Friday, May 17, 2024

Prospects for Civil War in an E.U. State: The Case of Slovakia

As the E.U. was heading toward legislative elections in 2024, the shooting of Slovenia’s prime minister could have served as a wake-up call concerning the silent benefits of having a union that is political, and thus governmental, rather than merely an economic “bloc.” Were civil war likely in Slovakia, given the aggressive political division there, being a semi-sovereign state rather than a fully independent country meant that explicit and implicit buffers existed that could stave off such war. Considering that an assassination had been the trigger for World War I, having a federal system that could quell aggression within a state is no small benefit.

In 2004, Slovakia became an E.U. state, which means that some of its governmental sovereignty went to a federal level. Slovakia’s velvet reputation for having split peacefully from the Czech Republic in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 may have masked the ensuing stark political reality under Prime Minister Vladimir Merciar, when Slovakia “found itself at a crossroads, stuck between becoming an autocratic regime with close ties to organized crime or a state based on the rule of law.”[1] In 1995, the country’s secret service kidnapped the president’s son. In 2004, Robert Fico’s political career as a “social democrat fighting corruption and unbridled neoliberalism” was just beginning.[2] Yet after becoming prime minister for the first time in 2006, he was accused “of graft and involvement in the Penta Gorilla affair, Slovakia’s biggest post-communist corruption scandal.”[3] In his second stint as prime minister, he and his government “mainly focused on influencing the judiciary, . . . stopping corruption trials and silencing independent media.”[4] He spoke against the E.U. and Ukraine in the midst of the Russian invasion. With all of the press that Viktor Orban of Hungary was receiving for taking the same positions, it was easy to miss Fico’s stances in the E.U.

Together, Fico and Orban can be viewed as a minority stance in E.U. foreign policy in favor of Russia. With such policy requiring unanimity at the federal level, this minority had the potential of hamstringing any foreign policy at the federal level regarding Russia’s aggression. E.U. states would be free to work at cross purposes, and the power of a united front would be missed. This is an argument for applying qualified majority voting to E.U. foreign policy. Such a stance is more evident than another benefit that the E.U. provides to the states—a benefit highlighted by Slovakia.

The shooting of Fico in May, 2024 stemmed from a climate of hateful political polarization in the state. In the wake of the shooting, some fear of a resulting civil war was voiced in the media. Even though the European Steel and Coal Cooperative had been formed to stave off war between states (most notably involving Germany), the less obvious benefit of the E.U. in being able to step in to stave off war within a state has received little attention. The potential benefit for Europe as a whole resonates with the suggestion made by France’s Macron that the defense capability of the E.U. itself be strengthened. For it to be any good, its deployment would have to be decided by qualified majority vote rather than unanimity. Otherwise, Hungary could use its veto to enable Fico’s party to put away its opposition militarily.

A related benefit of the E.U. with respect to Slovakia does not depend on any additional governmental sovereignty being shifted to the federal level. The fact that some sovereignty had already been delegated to the E.U. by its states means that the likelihood of a civil war in a state is buffered, and thus reduced, simply by being in a federal union that has a legislature, executive branch, and a supreme court. Any one of these governmental branches could take action against Slovakia were civil war to break out. Financial levers alone could do the trick, but so too could informal conversations in the European Council, in which the states themselves, through their respective governors, are the members. As nervous as the E.U. officials are about a war just outside the E.U. is, the prospect of war within the E.U. would surely be galvanizing.

Furthermore, within Slovenia, simply viewing itself as a state rather than a sovereign country could work against forces that would otherwise provoke a civil war. In other words, being a state in a political and economic union is itself a moderating force with respect to political polarization getting out of control. In the early U.S., Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts and the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania were doubtless on the minds of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention in making sure that the U.S. president would be able to call the armies of the then-sovereign states into action to put down rebellions in the future semi-sovereign states. So, there is precedent for the E.U. calling on state militias to quell any rebellions in any of its semi-sovereign states, and even for bolstering a federal military force. As E.U. citizens and residents headed to the polls in 2024, it would be a shame were they to take the E.U. for granted. Going even further, it would be a shame were they to miss an opportunity to voice support for an ever more perfect, and thus strengthened rather than hamstrung, union.


1, Keno Verseck, “Robert Fico Shooting Highlights Slovakia’s Deep Polarization,” Deutsche Welle, May 17, 2024.
2, Ibid.
3, Ibid.
4, Ibid.


Monday, May 13, 2024

Eurovision Song Contest 2024: On the role of Political Ideology in Inconsistencies

Political preferences can be salient in organizing bodies of entertainment events that are billed as non-political in nature. This broad inconsistency can in turn allow for others—some of which may not be obvious. My objective here is to render such inconsistencies transparent so that other “hidden” inconsistencies can be more easily detected in the future. As a prime case study, I have in mind the European Broadcast Union (EBU), and more particularly its approach to the 2024 Eurovision Song Contest.

Firstly, that contest was impacted by the pro-Palestine protests because Israel was allowed to compete. More basic than the issue of Israel’s military incursion into famine-ravished Gaza at the time is that of why a country in the Middle East was part of a European contest. Consider the blatant contradiction evinced in a statement from Deutsche Welle: “The European Broadcasting Union (EBU), which organizes the pan-continental pop competition, ruled that Israel is allowed to compete.”[1] Clearly, the contest went beyond Europe. Once the proverbial cat is out of the bag, why not allow other non-European countries to compete? I submit, with a nod back to Kant, that the logical inconsistency itself is sordid.

Secondly, although the EBU subsequently claimed that it did not bar the E.U. flag, attendees were refused entry into the venue if they had the flag. The European Commission had protested the flag being signaled out—I would even say being discriminated against. “Ahead of the final, a spokesperson for the European Broadcasting Union said ticket holders would only be allowed to bring and display flags representing participating countries, as well as the rainbow-colored flag, which symbolizes LGBTQ+ communities.”[2] Besides the decision to include the gay flag being political even though the EBU had claimed to be non-political, the choice discredits the argument that the E.U. flag could not be shown because the E.U. is not a country, for an LGBT “community” is a social group rather than being anything close to a country.

Put another way, a pro-LGBT attendee could show the flag of a social issue, whereas a citizen of the E.U. could not show the flag representing the federal citizenship. E.U. citizens even have an E.U. passport! I suspect that the very notion of E.U. citizenship was ideologically repugnant to whomever in the EBU blocked the flag of the federal union. In other words, singling out the E.U. flag fits with a state’s rights, or Euroskeptic ideology that denies that the E.U. is anything more than a trading “bloc.”

As Euroskeptics would have it, the E.U. would be a confederation, meaning that all of the governmental sovereignty remains with the state governments. Historically, confederations have been used for military alliances, such as those of ancient Athens and Sparta. In contrast, the E.U., like the U.S., includes governmental sovereignty at both the federal and state levels. The qualified majority voting mechanism at the federal level of the E.U. alone involves a delegation of sovereignty from the states because any given state can be bound by federal law even though the state voted against it in the European Council, which, like the U.S. Senate, represents the states. Therefore, E.U. competencies, or enumerated powers, subject to qualified majority voting have been delegated by the states to the federal government. By the way, Euroskeptics are also in denial concerning the fact that a legislature, supreme court, and executive branch at a federal level together constitute a government. Essentially, The EBU fundamentally lacked understanding on the difference between confederalism and modern federalism, and federalism itself, and thus misunderstood the basic nature of the E.U.

That the anti-E.U. ideology is warped relative to the reality of the E.U. resulted in the inconsistencies in allowing in a social issues flag and even the flag of a state in the Middle East yet barring the flag of a government (i.e., a legislature, supreme court, and executive branch) in Europe. To be a citizen thereof and yet be reproved for waving the E.U. flag evinced a basic lack of understanding of what the E.U. is. Ideology can indeed impede and even block understanding. That the EBU would claim to be nonpolitical even as it makes the geo-political assessment to exclude the political flag takes us back to the basic inconsistency.  My main point is that the inconsistencies all stem from political ideology because it tends to warp knowledge and empirical facts to its own ends, confusing an ideal with the way things actually are. Put another way, the self-centered gravity of an ideology can warp knowledge and empirical facts much like black holes warp space and time. This may seem rather profound for a piece on a song contest, but the refusal to allow the federal flag while allowing state flags was not mere entertainment.


1. “Thousands Protest Israel’s Eurovision Participation,” Deutsche Welle, May 10, 2024.
2. “E.U. Slams Eurovision for Banning its Flag from Song Contest,” Deutsche Welle, May 15, 2024.