The E.U.’s Immigration “ICE”: The Pros and Cons of State Implementation

On 1 June, 2026, the E.U.’s two legislative chambers agreed informally on text for a law called Return Regulation, which is oriented to facilitating the return of illegal aliens to their respective countries. Both The European Council, the “upper chamber,” and the European Parliament, the “lower” legislative “chamber” (roughly corresponding to the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, respectively) worked in what in American parlance is called a Congressional reconciliation or conference committee to agree to text enabling state police to enter the domiciles of illegal immigrants and state governments to set up detention centers outside of the European Union. That the federal law relegates implementation to the states illustrates just how different E.U. federalism differs from U.S. federalism even though both systems are “modern” rather than confederal in that governmental sovereignty in both unions is split between the federal and state levels. Even though the E.U. after thirty years was like the U.S. after its first thirty years in that most of that sovereignty was at the state level, the use of state governments to implement a federal law differentiates the European federal system from the American one. Both advantages and disadvantages go with leaving implementation largely up to the states.

Imagine if the American Congress had passed a law leaving it up to the state governments to exercise “ICE” enforcement powers to rid the Union of illegal immigrants. In U.S. President Trump’s second term in office, Florida would jump at the chance, whereas states such as Massachusetts, Illinois, and California would refuse to implement the federal law. It would not be difficult to surmise how illegal aliens would work around such a patchwork, at least those with enough money to move to a more preferential state. As a result, the federal rationale—that of eliminating illegal immigrants from U.S. soil—would be compromised. However, the differing political-ideological centers-of-gravity in the several states would get more breathing room, and in empire-scale political unions such as the U.S. and E.U., one legislative size does not fit all. When one is imposed, internal pressure builds up that could eventually blow such a union apart.

Even in the E.U., in which the new law reflected “a broader political shift . . . sometimes backed by the far right . . . pushing for a tougher approach to migration,” states could be said to differ as to the political significance of the far right.[1] Some state governments may for example not find much internal political support for a state law that enables police to search a “place of residence or other relevant premises” of illegal migrants, especially as some NGOs (non-governmental organizations) compared “to the notorious raids conducted by the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).”[2] It is not as if the two federal legislative chambers passed the federal law under the assumption that it would be strenuously implemented by every state. “The provision is vague on purpose, to allow a broad interpretation in the different member states. It opens the doors to home raids and also raids in the premises of associations helping migrants and healthcare facilities,” Eleonora Celoria with Asgi, a state-level association of legal experts said at the time of the law’s passage.[3] Celoria’s depiction of the implications highlight just how politically and ethically controversial the law is, and this, I submit, is precisely why the provision is vague on purpose. States could be anticipated to differ on how the law should be implemented “on the ground.” Even though the maximum legal detention period for illegal immigrants waiting to be expatriated back to their respective countries is “extended from six months to two years, with a possible six-month extension and an unlimited duration for persons considered as posing a security risk,” clearly not every state legislature would go with the maximus. The comment made by MEP Mélissa Camara (of the European Parliament) that the legislative text serves “a xenophobic ideology” may resonate more in some states than in others.[4] Hence, the E.U.’s federal system could be said to be healthier than its U.S. counterpart at the time (2026) because the E.U states were legislatively given more breathing room in which to tailor the federal law according to their respective political cultures.

The astute reader may be waiting for “the other shoe to drop,” meaning: what’s the catch? According to E.U. figures, “only 29% of migrants with no legal right to remain” in the E.U “leave the EU.”[5] Illegals were a big problem facing the Union, and leaving enforcement up to whether a given state government favors the proposed legislative text risks creating a legal loophole wherein illegal migrants could simply move to another state where enforcement is lax or utterly lacking. The intentional vagueness in the legislative text makes even no enforcement possible. In California at the time, I was surprised to see a sign outside a popular pizza restaurant indicating that the workers reserved the right to refuse service and entry to ICE police, as if enforcement of U.S. immigration law were up to restaurant workers. Were such law up to the government of California, given the high proportion of registered Democrats over Republicans, it is a safe bet that no enforcement could be passed by the California Senate and Assembly. Contrast this with states such as Oklahoma, Alabama, and Florida! I would even venture to posit that the ideological distance on the issue of illegal immigration between those three states and California is more than existed at the time between E.U. states on the same issue: how, or even whether, illegal immigration should be expunged.

Perhaps my thesis can be generalized to say that giving states in an empire-scale union enough breathing room is inversely related to efficacy at the federal, or Union level. Federalism is a messy business in part because judgment is requisite; there are few easy answers in how to navigate the common good (of the political union) while seeing to it that the states have enough breathing room so their respective residents do not feel suffocated by a one-size-fits-all federal mentality. In other words, modern federalism, whose signature attribute is dual sovereignty, can be said to involve a balancing act. As of 2026, it could be said that the E.U. was doing a better job at that than was the U.S., but at what cost in terms of the interests of the European Union as a whole, which is not a mere aggregate of state interests? This is a dynamic unique to the empire-level, so it does not pertain to E.U. states that have adopted federal systems of their own. No large U.S. states are themselves federal, though in a nod to the Europeans such a prospect is worth entertaining. Even so, the heterogeneity across an empire of 27 or 50 republics dwarfs that which exists even within a large E.U. or U.S. state. This is yet another reason why the E.U. and U.S. should be compared and contrasted, rather than treating a large state in one union as equivalent to the other union. In other words, the U.S. is not a France with a large back yard that stretches across a continent and beyond. Within such an expanse of land, views on immigration can be expected to vary markedly from state to state.

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1. Vincenzo Genovese, “EU Greenlights Controversial Return Hubs in ‘Strictest-Ever’ New Migration Law,” Euronews.com, 1 June 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

Elon Musk’s Controversial Politics: Beyond the Financials

As U.S. President Trump signed his “Big Beautiful Bill” into law on July 4, 2025, Elon Musk, shareholder and CEO of Tesla, announced that he would create a new political party (or “group” in European-speak). Musk opposed the projected trillions of dollars that the bill would add to the debt held by the U.S. federal government, though, as CEO of SpaceX, he was fine with cutting a trillion dollars from Medicaid, which provides health coverage to the poorest of the poor, and from food assistance while the defense budget was augmented. Musk’s proposed “America” group would likely draw support from Trump’s “MAGA” base, rather than from moderate Republicans and any Democrats. Whether Musk was more motivated by breaking up the political duopoly of the two major parties, or groups, to increase the practical options for voters or to split Trump’s support and punish the Republican party, such controversial political involvement by a major shareholder CEO is without doubt risky business. This is not to say that CEO’s should not be active politically apart from business strategy, for even business managers are citizens and thus may feel compelled to become active politically. This is to be lauded especially if the motive is out of duty to repair or otherwise improve a political system.

On the next working day after Musk’s announcement that he would be forming a new political party, “Tesla shares plunged nearly 7 percent . . . as investors registered dismay” at Musk’s “plans to form a third party and his intensifying feud with President Trump.”[1] Even though 7% is not exacting “plunging” or “crushing” Testa shares, beyond the hyperbole of journalists is the point that not avoiding controversy politically has costed Tesla and Musk himself financially. To be sure, billionaires can afford to lose significant wealth and still be left standing comfortably, and even in the case of business practitioners, economic reductionism doesn’t always hold. Also, political involvement can raise stock prices, as, for example, “Musk’s involvement in politics and his financial support for the president’s campaign were once seen by investors as a benefit to Tesla, fueling a steep rise in company shares after the election” in November, 2024.[2] No one but the most cynical would deny, however, that Musk’s chief motivation that led to his involvement in “DOGE” in the White House was for his businesses to benefit even though they did, initially. So that they took a hit when Musk broke from President Trump and then formed the America Party cannot be assessed only as concerns the financial impact on Tesla or SpaceX.

In American history, the notion that wealthy people should devote some time to public service for the benefit of the Union or their respective member-states was once well-known. Both because such people could afford financially to take time off from business and because their experience could be useful in governing, the notion of public duty was beneficial to the public good. Men like Thomas Jefferson and George Washington did not make public service into a career and did not go into politics primarily for its positive financial benefit. As a frustrated General dependent on the sovereign states whose delegates met in the Second Continental Congress, Washington would not have endured such hardships as he did were his motivation simply to benefit himself and his landholdings in Virginia financially. Even though Musk is by no stretch another Washington, more has been involved in Musk’s political motivation than maximizing Tesla’s stock price or gaining government contracts for SpaceX, and even getting back at Donald Trump. Government, moreover, is not just the aggregate of business interests without remainder.

Other billionaires might look to Musk’s example not in terms of his political ideology necessarily, but in terms of having enough financial cushion to weather political-turned-financial pushback from going beyond business to engage in public service—to give back, as it were, so to improve the system of government and add to the public good. It is admittedly very easy to be guided by personal and business financial considerations in delving into politics, whereas being willing to hold those at bay out of a sense of public duty is more difficult, and, frankly, increasing rare as American history has proceeded but not necessarily evolved politically. The notion that duty pertains to citizenship has become increasingly recessive in public discourse and consciousness. This is to say that duty-bound CEO’s are saints; rather, it is to say that we shouldn’t be so surprised when a billionaire businessman jumps into politics not merely for financial reasons, and thus not turn back to shore after a financial hit. Even if motivated by political ideology rather than in saving the union from itself (e.g., public debt), personal and business financial benefit is not the whole story, and the public good can still be a beneficiary. 

Mozi says, "'worthy people [are] those who are well versed in virtuous conduct, discriminating in discussion, and broadly knowledgeable!’ . . . . When the wealthy and eminent in the state heard this they retired and thought to themselves, ‘At first, we could rely on our wealth and eminence, but now the king promotes the righteous and does not turn away the poor and the humble. This being the case, we too must be righteous.'"[3]

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1. Jack Ewing, “Musk’s Idea of 3^rd Party Is Crushing Testla Shares,” The New York Times, July 8, 2025.

2. Ibid.

3. Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, ed.s, Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (New York: Seen Bridges Press, 2001), 58.

Pulling the Curtain Back on President Biden’s Retirement Address

There is an expression in politics referring to how legislation is made; it is likened to the making of sausage, the public display of which is not generally desired. Furthermore, it is unrealistic and even counter-productive for the American electorate to know the intricate mechanisms by which a bill makes its way through Congress before being signed by the president to become a law. Nevertheless, the strategic and self-interested manipulation of public perception by elected representatives in order that the electorate will have an overstated positive view of its representatives, who can have more discretion and thus power with the vote of confidence, is counter to an effective democratic republic, which after all is distinct from direct democracy. I contend that the desire to falsely manipulate popular opinion went into President Biden’s address on his decision to serve only one term, as well as in the comments of high ranking members of his party in support of his decision not to run for reelection. That there might be more political capital, not to mention a better legacy, in being straight with the American people is a possibility that seems to elude American politicians.

American political philosophy posits unintentional beneficial consequences from the pursuit of self-interest, which springs from self-oriented love, as does Adam Smith’s price-oriented theory of competitive markets. That such benefits are possible does not mean that a self-centric pursuit of one’s interest is itself normatively good, and thus laudatory. Indeed, Smith is careful to condition even the unintended beneficial economic consequence of the individual’s pursuit of one’s interest on the presence of competition wherein no individual seller, or oligopolistic group thereof, can sent a price by fiat. Smith even enveloped his economic theory on his other major work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, the title of which speaks for itself even if such sentiments are in practice hardly strong enough against the love of greed even in a competitive market. Translated into political terms, the check-and-balance vital function in the separation of powers, or branches, of the U.S. Government, and even between the governments of the member states and that of the union, is an institutional means by which the ambition of individual representatives and even governmental bodies can be held back from overreaching at the expense of the liberty of the people. It is vital that the self-interest qua political ambition of elected representatives (as well as their respective appointees) be held in check not only by criminal law, but also by the very arrangement of political institutions within a government, and even between governments in a federal system. 

Of course, in addition to institutional checks and balances, elections should have consequences. An officeholder who deftly trades monetary favors (aka campaign contributions) for support on legislation favorable to the private interest (and thus the officeholder’s own interest in gaining more power) but unfavorable to the public interest or at least the interests of the electorate can be voted out of office at the next election. However, the stealth that the elected representatives usually use to enact such private trades render the electorate’s judgment and thus decision suboptimal. In short, a lot goes on behind the scenes that is pertinent to an electorate’s ability to exercise effective judgment in holding officeholders accountable from the standpoint of the electorate’s interests. It is in the political interest of elected representatives to create and sustain the impression publicly of being worthy of the public trust, so more is needed to counter this natural inclination among the powerful in line with the central principle of a republic that the electorate—the popular sovereign—is superior to its elected representatives—the governmental sovereign. For an agent to willfully mislead a principal, taking advantage of there being too much “daylight” existing between an elected representative and the electorate, is essentially to turn a republic upside down.

Speaking from the Oval Office on television on his decision not to run for reelection, U.S. President Joe Biden said that “saving our democracy” is “more important than any title.”[1] Actually, former U.S. presidents were in the practice of retaining the title. At the time, President Carter, President Bush, President Clinton, and President Obama were still alive. So, President Biden could expect to continue to be referred to as such after his term as president. It was power that he was giving up by not running for reelection. Although he casted his decision as one of voluntarily putting the interests of his party and country above his political ambition, the fact what that his two top advisors had just days earlier explained to him why it was virtually impossible for him to win reelection. Additionally, according to CNN, “Former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi privately told President Joe Biden . . . that polling shows that the president cannot defeat Donald Trump and that Biden could destroy Democrats’ chances of winning the House in November.”[2] The press also reported that Pelosi also told the president that she would make the polling numbers public if he did not bow out on his own within in a week or so. Because the president took “the easy way” rather than “the hard way,” Sen. Chuck Schumer, the Democrats’ majority leader in the U.S. Senate, used a press conference to characterize Biden’s decision as selfless and patriotic, when it was actually a realistic assessment that he would lose power anyway by losing the election. Because Biden took Pelosi’s “easy way” to make the decision on his own, Schumer even said that he “deeply” loved the president. If it was love, it was a very conditional sort.

As if Schumer’s declaration of love were not over the top enough, Biden “presented himself as a truth-teller” during his address. He even said, “The truth is that the sacred cause of this nation is bigger than any one of us,” as if he had just selflessly given up power to save democracy in America from a tyranny under Don Trump rather than just been shown the exit by the other top leaders of the Democratic Party.[3] He made no reference to his elderly infirmities and how they could be expected to be worse during a second term, or the intractable electoral math, which in turn was due to the obvious display of the toll that age had already taken on his body during the presidential debate a month earlier.

In short, he was essentially pushed out by his own party because he refused to do the responsible (and selfless) thing by leveling with the American people that he should not serve a second term even if he could. His decision was not really voluntary, as if he was giving up something that he could otherwise have (a second term). His decision was neither selfless nor patriotic, for he had held on to his nomination even when it was clear that he would be too old to be president in a term that would not even begin for six months. He did not “fall on his sword.” Like Schumer’s false declaration of “deep love” for the president, Biden’s claim of giving up power for the good of his party and the nation was a lie, even as he had the audacity to say in his brief address, “When I was elected, I promised to always level with you, to tell you the truth.”[4]

My point is not to criticize Joe Biden or even other leaders of the Democratic Party. Decades earlier, when I was a student at Yale, I had been very impressed in a small-group setting—at what used to be called Master’s Teas at Yale—listening to Sen. Biden discuss the federal deficits and debt and the implications for the international financial system. I raise the case of his public address on his retirement from politics to make a broader claim.

The president said in his address, “The great thing about America is here, kings and dictators do not rule. The people do. History is in your hands. The power is in your hands. The idea of America—lies in your hands.”[5] This case shows just how much the people’s elected representatives can mislead the people in civic matters. The reality behind President Biden’s decision not to run for reelection was much different, much less stellar, than what the president and many elected Democrats presented to the people. The upshot is that the elected representatives, including the president of the United States, are less saintly—less willing to be selflessly patriotic—than the electorate has been led to believe. The need to keep an eye on officials is greater than what is implied by Biden’s address. Government of the people, through elected representatives, is not at altruistic as the political elite, for selfish reasons, would like the people to believe. Rather than trying to save American democracy, Pelosi and Schumer did not want to see the president’s reelection campaign result in Republican control of both chambers of Congress. This issue here is thus not Joe Biden, or even the Democratic Party; rather, the problem is how little the American people actually see and know of the real motives and strategies of the political elite, which includes both parties.

Assessing candidates at election time is likely not as effective as the American electorate  believes on account of being subtly manipulated from afar; more is kept from the electorate than it realizes concerning the people running for public office. On Capitol Hill and in the West Wing, more effort than the American people realize is put into how things will be perceived by the people. For example, it is enough that the people perceive members of Congress being vocally critical of powerful CEOs, such as Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and Mark Zuckerberg of (formerly) Facebook during the user-data privacy scandal, who contribute lots of money to political campaigns (which generally is not well publicized), without actual legislation being enacted contrary to the financial interests of the CEOs or their companies. It is enough that the public sees angry elected representatives. The superficial implication is that they are protecting the public interest so the electorate can have confidence in its public officials rather than having to double the effort to disentangle big business from Congress and the White House.

To put a private, or partial, interest above the public good is to doom the later to interests that care little of the good of the whole relative to the welfare of the part. The good of a whole is never the same as that of one of its parts unless all of the parts are identical. The interests of the United States do not reduce to those of Texas any more that those of the European Union reduce to those of France. This is why the political dominance of a large state in either union at the federal level is problematic, such as was evinced by Germany in E.U. policy during the European debt crisis.

The private (including political) interests of an elected representative are, I submit, not generally speaking well known by voters, who in turn are tasked with assessing the qualities of candidates rather than merely voting on policy positions. Perhaps more of the latter could be decided by referendum, leaving to elections the primary matter of the sort of people who are to be elected to serve the public interest. Moreover, popular sovereignty could stand to be strengthened, given the distance between elected political elites and their electorates. Simply put, that distance should be reduced, and journalism can go only so far, especially with journalists relying of officeholders for interviews.

In the film, The Wizard of Oz, Dorothy’s dog Toto pulls open the curtain that had been hiding the actual Wizard from view. Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain! This is one of the all-time iconic lines in cinema. And Toto too! is not far behind. It is in the Wizard’s interest to keep his actual condition—that he is just a person rather than a giant head with raging flames on both sides—hidden from view so he can continue to exercise extraordinary power by instilling fear. It is interesting to ponder what this uncovering might look like writ-large in America’s representative democracy. I submit that pulling open the curtain that acts as a beltway around Washington D.C., formerly a swamp, is vitally needed to restore the proper relationship between popular and governmental sovereignty in the United States.

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1. Eli Stokols and Lauren Egan, “Biden Is Passing the Torch ‘to Unite Our Nation,” Politico, July 24, 2024.
2. M.J. Lee, Jamie Gangel, and Jeff Zeleny, “Pelosi Privately Told Biden Polls Show He Cannot Win and Will Take Dow the House; Biden Responded with Defensiveness,” CNN, July 18, 2024.
3. Eli Stokols and Lauren Egan, “Biden Is Passing the Torch ‘to Unite Our Nation,” Politico, July 24, 2024.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

Pittsburgh Businesses Encroach on Public Property with Impunity

Private property, competition, and the market-mechanism have come to be assumed to be integral to the economic system of Capitalism. The assumption that this cluster of attributes is necessary is faulty though, as, for example, the state can own some or all of the “means of production” (i.e., firms) that are subject to market competition, especially if privately-owned enterprises also exist. China had a mix of private and state-owned enterprises compete in several industries when the state opened the economy to competitive forces setting supply and demand. In Wisconsin, the Green Bay Packers, an NFL football team, is owned by the residents of that city, such ownership being Socialism, and yet that team has competed not only to win, but also in the hiring of players and managers. A competitive market does not require that the property of the means of production be privately owned. Even in the case of private ownership of companies, the widely accepted custom wherein the owners receive the residual profits after expenses is dogmatic in the sense of being arbitrary. Alternatively, creditors or employees/managers could receive any excess revenue after expenses have been paid. In short, Capitalism as it has come to be known and exercised is more arbitrary than capitalists may realize. Even the taken-for-granted distinction between public and private property is not as stark as may be typically supposed. This is no excuse, however, for businesses that knowingly encroach on public property as if it were their own private property. A Capitalist economic system predicated on private property may contain not only the seed of monopoly, as Marx claimed, but also a tendency of private enterprises to over-reach on the public domain. If so, government has a responsibility to prune back the overweening tentacles. Two examples make this point.

Once while walking on a narrow sidewalk, I glanced down at my phone and was instantly startled as I ran into and tumbled over a metal chair in the middle of the sidewalk. A restaurant’s employees had set up tables on the side of the sidewalk with chairs out into the middle of the sidewalk, and a bit beyond a table had been placed in the middle of the sidewalk, with a potted plant placed making it even more difficult to navigate around the tables and chairs. Who would want to eat in the middle of a sidewalk, with people passing by at close range? The manager of that restaurant was guilty not only of missing this rather basic point, but also of the incredible presumption that the public sidewalk was essentially part of the business’s private property, which astonishingly placed the public at a disadvantage on public property!

A month earlier, I had called the zoning department of the city. I had been assured that a restaurant cannot obstruct a sidewalk. However, the city then failed to act, perhaps capitulating to the business interest (and wealth). So, after I nearly fell from running into the chair, I called the city again. The employee who answered insisted that the city gives permits allowing businesses to permanently block or obstruct public sidewalks. So, I called again and spoke with another person who had more of a sympathetic ear when I explained that I had almost fallen, and that a hazard exists because numerous pedestrians walk into the street because of the obstruction. Two weeks later, with Franks Bar and Grill still interlarding on public property, I left a phone message for the code enforcement person. Two weeks after that, as the photo below demonstrates, the restaurant was still blocking the sidewalk. 

I know that the city had opened an investigations months earlier, so I surmise that the restaurant's owner or manager knew of the complaints and dismissed them. Additionally, I suspect that the city of Pittsburgh had bowed to the business interest at the expense of the public good. This is as much of a problem as is the presumptuousness and dismissiveness of a business that can take advantage of a corrupt municipal government.

Another example of companies encroaching on public "space" is the overreaching of security guards and private police employees presuming that their turf extends beyond a company's private property. When I lived temporarily in Pittsburgh, while I was walking on a public sidewalk along a hospital that was part of the University of Pittsburgh, I stopped at a food-truck only to realize that a security guard was perched on a small hill from which he seemed to have been presumptuously patrolling the sidewalk. In the distance was another security guard. 

Initially, I thought he was in line to order food from the food truck as I was. So I held back. Strangely, he likely viewed my standing position with suspicion, or, more likely, dislike as I was looking generally in his direction. Not all subtle, he strategically walked past me up close and stopped further along on the sidewalk, presumably there to talk to another food vender, yet his body position reveals his real orientation. 

The presumptuousness of that university-affiliated hospital was visible in the choice of the security guard’s uniform mimicking that of the police—including with a silver “badge” and handcuffs. If the hospital was breaching the state's monopoly of police powers, which in general is a larger problem, I submit that the visible artifacts added to the possible presumptuousness of the wearers that company security hyper-extends "off campus" even if the state permits it. The artifacts also misled the public into supposing that the company's police were the same as the city police. At the very least, a company's private security or "police" employees do not necessarily receive the same training as the regular police receive. There is also the problem of legitimacy from a democratic standpoint once the state's monopoly of police powers, as per the U.S. Constitution, is violated by companies. 

Just a public property is distinct from private property, a company's employees are distinct from a government's police force (and power). Encroachment onto a government's use of force puts a company in a conflict of interest in that its security employees are not in an even-handed position in disagreements between a company's management and its stakeholders. Human nature being what it is, we should not assume that the employees would be fair in cases in which a management oversteps its own authority ethically or legally. 

I contend that business managers have a tendency to overreach, even perceiving public property as fair game to be captured for the private, narrower, interest of a business as the public interest suffers. This tendency on the microlevel is the same as that which fuels a company in a competitive industry to become a monopoly. John D. Rockefeller, for example, pressured competitors unwilling to be bought by his Standard Oil company. The titan had the audacity to view himself as a Noah saving the drowning competitors from being ruined by the destructive competition especially in the 1860s, and as a Christ-figure saving them. Unlike Rockefeller, Jesus in the Gospel stories does not kill off people who are unwilling to accept his help. Rockefeller even pressured the railroads to pay Standard Oil a “drawback” when they carried the oil of his competitors. Such encroachment breached what was thought to be ethical business conduct at the time, which in turn included some practices that would come to be regarded as unethical. The titan’s presumptuousness thus extended to treating the railroads as akin to his own property. By such means of encroachment, Rockefeller built his company into a monopoly in the refining industry. Fortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court broke up Standard Oil in 1913, but made the mistake of keeping in tact the same ownership in all of the resulting companies. The managements thereof were even allowed to be in the same building! A willingness to stand up to powerful businesses and competency as to how to break up their excessive market power from previous encroachments are both important if the private-property attribute of modern Capitalism is not to eviscerate the attributes of competition and the market-mechanism. Given the tendency of business managers to shirk the public interest, society needs some means of protecting public property from the inevitable encroachments.

On the American Military-Industrial Complex

A democratic republic affords many avenues for organized private interests to influence public policy. The fact that such interests are organized is enough to outweigh the influenced of an organized constituency. Add in the money available to organized interests and the imbalance is exaggerated. The military industrial complex—the “informal” alliance between a military and private defense-contractors is a case in point in the United States.

At the end of his second term in 1961, President Eisenhower warned the American people of the abuses of power that can come from the military’s alliance with its defense-contractors. The influence of the alliance, in other words, could come to trump the influence of the electorate and what is in the best interests of the United States in the world. After World War II, a permanent armaments industry emerged; the president was concerned that its influence would grow too much. He said, “We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence. . . . The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”[1] Once such power exists, it can protect itself even from threats from the electorate. Such protection can be explicit, as in efforts to keep the U.S. in a war, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, which were quite long ones.

Roughly sixty years after Eisenhower’s farewell speech, President Trump publicly claimed that the U.S. military seeks to do the bidding of the defense contractors.[2] Such an open admission was itself startling, for the president was telling the electorate that private companies effectively control defense policy. The interests of such companies are private, and thus partial, rather than being identical to the public good, which a republic’s government is supposed to enact and protect. Where a few strong interests, whether that of the financial sector or defense contractors, can control elected representatives, a democracy can actually be a mere gloss for the books. A republic is thus vulnerable.

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1. “President Eisenhower Warns of Military-Industrial Complex,” History.com, November 16, 2009.
2. Maeve Reston, “Trump Presses On after Rough Week with His Presidential Image in Shambles,” CNN.com, September 12, 2020.

Public Access to the Public Domain Increasingly Privatized for Profit

To Aaron Swartz, the subject of the documentary, The Internet’s Own Boy (2014), the major concern in his day regarding the internet was not the ability of a person to create a blog or use social media; rather, the problem was in the trend of the power of the gate-keepers, who tell you were on the internet you want to go, concentrating. In other words, the issue concerned what commands our attention. More specifically, who gets access to the ways people find things on the internet. “Now everyone has a license to speak; it’s a question of who gets heard,” he said.  Although he was a computer wiz, he also had political aspirations; both of which were on display as he lobbied against the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), which was introduced in Congress in October of 2011. Unfortunately, the combination of his computer and political skills got the attention of the FBI, which engaged in a relentless pursuit of him until, under the pressure, he committed suicide at the age of 26. His short life was one of idealism that should not have been squashed by an unstoppable criminal-justice system, especially when influenced by political pressure from corporations and politicians. Lest the overzealousness of law enforcement obscure a vision of Aaron’s idealism, it can be viewed as public access being restored to the public domain in terms of the internet.

The full essay is at "The Internet's Own Boy."

A U.S. Senator Aiding a Contributor While Averting a "Fiscal Cliff": Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity

The law passed by Congress on January 3, 2013 to avert the across-the-board tax increases and “sequester” (i.e., across-the-board budget cuts) was “stuffed with special provisions helping specific companies and industries.” While many of the provisions would increase the U.S. Government’s debt, at least one would decrease it. Is the latter any more ethical because it is in line with the more general interest in reducing the federal debt? Put another way, does the end justify the means?  Do good consequences justify bad motives?  These are extremely difficult questions. The best I can do here is suggest how they can be approached by analysis of a particular case study.

In the legislation, a provision reduced the Medicare reimbursement rate for a radiosurgery device manufactured by the E.U. company Elekta AB. The cut was pushed by a competitor, Varian Medical Systems. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid asked Sen. Max Baucus, chair of the Senate Finance Committee, to write the cut into the legislation. While both senators could point to the public interest in the debt-reduction result of the cut, their relationship with Varian makes their motives suspect. Specifically, they may have exploited personal conflicts of interest that eclipsed a more expansive duty to the wider (i.e., not private, or personal) public interest. 

While it is perhaps simplistic to relate campaign contributions to a senator’s subsequent action, it is significant that Varian spent  $570,000 in 2012 on lobbying. The company added Capitol Counsel, which had contacts to Sen. Baucus. Vivian already had connections to Reid through Cornerstone Government Affairs lobbyist Paul Denino, a former Reid deputy chief of staff. Additionally, the leading beneficiary of the contributions of Varian executives and the company’s PAC over the previous four years was Sen. Reid, whose committees received $21,200. Varian’s lobbyists added $42,700 more to Reid’s campaign.[1] While Sen. Reid’s subsequent urging of the reimbursement rate cut could have been unrelated to these contributions and contacts, the senator’s involvement compromises him ethically. Put another way, it is at the very least bad form, or unseemly. It implies that companies making political contributions and hiring lobbyists connected to public officials do so (or worse, should do so) to have special access to those particular officials to turn upcoming legislation to the companies’ financial advantage. Even if the public also benefits, it can be asked whether the companies deserve their particular benefits. In the case of Varian, it may be asked whether the company deserved the cut in the reimbursement rate going to Elekta.

As could be expected, spokespersons at both companies sought to argue the merits of their respective cases in the court of public opinion.  It is more useful to look at the regulators’ rationale for increasing the reimbursement rate for Elekta’s  “Gamma Knife” in the first place. Originally, the knife and Varian’s linac machines were lumped together by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) under the same CMS code. In 2001, the Centers separated the devices in terms of data collection so an analysis could be conducted on whether the devices should receive different reimbursement rates. The Huffington Post reports that the reimbursement rate for the Gamma Knife was increased because “it typically requires only one treatment, while the linacs often require multiple treatments.” Also, “Gamma Knives machines are more expensive to obtain and maintain due to the storage of radioactive cobalt and regulation by both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Homeland Security. Linacs don’t use nuclear material and are regulated by the Food and Drug Administration.”[2] So, due to the cost and use differential, CMS  increased the Gamma Knife reimbursement in 2006 to $7000. From the standpoint of the criteria of regulators, the data-collection and analysis method and the rational rationale are legitimate. In contrast, because neither the use or cost differential had changed by January 2013, the cut in the reimbursement rate cannot enjoy such legitimacy. Hence it is possible that exogenous factors, such as the political influence of Varian’s lobbyists and campaign contributions, were behind the change. From the standpoint of the previous rate differential, the change cannot be justified. Neither Sen. Reid nor Sen. Baucus could justify their actions (and motives) by the substance of the case. However, they could still appeal to the salubrious budget-cutting effect as justifying their involvement.

The question here is whether the favorable consequences of the cut on the government’s subsequent deficits mitigates or reduces the shady scenario of a senator acting on behalf of a company that had contributed to his or her campaign. I would advise a member of Congress to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest. If the result in this particular case is in the public interest (i.e., reducing the deficit), does this positive consequence justify the senators’ actions and even the questionable appearance?  It’s a no-brainer that the senators would immediately point to the public interest in the consequence, but does it effectively remove the taint of immoral political conduct (and perhaps motive)?

The link between the company-senator relation, the senators’ action in which the company stands to benefit financially in a material way, and the financial benefit to the company can be distinguished ethically from a good consequence to the public. A bystander would naturally view the consequence to the public as salubrious even while having a sentiment of disapprobation toward the company’s own benefit as well as the senators’ action and relation to the company. In other words, the favorable impact on the public does not remove the stain on the company and the senators. To be sure, that stain would be greater were the public harmed rather than helped, but even with the positive general consequence the senators may have acted for the private benefit. Also, their action could have come from other senators, hence obviating the ethical problem. In short, the public interest does not remove either senator from the ethically problematic situation in which they decided to occupy.  Even if their motive had been solely for the public interest, they violated the appearance of unethical motive and conduct.

“The end justifies the means” is a slippery slope in terms of what the human mind can rationalize as legitimate. Great harm has been seemingly justified by great ideals. Even in the face of the ideals, the harms provoke a sentiment of disapprobation by the observer (excepting sociopaths). This suggests that the ideals cannot completely justify unethical means.  It may indeed be that unethical means are necessary in some particular cases, but this does not render the devices ethically pure. Ethical principles do not know practical compromise. Rather, people do.

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1. Paul Blumenthal, “Varian Medical Systems Used Fiscal Cliff Deal to Hurt Competitor,” The Huffington Post, February 8, 2013.

2. Ibid.

Oligarchic Social Media Companies: Willowing the Internet Unethically

Too much power in a few hands is inherently dangerous. That goes for private as well as public, or governmental, power. In the world of social media, the companies that own and control the platforms are essentially governmental in nature in that the executives promulgate rules and, ideally, see that they are enforced. The downsides to too few platforms—each with an extraordinary amount of power—involve a constricting of ideas, or content, on the internet, and potentially unanswered violations of the rights of the social-networks’ respective users. The public policy repercussions, I submit, include applying anti-trust law to social media companies such that none gets to become as massively dominating as Facebook had been allowed to become.

In an open letter in March, 2018, Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World Wide Web, proposed a regulatory framework to balance the interests of the social media companies and their users. In the wake of the Facebook scandal then involving the psychological-political manipulation of up to 50 million users by a third party, Cambridge Analytica, the obvious inference was that privacy rights were in dire need of being shored up by regulators as Facebook’s management had failed even to notify the users of the invasive  use of their data. Yet a single-minded focus on that problem risks missing a more subtle one.

Berners-Lee points in his letter to the “concentration of power” in a few social media companies that “creates a new set of gatekeepers, allowing a handful of platforms to control which ideas and opinions are seen and shared.”[1] As a result, the “Web that many connected to years ago is not what new users will find today. What was once a rich selection of blogs and websites has been compressed under the powerful weight of a few dominant platforms.”[2] The bloggers who can make good use of Facebook’s algorithm get to see their ideas (and blogs) popularized, whereas bloggers who eschew Facebook stand a greater chance of being relegated to a marginal position on the internet.

I am a case in point. I could have made use of Facebook for years to promote essays I have posted online, but I made a decision on principle not to use Facebook because of how that company had treated my attempts to create and use an account. On my first attempt, Facebook suspended my account because I had sent some text with a link to one of my academic articles to some scholars whom I actually knew. No one at Facebook bothered to ask me if my posts were spam. I was deemed to have sordid motives without much evidence to support the projection of distrust. I deleted the account. A few years later, I tried again. That time, Facebook demanded that I upload a clear facial picture of myself so I could be identified. Facebook had verified my phone number and email address, and thus my name, but strangely those were not enough. I had not yet even used the account and thus could not have violated any of the company’s use-policies, so the projection of distrust onto me was unacceptable to me. So I deleted that account rather than supply a picture of myself to be scanned. I was also concerned how the facial recognition software would be used, especially when combined with other basic information I had included in the profile. It turns out I had reason to be concerned, for even if my personality had not been construed and I had not been subject to political manipulation psychologically, the fact that Facebook failed to prevent the invasive actions by a political firm in 2015 means that other harvesting of data could have been going on without the users being informed. Even before that scandal broke, I did not trust Facebook’s staff.  

I suspect that the fact that I had written a booklet, Taking the Face off Facebook, had something to do with Facebook making it difficult for me to create and use an account. That the platform was at the time so huge means that keeping me off made it much more difficult for me to popularize my essays at The Worden Report. If so, Facebook was exploiting a conflict of interest by keeping off ideas critical of Facebook’s management. Although I made considerable use of LinkedIn and some use of Twitter, I felt as though I was swimming upstream in steering clear of Facebook as a possible means of publicizing my site. Even though business ethics was one of my areas of expertise, and thus of the essays on my site, I felt a strange feeling in actually making a stand ethically against my own use of Facebook even though I really could use the added publicity for my site.

A faculty member at the University of Chicago business school wrote me interestingly just after the Facebook scandal became public that if only I would get on Twitter and Facebook and attack the positions of other people, my essays would be picked up by the major media and I would no longer be making things harder on myself than need be. If only I “attack people.” Really? The University of Chicago must be quite a place! Another ethical line in the sand that I would not cross. Years earlier, I had stopped attending the Academy of Management “academic” conferences because the “scholars” had made a “blood sport” out of tearing apart scholars giving paper-presentations. I found that I could be helpful to the presenters by instead suggesting fruitful directions rather than trashing what had already been written. Any dead wood would eventually fall off from the tree anyway, whereas a useful insight would be sited and thus popularized. I had the same philosophy about my essays, sans any “facilitator” like Facebook. I suspect that Facebook’s culture might have been allowed to become akin to that of the Academy of Management. If so, vindictiveness could be added as a reason why the range of ideas on the internet has been narrowed, and why more attention was not devoted to enforcing policies on the third-party uses of user data. With great power comes great responsibility, so does the power remain when it has become clear that the responsibility has been lacking?

In short, social media companies like Google and Facebook had been allowed by the U.S. Government, and ultimately the American people, to get too big—too much coverage and control of the internet. There should have been another platform similar to Facebook’s that I could have used to reach more readers. Heather West of Mozilla stated at the SXSW conference in 2018 that people were “realizing the power that technology has in our lives and [were] asking technology companies to be more transparent and responsible.”[3] I doubt that, and, besides, I submit that something more than asking was needed. Social media companies like Facebook were clinging at the time to their mantra that they merely provide platforms rather than the content (or even curating it). That is similar to Goldman Sachs insisting in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008 that the bank merely puts markets together, rather than acts also as a proprietary player in them. At the SXSW conference, Kara Swisher of Vox Media and Christiane Amanpour of CNN mocked Twitter and Facebook for insisting, “We’re a tech platform that facilitates media.”[4] A conflict of interest is in even just that, for which media is to be facilitated and which relegated as problematic? Clearly, fake political ads are problematic, but are the social critics whose range includes critiquing social media companies also problematic? Perhaps Facebook’s actual role is a blend of public and private—a private sector government, one might say. If so, democratic accountability, and even that by stockholders, is problematic and thus not to be relied on.

The answer is more government regulation of companies like Facebook, essentially meaning that the public governance functions of Facebook should be overseen at the very least by public policy rather than corporate governance and pressure from users. But government regulation has its limits. Regulators cannot be everywhere, and they cannot get at the problem of the willowing of the blogs on the internet due to factors controlled by the social media companies. For there to be a true democracy of ideas on the World Wide Web, alternative platforms of substantial but not dominating scale  must be viable without being snuffed out by a bloated platform like Facebook’s. Breaking up that company could mean that potential upstarts would get a chance to grow without being bought out and shelved by the giant. Oligopoly is not good for competition, and whether or not an industry is permitted to attain an oligarchic structure is a matter for governments to decide, and ultimately electorates.

For more on this topic, 

See the essay, "Facebook: A Distrustful Company."

See also the booklet, Taking the Face off Facebook

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[1] Rob Pegoraro, “SXSW Takes a Skeptical Look at Tech,” USA Today, March 13, 2018.

[2] Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

Gary Cohn of Goldman Sachs in the White House: A Hidden Agenda?

Rex Tillerson, the U.S. Secretary of State fired by U.S. President Donald Trump and former CEO of Exxon, an international oil company based in the U.S., did not allow his difference with the president of tariffs on steel and aluminum to be a deal breaker. In this respect, the ex-CEO was not doing his company’s bidding. That is to say, he was not primarily in public service to serve the private interests of a multinational corporation. Unfortunately, this cannot be said of Gary Cohn, the ex-president of Goldman Sachs who quit as Trump’s chief economic advisor just after the tariffs were announced. Tariffs in general and especially to protect goods in another sector are not in the interests of a major American banks with substantial international business. If the former president of Goldman Sachs had taken the post in government to further Goldman’s interests, the question is whether public service is mere window-dressing at the highest levels of government—plutocracy being the real name of the game.

In a statement at the time of his resignation, Cohn wrote, “It has been an honour to serve my country and enact pro-growth economic policies to benefit the American people. In particular the passage of historic tax reform.”[1] That reform lowered the corporate tax rate and thus was a financial benefit to Goldman Sachs. Cohn left this point out and instead cited the benefit to the American people, which might thus have been a mere subterfuge designed to hide the possibility that the ex-president of Goldman Sachs was actually doing his firm’s bidding.

That Cohn was instrumental in getting the corporate tax rate reduced and that he resigned at least in part because President Trump acted aversely to Goldman Sachs’ interests in enacting tariffs—even just as a negotiating tactic in the trade negotiations then going on—suggests that Cohn had taken the governmental post to safeguard and promote the financial interests of Goldman Sachs. Perhaps President Trump had been obliged to fill the position with such a person in exchange for having accepted campaign contributions from the firm or even the financial industry more generally. It would then be no accident that the Secretary of the Treasury was also a Goldman alum.

The larger question regards whether the public interest can be served in a political economy in which large companies have substantial political leverage over aspiring candidates for office via campaign contributions. At the time of Tillerson’s firing, President Trump remarked that he was finally able to have a cabinet of his own—of his choosing. This statement implies that he had been obliged initially to hand over several cabinet positions to people not of his own choosing. Had Exxon purchased the de facto first chance to fill the Secretary of State position, and Goldman Sachs the U.S. Treasury and chief economic advisor positions? With public statements insisting on having served the American people, which would hardly be need to be said were it true, it should come as no surprise that the American people have been kept in the dark concerning the influence of “dark” money on “public” offices at the expense of the public good.

For more on this topic, see Institutional Conflicts of Interest

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1. Kate Kelly, Maggie Haberman, and Peter Baker, “Gary Cohn to Resign as Trump’s Top Economic Advisor,” The New York  Times, March 6, 2018.

BP and MMS: A Case of Regulatory Capture

In the U.S. Constitutional Convention, James Madison in particular stressed the nepharious quality of faction in relation to the public good. He argued that if a republic is extended in scope sufficently that there are more factions, none of them would be able to dominate and the public good would emerge. In a republic in which there are only a few major parties, the people's perspectives can become delimited by the parties' paradigms in an either-or dual macro-framework. That is to say, societal blind-spots can exist. To the extent that both BP and the relevant U.S. Government regulatory agency, MMS, were both culpable in the Deep Water Horizon rig explosion in 2010, both the Republican defense of business and the Democratic defense of government fall short. Even so, these respective defenses went on undaunted in the wake of the disaster and in the next year. To be sure, old paradigms die hard.

Albeit an oversimplification, it can be said that the Democratic party in the United States stresses the power of business as the problem, whereas the Republican party there views the problem as being government.  In campaigning for President in 1980, Ronald Reagan bluntly said that government was indeed the problem.  Deregulation ensued and industry self-regulation was like a fad. The idea was that the checks and balances in goverment that protect the liberties of the citizens could be applied at the industry level such firms would provide a check on eachother automatically. Lost in the buzz was the extent to which an industry would be willing to sacrifice its own long-term viability in order to protect even the bad among its own.

In 2010, the Republican paradigm whereas business is good and government is bad resulted in some Republican office holders defending a piriah (BP) and continuing to urge deregulation in order to excoreate against the US Government and frustrate the Obama Administration.  The ranking Republican on the US House Energy and Commerce committee apologized to BP’s CEO for the “shakedown” by Obama in extracting a $20 billion fund for the claims in the Gulf region. Meanwhile, Democrats were hard-pressed to admit that a goverment regulatory agency, namely MMS, could be so inept and corrupt.  It was not so much a matter of more regulations being needed; rather, the problem was government regulation itself.

Democrats could point to the encroaching nature of big business over the regulators, but absent a shakedown in the size of the biggest companies, the wherewithal of the regulators not to “partner up” with the regulatees may be an intractable problem in government regulation.  The traditional argument in capture theory that regulators depend on their respective industries for information doesn’t even break a sweat in what is needed to explain the extent of the power of big business over government regulatory agencies.  The imbalance of power is systemic: government officials being too feckless and corrupt. and big business being too powerful for the good of the republic.  In their letters, Jefferson and Adams agree on the need for a natural aristocracy of virtue and talent, rather than the artifical sort of wealth and birth.  Absent a natural aristocracy, systems whether business or government, cannot but be ineffective and corrupt.

In 2010, BP’s sordid safety record and its explosion in the Gulf of Mexico challenged the paradigms of both parties.  In actuality, business and goverment, as well as business and government, contain problems that exceed and transcend a particular paradigm. In treating the two party paradigms as a dichotomy, we miss the interaction effect that exists among the respective sectors’ problems.  It might be that the founders were correct in their suspicion of factionalism, as it does indeed detract from the common good.  Where a paradigm keeps one from acknowledging problems that are in the radar of an “opposing” paradigm, a person is not apt to serve the public interest.  In other words, both paradigms are limited.  The BP-MMS interaction and the subsequent explosion and responses exposed the delimited nature of the partisan paradigms.

For more on MMS, see Cases of Unethical Business, which is available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Chinese Censorship: Beyond the FCC in the U.S.

Regarding the Chinese government’s attempts to rein in microblogging and television programming, the New York Times observed in 2011, “Political censorship in this authoritarian state remains absolute.” It is therefore perhaps all the more surprising that bloggers in China have been able to post “whistle-blowing” reports at the expense (and embarrassment) of the political elite. That this has occurred at all suggests that once a Jennie gets out of its bottle, it is difficult to reverse course. This is the traditional Western view. Using television programming as a case study, I submit that the picture is actually more complex than the antiquated "black and white" version may suggest. 

On October 25, 2011, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television ordered 24 regional television stations to limit themselves to no more than two 90-minute entertainment shows per week. The requirement is aimed, according to the ministry, at rooting out “excessive entertainment and vulgar tendencies.” The additional requirement for two hours of news every evening suggests that “excessive entertainment” may refer not only to the decadent sort of programing commonly called “reality shows” in the West, but also to the desire to have a balance of programming available on the public airwaves. Lest the regulations seem too draconian particularly to Americans, having a check on the proliferation of decadent programming spurred on by its low production cost may be something that many Westerners over 30 might favor. That public airwaves are public means that the public, through its government, has a right to regulate the content. For example, American televisions must include public service ads (PSAs) among the paid ads. Even so, the Chinese ministry’s order that television stations ignore audience ratings goes too far in the other direction.

The difficult task of balancing the fact that the airwaves belong to the public with the equally valid point that programming to at least some degree should reflect what people want to see, as per the definition of entertainment, can be evaded by running to either pole; it is far more difficult to manage the competing points. Programming the public airwaves need not succumb to “bottom feeding,” such that one or two segments of the population are effectively allowed to define entertainment for the whole even if this is in the networks’ short-term financial interests (i.e., cheapest programming and largest audience). No constraint on catering to the lowest common denominator can have the effect of facilitating a cultural trajectory into decadence.

At the same time, entertainment cannot be imposed; people simply won’t watch a boring show on public safety. Even forcing people to watch does not mean that they will be entertained. Authoritarianism may seem powerful, but it cannot easily access the inner recesses of the human being. Acting to protect the public airwaves from being monopolized at the expense of the whole need not slip into a control fixation. Indeed, the proliferation of television channels and internet programming even beyond television programming means that particular networks can specialize on specific market segments (either in terms of programming or audience) without segments of the public at large being ignored.

Whereas the Chinese government is too extreme in the authoritarian direction, the FCC in the U.S. could also be criticized for standing by as television networks maximize their profits by catering to “reality show” viewers at the expense of programming that bothers to use actors. Of course, people do not have to watch such shows, but if such programming dominates a significant number of programming venues, the wider public may have a legitimate claim—if not to equal time, then at least to a bit more being offered that is oriented to their tastes. For example, some people might not be edified by Jerry Springer or Jersey Shore—wanting something more like West Wing, LA Law or Boston Legal even though such shows are more expensive to produce. Should the content on the public airwaves be decided by profitability alone?

Imagine, if you will, turning on your television and finding either news shows serving as mouthpieces for certain talking heads, or series “show-casing” low-class, non-actors engaged in “drama” (the term itself has morphed from its ancient Greek association with temple-worship to the absence of any self-discipline, similar to how “professional” has become democratized to fit virtually any occupation). Even though the Chinese government is not known for its lightness of touch, its decision to try to impact programming at the expense of popularity contests might not be as outlandish as it seems. This is my point, rather than that the Chinese government should be defended for having a draconian demeanor. Both consumer demand and the public interest can be reflected in what is broadcast on television. Government regulation along with a market economy is, as of 2011 at least, the best the human race has come up with to accommodate both points. The picture is not black and white (or at least anymore). Perhaps both the Chinese ministry and the FAA could move a bit to the center.

While the market mechanism can function well in allocating non-essential goods and services, it may be vulnerable to succumbing to the “systemic risk” of being reduced to a lowest common denominator functioning like a vortex or black hole of sorts. It is a legitimate function of government to look after the public good, and this can include stepping in when a market mechanism succumbs to some decadent exuberance wherein a minority preference trumps the good of the whole. A government need not be obsessed with maintaining public order and decency (as though in 1950's America) to exercise its duty with respect to the public airwaves.

Source:

Sharon LaFraniere, Michael Wines, and Edward Wong, “China Reins in Entertainment and Bloggers,” The New York Times, October 27, 2011.