Saturday, September 3, 2016

Apple Owes Back-Taxes in the E.U.: Blame Ireland or Apple?


The European Commission issued a formal decision on August 30, 2016 that the state of Ireland “recoup roughly €13 billion ($14.5 billion) of unpaid taxes accumulated over more than a decade by Apple, Inc.”[1] The decision “shows companies could be on the hook for past behavior and potentially be handed big bills for allegedly unpaid back taxes.”[2] E.U. law “forbid companies from gaining advantages over competitors because of government help.”[3] This applies both the federal government and the state governments, so the law could be better stated as, “No state government shall help companies gain advantages over their competitors.” Presumably Ireland’s government made the offer of help, rather than Apple getting that government to comply with the company’s wishes. If so, the state government rather than the company should be held responsible. Put another way, if Apple’s board and management considered the Irish offer to be legitimate at the time, Apple should not be held to pay the back taxes; rather, the state government should pay a penalty to the Commission.
In the wake of the decision, Tim Cook, CEO of Apple, wrote, “Apple follows the law and we pay all the taxes we owe.”[4] In other words, the company took the Irish offer as legal and thus paid only the taxes owed as per Ireland’s position. To be sure, the arrangement was sweet for the company. According to the Commission, Ireland offered Apple tax arrangements in 1991 and 2007 allowing the company “to pay annual tax rates of between 0.005% and 1% on its European profits for over a decade to 2014, by designating only a tiny portion of its profit as taxable in Ireland.”[5] Ireland allowed the company to allocate profit at an Irish-registered unit called Apple Sales International, which purchased Apple goods from its outside manufacturers and sold them at a markup outside North and South America. In 2011, the unit brought in €16 billion in profit, and allocated under €50 million of it to Ireland where it was subject to taxation. The rest was allocated to a “head office” registered in Ireland and thus outside of U.S. jurisdiction.[6] The tax benefit is clearly unfair prime facie, to the U.S., and to other foreign companies doing business in the E.U. It should be noted, however, that the U.S. tax system encouraged “companies to find as low a foreign tax rate as they can, book as much profit as possible outside the U.S. and leave the money overseas.”[7] This is precisely what Apple did.
The principal question before us here is not whether the arrangement was fair, but, rather, whether the state government or the company was to blame, and thus deemed culpable to be fined or taxed. It is significant that the E.U.’s antitrust commissioner, Margrethe Vestager, noted that the commission’s investigation “concluded that Ireland granted illegal tax benefits to Apple, which enabled it to pay substantially less tax than other businesses over many years.”[8] The state government is thus the culprit here in that it granted the illegal benefits. Doubtless Apple’s management and board had no reason to suspect that an offer from a government would be illegal. When a U.S. state government makes an offer to a company so it will build a factory in the state, the company’s management does not have reason to suspect that the offer is against U.S. law.
Hence, a spokeswoman for the U.S. federal treasury observed that “retroactive tax assessments by the commission are unfair, contrary to well-established legal principles, and call into question the tax rules” of the E.U. state governments.[9] Apple’s benefits may be quite unfair, yet so too are retroactive tax assessments when the company had no reason to call into question Ireland’s tax rules. I suspect that the unfairness in the former biased E.U. federal officials against viewing the state government rather than the company as culpable. If the issue is that of a state government violating federal law, then the federal executive should hold the state government to account, and thus fine it rather than the company.



[1] Natalia Drozdiak and Sam Schechner, “$14.5 Billion Irish Tax Bill,” The Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2016.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Richard Rubin, “EU Decision Upsets Treasury, Congress,” The Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2016.
“Companies based in the U.S. owe the full 35% corporate tax rate on their global profits. They get tax credits for payments to foreign governments, and they don't pay the residual U.S. tax until they bring the money home.”
[8] Drozdiak and Schechner, “$14.5 Billion Irish Tax Bill,”, italics added.
[9] Ibid.

Thursday, September 1, 2016

Going Off-Shore, Dodging Sanctions, and Laundering Money: The World of the Richest of the Rich


On April 3, 2016, 2.6 terabytes of data—more than 11.5 million documents—leaked from Panama’s law firm, Mossack Fonseca. The documents show that the firm “helped heads of state, oligarchs and celebrities launder money, dodge sanctions and avoid taxes.”[1] Over 40 years, 214,000 offshore shell companies in 200 countries implicate individuals including the family of Syrian President Bashar Assad, and that of British Prime Minister David Cameron, several friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmunder Gunnlaugsson; financial institutions implicated include UBS, HSBC, and Société Générale.[2] I contend that the markets themselves had been tilted in the interest of the greater power (i.e., the rich), so systemic rather than incremental or piecemeal efforts would be necessary to solve the problem.
To be sure, offshore accounts were not at the time illegal, yet even so, the ethical dimension is stinging. Peter Atwater, a behavior economist, points to the 1% being able to “move anywhere they want and profit handsomely from the relocation” whereas “the 99% are left with the aftermath—the empty buildings of a deserted Detroit, the toxic waste from chemical plants in West Virginai or the unsustainable tax liabilities of Puerto Rico.”[3] In short, the richest of the rich had for years gotten away with minimizing their taxes in ways that are not open to anyone else. Simply put, this is not fair; no social contract with any sort of equitable basis would have such an “out.”
Global Financial Integrity found at the time of the leak that “developing and emerging economies lost $7.8 trillion in cash from 2004 to 2013 because of maneuvers like those allegedly perfected by Mossack.”[4] In 2016, illicit outflows were increasing at the rate of 6.5% a year, twice the rate of global GDP growth.[5] As most emerging economies were slowing in the first quarter of 2016, the outflows could have tipped the global economy into recession.
Clearly, a cultural mentality of self-aggrandizement at the expense of the general economic good (not to mention ethics) had gripped the richest of the rich, with a slanted (i.e., unfair) economic “game-board” resulting. Such a dynamic is the antithesis of a social contract. Put another way, the mentality undercuts the de facto social contracts by which people agree to live within societies and accept even their basic frameworks. Were the 99% organized, we might have seen an effort to re-evaluate how the market mechanism works. As it was, incremental rule-changes by governments was the response. For instance, “new rules released by the U.S. Treasury on April 4 crack down on American corporations that allow themselves to be acquired by foreign firms to avoid U.S. taxes.”[6] Yet if the Panama Papers are any indication, the problem goes well beyond the acquisition of U.S. firms by foreign ones. For instance, a company need only establish operations in a tax-haven to shield taxation at higher rates. Furthermore, what was being done to stop companies from dodging sanctions to do business with certain countries? What of the money laundering? Even answering these questions one by one misses the more fundamental point that the global market-system itself is flawed—and in a way that is convenient only for the rich. Attention to the system itself is needed, yet without the organized pressure of the 99 percent, wholesale political efforts are unlikely.
Abstractly speaking, a system is not a system if certain internal variables can maximize themselves without stopping at the contours of the system. Put another way, a system that restricts the vast majority of people yet is semipermeable to the maximizing few is inherently as well as ethically compromised. Yet efforts to level the board would seem to require lessor power to overrule a greater power unless the power of the vast majority is organized and activated such that it becomes the greater power.



[1] Rana Foroohar and Matt Vella, “The Panama Papers Expose the Secret World of the 1%,” Time, April 18, 2016, pp. 11-12.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.

Wednesday, August 31, 2016

The E.U.’s Federal System: Thwarting a Trade Deal with Canada


Dwarfed by the arduous trade negotiations between the E.U. and U.S., the E.U. and Canada actually completed negotiations on a free-trade deal in February, 2016. Ratification had to be pushed back from the fall. The drag from the “deep suspicion over the benefits of unrestricted trade” that was increasing globally was ostensibly the reason.[1] I contend that the true obstacle was the amount of sovereignty that the E.U. states still retained in the Union. Americans can think back to the Articles of Confederation as having the same major drawback. In the E.U.’s case, however, the Union had evolved past being a confederation, given the governmental sovereignty already at the federal level. The veto-power of a state government was thus out of place, and thus an obstacle for the E.U. even in fulfilling its existing responsibilities at the federal level.


The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.




[1] Paul Vieira, “Antitrade Sentiment Thwarts Talks,” The Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2016.



Monday, August 29, 2016

California Passes Stricter Pollution Targets: Bringing Business Around


California’s legislature approved a bill (SB 32) in August, 2016 that extends the climate targets from reducing greenhouse-gas emissions from 1990 levels by 2020 (the former target) to just 40 percent of 1990 levels by 2030.[1] A second law, which includes increased legislative oversight of California regulators and targets refineries in poor areas, passed as well. Diane Regas of the Environmental Defense Fund pointed to California’s climate leadership. “As major economies work under the Paris Agreement to strengthen their plans to cut pollution and boost clean energy, California, once again, is setting a new standard for climate leadership worldwide.”[2] At first glance, it would seem that the legislature had freed itself from big business to pass the bills, but the sector itself was split. I submit the anticipation of a refreshed “cap and trade” program as an alternative (or mitigating factor) to stricter regulations played a role. Simply put, using the market mechanism in government regulation makes the stricter targets more palatable to market-based enterprises.
To be sure, oil companies and some manufacturers fought the bills hard. Of the higher costs and out-of-control regulators supposed or at least advertised by big oil, Governor Brown labeled the lobbying campaign a “brazen deception.”[3] Given the companies’ vested commercial interests, that lobbying effort could have been flagged as a conflict-of-interest situation. Accordingly, that campaign’s credibility should have been hard won, with Californians applying strict scrutiny to the “information.” Sadly, it is not uncommon for regulators to cast aside such a conflict because they are fine with relying on information provided by the very companies being regulated. 
That big oil did not dominate the debate may be due in part to Governor Brown’s use of the market mechanism to appeal to business in spite of the higher target in the legislation. Specifically, the legislation increased the government’s leverage in getting wayward polluting companies to participate in the cap and trade program, which requires companies to buy permits in order to release greenhouse gas emissions. According to Governor Brown, the passage of SB32 would increase the leverage that the government has to “reach an elusive deal with businesses that would prefer a flexible program like cap and trade instead of more stringent requirements to slash pollution.”[4] Business managers prefer flexible programs, and bringing in the market mechanism provides a sense of familiar ground.
Therefore, it is possible that the anticipation of a renewed, fuller utilization of the market-based method increased support for the bills from the business sector, or at least mitigated possible opposition, such that big oil and the climate-denying stalwarts in manufacturing could not dominate the lobbying. Put another way, incorporating the market mechanism either directly or indirectly as an alternative to tougher regulations applied across the board is a political strategy that can split the business vote such that the sector itself does not dominate lobbying campaigns in one direction and thus thwart the voters’ judgments, which should consider the arguments of both sides of a proposal.  



[1] Chris Megerian, “’A Real Commitment Backed Up by Real Power’: Gov. Jerry Brown to Sign Sweeping New Climate legislation,” Los Angeles Times, August 25, 2016.
[4] Megerian, “A Real Commitment.”