.U. economy turning recessionary. I contend that both of these baleful indicators were over-emphasized. Additionally, adding the increasing political polarization in the E.U. as another contributor to an upcoming recession would be too much.

Germany’s economy contracted just 0.1% from the 0.4% growth rate of the first quarter.[1] Placing such emphasis on a change from 0.4 to 0.3 might strike some people as being petty. Yet Carsten Brzeski, chief economist in Germany of the Dutch bank ING said at the time, “Today’s GDP report definitely marks the end of a golden decade for the German economy.”[2] A 0.1% change ends a golden decade. How fragile golden decades must be!

To be sure, “industrial output for June dropped over 5% compared to the previous year. And the ZEW indicator of economic sentiment for August plunged sharply, hitting its lowest level since December 2011.”[3] Brzeski pointed to increased uncertainty from a large state seceding from the E.U. and the U.S.-China trade negotiations as the main culprit. Whereas the British economy would likely be negatively affected in the scenario of secession without coordination, the argument that the E.U. economy would contract as a result is more tenuous. Even if the British economy of a fully sovereign U.K. were to falter, the E.U. economy, being, like that of the U.S., made up of state economies, would hopefully be able to absorb interruptions in trade with Britain. Moreover, the empire-scale of the E.U. (and U.S.) is, as a cluster, much larger than the state-scale of political entities within the empire-scale union.[4]  Baleful economic predictions in 2019 for the E.U. post-secession may have been exaggerated in part due to conflating the two political scales. References to Britain’s “divorce” from the E.U. serve as perfect examples of the category-mistake. No, Virginia, the U.K. is not another E.U.; rather, pre-secession Britain was/is a political sub-unit in the E.U., whose laws and court (ECJ) trump(ed) British law and courts.

The pre-secession trend of business moving from the state of the U.K. to other states may suggest that the E.U. economy would actually benefit from a “no deal” secession. Furthermore, the E.U. trades with other countries, so disruption in trade with a former state could be viewed relatively and thus seen as less baleful for the Union than some economic forecasters were predicting in 2019.

More crucial to the E.U., and less to its economy, were “insurgent movements from the anticapitalist far-left to the nativist far-right,” which have “made inroads” amid “eroding public confidence in mainstream conservative and social-democratic parties that for decades” had dominated at the state level.[5] Although it is tempting to label all this as political instability, the political institutions have funneled even parties like the 5 Star party, which came out of anti-corruption protests, into the nitty-gritty of coalition talks.

Even the political tensions in 2018 between the state government of Italy and the federal E.U. level, which “upset investors in Italian bonds and banks, hurting the flow of credit,” and the collapse of the governing coalition in 2019, which drive some investors into bonds, were not economic crises for the E.U. economy as a whole. Politically, however, Matteo Salvini of the League Party in Italy, could already be viewed as potentially damaging the E.U. federal system. He “challenged” the E.U. law on fiscal discipline for state governments, accusing the states of Germany and France of hypocritically getting away with exceeding the limits on state debt and deficits while the E.U. imposed austerity on the Italian government. His complaint was valid enough. On August 20, 2019, he repeated he would defy federal authorities on the tax-increase (rather than a decrease!) part of the austerity fiscal-discipline federal mandate.

In the early 1830’s, U.S. President Andrew Jackson was forced to deal with South Carolina’s Nullification Acts, which stipulated that the state government could defy federal law regarding laws that the state deems are detrimental to South Carolina. Jackson was aware that a federal system in which governmental sovereignty is split, as in the U.S. and E.U., cannot long survive when even just one state government can decide to defy federal law. So the political uncertainty regarding the growing power of the political extremes in the E.U. has primarily political implications. To put the economics before the political in such a case represents yet another over-statement of the economic. Politics does not reduce to economics. Although the former can obviously affect the latter, one of the domains should not be put foremost in the domain of the other. My thinking on political uncertainty is that its economic effects tend to be overstated. Even in political terms, political institutions have shown a remarkable ability to funnel, or normalize, what was once raw political conflict.

Related: Skip Worden, Essays on the E.U. Political Economy: Federalism and the Debt Crisis. Available at Amazon.

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[1] Julia Horowitz, “German Economy Shrinks as ‘Golden Decade’ Comes to an End,” CNN.com, August 14, 2019.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Skip Worden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire: A Basis for Trans-Atlantic Comparisons. Available at Amazon.

[5] Marcus Walker, “Italy’s Government Collapse Sets Up a Power Struggle,” The Wall Street Journal, August 21, 2019.

Exaggeration on the U.S. Economy “Going Over the Cliff” after the Financial Crisis of 2008

As the U.S. Government faced down its own deadline in 2012 before the Bush tax cuts would expire and across-the-board budget cuts would commence, the Federal Reserve, which had been struggling to prop up the economy by buying bonds and keeping interest rates low, would, according to the Chairman, Ben Bernanke, be largely powerless to do more in the face of a recessionary policy on taxes and spending. "We cannot offset the full impact of the fiscal cliff," he said of the Fed. "It's just too big." That he had written a doctoral dissertation on the Great Depression and had specialized on it as a professor at Princeton lends a lot of weight to his judgment on the matter. However, he had also managed to be re-appointed to the Fed and thus knew how to play the game. In the case of the automatic budget cuts, major power-brokers, specifically in the military industrial complex, had a lot riding on Congress and the White House making a deal that would obviate the cuts in defense spending. The chairman of the Fed could have been carrying their water.

Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, in front of the lights.   Reuters

In September 2012, Bernanke had announced an open-ended mortgage-backed-security purchasing program that would put $40 billion a month into the economy. At the time, he said, “If we do not see substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market, we will continue the MBS purchase program, undertake additional asset purchases, and employ our policy tools as appropriate until we do. We will be looking for the sort of broad-based growth in jobs and economic activity that generally signal sustained improvement in labor market conditions and declining unemployment.” Presumably the Fed would continue the mortgage-bond purchases were the automatic budget cuts and end of the Bush tax breaks to forestall a “broad-based growth in jobs and economic activity.”

In terms of economic impact, a stimulus of $40 billion a month, or $480 billion annually, would just about match the anticipated $500 billion hit from the “cliff.” How is it then, that the latter is “just too big”? Were the $480 billion insufficient, the Fed would be free to increase its purchases.  Time magazine describes the stimulus mechanism as follows: “Open-ended purchases of mortgages will have the effect of lowering interest rates, helping more people qualify for mortgages or refinance. But more importantly it will — in theory — have the effect of creating an expectation of generally higher asset prices in the future, which will motivate people to get off their duffs and spend money now. If companies and individuals are indeed convinced that prices will rise in the future, that would encourage them to spend, hire, and jump-start the economy out of its chronic underperformance.” Whereas monetary policy was contracted in response to the Great Depression, the scholar of that mistake could presumably do the opposite should we—in his words, “go over the cliff.” His $480 billion mountain of money could turn his $500 billion cliff into a mere bump.

To be sure, purchasing mortgage-bonds can only do so much. As David Dayen of Firedoglake argues, there’s only so much the lifting of asset prices can do without appropriate fiscal policy to accompany it: “(Y)ou have to question the role of monetary actions by themselves to generate an economic boost, especially at this time. Lower mortgage rates may or may not prove helpful . . . without fiscal stimulus and a reversal of the current trajectory of deficit reduction, we will never get to the desired trend for growth.” However, the Fed could presumably buy up more than mortgage-bonds, freeing banks up to lend more in the process.

Most telling is Bernanke’s claim that the Fed could not increase its stimulus enough to counter the anticipated $500 billion hit from sequestration and the end of the Bush tax breaks—and yet the Fed was already on record that it would spend $480 billion in 2013 unless the economy improved in the meantime. His inflexibility seems arbitrary, or dogmatic, in other words, given what the Fed can do, and this leads me to the alternative explanation that the chairman was actually doing someone else’s bidding rather than proffering a judgment steeped in decades of study. The real task would be one of locating the real power-brokers whose financial interests were so threatened.

Whereas the expiration of the Bush tax cuts and cutting entitlement programs had been perennially on the block for years, the sacred-cow of defense spending was all of a sudden susceptible as well. Hence, I believe, all the dire doomsday warnings coming out of Washington to the contrary, the pressure on a political deal was oriented to protecting the status quo of the military-industrial complex rather than obviating certain economic collapse. That is, even more fundamental than the interest of politicians and the media to over-dramatize “going over the cliff” in order to gain attention, the subterranean financial interest of the American military-industrial complex may have been pulling many strings—many puppets—to veer the debate toward a deal. Even as the major players on stage were posturing, a two-step could have been going on behind the scenes—dancing around the sacred cows. Perhaps the real news behind the Bernanke’s warning is that even the “non-politicized” central bank was “doing the dance.”

Sources:

John Cushman, “To Bernanke, ‘Cliff’ Says It All” The New York Times, December 12, 2012.

Christopher Matthews, “Ben Bernanke’s Heavy Artillery: Will Open-Ended Bond Buying Drive Down Unemployment?” Time, September 14, 2012.

Contagion Beyond the Headlines in the E.U.

The E.U. states of Greece and Italy were grabbing headlines during the first two weeks of November 2011, given the dramatic resignations of Papandreou and Berlusconi. The only other state to get some attention was France. The Wall Street Journal noted on November 12^th that concerns had been quietly building about France. According to the paper,“French bond yields rose to four-month highs, one day after Standard & Poor's Ratings Services erroneously issued a message saying it had cut France's triple-A credit rating. The yield on France's benchmark 10-year bond climbed 0.02 percentage point to 3.46%. That was 1.66 percentage points over yields on comparable German government bonds. France now has the highest government bond yields among its triple-A-rated peers in the region.” However, it seems overly dramatic to say that a .02 percent increase evinces a climb. Moreover, 3.46% is well under 7 percent, which is the level that was presumed at the time to signify the need for a bailout. Relative to the changes in the Italian yield, those of the French bonds could be viewed as relatively moderate, The French yield was still closer to that of Germany. Although not a red herring, the concern over France masked some real sleepers that were poised to take a hit in 2012. 

Eclipsed by the headlines, Portugal’s expected GDP for 2012 was revised downward by the E.U.’s executive branch in November from the May estimates of around -1.8% to -3% with an expected unemployment rate of nearly 14 percent. The 2011 numbers were also revised downward, from about -1.9% to around -2.1 percent. Meanwhile, Portugal’s semi-sovereign 10-year bond yield was at just over 12 percent, well over Italy’s “point of no return” rate of 7.5 percent, which was hit for a day during the second week of November. With an expected contraction of 3% in 2012 and a 12% yield in November of 2011, Portugal could be expected to face stronger head-winds in being able to make its interest payments in 2012. I suspect that the press had become so captivated with the circus of personalities in Greece and Italy that the iceberg lying in front of Portugal was simply not seen.

Besides Portugal, some of the states in Eastern Europe faced icebergs of their own—though not necessarily of their own making. These too were receiving too little press coverage in November of 2011. Specifically, the state leaders of the “euro zone” had decided in October to give the “zone’s” major banks until the following summer to raise their capital reserves. With that amount of time, the banks could avoid issuing new stock (which would dilute the holdings of their existing stockholders) and get the added reserves together by cutting back on lending to Eastern E.U. state governments instead. Morgan Stanley figures that Poland, Romania, and Hungary are most vulnerable to a loss of “euro zone” bank lending. Roughly 1 trillion euros of “euro zone” bank assets were in Eastern Europe at the time of the change in governments in Greece and Italy. Hungary’s exposure was the largest, with loans held by the banks amounting to about 37% of GDP. According to the Wall Street Journal, any hit to the E.U.’s eastern states, whose economic growth had been powered the global recovery, would only worsen the E.U.’s economic outlook and its ability to service its debts. That is to say, enabling the “euro zone” banks to raise additional reserve capital by reducing lending rather than raising equity may have been in the banks’ interest, but choking the eastern states could already in November be expected to make it more difficult for Greece, Italy, and Portugal to service their respective debts from reduced economic output in 2012. 

It would have been wiser on the journalists’ part to put France in perspective and take a look at Portugal and Eastern Europe than to have fixated so much on the plights of Papandreou and Berlusconi as they struggled to maintain power only to ultimately lose it.

For more on this topic, see Essays on the E.U. Political Economy

Sources:

Matthew Dalton, “Europe Slashes Its Growth Forecast,” The Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2011. 

Kelly Evans, “Eastern Europe Vulnerable in Debt Crisis,” The Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2011. 

Neelabh Chaturvedi, Stelios Bouras, and Liam Moloney, “Europe Pulls Back From Brink,” The Wall Street Journal, November 12-13, 2011. 

Political Risk Exaggerated on Catexit

On the day the Catalan parliament voted in favor of “Catexit” from Spain, the IBEX-35 stock-market index dropped 1.4 percent while the Stoxx Europe 600 gained 0.3 percent.[1] The IBEX-35 is an stock-index of companies based in Spain. Investors also sold state bonds; yields on 10-year bonds rose to 1.574% from 1.558. Even though these changes were hardly earth-shattering in magnitude, their directionality points to investor-anxiety. I submit that it was overblown, which suggests that investors generally tend to over-react to political events.

Analysts said at the time that the state of Spain and the E.U. were unlikely to recognize the validity of the legislative vote, so the possibility of social unrest accounted for the drop in the index and rise in bond-yields. The prospect of a Catexit was indeed still bleak; in fact, the state government had redoubled its control in the problematic, wealthy region, so even the prospect that social unrest would even ruffle the feathers of business could be said to be bleak. Uncertainty itself was the alleged culprit. The Wall Street Journal observed at the time that the “market selloff reflects fears that uncertainty will be harmful for [the state’s] economy.”[2] The fear of fear itself, I submit, can as in this instance be overblown, given the haziness of the future negative scenarios.

Generally speaking, political risk can be overstated if a political event occurs on a day rather than strung out over weeks or months even though the eventual possible outcomes are far from clear. The publicity from the sheer dramatic flair of an event can magnify the perception of uncertainty, prompting investors not just to stay away, but even to sell.  

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[1] Jon Sindreu, “Stocks, Bonds Hit by Political Unrest,” The Wall Street Journal, October 28-29, 2017.

[2] Ibid.

Goldman Sachs’ Venezuelan Bonds: Power Behind the Throne

Goldman Sachs paid about $865 million for $2.8 billion worth of bonds in May, 2017. This represents 31 cents on the dollar and translates into an annual yield of more than 40 percent.[1] The high yield is due to the high risk that is involved, for the bonds had been held by Venezuela’s central bank in what “the government’s opposition decried as a lifeline” to the regime then in power.[2] Indeed, the central bank’s foreign-currency reserves increased by $442 million to $10.8 billion the day the bond deal was completed, and the government needed to raise money it owed to key allies like Russia and China.[3] In indirectly aiding that government, Goldman Sachs risked the ire of the opposition. Writing to Goldman Sachs, Julio Borges, head of Venezuela’s opposition-controlled legislature, indicated that he would “recommend to any future democratic government of Venezuela not to recognize or pay on these bonds.”[4] Hence, the high risk, high return. Though I submit that the risk might have been considerably less than meets the eye on account of the influence of the bank on the U.S. Government.

Goldman Sachs had been “steadily increasing its Venezuelan holdings in recent months, betting that a change in government could more than double the value of the debt if the country, which sits atop the world’s largest oil reserves, reforms its economy.”[5] The American bank could arguably dismiss Borges’ ominous threat because of the bank’s formidable influence, or power, in the U.S. Government. Besides the lavish political-campaign contributions that the bank no doubt extended to members of Congress, prospective candidates, and to the sitting president at the time, the bank had an insurance policy of sorts in that one of its alums, Steve Mnuchin (formerly a partner at Goldman) was serving as U.S. Treasury Secretary and another, Gary Cohen (who had resigned from being the President at Goldman), was the U.S. President’s Chief Economic Advisor (i.e., head of the National Economic Council). Additionally, Steven Bannon, the chief strategist in the Trump administration, had worked in the bank. Ex-Goldman bankers thus held very senior positions in the U.S. Government as the bank was betting that future regimes in Venezuela would recognize the validity of the debt owed to the bank.

The expression, “power behind the throne,” expresses the underbelly of power that has existed without doubt since the dawn of human organization. The advent of the large corporation, whose astonishing accumulation of wealth stems from principles of the Industrial Revolution, meant that private power could trump publicly held power to an unprecedented extent. The governmental discretion of lawmakers and even heads of governments may actually be diminished because of the sheer power behind the strings. In spite of the dubious democratic legitimacy and the horrendous human-rights record of the regime in power in Venezuela when Goldman Sachs bought the bond that had been issued by the state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, the policy of the U.S. Government could easily be to “look the other way” and even prop up that regime or support any prospective regime that agrees to “toe the line” on repaying the debt owed to Goldman. The power behind the American throne, in other words, might reduce to the bottom-line financial transactions of the large American banks, which, by the way, are too big to fail yet sufficiently powerful to vanquish even public debate on whether the banks should be broken up for the overall interest of the U.S. economies and financial system. In short, follow the money, not the ideals or even enlightened self-interest. The world, moreover, may be in a driverless ship—one whose route is simply a matter of large financial transactions. Those transactions themselves may be the true power, for not even the CEO at a major bank can realistically deviate from seeing them through; the shareholders would have his head.

The discretion, whether in the large corporations or in the halls of government, may really only reside at the point at which the decisions are taken to proceed with a given large transaction. Only an investment banker would know how much discretion is truly present in the decision of whether to commit funds to an investment. In the case of Goldman’s purchase of the Venezuelan state-related bonds, the anticipation of the artificial risk-reduction by means of financial-to-political power could mean the allure of a 40% return on investment is too much to resist (i.e., greed). Yet such a prospect being deemed realistic could mean that Goldman’s managers faced a de facto fiduciary duty to the stockholders to make the non-bet “bet.” The availability of alternative profitable uses of the funds available for a bank like Goldman Sachs could give the bank’s managers some leeway in line with not propping up a regime that suffers democratically and in terms of human rights. It is only on the margins, I suspect, that ideals can get a glimpse of sunlight in a political economy in which large financial transactions hold sway in terms of both financial and political power. Yet the greed leaning strongly toward the 40% return, which crucially is made so realizable only by the bank’s power over political power in the U.S. Government, is hard for human nature to resist, especially that which is well ensconced in the culture on Wall Street. Accordingly, large financial transactions may take on a deterministic hew.

In any case, once a transaction is committed to, power goes to the transaction itself, with its private and public defenders feeling they have little practical choice but to act in the transaction’s own interest. Indeed, bank managers can be fired and government officials can be turned out if they don’t “play along.” The logic of the existing financial transactions may be determinative for the ship of state as well as an economic system. It is no wonder, therefore, that the general public should fear the prospect of a distant iceberg coming unawares over the bow, and that ideals for a better world should fall off along the way like ice melting off the rails. 

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1. Kejal Vyas, Anatoly Kurmanaev, and Julie Wernau, “Goldman Sachs Under Fire For Venezuela Bond Deal,” The Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2017.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

Should the ECB Buy State Bonds and Encourage State Deficits?

In remarks at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, European Central Bank president Mario Draghi urged greater fiscal and monetary coordination to boost the E.U.’s economy. A ship cannot move along at full speed if all the sails are not coordinated so that each is poised at its optimal angle to the prevailing winds. So too, various policies in a political economy must all sail in the same direction for a full-sail recovery to really take off. Just as a sailing ship must avoid jagged pitfalls lurking in rocky waters, so too must policy makers; for it is all too easy in focusing on one point on the horizon to ignore or dismiss baleful downsides to the dominant policies.

At the foot of the Teton Mountains, there being no foothills, Draghi “called for explicit policy co-ordination between the [Eurozone’s] monetary guardian and [the states].”[1] Brandishing considerably less concern on inflation, he linked the ECB’s future purchases of state bonds (i.e., quantitative easing, or QE) to structural reforms, tax cuts, and more spending at the state level. 

At the time, E.U. law limited state budget deficits to 3% of gross domestic product. Pointing to the existing flexibility in that law, the central banker urged the state governors to “better address the weak recovery and to make room for the cost of needed structural reforms.”[2] I submit that the accent should be placed on the latter, as they would have more staying power. It is like the difference between consuming sugar (even in fruit) before running, and drinking a protein shake after lifting weights; both food elements are helpful, but only the protein becomes a part the body and can thus strengthen it for the future.

Quantitative easing can unfortunately impact an economy in both foreseen and unforeseen ways due to the intended artificially-low interest rates. The market-mechanism cannot but be distorted, with harsh byproducts free to silently ravage certain segments while others benefit without merit. The human brain is not so omniscient as to be able to fully anticipate and plug all the leaks that can arise from a systemic distortion in a macro-economy. That is to say, the system is so complex that a huge distortion using one macro policy tool can introduce significant systemic risk.

In the U.S., for example, low rates in the 1990s incentivized a housing bubble whose collapse in 2007 triggered the potentially catastrophic credit freeze and collapse of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008. The government bailout of GM, AIG, and Wall Street banks worsened the federal public debt. By 2014, that debt reached over $17 trillion. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve printed money far exceeding the meager growth of GDP by buying bonds to artificially lower interest rates to prompt a recovery.

With interest rates low, money flooded into stocks. “The market is in effect rigged because of the [low] interest rate,” Charles Biderman said on CNBC as the summer of 2014 was coming to an end.[3] A grinding ethical fault-line ran between the stocks increasing at 25% a year and the wages and salaries increasing at a mere 3 percent. Moreover, the middle and lower economic classes would doubtless feel the brunt of a collapse of the stock market due to irrational fear should rates be raised to counter the inflation from too many dollars chasing too few goods.

With borrowing money being so cheap at the low rates, government officials did not feel the normal market pressure to hem in the deficits. Corporate managements could borrow money cheaply to acquire or merge with other companies without being perhaps as discerning of the degree of compatibility and synergy as would be the case under naturally determined interest rates. In 2014 through August, more than $2 trillion in mergers and acquisitions were announced—an increase of 70 percent over the same period the year before.[4] While managers, stockholders, and lawyers make out like bandits on the deals, subordinate employees are left out of the largess and may even lose their jobs as the price of synergy.

As dark as the underside of quantitative easing is in pushing rates abnormally low, the most potentially harmful byproduct of Draghi’s plan concerns his intent to encourage the E.U.’s state governments to make greater use of the “existing flexibility” already in the federal law limiting state budget deficits to 3% of annual economic output. Even large states such as France and Germany had had trouble keeping within the law; states such as Greece, Spain, and even Italy carried so much debt that the systemic risk of default became a problem not just for the E.U., but for the global financial system as well. To encourage flexibility might be like giving money to an alcoholic standing outside a liquor store. The last thing state legislators need to hear is additional flexibility to tax less and spend more can be found in the fine print.

As an alternative, Draghi could have emphasized that the ECB would focus on assisting states with structural reforms both by lending its expertise and finding the right monetary incentives that would not distort the financial market in potentially unforeseen ways. Sticking to old ways is not necessarily the best route to getting structural changes capable of ushering in new ways.

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1. Claire Jones, Peter Spiegel, and Robin Harding, “Draghi Softens Tone on Austerity,” The Financial Times, August 22, 2014.

2. Ibid.

3. Charles Biderman, CNBC TV, August 28, 2104.

4. Trish Regan, “Has Fed Jumped the Shark?” USA Today, August 26, 2014.

A Fifty-Percent Write-Down: Discounting Debt Insurance?

In “Europe’s Rescue Plan,” The Economist (October 29, 2011) opines on the “fixes” that had been announced just days before by E.U. leaders on the public debt crisis. I find three points of note that are particularly worth elaboration. 

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

Voluntary Greek-Debt Maturity Extensions: A Rush for the Exits?

As the E.U. was working out more loans for Greece in summer 2011, rating agencies looking at the state’s debt indicated that default would be pronounced should the decision of bond-holders to continue to hold Greek bonds be anything less than voluntary. Germany had been pushing for something less than voluntary so taxpayers would not have to bear so much of the risk and cost. France, doing the bidding of its banks, effectively used the rating agencies’ default-guidelines to insist that additional E.U. loans do not require then-current bond-holders to agree to later maturities. Given the extent of Greece’s debt-load relative to the state’s GDP, a private sector bond-holder, such as a bank, would naturally loose little time in getting out of holding Greek debt, even given the high interest rates (which reflect the risk).  

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.

The Federal Reserve to Buy More U.S. T-Bills but No State Debt

According to The New York Times, “At their first meeting of the year, Federal Reserve policy makers voted unanimously … to continue the central bank’s controversial $600 billion plan to spur the recovery by buying government bonds.”[1] In other words, the central bank would continue to “print money” to buy up U.S. Government debt, allowing that government to go into more debt without putting pressure on the interest rate to go up (which would cost the government more in interest payments to bondholders).

Theoretically, the Federal Reserve can buy an unlimited amount of bonds because the central bank can create money. Of course, creating money relative to GNP growth can spark inflation, but the central bankers are not worries. “The Fed did note that commodity prices had risen, but cautioned that long-term inflation expectations had been stable and that measures of underlying inflation had continued to trend downward.” Even so, “skeptics fear that the bond-buying — which has the effect of further expanding the Fed’s already large balance sheet — could lead to destabilizing asset bubbles or touch off inflation.”[2] I contend that this is a rather narrow (though certainly valid) concern; equally or more troubling for the long term is the asymetry in the Fed’s treatment of debt issued by the U.S. Government and that of the state governments. 

For instance, in 2010 Illinois issued $16 billion in additional debt. Whereas the U.S.Government could fall back on the Federal Reserve, the latter has refused to purchase debt from states like Illinois. Aside from the unfairness inherent in the Federal Reserve’s proclivity, the asymetry subtly undercuts federalism. In other words, the U.S. Government having an unlimited ability to have its central bank purchase its debt gives that government still another edge over the state governments, which one can expect will be even more compromised in being able to check encroachments by the U.S. Government. The resulting enervation of federalism means that consolidation may reach us sooner rather than later, at the expense of our governments being able to act as mutual checks on eachother.

Another way of making this point is to charge that the Federal Reserve’s refusal to do for the state governments what the central bank is doing for the U.S. Government evinces a structural bias in our system of federalism. The lack of balance (and the underlying unfairness) ought to be of concern to the citizenry. The result may well be that the U.S. Government will be enabled to get into unsustainable debt such that the empire itself may one day collapse under its own weight at the center.

1. Sewell Chan, "Fed to Continue Bond Buying Program," The New York Times, January 26, 2011.

2. Ibid.