Friday, June 21, 2024

E.U. Political Parties

Following the E.U. 2024 election, political parties jostled for members in the Parliament. Whereas the political duopoly of parties in the U.S. House of Representatives severely limits such skipping around, the European analogue puts more of an emphasis on party management in terms of weighing ideological or policy “purity” against the power that comes from size. In contrast, the two major parties in the U.S. must be content to be “big tents,” each of which contains groups. From the standpoint of the parties in the E.U. Parliament, the groups are at the state level. The defection of Andrej Babis and the rest of his group from the Renew Europe party just weeks after the E.U. election in June, 2024 demonstrates the distinct balancing task of the E.U. parties. Such balancing is not something that the American political duopoly of parties need do. I contend that the Americans could benefit by looking at the European case in this regard.

On the one hand, the departure of Babis’s group caused Renew Europe to go from 81 representatives to 74, further weakening its power in the federal legislative body. On the plus side, however, Valérie Hayer, Renew Europe’s head, observed of the departed representatives that “their divergence from our values” had “increased exponentially and we witnessed this with great concern.”[1] For his part, Babis pointed out, “We went to the European elections saying that we would fight against illegal migration, that we wanted to repeal the ban on internal combustion engines and fundamentally change the Green Deal. . . . Above all, we want the Czech Republic to remain a sovereign country.”[2] Although Babis’ claim that the Renew Europe party would not change its party platform on immigration and the Green Deal is correct, he could not very credibly blame the party because the Czech Republic had given up some of its sovereignty in becoming a state in the Union; qualified majority voting alone is part of that transfer, since Babis’ state could be on the losing side of a QMV in the European Council. Nevertheless, the ideological difference between Bibis’s group and the party on immigration and the Green Deal meant that the Renew Europe party would be more ideologically “tight” and thus powerful in that sense with the departure of Babis and his fellow MEPs, and they in turn could find another party closer to their views precisely because the Parliament contained several parties rather than just two. Hayer pointed to the impact on the party’s ideological position in saying that the departed MEPs’ “unwillingness to continue their commitment to liberal values has led to today’s outcome. They have turned their back to our firm pro-European convictions and values.”[3] More to the point, Hayer predicted that the party would be “more united.”[4]  Fewer members in the legislative body but more united: this is the trade-off that any party leadership in the E.U. Parliament had to balance in the post-election phrase of politics. I submit that this is a good thing.

A major benefit of the balancing act is that E.U. citizens going to the polls could more closely tailor their respective votes to their political positions or ideology than can U.S. citizens voting for members of the U.S. House. An American voter angry at the Israeli government, for example, did not have a choice of party opposing the military incursion into Gaza; both the Democratic and Republican parties supported Israel in 2024. In contrast, a European could vote for a party with a plank opposing military support for Israel. The drawback in the European case is in terms of political stability in the Parliament, but as even an increase in representatives in the parties on the right did not fundamentally alter the majority coalition of parties, the inertia of the status quo has considerable weight in maintaining stability even as multiple parties jostle for members while trying to stay true to specific values on the political spectrum. In other words, the fear of political instability from there being many parties in the Parliament is overstated.

Therefore, Americans could be less scared of deviating from the American duopoly of major parties, as if the credible advent of other parties being truly competitive would trigger seismic political instability. A recalibrated “cost-benefit” analysis of having a duopoly of just two major “big tents” could result in reforms in which voters would be better able to tailor their votes to their values and political positions without having to vote for whichever party is closer even if it isn’t really very close and may even have antipodal positions. The political-legal electoral architecture, or basic framework, that favors the duopoly would have to be fundamentally changed, and in a political culture of incrementalism, such a change is only possible but not probable. Even so, it doesn’t hurt to look to the E.U. for ideas. That is to say, the U.S. could learn a thing or two from the E.U.



1. Jorge Liboreiro, “E.U. Liberals Dealt a New Blow after Czechia’s Andrej Babis Pulls Out His Seven MEPs,” Euronews, June 21, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Wednesday, June 19, 2024

Nominating and Electing the President of the E.U.'s Commission

Before the office of president of the European Commission can be elected by the European Parliament by a simple majority, the European Council must nominate a candidate. The nomination is by qualified majority vote, in that at least 55% of the states must be in favor and the combined population of the states voting yes must be at least 65% of the total population of the European Union. Were any state represented in the Council to have a veto (i.e., unanimity being required), the infeasibility alone of getting a candidate nominated would be astounding and prohibitive for the Union and especially its executive branch, the Commission. Just imagine if every sitting state governor in the U.S. meeting as the Senate (which represents the states) had to sign off on a candidate for that union’s executive-branch president before the House of Representatives (which represents citizens) could elect the candidate by a simple majority! From this comparison, we might wonder whether the European Council should be tasked with nominating two candidates, whom the representatives in the Parliament would then vote on in electing the president of Union’s executive branch. After all, there is more than one candidate when the U.S. House of Representatives votes (by member state!) to elect the president if no candidate receives a majority of the votes of the states’ electoral colleges. Indeed, the E.U. is not the only federal union in which states have a significant role in electing the head of the (federal) executive branch. I contend that the members of parliament should have a choice of more than one candidate when voting for the president of the E.U.’s executive branch. This is as of June, 2024, when the European Council was busy coming up with a nominee; being able to present two nominees to the Parliament would have made the Council’s job easier and the Parliament’s voting more democratic.

With no decision on a nominee at the Council’s informal dinner on June 17, 2024, a meeting was set for June 27th to make another attempt, doubtless after ten days of horse-trading in private. With the European People’s Party having amassed the most seats of any party in the Parliament, that party was able to continue its coalition agreement with the Renew Europe party even though it had lost 20 seats compared to 2019. With the Green party and the Socialist party, the coalition could have 400-plus seats. The right-wing Identity and Democracy party and the European Conservatives and Reformists party gained members, though not as many as expected, so the People’s Party did not have to reach out to those parties in putting together the governing coalition. Such a coalition was necessary because the EPP did not get a majority of the 720 seats. To be sure, political groups at the state level in some states, such as Le Pen’s group in France and the Alt group in Germany could feed into the right-wing parties in the Parliament and affect how they relate, and those parties in turn had the option of combining into one larger party to act as a united opposition to the grand coalition. However, the ID party’s efforts had not borne fruit as of the Council’s informal dinner.[1]

Rather than get consumed by the various mechanizations of the state-level groups, a matter of more importance on the federal level is that of how much of a say the federal-level parties represented in (and recognized by) the European Parliament that were not in the majority coalition should have in the nominating process.

At the informal dinner, a “raft of bilateral and trilateral meetings between the three main parties—the European People’s Party (EPP), the Socialists and the Liberals—helped bridge the gaps but became bogged down by the EPP’s maximalist demands.”[2] Those likely included the demand to split the term of the Council’s president to have an EPP person in for 2.5 years even as Von der Leyen, who wanted a second term as president of the Commission and was in the EPP, was likely to be nominated. That the parties on the right were left out of the discussions even though they had gained seats in the Parliament was not lost on Viktor Orbán of the E.U. state of Hungary, who said, “The will of the European people was ignored today in Brussels,” at the end of the meeting.[3] Those parties would have been justified in objecting to the “custom” whereby the candidate from the party of the most seats, the EPP in 2024, is supposed to be automatically “rubber-stamped” by the Council as its nominee; at least as of 2024, the Council had a free hand constitutionally (i.e., in terms of the E.U.’s basic law) in picking a nominee, as the Council is independent of the Parliament. On a basic level, the Council represents the states while the Parliament represents E.U. citizens (and residents). That the largest party in the Parliament should have its candidate automatically nominated by the Council also runs up against the separation between the legislative-branch Parliament and the executive-branch Commission.

Were the Council tasked with presenting at least two nominees to the Parliament, the nominating process would obviate (or eviscerate) the custom of rubber-stamping the wishes of the largest party in the Parliament. The E.U. parties on the right that were not included in the EPP’s majority-coalition could perhaps have seen a candidate representing the right compete with the other nominee at the election stage at the Parliament. Should the Council come up with more than two nominees in the future, then the Parliament could simply include a process of elimination feature in its voting process. Rather than risk the Parliament rejecting a sole nominee from the Council, which would bring the process back to the Council, and so further delay the selection, the Commission would not have to face the possibility of being without a head for so long. In the midst of the Russian military menace on the eastern flank of the E.U. in 2024, elongating the nominating and electing process would not be in the interest of the European Union.

As it stood in 2024, the nomination of just one candidate followed by a vote in the legislative lower house was more like the nomination by the U.S. president of one person to be a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court and the subsequent majority vote by the U.S. Senate than the way the U.S. House of Representatives elects the President if no candidate has received a majority of the combined electors of the states’ electoral colleges. I contend that the selection of the head of the E.U.’s executive branch should not be like that of a U.S. justice, for unlike the latter, the former is not supposed to be immune from politics. This is not to say that the dominant coalition of the Parliament, or the largest party, should have political control the President of the Commission. Rather, it is to say that democratic competition at the election stage of that president is fitting (whereas it wouldn’t be for selecting a justice). Comparing the E.U. and U.S. can thus be seen as a beneficial project for both unions as each seeks to be better as systems of public governance.


1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Analysis: Why Orbán, Meloni, and Fiala Are Angry about the E.U. Top Jobs,” Euronews, June 19, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.