On the Allure of Popular Suffrage

In the European singing contest/show in which Susan Boyle competed, she lost the top spot to a teenage rap group. The method of selection made all the difference. Rather than having a three-judge panel of experts on singing determine the winner, the general public could “text” via cell phone or other device to vote. That one of the judges explicitly advocated for Boyle after her final performance (just before the voting) was no never mind to the general public that submitted a majority of the votes. To be sure, there were certainly non-music reasons to vote against her. Most notably, the suggestive comments she made on stage just before her first performance, including, “I’m 48, and that’s not my other half” (as she was swinging her hips as if she were sexy), were downright emetic, if not utterly bizarre. So it is possible that the voters put her personality defect above her excellent singing. It is also possible that the “texters” responsible for a majority of the votes simply preferred rap music. I do not like rap “songs” that include shouting and swearing; I do not even regard such “songs” as music. Otherwise, I could sing a song simply by yelling at you. From what I saw, the rap group in the competition was not swearing, but the “singing” did sound at times like shouting to me. Moreover, the group members seemed more oriented to dancing than singing. It is possible that the votes for that group went for any of the fads being represented rather than to singing per se.

A tension, or even an outright contradiction, can exist between meritocracy and direct democracy, or popular sovereignty. Plato and Aristotle both claim that there is a dark side to each system. Meritocracy can slide into aristocracy and democracy into mob rule: government by a selfish and uninformed mob swayed by the passions of the moment over even the people’s own best interests. What struck me about the results of the singing contest was that the rap singing wasn’t good singing whereas Susan Boyle sang very well, yet even so, the group won. It can be safely assumed that most of the voters probably were not experts on good singing. They were not trained to separate their own tastes from a critical perspective focusing on the singers’ voices. The judges presumably could have done this, but they were relegated to proffering their views before the voting—views that the voters could ignore without any imprecation. Indeed, the selection method itself—popular sovereignty—tacitly "disvalues" expertise. In one person, one vote, no one is assumed to be any better qualified to render a decision than anyone else. Differences in effort and talent among the electors are irrelevant unless particular voters care to take them into account.

Lest it be assumed that people in Western democracies necessarily privilege popular sovereignty or the will of the people refracted through elected representatives, it should be noted that power-elites are tacitly permitted to run our political, commercial and non-profit sectors. When Greece’s prime minister, George Papandreou, proposed a referendum in which the Greek people would decide whether to accept the latest debt-deal negotiated at a meeting of the European Council (consisting of heads of the E.U.’s state governments), leaders of France and Germany as well as E.U. appointed officials bore down on the prime minister, perhaps even undercutting his influence with members of his own party in the Greek legislature. Although defending the euro currency from a collapse assumed likely without the implementation of the latest debt deal, the E.U. leaders (including Merkel and Sarkozy) sent the message that direct democracy, ironically in Greece, could not be tolerated given the severity of the economic challenges involved. Experts at the E.U. level, such as the head of the European Central Bank, were included as the E.U. leaders met with Papandreou to pressure him to drop his proposal or change the question to being on the euro zone (rather than on whether to accept the latest E.U. debt deal). Disrespect for direct democracy, or popular sovereignty, was very much implied in the stance being taken at the impromptu E.U. meeting before the G-20 meeting. Yet strangely, the “gang” got away with it. Europeans did not stand up for the voice of the Greek people to be heard directly. Not even the Greek parliament resisted the E.U. “gang” by sufficiently backing the prime minister’s proposal. Instead, leaders of some of the E.U.’s big states and maybe even some E.U. appointed officials may even have pressured members of Papandreou’s own party to bring him down lest he not relent and do what was being deemed necessary to save the euro and the E.U. itself.  Indeed, even Papandreou, when he was caving on the referendum, betrayed his earlier appeal to popular sovereignty by stating that the referendum had value only as long as the opposition was opposing the debt-deal.

I contend that in the E.U., as well as in the U.S., all too often lip-service is given to popular sovereignty and representative democracy, when in fact people still look up to expertise. The Oscars, whose awards are decided by members of the film academy who have expertise in the various fields of filmmaking, is more esteemed than are the People’s Choice Awards. The Oscars are more likely to recognize Maryl Streep’s acting ability than is the People’s Choice.  I would argue that the results of the Oscars are more credible because expertise is not chucked for a flavor of the month. For instance, in the 2010 Oscars, Hurt Locker beat Avatar for Best Director and Best Picture. Hurt Locker was largely an Indie (i.e., on the fringes) film, whereas Avatar broke box office records and was no doubt much more popular with the general public. The Academy members were able to weight improved 3D effects, story and direction without allowing the technical dazzle to overshadow. Indeed, Avatar did receive the Oscar for its development and use of new 3-D technology, even as the members of the academy recognized that the most technologically-advanced film is not necessarily the best.

Of course, Oscar voting is not perfect. The 5000 plus membership may be sufficiently small that cronyism or, its opposite, grudges, may play a role. Avatar’s David Cameron, for example, was apparently not the best-liked man in Hollywood at the time, and his ex-wife just happened to be the director of Hurt Locker. I saw a television clip a few months before the 2010 Oscars showing Cameron being very rude to a fan who simply wanted an autograph at LAX, so I was rooting for his ex-wife and her movie even though Avatar was one of my favorite movies at the time. The lesson is perhaps that no selection process, or person for that matter, is perfect.

My point is that the case of Susan Boyle and the Oscars both point to there being drawbacks to popular suffrage. The E.U. suggests that efforts to bracket direct and even representative democracy are tolerated by the general populous even in democracies. Maybe we are not as much the democrats as we think we are. Maybe there is good reason to leave some things to experts. Even so, at least with respect to political judgment, there may be good reason not to cut off the will of the people. Hence, the U.S. has its Electoral College and the European Council appoints its president, while the U.S. House of Representatives and the E.U. Parliament have elected representatives of the people. In binding the Electoral College to popular vote, the U.S. has moved to the democratic pole, even while tolerating the influence of “big money” in politics. In looking the other way while E.U. leaders undercut state government vetoes and referendums, the E.U. have moved subtly away from the rule of law as well as democracy, even while the salience of state-level elected officials at the EU level (via the European Council) emphasizes “first order” representative democracy (over “second order” selected by the first order). Ideally, neither expertise nor the will of the people are eclipsed, with the rule of law protecting both. The E.U. and U.S. could both take a lesson.

Sources:

 Richard Corliss, “Oscar Wrap-Up: Why Avatar Lost,” Time, March 8, 2010. 

Marcus Walker and Alkman Granitsas, “Greece Blinks on Euro Threat,” The Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2011. 

Chinese Censorship: Beyond the FCC in the U.S.

Regarding the Chinese government’s attempts to rein in microblogging and television programming, the New York Times observed in 2011, “Political censorship in this authoritarian state remains absolute.” It is therefore perhaps all the more surprising that bloggers in China have been able to post “whistle-blowing” reports at the expense (and embarrassment) of the political elite. That this has occurred at all suggests that once a Jennie gets out of its bottle, it is difficult to reverse course. This is the traditional Western view. Using television programming as a case study, I submit that the picture is actually more complex than the antiquated "black and white" version may suggest. 

On October 25, 2011, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television ordered 24 regional television stations to limit themselves to no more than two 90-minute entertainment shows per week. The requirement is aimed, according to the ministry, at rooting out “excessive entertainment and vulgar tendencies.” The additional requirement for two hours of news every evening suggests that “excessive entertainment” may refer not only to the decadent sort of programing commonly called “reality shows” in the West, but also to the desire to have a balance of programming available on the public airwaves. Lest the regulations seem too draconian particularly to Americans, having a check on the proliferation of decadent programming spurred on by its low production cost may be something that many Westerners over 30 might favor. That public airwaves are public means that the public, through its government, has a right to regulate the content. For example, American televisions must include public service ads (PSAs) among the paid ads. Even so, the Chinese ministry’s order that television stations ignore audience ratings goes too far in the other direction.

The difficult task of balancing the fact that the airwaves belong to the public with the equally valid point that programming to at least some degree should reflect what people want to see, as per the definition of entertainment, can be evaded by running to either pole; it is far more difficult to manage the competing points. Programming the public airwaves need not succumb to “bottom feeding,” such that one or two segments of the population are effectively allowed to define entertainment for the whole even if this is in the networks’ short-term financial interests (i.e., cheapest programming and largest audience). No constraint on catering to the lowest common denominator can have the effect of facilitating a cultural trajectory into decadence.

At the same time, entertainment cannot be imposed; people simply won’t watch a boring show on public safety. Even forcing people to watch does not mean that they will be entertained. Authoritarianism may seem powerful, but it cannot easily access the inner recesses of the human being. Acting to protect the public airwaves from being monopolized at the expense of the whole need not slip into a control fixation. Indeed, the proliferation of television channels and internet programming even beyond television programming means that particular networks can specialize on specific market segments (either in terms of programming or audience) without segments of the public at large being ignored.

Whereas the Chinese government is too extreme in the authoritarian direction, the FCC in the U.S. could also be criticized for standing by as television networks maximize their profits by catering to “reality show” viewers at the expense of programming that bothers to use actors. Of course, people do not have to watch such shows, but if such programming dominates a significant number of programming venues, the wider public may have a legitimate claim—if not to equal time, then at least to a bit more being offered that is oriented to their tastes. For example, some people might not be edified by Jerry Springer or Jersey Shore—wanting something more like West Wing, LA Law or Boston Legal even though such shows are more expensive to produce. Should the content on the public airwaves be decided by profitability alone?

Imagine, if you will, turning on your television and finding either news shows serving as mouthpieces for certain talking heads, or series “show-casing” low-class, non-actors engaged in “drama” (the term itself has morphed from its ancient Greek association with temple-worship to the absence of any self-discipline, similar to how “professional” has become democratized to fit virtually any occupation). Even though the Chinese government is not known for its lightness of touch, its decision to try to impact programming at the expense of popularity contests might not be as outlandish as it seems. This is my point, rather than that the Chinese government should be defended for having a draconian demeanor. Both consumer demand and the public interest can be reflected in what is broadcast on television. Government regulation along with a market economy is, as of 2011 at least, the best the human race has come up with to accommodate both points. The picture is not black and white (or at least anymore). Perhaps both the Chinese ministry and the FAA could move a bit to the center.

While the market mechanism can function well in allocating non-essential goods and services, it may be vulnerable to succumbing to the “systemic risk” of being reduced to a lowest common denominator functioning like a vortex or black hole of sorts. It is a legitimate function of government to look after the public good, and this can include stepping in when a market mechanism succumbs to some decadent exuberance wherein a minority preference trumps the good of the whole. A government need not be obsessed with maintaining public order and decency (as though in 1950's America) to exercise its duty with respect to the public airwaves.

Source:

Sharon LaFraniere, Michael Wines, and Edward Wong, “China Reins in Entertainment and Bloggers,” The New York Times, October 27, 2011. 

CNN’s Hosts: Hidden Agendas

Hitting record-low ratings among total viewers and in the 25-54 age demographic, CNN had its overall lowest-rated month in April 2012 since August 2001. In May 2012, the network hit a 20-year low for total viewers during primetime viewing.[1] Something had gone seriously wrong. Perhaps the easiest move when a company takes a nose-dive is to fire the top. Accordingly, Time Warner executives were thinking of replacing the president of CNN Worldwide.[2] While taking off the top might make sense in government because the entire administration is apt to change, business firms tend to be more entrenched even when under new management.

In the case of CNN, the culprit may have been bad hiring decisions. If so, the solution would lie in replacing the staff who made the hires as well as the “personalities” hired. In an age of “media personalities” wherein opinion typically accompanies journalistic interviewing, it is only natural to hire people who have strong personalities. It is far less common to witness interviewees going after hosts in terms of their personalities. In May 2012, Donald Trump laid into Wolf Blitzer during an interview. The real-estate magnet told the journalist that the introduction was inappropriate, but then added a personal insult in remarking, but “that’s okay, because I’ve gotten to know you over the years.”[3] It would appear that Trump and others “in the loop” having had years of experience with Blitzer had come to the conclusion that he could not be trusted. The general public—meaning the viewers—could only surmise on the accusation, knowing only the “on-screen” media personality.

Years before Trump’s revelation, I had already glimpsed a bit of the man behind the curtain when Blitzer wished everyone “a happy holiday and happy New Year.” The meaning of this statement struck me as suggestive of a Jewish prejudice against Christmas, as if the U.S. holiday were only the religious holiday celebrated by Christians. I also saw footage of Blitzer at a Hollywood event as he was desperately trying to get interviewed by a journalist.

My sense that CNN “stars” might be too self-absorbed got a shot in the arm when Piers Morgan admitted on-camera while covering Queen Elizabeth II’s sixty years on the state’s throne that he really wanted to be king. That was too much even for one of Morgan’s co-host, who said in exasperation, “Oh, Piers!” Strangely, he had previously said that he was glad to be a subject (of the Queen).  Might it be that pride in being a subject is really a subterfuge for a desire to be king? Piers’ imagining of himself as king of the island (an interesting fantasy, given that he had been implicated in the Murdoch hacking scandal) was revealing. Two days before, his coverage had been reduced to drawing attention to the rain—a constant refrain during the parade of boats. He even pointed out that there was water on his seat (as if any of the viewers cared). Moreover, he was careful to stress everything that was distinctively British, while generalizing everything American across fifty republics (Britain is one republic). My instinctive reaction was to ask, well then why don’t you stay over there? 

I was not at all surprised to learn of CNN’s low ratings. I suspected that even if viewers had not been aware of it, they had probably reacted in reaction to the arrogance of the major hosts. People were voting with their remote controls even if they couldn’t put their finger on what was behind their decisions. Rather than limit the change to the top brass at CNN, Time Warner executives would have been wiser to demand that the major “stars” of CNN be replaced en masse. Owning a subsidiary does not mean that oversight is limited to the subsidiary’s executive suite, at least if the parent company is being capably run.

1. Rebecca Shapiro, “CNN Considering Leadership Change in Wake of Ratings Woes: Report,” The Huffington Post, June 8, 2012.

2. Ibid.

3. The Atlantic Wire, “Donald Trump Blasts Wolf Blitzer, CNN During Combative Live Interview,” May 29, 2012.

Long Term Capital Management: An Institutional Conflict of Interest

By 1997, “after three years of strong profits for LTCM, the opportunities were drying up. There was too much money chasing the same investments. . . . In early 1998, LTMC decided to give a large portion of its capital back to its original investors because profitable opportunities were so hard to find. At the end of 1997, LTCM had nearly $7.5 billion under management, compared to $1 billion when it started, and it now returned $2.7 billion of that to investors. The partners also figured that they could, if necessary, simply leverage their portfolio further to compensate for the loss of capital, which would compound their personal gains. Greed was at the heart of what turned out to be a disastrous decision. . . . Unable to reproduce the returns of the first three years, LTCM took increasingly more risk, abandoning its purer arbitrage for the kinds of ‘directional’ investments Soros made and LTCM had so long disdained—such as trying to forecast interest rate and currency movements. More and more of these trades were unhedged.”[1] Furthermore, “LTCM’s risk models—VAR and related statistical tools . . . –were misleading.”[2] For example, diversification was little protection if there was a run on the banks. When Russia defaulted on August 17, 1997, LTCM’s hedges against its Russian investments were worthless. Furthermore, because all fixed income assets fell sharply in value, “diversification, it turned out, did not matter. The finely calculated relationships on which LTCM was built and which the firm always believed would hold started to come apart. VAR could  not account for such an unlikely but sweeping event—an event in which everyone wanted out at the same time and almost all investments fell significantly in price. The use of VAR itself precipitated much of the selling. Commercial banks under the jurisdiction of the Basel Agreements, which . . . set capital requirements based on the level of VAR (the lower the VAR, the lower the capital required), were forced to sell assets to raise capital.”[3] LTCM lost $1.9 billion that August. Eventually, fourteen banks, organized by the Fed, put together loans of more than $3.5 billion to purchase 90 percent of the firm.” LTCM “did manage to sell down assets in an orderly fashion and by early 2000 it was essentially out of business”[4] 


The full essay is at Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

1. Jeff Madrick, Age of Greed: The Triumph of Finance and the Decline of America, 1970 to the Present (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 2011), 277-81.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.