The U.S. Government’s Debt: Federalism Unbalanced

On May 5, 2025, the debt of the U.S. Government stood at $36.21 trillion, $28.9 trillion being held by the public and $7.31 trillion being intragovernmental. That total is $1.66 trillion more than the total federal public debt on May 5, 2024. Projected interest payments of $952 billion in fiscal year 2025 would be 8 percent higher than the interest payments made in 2024. By comparison, the U.S. budget for national defense in fiscal year 2025 totaled $892.6 billion. Whether going to investors of treasury bonds or defense contractors and other corporations, the combined $1.85 trillion for fiscal 2025 represents a transfer payment to the wealthy from American taxpayers rich, middle-class, and poor. Meanwhile, Republican lawmakers in the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill in May, 2025 that would subject Medicaid and food assistance to significantly less money and subject the States with having to spend more on the administration of those programs. Principles of political ideology reside just below the surface. My task here is to flush them out and relate them to each other, rather than to impose my own ideology.

Fresh out of the Trump Administration, billionaire Elon Musk called the tax and spending bill a “disgusting abomination.”[1] Presumably this condemnation has to do with the “multi-trillion tax breaks” and the raising of the debt ceiling an additional $4 trillion, but the CEO of SpaceX would hardly object to the increase for defense.[2] Musk wrote that the “outrageous, pork-filled” bill would “massively increase the already gigantic budget deficit to $2.5 trillion” in spite of the cuts to healthcare and food for the poor that Musk supported.[3] U.S. Sen. Rand Paul promised to vote against the bill unless the debt ceiling would not be raised.

As of early June, 2025, who could say whether Republican opposition in the U.S. Senate would actually materialize beyond the rhetoric designed to give an impression of objection to voters back home. The Republican lawmakers in the House had quickly closed ranks to pass the House bill. Behind the numbers are values and ideological principles that can be difficult to see. Cutting federal programs that help the poor with subsistence living, such as with food and healthcare, can be said to imply a lack of compassion, especially if defense contractors would be getting more business from the federal government, but two political principles are also in play.

One is the belief that the role of government should not include providing even the basics to people; charities and families should supply basic needs to the poor. Overlaid with that principle is one concerning American federalism, wherein the federal government was originally intended to have very limited powers, and one way of limiting them was to make regulating interstate commerce and providing a common defense primary, with other domains of power being handled by the States. This principle is in accord with the differences between States in an empire-scale federal union of states because the state governments can more tightly match social programs with the political ideology of a majority of the voters in a state than can be done by Congress.

These two principles—the first being more general and the second more particular to the American federal philosophy—are not fully consistent, for according to the federal principle, Congress should take care that the state governments are not crowded out in taxing more so as to take on more in domestic programs—domestic being here within a given state. Whereas the view that the proper roles of government do not include making goods and services available to citizens applies to the States too, the principle of federalism favors expanding the taxing and spending abilities of the States according to how much of an entitlement-providing responsibility each state government wants, as per the relevant political ideology of the majority of the citizens of a state.

Re-balancing American federalism so the States regain some of authority that they once had should include managing the transition especially concerning programs relied on by the poor because they are vulnerable to suffering and even dying by slipping between the cracks. Relatedly, because in at least some of the several States, the majority of people believe that government should supply the poor with necessities, the more general political principle that government itself should not supply goods and services to individual citizens should give way to the second, federal principle. Put another way, were Congress to vote to restrict government itself, then more expansive ideologies in at least some States would be choked off. The general government principle should be decided therefore on the state level rather than by Congress.

Taking a page from the E.U., the U.S. member-states could conceivably be given more responsibility in funding defense beyond just militias, which are armies that the U.S. President can borrow. Not that the head of state of California should step over the federal president on defense policy as Macron of the E.U. state of France did in trying to head the E.U.’s defense policy against Russia in 2025. The defense budget of the U.S. Government could be reduced and the states could do more without the latter superseding the former. Together with transferring more non-interstate-commerce domestic programs to the states, the federal deficits could be reduced. President Reagan failed to rebalance American federalism because he favored the more general restrictive-government-role principle and thus did not facilitate states making up for federal cuts in domestic spending. To be sure, the state governments would have done so to various extents, given their distinct political climates.

Restoring power to the member-states heeds the fact that over a continent and beyond, one size (of public policy) does not fit all (States). Curtailing both federal defense and domestic spending while reducing federal taxation by less than the combined cuts but enough that state taxing abilities would no longer be crowded out from expanding to meet the incoming transfer of programs would put the federal government on the road to fiscal responsibility—meaning being able at some point to pay off its debt—while giving the state governments back more of the authority they had when the federal system was designed and put into operation. The horrendous fiscal imbalance of the U.S. (federal) Government can be interpreted as pointing, in effect, to how imbalanced the federal system itself has become. No one at the U.S. Constitutional Convention envisioned the federal level as handling everything of substance while the state governments become like municipal governments, so it should be no surprise that such a lack of fit would be reflected in a massive fiscal imbalance on the federal level.

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1. Bernd Debusmann, “Musk Calls Trump’s Tax Bill a ‘Disgusting Abomination’,” BBC.com, June 3, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

The Debt-Ceiling and the U.S. Budget as Ransom: A Structural Flaw of Democracy?

It is likely a drawback of democracy that hard decisions—that is, those in which fixing the problem goes against instant gratification or financial advantage—get pushed back, or “kicked down the road,” rather than addressed in a definitive way such that difficult problems are fixed. This structural problem can be seen in how Congressional leaders and the U.S. President delayed the “fiscal cliff” for two months at the beginning of 2013. More generally, the political tactic of holding the federal budget and the debt-ceiling as ransom evinces a fundamental flaw in democracy itself.

To be sure, excesses in politics were also in the mix, as each side stepped back from closing deals when presented with a more opportunistic bargaining standpoint in doing so. For example, President Obama suddenly added $400 billion more in revenue to his “grand bargain” with Speaker Boehner when the bipartisan “gang of six” in the U.S. Senate announced their own deal, which included more revenue than was in the “grand bargain.” Put another way, Obama got greedy and undercut his own credibility in terms of sticking to a deal that he had led the Speaker to believe had been achieved. Later, as conservative Republican pressure mounted on the Speaker, he walked away from even the “grand bargain” without the $400 billion more in revenue on the table. The result was frustration, distrust, and a “quick fix” that merely “kicked the can down the road” and unnerved markets with the prospect of ongoing uncertainty. At the very least, the trajectory bespoke the dysfunction rather than triumph of politics. More subtly, the verdict on representative democracy could not have been good. Although less transparent, this observation is far more serious, for no alternative to democracy could claim superiority even given the vulnerabilities in self-government.

Behind the leaders’ “inability” to reach a “grand bargain” capable of solving structural budgetary imbalances (beyond those which come from simply “digesting” the aging of the baby-boom) was pressure from competing ideologies on the size/role of government held within the electorate itself. Reconciling such distant ideologies can be difficult even in terms of reconciling visionary leadership;  deal-making is likely more oriented to a more micro level of policy.

The Speaker had been wise in wanting to do something much bigger in the “grand bargain” than merely getting the country’s debt ceiling raised and making a dent in the budget deficit. He had wanted fundamental tax and entitlements reform that would put the U.S. Government on the path to fiscal balance. “I did not come here to have a big title,” he said. “I came here to do big things.” Indeed, he put his title as Speaker at risk just by negotiating with the President with revenues on the table, given the emergence of the anti-tax “Tea-Party” Republicans in the House Republican caucus.

Upping the ante, as it were, was the choice made by Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI) to use the debt-ceiling vote as leverage to extract concessions from the White House. According to The New York Times, “Republicans vowed to use the need to raise the federal debt ceiling in early 2013 to force deeper spending reductions before agreeing to an extension until May.” Making passage of an increase in the ceiling in some sense contingent was itself destabilizing to the market due to the new uncertainty on whether the U.S. Government would default. Additional uncertainty in the business environment translates into a business reducing or putting off investments in expanding operations. The announcement itself added risk to U.S. Treasury bonds, even if the strategy would not actually go as far as actually standing by as the United States Treasury defaults on its obligations.

In reaction to Rep. Ryan’s announcement, Tim Geithner, Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, advised the President to make a deal because a default on Treasuries would trigger not only a significant downgrade in the nation’s debt rating, but also another Great Depression that would take generations to run its course. Even if Ryan’s negotiation strategy of “hold no prisoners” is very clever in a narrow sense of politics, it is difficult to accept the “ends justifies the means” justification for even opening up the mere possibility of another Great Depression. In other words, even great political strategy can raise red flags if the country itself is put at catastrophic economic risk even for a time. It makes sense that the American Founders viewed partisanship so negatively, even if the Federalists and Anti-federalists could be as partisan as they come. Being willing to up the ante without limit in terms of the risk of harm to the whole may be part of an escalation of ideological passion that eclipses common sense and eventually sinks the entire ship. An observer from Mars might get the idea that the humans over here are getting more desperate. Given the sheer ideological distance between the competing visions at issue, using something as catastrophic as not raising the debt ceiling as leverage can reasonably be regarded as reckless, if not foolish, even if the political calculus is cleaver and even ultimately effective in terms of the ideological objectives.

Fortunately (relative to having the debt-ceiling as leverage), the minority leader and the president of the U.S. Senate came up with a “fiscal cliff” to effectively replace the debt-ceiling as leverage. Even though legislative patrons of various parts of the federal budget claimed that the across-the-board cuts, or sequestration, would devastate the particular departments or programs, “going over” the “fiscal cliff” would be preferable to even risking the U.S. going into default. In other words, the move to something less catastrophic in what a partisan is threatening if he doesn’t get what he wants represents a ray of sanity in an otherwise insane escalation in systemic risk.

To be sure, the media had made sequestration sound like the U.S. Government would be paralyzed and the sky would fall. The economic fear and uncertainty unleashed by the hyperbolic rhetoric are perhaps more harmful than the actual “cuts” would be. The across-the-board “cuts” scheduled to go into effect on March 2, 2013 absent a deficit-reduction law in the meantime total $85 billion. This is a mere sliver in a budget of more than $3.5 trillion. Indeed, the “cuts” are less  in total than the last annual increase in the budget—far from likely to send the U.S. economy into recession.

According to the Fiscal Year 2012 Mid-Session Review, the enacted 2011 budget called for $3.63 trillion in outlays. The enacted 2012 budget called for $3.796 trillion in outlays, according to the Office of Management and Budget. The annual increase, $166 billion, is almost twice as much as the $85 billion at issue in the threatened sequester for March through December 2013. Put another way, the sequester’s cuts for 2013 beginning on March 2^nd equal about half of the increase in the budget from FY2011 to FY2012.

The reckless nature of the sequestration is not in taking back half of the last annual increase. In fact, the total amount of outlays would still steadily increase throughout the ten year period that is subject to sequestration.

Rather, the craziness pertains to two points. First, although the $85 billion is less than half of the prior year’s increase in the budget, the sequestered amount would not apply, according to the Congressional Budget Office, to about 70% of mandatory spending. That mandatory spending, such as social security, medicare and Medicaid, made up about two-thirds of the budget at the time. It follows that sequestration would not touch 47% of the federal budget. This means that for the remaining 53 percent, the reduction would go deeper than the increases in those categories, or “buckets,” from the prior year. In other words, about half of the budget would take on the full weight of the sequester, hence the “cuts” there really would be cuts (i.e., going beyond removing the increase from the prior year). Reports of suspended public services, such as air traffic control at some 100 smaller airports, could thus be expected even though in total the sequester amount is about half of the total budget increase from the prior year.

It would be like adding an additional product to an already-loaded caravan of camels crossing a desert. The caravan could easily absorb the addition, except that the decision is made to put the additional weight onto about half of the camels. From the strain on those camels, an observer might easily conclude that the additional product is too much for the caravan itself. Any question of adding still another product would be dismissed out of hand even though the further addition is feasible and would make the caravan profitable.

Second, each “budgetary bucket” in the 53% of the federal budget subject to the sequestration would face the same percentage or “automatic” reduction, regardless of how vital the particular bucket happens to be. A department could not shift its “cuts” from payroll, for example, to conferences, to avoid layoffs. Put another way, all of the buckets in a given department would have be treated the same way in the sequestration (i.e., automatic, across-the-board). As a result, even just $85 billion out of $3.5 trillion could result in significant layoffs.

From the standpoint of achieving fiscal balance, it could be argued that even more should be cut, or some additional combination of additional revenue and “cuts” going beyond a total amount that merely removes about half of the annual increase in the budget from the prior year.  However, this point would doubtless pale in comparison with the real cuts to the budget buckets subject to sequestration. The way the sequestration is designed implies or gives rise to a perception of severity that is not the case on the macro level, and this perception can arrest any movement to bring spending and revenue further into line. Put another way, the way the sequestration approaches the federal budget makes it more difficult to bring enough political will to “finishing the job” in ending structural deficits and not merely narrowing them.

In conclusion, using the debt-ceiling and sequestration as leverage are not really comparable from the standpoint of actual (rather than media-hyped) harm to the United States. The harm from sequestration applies only to certain “buckets”; the overall “hit” being merely taking back some of the increase from the prior year’s budget. In contrast, the failure to increase the debt-ceiling to the extent that Treasury can avoid default gives rise to the systemic harm of a governmental default. Perceptions notwithstanding, the particular harms from the sequestration are qualitatively and quantitatively different. Accordingly, the move from the debt-ceiling to sequestration as political leverage represents a bright spot on what otherwise looks like democracy being utterly incapable of tackling fundamental problems facing a republic. To be sure, the obsessive fixation on “revenue vs. cuts” contributes to the limited perspective that prevents more fundamental solutions from entering even into public deliberation and discourse. Generally speaking, we the people are holding ourselves back even from being aware of more far-reaching proposals because of the distortions in the media’s “reporting” (or opining) as well as in the design of the sequestration itself. The fundamental question is whether such “holding back” is intrinsic to self-governance of and by the People.

Source:

“Cliffhanger,” Frontline, PBS, February 11, 2013.

Cavuto, Neil “Sequestration Really the End of the World?” Fox News. 20 February 2013.

On Leveraging the U.S. Debt-Ceiling: How the Market Mechanism Handles Trust

On May 9 2011, U.S. House Speaker Boehner insisted “on trillions of dollars in spending cuts, and no tax increases, as the price for rounding up enough votes to allow more borrowing and prevent the country from defaulting on its debt,” according to the Huffington Post. The Ohio Republican had “said failure to increase the borrowing limit [in the summer of 2011] would trigger a financial disaster for the United States and the world.” On May 12^th in Congressional testimony, Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, cautioned against using raising the debt ceiling as leverage for getting a particular partisan policy-prescription on federal spending enacted into law. Richmond Fed President Jeffrey Lacker had told Reuters, “I do share the chairman’s concern that going up to the edge and playing chicken on the debt ceiling is not a wise strategy.”

Meanwhile, GOP U.S. Senators and House Representatives had been hearing from constituents warning them not to raise the debt ceiling.  “Enough is enough!” such citizens were saying. This pressure was geared to getting the U.S. Government to live closer to its means rather than resorting to its power to increase the debt it can issue without limit. Even so, U.S. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid said on May 10^th that tax increases may be needed, along with spending cuts, to help rein in the deficit. Moreover, he warned against ultimatums. “We shouldn’t be drawing lines in the sand,” he said according to The Wall Street Journal. This was not stopping Sen. Bob Corker, who was urging an automatic spending cap of 20.6% of GNP (when the fiscal 2011 figure was estimated at 24.3%) as a condition of passing an increase in the federal debt limit.

Given the existence of contending policy prescriptions, using default for leverage on one side is faulty. Aside from the implicit presumption that one side of the debate has a monopoly on truth, playing with fire where the viability of the financial system itself could hang in the balance does not evince much statesmanship and it could imperil the operation of the market mechanism itself.

Trust is vital in the very nature of a market. If trust is up for grabs, the increased volatility can freeze the market mechanism itself. Rather than simply increasing a price to account for the added risk, a market mechanism can simply close down even if trust is questioned. The reason is that the mechanism reflects human nature itself. Trust does not behave along a continuum as does risk/reward. Rather, people trust someone or something only to a point at which an implicit “all or none” mental calculation or feeling occurs. Beyond that point, the picture itself is fundamentally different. A shift in risk/return does not come into play because fear is choking off any action. In other words, human beings in fear or lack of trust freeze up rather than slow down. The market mechanism’s interval of risk/return tradeoffs reflecting in adjusting price is inconsistent with this feature of human nature as manifested even in a market mechanism. There is thus a fundamental flaw in the mechanism where it diverges from how human nature reacts to fear as lack of trust.

According to Alan Greenberg, former Chair and CEO of Bear Stearns, “Without reciprocal trust between the parties to any securities transaction, the money stops. Doubt fills the vacuum, and credit and liquidity are the chief casualties. Bad news . . . has an alarming capacity to become contagious and self-perpetuating. No problem is an isolated problem” (Greenberg, p. 3). Money simply stopping trumps price adjusting to reflect the increased risk from less trust because trust in human terms does not function as intervals of degrees. Accordingly, market theory itself, specifically in its risk/return tradeoff running the gambit, contains a flaw with respect to increased levels of volatility due to “trust issues.”

In using the debt ceiling as a bargaining chip for political leverage, the Republican lawmakers in the U.S. Government were risking the flaw being triggered. In other words, those politicians were implicitly assuming that the market would simply adjust to the added risk rather than shut down. Besides the problem in the lack of statesmanship—a political problem—the market mechanism itself contains a fundamental flaw in need of being addressed. Specifically, higher risk that kicks in even just close to the lack-of-trust-threshold can freeze the mechanism itself due to how human nature handles trust as a more of an “all or none” than “matter of degrees” phenomenon even as we wrongly suppose the market handles trust along an interval of prices. Unfortunately, we love the beauty of the latter even after having realized in September of 2008 that it does not hold.

Sources:

Alan C. Greenberg, The Rise and Fall of Bear Stearns (NY: Simon & Schuster, 2010).

Janet Hock and Carol E. Lee, “Democrats Oppose Spending Cap Plan,” The Wall Street Journal, May 11, 2011, p. A4.

The Huffington Post, “John Boehner, GOP Seek Leverage in Talks Over Raising Debt Ceiling,” May 12, 2011.

The Debt-Ceiling Disaster Flick, Hollywood-Style

During the last two weeks of July 2011, the American media was focused on the debt-ceiling negotiations. In the midst of a summer with plenty of natural distractions, an increasing number of Americans were cluing in to find their federal government at a stalemate as the clock ticked to a possible economic catastrophe said to begin on 12:01am on August 3, 2011. The U.S. Treasury department had estimated that it would run out of ways to make up for the lack of additional borrowing authority on August 2^nd.  To the media, that meant a clock ticking down to 12 midnight. In actuality, tax revenues were up so the actual date was said to be around August 10^th. In any case, the U.S. would not implode at precisely 12:01am on August 3^rd by any account, yet that made better drama, which in turn increased viewership.

I contend that the American people were, by in large, taken for a ride by the media and members of Congress who tacitly worked to build suspense toward a precise crisis-point in order to gain the attention of the people. Never mind that the possible crisis was self-inflicted; the media companies would have higher viewership numbers and the elected representatives would be at the center of attention. To deflect blame, the politicians used their press conferences to take partisan shots at the other party. The idea was basically this: I get the attention and you get the blame. Meanwhile, msnbc.com assures its viewers that it would be covering the crisis all weekend.

I suspect that the suspense was faked. The Congressional leaders quietly admitted that they would not allow the U.S. Government to default. Few viewers apparently picked up on that; nor did it stop the news networks from continuing with their ticking clocks and instilling still more fear of a financial collapse. Put another way, were the politicians really as worried as they said they were, they would not have been spending their press conferences to bash the other guy. Were an asteroid rapidly hurling toward Earth, members of Congress would really be too scared to be concerned that the other party had gotten a good shot in and therefore should be countered. The officials would not even think of partisanship if there were a real danger of collapse. Nor would they allow themselves to get distracted by bringing in other obfuscating priorities. Instead, they would be concentrating on coming up with a plan to blow up the rock.

It is interesting, by the way, that in spite of such sustained and constant news coverage of the "crisis" over weeks, an intensely concentrated or focused public analysis did not ensue. Rather, there was merely more time for "talking heads" to pontificate and argue over the partisan shots and distracting other priorities that kept attention from being focused on the debt-ceiling question itself. In other words, even saturated coverage by the news media did not proffer a better public discourse on the topic. Is there perhaps a limit to how well public discourse can function in a union of republics or countries (i.e., on the scale of empire)? Even if so, the conduct of the representatives in the representative democracy does not give one more confidence.

For example, neither the media nor the public had an accurate understanding of default. Rather than happening at 12:01am on August 3rd without a raise in the debt-ceiling, it would not have happened until or unless the Treasury department missed interest and principal payments on Treasury bonds. Going on a cash basis and even closing some government agencies do not signify default, which pertains only to servicing existing debt. To the extent that the final agreement was accepted under the assumption that default would ensue in a day or two, the various errors concerning the nature of the doomsday contributed to the problem.

What most concerns me, however, is that the actual behavior of the members of Congress may have belied their attention-grabbing scare tactics. Sadly, I think the American people were taken in by the disaster-film narrative; we gave the news media and the politicians the attention they craved and we let them convince us that it was do or die on August 2, 2011. We bought into the notion that the world as we know it would end abruptly at 12:01am on August 3^rd.  Consistent with the Congressional leaders’ quiet admission that not raising the debt-ceiling was “off the table,” a compromise arrived just in time, like a vintage ending of a Hollywood script--arriving just in the nick of time. The suspense was pushed just to the brink (defined as 12:01am on August 3^rd), then the quick climax, just as in a standard screenplay. No more than ten or fifteen pages are allowed after the critical event when everything comes to a head.

I contend that the powers in Congress and the White House were quietly managing this drama, and that it ended just as they sought (i.e., maximizing the dramatic element, and thus the attention). Compromise did not have to come at the eleventh hour; the agreement was reached because it had been agreed that it would be. In other words, the politicians were not primarily oriented to averting "crisis"; they allowed their other agendas to intercede and we enabled this by giving the attention they craved. In other words, we rewarded the very behavior that belied the representatives' own claims, and we did so by tacitly agreeing to sit through the self-inflicted (by us and them) drama.

If I am correct, the problem involves a conflict of interest wherein the news media and politicians had as much or more of an interest in the attention that goes with even a self-inflicted crisis than in solving the immediate problem itself (i.e., deciding whether to raise the debt-ceiling). To the Americans who thought the Russian roulette was for real—that the politicians would actually permit default—the attention-grubbing plot was undoubtedly not appreciated.  Nor was it in the interest of the United States. It is as though the politicians in front of the microphones were indifferent to the stress being put on people already stressed out over a languid jobless “recovery.” But the politicians came out as screwed up, you retort. Yes, and Congress itself has an even worse reputation than it had before the "crisis."

It should be remembered, however, that politicians (and journalists) yearn for attention for its own sake, and they will do their utmost to shovel the blame on the other politician's sidewalk so to get both the attention and the credit for averting the crisis the very possibility of which they themselves created. If this doesn't sound rational, it is because it isn't. The politician's desire for attention can be intoxicating and even self-destructive. In the case of the debt "crisis" orchestrated drama, simply for us all to go through it was destructive. We were so oriented to the clocks ticking down to doomsday that we missed the real destructiveness going on in our being taken in by the ruse itself. Put still another way, if the members of Congress really thought the U.S. could be facing economic catastrophe, engaging partisan shots would be beyond reckless, given the pivotal role of the members in "saving" the country. Their own partisanship and other intervening priorities belied their claims of the magnitude of the risk of default. At the very least, something was amiss in how the politicians were presenting the drama itself, given their conduct. Sadly, we, the American people, were taken in by the torrid narrative itself, and therein resides the true destructiveness of the drama.

A Self-Inflicted Compromise on the Debt-Ceiling in the U.S.

On August 1, 2011, the Republican and Democratic Congressional leaders and the Democratic President came to an agreement--a compromise of sorts--on raising the debt-ceiling and spending. According to the deal, cuts of roughly $920 billion over ten years would be followed either by adopting a twelve-member Congressional committee's recommendations (including possible cuts and revenue increases) or watching another round of automatic across-the-board spending cuts. Structurally, this arrangement is unbalanced with respect to the nature of compromise between the two parties. In short, it proffers a relatively easy out for the Republicans.

Specifically, the "enforcement mechanism" that would automatically activate should the "super" committee's recommendations not be voted and signed into law contains only cuts even though the Democratic position is for a mix of cuts and revenue. In other words, the mechanism itself is biased to the default of one of the parties. The only incentive the Republican party would have to accept the committee's recommendation would be to avoid the military cuts in the automatic cuts. To obviate any revenue increases, even if only for the wealthy, the Republicans in Congress need only scuttle the committee's work or vote it down. The mechanism being counted on as "teeth" for the committee's work to be adopted should have included both across the board cuts AND revenue increases (including on the very rich). The incentive would have been on BOTH parties to work something out in committee.

Therefore, if I am correct, the structure, or arrangement, of the compromise is itself unbalanced, at least from the standpoint of incentives. It would seem that even with the possible cuts to defense, the compromise itself is a win for the Republicans. Once again, Democrats can be left wondering why their representatives gave up the store, or at least kept the door unlocked. In terms of the public option in the health-insurance reform, the matter of breaking up the biggest banks (too big to fail), and finally in permitting a spending-cuts-only outcome to the debt problem, Democrats, it seems to me, have real cause in withholding their votes from "their" man in the White House in 2012. Yet they have no practical alternative absent a primary challenger. They may be in a very tight box in "staying the course," lest they want to risk seeing the keys of the White House store formally change hands to the other party.