The European Court of Justice Slaps Down Hungary: A Defense of Modern Federalism

The European Court of Justice (ECJ), the E.U.’s supreme court, which like the U.S. counterpart can overrule state courts, ordered the E.U. state of Hungary to pay a lump sum of €200 million and €1 million per day of delay from June 12, 2024 because the state government had disregarded “the principle of sincere cooperation” between states in taking in their fair share of foreign asylum-seekers and “deliberately” evaded implementing the federal law that directs the states how to treat those people who enter the E.U. through the state seeking political asylum.[1] The state government had made it “virtually impossible” for asylum seekers to file applications.[2] Similar to the Nullification Acts passed by the state government of South Carolina in the U.S. when that union was between 30 and 40 years old, the decision of Hungary to ignore the ECJ’s ruling on the matter in 2020 could not be tolerated by federal authorities, for a federal system of dual sovereignty (i.e., some held at the federal level and the rest at the state level) cannot survive if state governments can unilaterally decide to nullify, or ignore federal law. That federal directives in the E.U. reply on implementation into law at the state level just makes the E.U. more vulnerable should a state government so easily dismiss federal law. Why even be in a union if its law is deemed not worthy of respect?

In their written opinion, the justices of the ECJ clearly understood that the problem of Hungary’s dismissiveness of the legitimacy of federal law within the state struck at the foundation of the union. “That conduct constitutes a serious threat to the unity of E.U. law, which has an extraordinarily serious impact both on private interests, particularly the interests of asylum seekers, and on the public interest,” the high court declared.[3] The problem being extraordinary for the E.U. as a federal system of public governance, the public interest being impacted certainly includes that of the union itself. It is necessary therefore to separate out the particular issue, that of political asylum and even immigration, and focus on the viability of the E.U. itself.

Any federal system will not long endure if state governments attempt to throw off problems onto other states. In fact, given the cultural heterogeneity that naturally exists in an empire-scale federation such as the E.U. and U.S., cooperation between the states directly as well as through federal institutions of government plays a vital role. Tensions that might tear such gigantic unions apart need to be offset by cooperation; the last thing such a union needs is political infighting between the states and even just one state that presumes not to be subject to federal law. For such a union to lack enforcement power even in regard to its own competencies (E.U.), or enumerated powers (U.S.) is a sure recipe for collapse and the epitome, moreover, of weakness. So, the ECJ justices acted wisely in automatically taking Hungary’s fine out of its share of largess from the E.U. budget.

For its part, the state government of Hungary could have taken the opportunity to definitely decide whether to accept the validity of E.U. law as applicable even for the state governments, or secede from the union as the British did after they finally came to a decision rejecting the dual-sovereignty, which distinguishes (early) modern federalism from what is now called confederalism. A common expression in English comes to mind: that of, “shit or get off the pot.” Translated, this means, “use the toilette or get up, rather than procrastinate on it all day.” Muddling the difference by staying in the Union and yet mislabeling it as a “bloc” or a “network” rather than a federal system of government, and the European Parliament’s political parties (even the EPP!) as mere “groupings,” as if that legislative body were not a real legislature and political parties could only exist at the state level, only puts the E.U.’s self-understanding at odds with what the Union actually is, and such a lack of self-understanding can never be good for anything (or anyone).[4] A fish would not long live if it comes to believe that it is a frog. A house divided is bad enough; a house that comes to be viewed as a mere tool shed is in even worse shape.

Even though some healthy degree of anti-federalism is a good means of forestalling (i.e., by acting as a check politically and even in the basic or constitutional law itself) the kind of federal consolidation that has occurred in the U.S. since 1865 (i.e., the anti-federalists had been right), knowingly pretending with ill-suited words that a federal union of states is something else altogether whose nature, superimposed, weakens the union by denying what it is empirically is needlessly destructive and utterly dishonest intellectually. Engaging in word-games to obfuscate the public’s understanding of the very nature of the E.U. really only demonstrates the cognitively distortive propensity of ideology (i.e., its susceptibility to delusion from pride and resentment). Journalists and their editors generally have been easy, unthinking tools in that political game of perpetuating an illusion as if it were empirically extant and a fact of reason. What then of the perpetual peace, which old Kant saw as only possible rather than probable if there were a world federation, if a federal system just in Europe cannot even be consistently recognized as federal government rather than as something else entirely that is weaker in providing for public governance?  

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “ECJ Finds Hungary with €200 Million over ‘Extremely Serious’ Breach of E.U. Asylum Law,” Euronews.com, June 12, 2024 (accessed June 13, 2024).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, italics added for emphasis.
4. I am in the midst of translating a 17^th century text from French, and I think the tiresomely long sentences are rubbing off on me. At least I’m not compounding the problem by inserting colons and semicolons throughout such a train of thought. Regarding the EPP, the European People’s Party, which is a political party in the European Parliament, a journalist at the time even parroted (not quoting) a Euroskeptic by dutifully writing, “the European People’s Party group” in an article published online by Euronews. Stating the obvious, I feel the instinctual need nonetheless to point out that “party” is in the very name of the party and thus it is, and understands itself as, a political party. Perhaps “group” should be used to designate the smaller parties at the state level, as more than one of such groups can feed into one of the larger federal parties by means of the elected representatives in the federal parliament—such groups themselves not being recognized there. Such a reversal would doubtless not be tolerated for long! Even so, by engaging in such a reversal, the hypocrisy of the status quo may be better known.

Brexit as a Contribution to Political Development

Britain’s secession from the E.U. was, I submit, based on a reaction within the state against it having given up some of its sovereignty to the European Union. The American states too were originally (i.e., from 1776) fully sovereign until they gave up some limited (i.e., enumerated) sovereignty to the federal level in 1789. In 1861, South Carolina, like Britain, also sought to secede based on the view that too much sovereignty had been transferred. Unlike the UK, however, SC (and then the other seceding states) resorted to force. Although the process of Britain’s secession was arduous, I submit that South Carolina and federal officials had been excessively rigid. Even though the “dual sovereignty” of the European and American federal systems is perpetual, only the E.U. allows for peaceful secession. This evinces a step forward in the political development of federalism. Both a federal union and a strongly anti-federalist state are better off with secession being possible, especially if the process is peaceful. Europe deserves to be congratulated, and America would do well in taking a lesson in order to benefit from the advance. Peaceful secession can be done in a federal system of dual (i.e., federal and state) sovereignty.

Although several possible rationales were put forward both for South Carolina (and the other confederate states) and the United Kingdom seceding from their respective empire-level unions, I contend that in both cases the enormous distance and thus tension between confederalism (i.e., the states retaining sovereignty) and modern federalism (i.e., dual sovereignty was the root cause. In both cases, the belief that the federal level had too much governmental sovereignty at the expense of that of the states was in play. In both cases, moreover, the respective unions were seen as confederations. In the case of SC, this belief supported the argument that a state could justifiably secede. In the case of the UK, Prime Minister David Cameron referred to the E.U. to an association and Britain as a member. This view is utterly incompatible with the E.U.s basic law due to the feature of dual sovereignty. Joining an international organization as a member does not involve any transfer of the member’s governmental sovereignty.

Not even the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the E.U., was an international organization because sovereignty was split. In Flaminio v. E.N.E.L. (1964), the European Court of Justice stated, “By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the member states and which their courts are bound to apply.”[1] Even the superiority of the ECJ over state supreme courts involves a transfer of sovereignty because a state cannot overrule the ECJ; the state is bound rather than at liberty in this respect and has thus lost some sovereignty. Interestingly, the Court nonetheless refers to the EEC as founded by an international treaty, though not an “ordinary” one. Dual sovereignty characterizes modern federalism, which began with the American constitution, so not even confederalism, wherein the states retain full sovereignty, is sufficient to characterize the EEC (not to mention the E.U.)! The reference to a EEC non-ordinary treaty is thus problematic.

I suspect that the gravitas of nationalism may explain the Court’s odd legal invention of a non-ordinary international treaty wherein sovereignty is split within an overarching legal system (i.e., modern federalism). I am reminded of a line from The Euthyphro, a Socratic dialogue. Euthyphro suddenly remembers that he has an appointment as soon as he realizes that he has lost the debate. Socrates quips, “Oh Euthyphro, you are a rascal!” Rather than own up to the fact that international treaties do not split sovereignty within an overarching legal system, the Court stated that the EEC international treaty was not ordinary, and yet the ruling explicitly affirms: The transfer by the states from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights.[2] In fact, the EEC could exercise direct effect in obligating the residents of a state without the state’s involvement.

The E.U. shifted even more sovereignty from the states to the federal level and continued direct effect, and expanded the federal governmental institutions to include a parliament and an executive branch (with a president), so the case that the E.U. federal system includes dual or split governmental sovereignty is even stronger. Even so, David Cameron referred to the Union as one of the international organizations to which Britain happens to belong. Even the Court ruling about the EEC would challenge such a characterization, albeit in a vague way.

I submit that enough of the residents of the E.U. state of Britain viewed the E.U. as an international organization and thus as having an illegitimate claim to any sovereignty that secession was good both for the state and the Union. Put another way, the state’s predominant notion of what the E.U. was conflicted violently with what the E.U. actually was at the time: a federal system characterized by dual sovereignty (i.e., modern federalism—not even confederalism!). A real difference of opinion on something is can be understood as a deep fault-line, and thus as destabilizing at best. A house divided so fundamentally does not stand much of chance in the long term. Therefore, it was to tremendous benefit both to the E.U. and its most wayward state that the secession was not only allowed, but also accomplished peacefully. The arduous process, in other words, was well worth all the headaches. The American case demonstrates that resorting to force can go terribly wrong.

1. Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., Summary, Case 6-64, 15 July 1964.

2. Ibid.

The Euroskeptic Ideology: Inherently Exogenous to the E.U.

At the root of the matter of Britain's secession from the Union, I submit, is a starkly Euro-skeptic, or Anti-federalist, ideology that viewed the E.U. as a network to which the sovereign state of Britain belongs, as PM David Cameron said before the secession referendum. Unfortunately, this view ran up against the reality of the E.U.'s federal system in which the federal level too had some sovereignty. Even the mechanism of qualified majority voting involves a loss of sovereignty for the state governments. The discordance can be heard in a speech given by William Hague of the British government at the end of May in 2013 in which he advocated that state legislatures should be able to block E.U. laws proposed by the European Commission.[1] At the time, a state legislature could use a “yellow card” to object to a proposal that could presumably be better legislated and enforced at the state level. Hague wanted a “red card” option that a state legislature could use to block legislation. This proposal reflects the Nullification Acts passed by the government of South Carolina in the early 1830s, which prompted the U.S. to resist strongly as the union itself could have unraveled. Aside from the exogenous ideology itself in the E.U., two problems with Hague’s proposal can be identified. I contend that the problems stem from, and thus can point to, the underlying ideology that is inherently at odds with modern federalism, in which dual-sovereignty is a prominent attribute.

Should the state legislatures dominate the EU's legislature?  The British state government says yes. Would the Union wither and die?  (Source: mapperywordpress.com)

Presumably, such a card from just one of the 27 state legislatures could block a proposal. It would be difficult to imagine virtually any law surviving at the E.U. level. Why then have the E.U. at all then? If every state can pick and choose among federal laws, what force would any federal law have on the state level, given that only the enforcement would only be in states in favor of the law? Without any binding force on the states, the federal level cannot act as a check on abuses of power at the state level. This function of federalism would be limited to the states checking the federal government. 

Secondly, Hague was assuming that the European Parliament was not democratic at all, whereas the state legislatures were fully so. However, the members of the European Parliament are directly elected by EU citizens. The representatives represent those constituents rather than states (or state governments). Perhaps the direct representation, which leaves out the state government officials, is why Hague proposed to have the state legislatures essentially replace the European Parliament. To be sure, the legislative districts at the state level are smaller and thus more democratic in this respect, but this point does not render federal legislative bodies like the European Parliament and the U.S. House of Representatives non-democratic. In fact, giving the E.U. voters a direct say at the federal level through their respective representatives is a necessary feature of modern federalism because in it the federal level has at least some sovereignty that does not reduce to that of the states. Put another way, Europeans in the E.U.. are citizens both of their states and the E.U. Accordingly, the people have a right to be represented in both governmental systems--that of the states and the Union. 

1. “William Hague Demands Right to Show ‘Red Card’ to European Union,” The Huffington Post, May 31, 2013.

President Trump: Revisiting Presidents Jackson and Lincoln on their Statesmanship

In an interview in 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump said he wondered why the issues leading to the U.S. Civil War “could not have been worked out” to prevent the republics from exiting the U.S.[1] “People don’t realize, you know, the Civil War, if you think about it, why?”[2] In particular, “People don’t ask . . . why was there the Civil War? Why could that one not have been worked out?”[3] The reigning assumption has been that President Lincoln could not have resolved the dispute short of going to war. Trump then suggested that had President Andrew Jackson been president rather than Lincoln, we “wouldn’t have had the Civil War.”[4] Aside from the point that Jackson was a Southerner, his feat in resolving the Nullification Crisis without a shot being fired suggests that Trump had a point; the war between the C.S.A. and U.S.A. could have been averted. More importantly, the mentality that won the war may not be as salubrious as we suppose.

In 1828, when John Quincy Adams was the federal president, a tariff—a tax on imported manufactured goods that originally went into effect in 1816—was increased even beyond the increase in 1824. The intent was to protect the nascent American manufacturing sector, which was mainly in the Northern states, from cheaper European imports. As a result of the tariff, Southern plantation owners had to pay more for manufactured goods from Europe, and Europeans had fewer dollars with which to buy Southern exports, of which cotton and rice were particularly important to the Southern agrarian economy.

In 1829, Andrew Jackson became the U.S. President and John C. Calhoun became the Vice President. The latter, who was from South Carolina, proposed the doctrine of nullification, wherein a state government could constitutionally nullify any federal law injurious to the state’s interests. Even from the standpoint of a loose federation, or a confederated Union of mostly sovereign republics, the doctrine was specious; for it would eviscerate virtually any federally-agreed-to constraint on the states. The former president John Quincy Adams argued more practically that the U.S. Supreme Court, not the state governments, had the ultimate authority to declare federal law unconstitutional. For his part, President Jackson sided with Adams out of fear that state-nullification could potentially lead to the break-up of the Union.

Meanwhile, South Carolina’s government declared the tariff to be unenforceable in the state. European firms could export their goods to buyers in South Carolina without having to pay the tariff. Hence, the buyers would get the lower prices, and the sellers and their compatriots would have more dollars with which to buy South Carolina rice and cotton. The tariff would remain in effect in the U.S. where the toll on economies was less. Interestingly, Calhoun also argued that the federal government had constitutional authority to use tariffs only as a means to raise revenue for that government, rather than to favor certain economic sectors; such picking and choosing—essentially between states—was going too far, especially as a certain region of states was losing power in Congress as the Union added new states. I submit that South Carolina’s government officials and Calhoun pushed their favored confederal approach or interpretation of American federalism too far in incorporating the nullification doctrine precisely because the plantation economy was becoming less and less, proportionally speaking, of the American economy, and the Southern states, less and less, also proportionately, of the total number of states in the American Union. This dynamic, not its symptom of slavery, was the underlying cause of the war between the C.S.A. and the U.S.A. How this interpretation differs so from the victor’s moralistic, almost apolitical narrative! How bound we are, without even realizing it, to the narrative!—alternatives being deemed nothing short of heresy! Abominations!

President Jackson diffused the changing dynamic—shifting regional power in the Union in the midst of two starkly different preferences of federalism (confederalism and modern federalism, respectively)— by signing tariff legislation in 1832 and again in 1833 that lowered the tariffs even as he stated that South Carolina’s nullification law was null and void and sent federal troops down to the state to enforce the law. The deal, in other words, was a much lower tariff in exchange for the state’s repeal of its nullification law. Because the president pressed Congress to repeal its increased tariff, essentially giving that one to Calhoun’s point on the federal use of tariffs for revenue only, Jackson cannot be said to have been staunchly on the side of the federal government—which is something, considering that Jackson headed one of its three branches! Rather, the president gave something to South Carolina—putting the state’s interests ahead of the other states and the federal government. Yet the state’s government had to pay a price—giving up on its cherished, albeit over-extended, doctrine of nullification.

South Carolina’s legislature had prepared a secession, or “exit,” document—Calhoun himself was involved in crafting it. The same document would be used in 1861 for the “SoCarexit”—to borrow from the E.U. secessionist state’s lexicon. Interestingly, Congress had again just enacted a tariff increase in 1858. It is possible that this old issue, as much as new free states being admitted to the Union, sparked renewed impetus to divorce from the U.S.[5]

The threat to the Southern plantations in 1861 was not the imminent end of slavery there. The threat was indirect and more diffused, coming in the form of new states with different economies being admitted to the Union. The theory of confederalism insists that the enumerated and residual sovereignty of each state is protected—hence the balance of power resides with the states. The Southern fear was that the balance was already shifting in favor of the federal head, and this made the decreasing proportion of the Southern states in the enlarging Union particularly worrisome. In other words, the “nationalist” variant of federalism (modern federalism) was gaining over confederalism, and the interests of the Southern states—political, economic, cultural, religious—were becoming more of a minority in an increasingly heterogeneous, larger empire: the United States. The tariff and slavery were only symptoms.

Jackson’s peaceful resolution of the Nullification Crisis lays in stark contrast to Lincoln’s “take it or leave it” approach to the Southern secessionist states. Whereas Jackson had the federal government retreat voluntarily on its tariff, Lincoln’s approach can be seen as being one-sided because he did not even offer to have the federal government step back at all from its position. When all the political heavy-lifting is put on the other side—for it to do the backing down—it is no wonder that resistance is encountered and a long, bloody war results. I submit that Lincoln could reasonably have compromised and yet save the Union in the sense of retaining all of its existing states.

For example, Lincoln could have assuaged the Southerners’ fears by proposing a qualified majority voting system in the U.S. Senate and perhaps even in the U.S. House of Representatives. Such a system would be designed such that legislation could not pass without at least some Southern support. The federal government would thus not be able to turn on the South—which I submit was the underlying fear. In the E.U., for instance, qualified majority voting in the federal legislative chambers—the European Council and the European Parliament—requires at least 55% of population of the Union and 55% of the states be represented on the yes side of votes for the bills to become law. Lincoln and Congressional leaders could have entertained novel ideas on how to craft such a system. A Council of Regions, for instance, wherein only the major regions of the U.S. were represented—each region having a veto--could have been added as a third legislative chamber, or perhaps even to replace the U.S. Senate! Even beyond Jackson’s fine job in 1832, thinking outside the box in such occasions is invaluable in thwarting violent conflict from engulfing all other possibilities of resolution.

For the slavery-reductionist advocates, I submit that the Southern states were a significant portion of the Union and so were justified politically in wanting to feel that they would not be rolled over in federal chambers—even though the institution of slavery was squalid, especially to our modern sensibility in the twenty-first century. The institution is for us unthinkable, undenkbar, vorbotten even in retrospect (i.e., in a historical context). For us, to think of other human beings as wild animals or property is nothing short of pathological. Even so, we must allow ourselves to admit that because the Emancipation Proclamation did not occur until 1863 (and did not apply to the five slave states that remained with the Union, and had no effect in the rebel states), the immediate point of contention in 1861 was not slavery itself where it existed. The fear was more future-oriented, and generalized, and the anger was informed by political theory—namely, two contending versions of federalism—and declining political power. Accordingly, the conflict at hand could have been resolved short of war without the South having to give up the institution of slavery. The demand that Jackson's approach applied back in 1861 include the abolition of slavery where it then existed is unfair, for not even the new Republican Party was demanding then that the South give up its sordid institution! 

Had Lincoln adopted Jackson’s approach at that time, the South might then have moved years later to put its slavery in play. Perhaps the Southern states would have accepted federal financial help with a new plantation labor system in exchange for a repeal of the 1858 tariff, combined with the region having a veto on federal legislation in a Council of Regions or a stiff qualified-majority voting system in the U.S. Senate—either of which could have been enshrined as a constitutional amendment. To be sure, any of these items could have been used in 1861 to walk back from war. At any rate, ensuing incremental agreements, progress without war, might have been possible once cooler heads could again prevail. My point is that we cannot assume that were Jackson’s approach put in place in 1861, slavery would have endured for decades. But I digress.

Jackson was able to resolve his “either/or” by putting together a deal in which both sides—the federal government and the state—gave something and got something in return. Such an approach is superior to Lincoln’s “my way or the highway” stance—that of making demands of the other side without any accommodation or retreat on his side. Rigidity begets rigidity, and much harm came ensue when two pieces of sandpaper are rubbed against each other. Even beyond Jackson’s paradigm, however, of resolving a seemingly intractable “either/or” within itself is the ability to see a third, fourth, and even fifth alternative that may never be even thought of in holding fiercely onto the typical “either/or” paradigm. In short, I think we make things more difficult than they need be, even in assuming that the Civil War had to be fought. We do not even recognize our own mental cages, so we go on making the same mistakes over and over. To arrest this pattern, revisiting even “sacred cows” can be invaluable.

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[1] Jonathan Lemire, “Trump Makes Puzzling Claim About Andrew Jackson, Civil War,” The Sacramento Bee, May 1, 2017.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] The use of the term divorce is incorrect as it assumes two equal or equivalent parties. A state is not equivalent to a union of such states, hence the use of the term for the secession of a state involves a category mistake. In the context of “Brexit,” for example, “divorce” can be read as presumptuous for the secessionists.

The Scots Weigh Independence from Britain as the British Consider Leaving the E.U.

The debate over whether the Scottish region of Great Britain should secede from the UK extends beyond whatever provincial interests unite and divide the state’s regions; it "is also part of a larger question that extends well beyond Britain, to Texas and Colorado, for example, and elsewhere: What are the benefits and drawbacks of larger, politically diverse countries, compared with smaller, more homogeneous ones?"[1] Yet is Britain a large, heterogeneous country even as it is a state in the European Union? Texas is much larger, and yet  it too is a state in a union of relatively homogeneous states. 

The full essay is at "Essays on the E.U. Political Economy," available at Amazon.