American Businesses as Police-States: The Case of Hilton Hotels

Days before Christmas in 2018, Jermaine Massey was on a phone call with his mother. It being personal, he was in a remote area and was thus not disturbing anyone—that except for Earl, Doubletree’s security guard. Massey subsequently accused Earl of harassment. While the video that Massey took of the guard during the altercation shows Earl to be quite calm, the passive aggression was doubtless off the charts. The incident points to a growing problem at the time as American businesses were increasing their security presence, at the very least in terms of exposure, and last but not least, with considerable discretion and thus power. The incident shows that guards were well aware of how to mask personal power with the air of staid professionalism.  This only makes the latent authoritarian mindset more dangerous to the public.

After Massey had relocated to another hotel (without a refund from Hilton/Doubletree as of that time), he wrote on social media that while he had been talking with his mother, Earl approached. “He said that I was a safety threat to the other guests and that I was trespassing and said that I was a disturbance because I took a personal phone call from my mom in a more remote area of the lobby.”[1] Even if Massey had been too loud in his phone conversation, considerable overkill is involved in stretching noise to a safety “issue.” Additionally, Earl presumed that Massey was trespassing even though the latter had his room key (with the envelop indicating the room and date!) visible. That Earl refused even to admit the possibility that the key might be valid points to a serious lapse in Earl’s mind. What could prompt such a distortion well in the scope of Earl’s duty?

Friedrich Nietzsche would say that the pleasure of power is the underlying culprit. Earl was simply too weak to resist his over-extended need for power, and his tendency to assume the worst in people—common, I suspect, among police—only fed his need. That Earl had handcuffs and a metal “badge” that doubtless had been designed to mimic a police badge only enabled his predisposition to act even beyond the functions of a guard. For instance, a guard does not have the authority to arrest—so why the cuffs?

Making the problem of the over-extended guard worse, the hotel’s manager on duty enabled Earl by taking Earl’s decision that the police should be called on Massey as something that should and cannot be overridden. Earl used a walkie-talky to communicate his decision to the manager, then told Massey that the police would be there to escort him off the property. Even though Massey insisted that he had a room at that hotel, Earl countered with a tone of being the person in charge there, “Not anymore.” Even though the manager followed Earl’s instruction to call the police, Massey claimed that the manager only asked him—after having called the police!—what had happened. Luis, the young manager, was derelict in subordinating his authority to a guard—taking the guard’s side as the full story. And yet Luis and Earl would presume to call the customers guests. After being a customer of Hilton Hotels (Doubletree), Massey would be well within proper behavior to laugh out loud at the sheer presumption, for who treats a guest as Earl and Luis had treated Massey?  

In conclusion, this case strongly suggests that managers should not just take the word of their respective security guards, who likely have their own agendas (i.e., power-trips). It is the absolute power that businesses allow or enable guards to have that is so dangerous. What if the police had arrested Massey? A bad situation could have gotten much worse (with a police record). Significantly, the Portland, Oregon police did not even talk to Massey; they too took the guard’s side for objective truth. An axis can be drawn from Earl to Luis to the local police: the axis of absolute power that businesses enable. At the very least, businesses should not permit their guards to wear handcuffs or police-like badges. Once I saw this in a Target store and asked a cashier about it. “I know; it is over the top. They can’t even use those cuffs.” I asked why the show. “To intimidate customers,” she answered matter-of-factly. Target would go on in following the other herd-animal retailers to call customers guests. Intent to intimidate guests—nice!


For more on Nietzsche applied to managers, see On the Arrogance of False Entitlement, available at Amazon. For more on business ethics, see Cases of Unethical Business.

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1. Keith Allen, “Hotel Employees Who Asked Black Guest to Leave Fired,” Cnn.com (December 29, 2018).

Weening the American Voters off Reliance on the Media in Selecting Candidates

How well do voters (i.e., an electorate) know and thus are able to assess people running for public office? As the proportion of people who know a candidate firsthand decreases, the importance of the campaign ads and debates increases. In other words, the candidate's marketing plays a greater role in who wins. At an empire-level, such as the U.S. Government, an overwhelming percentage of people in an electorate (e.g., voting in a U.S. Senate race, or that of the federal president) are significantly influenced by the candidates' respective media campaigns for lack of real knowledge. In a U.S. presidential campaign, financial contributions are vital in being able to orchestrate an empire-wide media campaign. Also, how a campaign manipulates the media coverage of the candidate is very important. The case of Sarah Palin, who ran as John McCain's running mate in 2008, illustrates the extent of distance that can separate what the public "knows" of the real person from the media-made candidate. When people learned of her shocking ignorance of government, the distance was suddenly transparent, and yet no electioneering reforms were subsequently put into effect. Americans still had to rely on presidential debates to get a glimpse of the "man behind the curtain." 

In the election of 2012, I had the sense in the second presidential debate that Barack Obama looked smug, even arrogant, as if he were running the debate in virtue of his office. His tone directed at the moderated seemed to say, "Ok Candy, you may proceed with that." Perhaps the two labels are unfair, though people who have had contact with the president in person tend to provide similar feedback. I suspect the average Joe (not necessarily "the plumber") voter is turned off by conceit. Watching the debate, I had a subtle sense that whispered in my ears, "American viewers might be reacting negatively to his personality, as if saying to themselves, 'now we see how he really is . . . hmmm.'" There is the brand and the man. In other words, apart from the speeches and the orchastrated ads, Barak Obame might not be someone we would necessarily want to get to know, after all. I wonder if this recognition or awareness was occurring for the American people only then, during the debates, as we observed Obama interact with a rival in real time. "So this is how he plays with others . . . hmmm."

In divining what prompts the electorate's leaning one way or the other in a given election, we would be wise not to leave out "comfort level" with seeing and hearing the candidate at issue. Mentality or attitude is relevant because we know that whoever is elected president will be a regular fixture in our lives, albeit vicariously through electronic means. I am not referring only to whether we like the guy; the matter extends to our comfort with his attitude. This is a very subtle thing. Personality and attitude can thus be understood to play a role, albeit a subtle one, in how a candidate for president is "evaluated." An election is not simply about policy, which is a reason why the latter should be included on a ballot separately. 

Of course, Obama's attitude was not the only one on display during the debate. I have in mind Romney's duplicity, even lying, in his claim, "I care about all Americans" during the debate after he had said in private that it would not be his job to worry about 47 percent of us if elected no doubt turned many people off (at least those of us who follow politics). As he looked straight into the camera and made his statement as though sincere, I wondered whether the highest politicians have such an astonishing ability to act. That is to say, the true gift of a politician could be the ability to come off as incredibly sincere when he or she is simply acting the part. "Wow he's good" was what came to my mind. Of course, the excellence of a skill is of little value if the skill itself is a vice. Perhaps what we are left with is a fleeting glimpse of how little we know about either candidate, and yet we presume we know so much about both. "Obama cares" and "Romney is compassionate" may turn out to be marketing-driven rather than real, yet we cannot be wrong about what we believe to be the case, right?

To offer a less sensitive example illustrating the distance between a person and his character on television, Andy Taylor, the nice, common-sense sheriff in The Andy Griffith Show, was easy for millions of viewers to like. From this viewing experience of  the character, many Americans doubtlessly felt a loss when Andy Griffith died in the summer of 2012 even though the man was reportedly not "good with people." He even fought with the actress who played Aunt Bee, a kind, motherly character (how many viewers could say the actress playing her was so nice?). The actor who played the sheriff was not as kind in person as is his character, yet people with just the character in mind mourned as if they had lost the man himself. This, I submit, is a problem that also impairs political elections. For some reason, the human mind is susceptible to viewing acting as if the actor were the character (i.e., no distance between them). In mourning President Reagan as his funeral was broadcast, the vast majority of Americans had only the actor's presidential character in mind, for they could not get to the man himself. How many knew that he called his wife, Mommie? Where most of an electorate do not get to meet the candidates in person, as in the case of the election for an empire-scale office such as the U.S. Presidency, the susceptibility is particularly strong because the contact comes only through the media and the candidates' own respective media campaigns. As debates can become unscripted, they are perhaps the best means of catching of glimpse of the real persons who would use judgment in office on some very important matters. To the extent that an electorate relies on the real people in offices so far away, getting to the real persons who mask as candidates is important, and yet little if any progress has been made in at least the United States. The European Union is a better construct for this, as more power in the E.U. resides with state-level office-holders. In general, less distance between the voter and a candidate is within states than at the empire-level (i.e., the Congress and the federal president). The sizes of the electorates for federal offices are a leap greater than those within the states. Less distance is involved in the latter, for the electorates are so much smaller. Hence it is easier for proportionately more of such electorates to know the "man behind the candidate." Other things equal, better candidates should be more likely to beat the bad ones. 

I suspect that in 2012 after the second debate, many independents (and perhaps even some Republicans and Democrats) had the sense that better people could have been selected as candidates. This suspicion was confirmed for me when I learned after the third debate that the candidates  to discuss took liberties in discussing domestic policy even though the debate was to be on FOREIGN policy. Such a lapse can itself be a red flag respecting boundary issues or problems with "keeping within the lines" (i.e., as in coloring books). At the very least, it evinces self-centeredness. In short, the debate gave the electorate a glimpse into the man behind the candidate--for both candidates, but should a democracy founded on popular sovereignty--the voters as a group--be satisfied with just glimpses?  They can trigger unfounded inferences, which in turn can lead a voter to use bad judgement in voting. At the very least, then, the American electorates should have better access behind the candidate. For example, release of President Trump's tax returns should have been mandated so voters could get a better sense of how he ran his company, as such an executive role is arguably related to how he would be the chief executive of the U.S. Government. Mandated disclosures could also have pointed to the man himself--his judgments and character. Generally speaking, the People should demand that their government require more along this line. Put another way, the People have a right to be informed even if it means that political media campaigns must deviate from their respective scripts and even have to play defense, losing control of the narrative.

On the Futility of Divided Government at the Empire Level: The Case of the U.S.A.

Rick Perry, when he was the Republican governor of Texas running for re-election, said his primary opponent, Senator Kay Hutchison, was spending tax dollars too freely in Washington. He meant that she was too Washington. He claimed that she didn't get what he called, “Texas values.” Then, he added something really telling—something that went beyond his electoral contest: “Washington’s one-size-fits-all approaches simply don’t work. They want more control of your dollars and your life, and they want it now. We surrender that to them with peril.” His statement is worthy of our reflection even long after Perry's re-election campaign.

The frustrating matter during the summer of 2011 of whether (and how) the debt ceiling of the U.S. ought to have been raised shows just how difficult it is to get all of the factions on board in passing a law. When both major parties must agree for a bill to become a law, “the opposition” is part of the government. No parliamentary system would mandate that a government (i.e., governing coalition) must get its opposition on board for laws to be enacted. This is true enough even on the level of EU and US states; for a diverse union of such states to require that almost every faction agree is foolhardy. In other words, “divided government” at the empire-level gives the inherent diversity too much leverage with which to block governmental action.

Why doesn’t a one-size-fits-all approach not work in the United States at the federal level? First, an empire consisting of member states or republics is inherently diverse, given the scale of the countries themselves. Imperial-level legislation should take into account the different political entities that constitute or are members of the empire, even if the legislation applies directly to individuals (rather than to the member states). Otherwise, pressure from the real differences will build—potentially blowing the Union apart eventually.

Second, governments have ruling and opposition parties for a reason: getting all of them to agree for a bill to become a law is unrealistic given the extent of ideological distance from the far right to the far left. Compromise is difficult enough within a governing coalition. Even though having a “divided government” allows for better checks and balances, it is a recipe for nothing getting done. One size does not fit for all parties, which are themselves coalitions. Perhaps we like divided government because we are so scared about what a governing coalition might actually do. As a consequence, gridlock.

On European and American federalism compared , see Essays on Two Federal Empires, available at Amazon. See also, "American and European Federalism, a short critique of Perry's book on federalism, Fed Up!

Putin Likened Protesters to "Weak Birds"

At the conclusion of the 2012 Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Russia, the host president, Vladimir Putin, likened the birds that had been following his motorized glider south one day to the Russians who did not follow him--in other words, the protesters. “Only the weak ones,” he quipped, "didn’t follow me.” Elaborating, he added of the birds, “not all of the cranes flew, and the leader, the pilot, has to be blamed because he was too fast in gaining speed and altitude and they were just lagging behind; they couldn’t catch up.” It is interesting that he was blaming himself as well as referring to the lagging birds, and thus protesters, as weak. Was Putin really blaming himself though? Furthermore, doesn't blaming the protesters contradict the notion in the transformational-leadership literature that such leaders build up rather than push down their followers?

Putin could not have been entirely objective on the protests against him.      

Source: Democracy Chronicles

Putin stated that “during certain circumstances, when there is strong wind and bad weather, the pilot has to lift very speedily—otherwise the vehicle, the flying machine, could overturn and capsize.” In other words, Russia would collapse were he to have relaxed or compromised on his agenda for change. 

Is it really the case that a political leader’s transformational paradigm must be implemented quickly or the government, economy or society will collapse? Is a glider stalling and falling really comparable to a government slowing down on reform? I contend that the latter is oriented to graduations, whereas a stall in the air happens all at once (i.e., a qualitative change). 
Was there really the political, economic or social equivalent of “strong wind and bad weather” facing Russia at the time? In the 1990's in the wake of a collapsed Soviet Union, governmental and economic transformation was clearly needed as soon as possible. In fact the rise of the suddenly rich Russian oligarchs can be taken as an indication that the government did not produce adequate economic laws soon enough. In 2012, it could be argued that Putin was applying “leadership in a crisis” to “leadership in the status quo” in his own time. In the midst of a tsunami, for example, there is not time to question or debate the directions from a leader; people must get to higher ground as soon as possible. Russia was not facing such a massive wave in 2012. Therefore, Putin's argument that he had not been at fault because he was avoiding stalling so the economy and/or government would not collapse is valid. 
Had Putin been willing to take some responsibility for the protests, he may not have characterized the protesters as weak. According to the transformational leadership literature, doing so undercuts a leader's ability to transform an economy, government, and society. In Transformational Leadership, James Burns defines transformational leadership in terms of developing the capacities of followers, which presumably includes the followers being able to become leaders themselves. Nietzsche would beg to differ, claiming that the weak cannot be weak; they are simply not constituted to be strong. The strong too, cannot be but strong. I suspect that Putin would agree with the nineteenth-century European philosopher. In the transformational leadership literature, leadership is portrayed as stronger than followership because a leader can encourage followers to develop their own inner authority, which in turn can be used in becoming a leader. Plato's notion of justice, wherein reason is in control of the passions, is consistent with the notion that inner authority (i.e. self-discipline) can enable a person to be a leader. A just polis, Plato claims in The Republic, is one in which a government uses reason to control the passions in society. 

It is possible that Putin's comment regarding the protesters actually reveals Putin as weaker. According to Nietzsche, the truly strong feel no need to dominate as they have a surplus of self-confidence and pleasure from exercising power to go after protesters. "What are these parasites to me really?" such a political leader would say. "Let them have their protests; my sights are on turning my transformational paradigm into reality."  In fact, the strong are not stingy in giving away the surplus; they have more than enough. The best source of such power, according to Nietzsche, is from the inner strength to master an internal intractable instinctual urge. Doing so gives the strong such pleasure from power that they are not motivated to be cruel to an opposition even as it protests. Put another way, in trying to snuff out threats to his power, Putin demonstrated a lack of self-confidence and strength.

Source:

David Herszenhorn and Steven Lee Myers, “For Putin, a Flight of Fancy at a Summit Meeting’s Close,” The New York Times, September 10, 2012.

On Nietzsche applied to power in business, see On the Arrogance of False Entitlement: A Nietzschean Critique of Business Ethics and Management (available at Amazon)

Alan Greenspan on the Self-Regulatory Market

Two days after the LTCM bailout was agreed to in 1998, a worried Alan Greenspan, leaning toward raising rates at the time, cut the federal funds rate. It was not enough to calm the markets, and he cut it again three weeks later. . . . It was not the self-correcting powers of the markets but aggressive central bank intervention plus a new round of irrational speculation that provided a floor under the downward financial prices and the calamitous consequences of bad Wall Street decisions. It was not even the LTCM rescue alone by private banks that saved Wall Street” Madrick, p. 281). “Alan Greenspan learned no lessons from these events about the inherent instability of a completely free market in finance. He still insisted markets regulate themselves” (Madrick, p. 282).

Analysis:

Milton Friedman believed that government regulation keeps markets from being efficient; he assumed that the market mechanism is capable of regulating itself. That increasing uncertainty and risk might reach a point that a market mechanism would freeze up, or collapse, rather than simply incorporate the increased volatility through pricing is a point extrinsic to the efficient market thesis. That theory submits that markets tend toward equilibrium, rather than spiraling out of control.
Testifying before Congress after the credit crisis of 2008, Alan Greenspan was asked by Henry Waxman (D-Calif) whether the government-averted credit-market collapse had prompted any revision of the retired Fed Chairman’s economic paradigm. Greenspan admitted to a flaw in the ointment of self-regulatory market theory. In spite of 40 years of evidence to the contrary, official Washington’s font of economic wisdom had drawn a blank.
Lest the human mind be left without an operative paradigm by which one can make sense of the world, by mid June 2011, Greenspan had mentally reduced the fly in the ointment to a mere footnote. Asked by Charlie Rose on The Charlie Rose Show what how the crisis had changed his understanding of the market mechanism and economics, Greenspan admitted his surprise that bank CEOs do not always operate their banks so as to keep them solvent. This is how the financial crisis of 2008 had changed his view of the market mechanism after all. Of course, such a fault could be attributed to distortive government regulation (e.g. regulation Q limiting deposit interest) rather than to some inherent weakness in the market mechanism being able to regulate itself.
Greenspan had backtracked; he had unlearned his lesson much like an alcoholic “forgets” that he or she has admitted to having a drinking problem.  Faced with a fundamental flaw in a paradigm on which it relies, the human mind can succumb to retreating to the safety of denial. In his Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn tells us that it can be a generation before the downfall of a reigning paradigm is finally recognized, after the current proselytizers have passed and the people to come, without a vested interest in the prevailing paradigm, have taken their place. Perhaps it is only the human mind writ large (i.e, intergenerational) that advances, or really learns.
Lest we have to wait for the dead to bury themselves, we can affirm and acknowledge right now that the market-mechanism is not inherently self-regulating, and that this flaw is not caused by government regulation. Instead, markets can collapse—just as a human being freezes up from fear when risk and uncertainty hit a certain threshold—only to be revived by governmental intervention.  

Source:

Jeff Madrick, Age of Greed: The Triumph of Finance and the Decline of America, 1970 to the Present (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 2011).

See also Skip Worden, Essays on the Financial Crisis, available at Amazon.

Elected Representatives in a Republic: Is Any Sense of Duty Remaining?

I suspect the notion of duty had by 2018 taken a rear seat, pushed out by self-centered ambition, in many if not most democracies in the world. In the ancient world, office-holding by lot stemmed the impact of people desiring office. Of the latter, the desire for personal gain would, I submit, be more likely. In contrast, finding oneself holding an office by lot was more likely to be accompanied by a sense of duty rather than personal ambition. Of course, ordinary citizens could find themselves voting in councils or legislatures—but would that necessarily be so bad?

In the American experiment, office-holding was originally thought of as a civic duty of the wealthy class. Landless citizens were cut off from even voting. George Washington did his duty as the first U.S. president, then went home to Virginia; he had done his duty (and then some). Once he decided not to run again, he did not, while still president, call it quits even if he was personally done with the office. I submit that that sense of duty had been lost by the twenty-first century.

After the 2018 midterm Congressional election, many U.S. House representatives who would retired or were not re-elected conveniently decided that their term would end early. “Call it the revenge of the lame ducks. Many lawmakers, relegated to cubicles as incoming members take their offices, have been skipping votes in the weeks since House Republicans were swept from power in the midterm elections, and Republican leaders are unsure whether they will ever return.”[1] The skipping of votes connotes an absence of a sense of duty; being in Congress in such cases is really about the office-holder, rather than his or her constituents or patriotism. Duty to oneself is not even a pale reflection of duty to the other two.

In the midst of the hegemony of duty to self, corruption can be expected to become a norm in the halls of a government. We could expect self-enriching schemes rather than a duty to fulfill the office. In the case of 2018, the U.S. Government was poised to shutdown, as the two major parties were in a stalemate over funding a southern-border wall. Duty to return to Washington in case one’s vote may facilitate the government remaining in operation would seem to be a relatively clear duty to which a legislator would be bound. Yet a major problem with duty, as with other moral principles, is it’s voluntary nature; legislators in eyesight of the end of their term know they can get away with staying away, whether out of being tired of politics or having a new lucrative opportunity in lobbying or business.

What is a republic, really? Surely some presence of a common good that needs to be looked after in its own right is involved. Who is tasked with this looking after? The government of a republic, no doubt. So office-holders should (i.e., in principle) be foremost oriented to putting the public good first, for no one else in a society is tasked by nature or occupation with putting the interests of the whole before those of the parts. In deciding to end a term of office early, for whatever extrinsic reason, the representatives in the U.S. House in late 2018 demonstrated that the voters had erred by electing people who were not in fact willing (or able) to look after the whole, to keep an eye primarily on the steering of the ship so it would not crash. tasked with steering and looking outward Knowing that the only sector of society tasked with looking after the entire ship and thus for any obstacles ahead is the government, those representatives acted selfishly in spite of the fact that they knew a government showdown would soon come up ahead and the government—that part of society specifically tasked with protecting the ship—could shut down. Such a mentality goes beyond selfishness to include a reckless disregard for the ship, which those representatives had doubtlessly lauded many times when doing so had been in their own interests.

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[1] Julie Hirshfeld and Emily Cochrane, “A Shutdown Looms. Can the G.O.P. Get Lawmakers to Show Up to Vote?” The New York Times, December 16, 2018.

Leading at the Top beyond Appearances: The case of John Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives

In the wake of President Obama's mission to execute Osama bin Laden, Speaker Boehner issued a statement complimenting his rival in the White House. In contrast, Sarah Palin gave George W. Bush all the credit. The Speaker, too, could have gone with political expediency. Therefore, for the Speaker to have publicly acknowledged Obama's victory as America's more generally involved political self-discipline. Speaker Boehner had sought to apply self-discipline, moreover, to his decentralized leadership style from the moment of his swearing in. Given the consolidating nature of power, such a leadership style in the U.S. House of Representatives faced considerable head winds.

On January 5, 2011, John Boehner was sworn in as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. He had promised to decentralize the power that had been so tightly held by the previous Speaker and others further back.  Indeed, it had been Gingrich's micromanaging of Boehner in 1995 that may well have prompted Boehner to want to give more power to lower-level party leaders and committee chairs. Boehner even promised to better provide for the minority party in that proceedings would be more open and fair.  Of course, obstructionism, favoritism, and in general the realities of governing all can be used to consolidate power. The exigencies of Boehner's position could have trumped any bad memories of having been one of the low men on the totem pole.  It is only human nature, after all, to identify with and prefer the present at the expense of the past. Hence, the concept of the net present value of money. Additionally, consolidating power into a few select hands may seem necessary to getting the trains to run on time.

Indeed, Boehner might have been tempted to add trains. Noting the inherent difficulty in having one legislature (albeit consisting of two separate chambers) governing an empire-scale union, the anti-federalist (and pro-commerce) Agrippa of Massachusetts wrote in 1787, "A diversity of produce, wants and interests, produces commerce, and commerce, where there is a common, equal and moderate authority to preside, produces friendship." (Agrippa, Letter 8, 4.6.30). Agrippa was bemoaning the consolidation that he feared would ensue from the powers granted by the U.S. Constitution to Congress (at the expense of the state governments). Agrippa was by in large right. The dual-sovereignty in American federalism has largely been eclipsed by decades of encroachments by the general government. It would have taken self-discipline for Congress not to have encroached when it could. Similarly, self-discipline is required for a Speaker of the House, which is a constitutional office, to preside, which is to say, to look to the overall interest of the whole rather than to engage in partisanship.    In spite of Boehner's intentions to return some power to the states and to decentralize his power in the House, he was from the start already likely to reverse himself in practice. The nature of power may well be paradoxical: those who love it most tend to find it most offensive to give even some of it up to others. It takes maturity for a leader who does not crave power to trust others in decentralizing it; I can scarcely imagine a person who climbs the difficult mountain to the head of a governmental body (or business corporation) to suddenly work on the newly won power. So I am led to wonder, what exactly was Boehner's motivation in publicly stating his vision of a more decentralized power structure in the U.S. House of Representatives? Perhaps he knew that people out across the lands would approve of him as a result. There is the appearance of power and there is real power. I'm not convinced that the citizens who vote in a republic are able to get behind the appearance, if efforts behind the scenes are intensely invested in keeping the public awash in appearances. 

Sources:

Naftali Bendavid and Patrick O'Conner, "New Speaker Vows to Share Power--a Tricky Proposition," The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2011, pp. A1, A6.

Agrippa, in Herbert J. Storing, ed., The Anti-Federalist, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, p. 243

See Skip Worden, Ethical Leadership, a booklet available at Amazon. See more generally, Essence of Leadership, a book available at Amazon.

Auto vs. Oil Industries on Emission Standards: Putting a Part Above the Whole

When a company or an entire industry skips over the good of the whole—the public good—in lobbying for legislation that only reflects the needs or desires of individuals (qua consumers only), the society itself (and even the Earth) is slighted and thus more at risk. For the good of the whole is more than just the cumulative needs and desires of individuals in part because the latter do not take into account the wider effects of their choices. When an individual company or industry takes this point into account and rebuffs favorable legislative proposals because they would do too much damage to society and/or the planet, social responsibility is at hand. Companies or industries that do not are thus irresponsible from the standpoint of the whole, which, through government, is justified in keeping an eye on them (especially in making transparent their efforts to influence legislation and regulation. The American auto and oil industries can be distinguished in this regard.

“When the Trump administration laid out a plan” in 2018 that would have eventually allowed “cars to emit more pollution, automakers, the obvious winners from the proposal, balked. The changes, they said, went too far even for them.”[1] Too far even for the obvious winners—an amazing statement, considering that companies and industries generally try to get as much as they can in terms of deregulation and favorable laws.

Another industry, however, fueled by the efforts of Marathon Petroleum, “was pushing for the changes all along.”[2] The campaign’s main argument “for significantly easing fuel efficiency standards” was “that the United States [was] so awash in oil” that energy conservation need no longer be a worry.[3] This statement blatantly misses the point that the standards that were in place then were also to reduce emissions of CO2 from what they would otherwise have been from entering the Earth’s atmosphere.

Interestingly, the American oil industry must have missed the memo on the continuing increases in the emissions.

In fact, 2017 saw a record amount of emissions added to the atmosphere; the Paris Accord in 2015 was already proving to have been a failure.  Issued in early October, 2018, a “landmark report” from the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change “paints a far more dire picture of the immediate consequences of climate change than previously thought.”[4] The report states that if “greenhouse gas emissions continue at the current rate, the atmosphere will warm up by as much as 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit (1.5 degrees Celsius) above preindustrial levels by 2040, inundating coastlines and intensifying droughts and poverty.”[5] This was the context in which the oil industry was running “a stealth campaign to roll back car emissions standards.”[6]

The industry’s rationale reduced everything to the needs and desires of individual customers with no consideration of the impact on even them, not to mention humanity—including possibly its very survival. “With oil scarcity no longer a concern,” Americans should be given a “choice in vehicles that best fit their needs,” read a draft of a letter that Marathon helped to circulate to members of Congress over the summer. Official correspondence later sent to regulators by more than a dozen lawmakers included phrases or sentences from the industry talking points, and the Trump administration’s proposed rules incorporate similar logic.”[7] Of course, that a “quarter of the world’s oil is used to power cars, and less-thirsty vehicles mean lower gasoline sales” was not missed on either Marathon or its industry as a whole.[8] But the notion of a whole apparently stopped at the industry level; externalities beyond that, even one bearing on the future of mankind, were apparently of no concern.

Marathon Petroleum even “teamed up with the American Legislative Exchange Council, a secret policy group financed by corporations as well as the Koch network, to draft legislation for states supporting the industry’s position. [The] proposed resolution, dated Sept. 18, describes [the then] current fuel-efficiency rules as ‘a relic of a disproven narrative of resource scarcity’ and [urges that ‘unelected bureaucrats’ shouldn’t dictate the cars Americans drive.”[9] The resolution’s language doubtlessly included the council’s talking points, which, in staying on the “resource scarcity” rationale for standards, neglect the obvious link between emissions and climate change. Furthermore, the smack on “unelected bureaucrats” demonstrates no regard for government as standing for the interests of the whole when externalities from cumulative individual decisions are too much from the perspective of the whole. To be sure, with industries swaying legislators and regulators in democracies, laws and regulations can indeed benefit a part at the expense of the whole, but this deplorable flaw does not negate the need to protect the whole from parts from exploiting conflicts of interest. Unlike the auto industry, the oil industry sought to exploit its conflict of interest by putting its narrow interest ahead of that of the whole where the whole supposed to be paramount—in the halls of government.

I suggest, therefore, that heightened scrutiny is warranted where a company or industry (or the business sector—still but a part of the whole) seeks to influence lawmakers, regulators, or the general public in line with the private (profit) interest. This is especially needed in a culture that is generally in line with its business sector’s values. People and government officials alike in such a culture (such as that of the U.S.A.) find it difficult to realize the need to see that such conflicts of interest are not exploited. In fact, in my book, Institutional Conflicts of Interest, I argue that a conflict of interest is inherently unethical even if it is not exploited. A few other scholars on the subject argue in contrast that if a conflict of interest is not exploited, no harm is involved, but I contend that another reason exists why arrangements or situations that include conflicts of interest are unethical. I actually met one of those scholars on the Loyola campus in Chicago, but once in his office, I found he only wanted to talk about Obama. So much for scholarly exchanges.

---

1. Hiroko Tabuchi, “The Oil Industry’s Covert Campaign to Rewrite American Car Emissions Rules,” The New York Times, December 13, 2018.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Coral Davenport, “Major Climate Report Describes a Strong Risk of Crisis as Early as 2040,” The New York Times, October 7, 2018.

5. Ibid.

6. Hiroko Tabuchi, “The Oil Industry’s Covert Campaign to Rewrite American Car Emissions Rules,” The New York Times, December 13, 2018.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

Investor Assessments of Political Events

Although the various investors in the financial markets doubtlessly pay great attention to important political events, such as were a state in the E.U. to default on its bonds, I suspect that market analysts overstate the importance of more commonplace political events. For example, the New York Times reported in late September 2012 that investors were shifting their portfolios to reduce risk out of uncertainty regarding the upcoming American elections and the ongoing negotiations in Congress to avoid the huge budget cuts and tax increases set to begin automatically at the beginning of 2013 and run for a decade. Additionally, fears that E.U. leaders might hesitate on moving forward with the bailout program oriented to indebted states were prompting investors to be more risk-averse. Generally speaking, analysts were “anticipating that politicians may not act until forced,” both in the U.S. and E.U., “setting the markets up for weeks of angst.” In my view, this account is overstated.

“Right now, we’re much more defensive than we were a few weeks ago,” Martin Leclerk of Barrack Yard Advisors said at the time. He had shifted 20 percent of his company’s assets to the safety of cash. More broadly, investors were cashing in their gains, according to the Times, “on riskier stocks and moving into bonds and safer stocks, like consumer discretionary companies that are not as susceptible to a downturn in the economy.” Rather than presume that all this stemmed from uncertainty regarding the American elections or even the anticipated budget sequestration of the U.S. Government and the E.U. bailout program, I submit that the investors were taking a general reading of the global economy to assess how much economic growth would be likely in 2013. In this regard, the announcement by the Chinese government of stimulus spending is more significant than who wins what offices in the U.S. or whether the E.U. officials are really hesitating on Greece and Spain. The minor presidential election drama fueled by an all-too-innocent media and even the manipulatory threats by E.U. leaders as if jockeys bending the whip to get Greece to pony up rather than lax off are both dwarfed in financial importance by assessments of how the world economy as a whole is likely to do. Specifically, the question is whether the lower growth in China will be tolerated by government officials, and if so, whether that growth would be enough to offset the sluggishness in the E.U. and U.S. The U.S. economy in 2013 would not likely hinge on which party wins the White House because the other party typically has a veto in the U.S. Senate thanks to the ubiquitous filibuster. In the E.U., hesitations should be read more as efforts to manipulate certain recalcitrant state governments than as serious attempts to scuttle the bailout program. Elections do matter and programs do change, but the trajectory based on the status quo has such tremendous gravitational pull that even mandates tend to get watered down by the time they get implemented.

 Does expertise on these make one an expert on politics?  

Therefore, I suspect that the market discounts political “news” that you and I are presented with as “important” and “vital.” Often times, the importance is magnified in order to sell ads. The world economy is remarkably steady-state, and wise investors undoubtedly take a long-term perspective rather than allowing themselves to become ensnared by the titillating excesses fomented by the media. To be sure, jolts such as the effect the financial credit-freeze in September 2008 had on world trade do matter in terms of contractions in the world economy, and investors are smart to become more risk-averse in anticipation of such periods. Even so, a near collapse of the global financial system can be distinguished from which corporate party wins the White House in a certain election cycle or how an internal tiff among E.U. leaders (or states) gets resolved. My point is simply that elections are not usually the beginning of major course changes (and I am not even sure those have such a bearing on the economy as a whole), and that squabbles in the E.U. do tend to get resolved somehow or other. Neither "event,"  therefore, is earth-shattering even if it makes for good television. I suspect that investors know this and discount the white noise accordingly.

Source:

Nathaniel Popper, “Fearing Fiscal Cliff, InvestorsCash In and Seek Safety,” The New York Times, September 28, 2012. 

Mitt Romney’s “About-Face" in the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election: A Candidate’s Conflict-of-Interest

As was demonstrated in September 2008 as banks began to stop lending to each other even overnight, trust is the foundation, or grundlagen, of a market. The same is true in relationships between people. I would be surprised were a marriage ever the same after even a contrite spouse has had an extramarital affair. The same is true in politics; once the electorate has been lied to, it is very hesitant to remove the asterisk next to the politician’s name. The relevance of a politician’s extra-marital affair, such as the flowery lapse of Gary Hart or the sordid stains of Bill Clinton, is that the people conclude that they, like the wives, could be betrayed. Once established, a lack of trust tends to spread like an invidious cancer until it has encompassed the entire body politic. The shift is from justice to a lack of harmony on many levels.

Plato theorized that justice is the harmony within the rational psyche and polis (city, or country) as well as between the heavenly spheres (planets and stars)—the harmony between the rational and the vibrations of the spheres being in sync, which is justice itself. It follows that a person who lets his or her desires run rampant is in line with a squalid or aggressive city, and that neither of these shares in the musical/mathematic harmonious vibrations of and between the heavenly spheres. Lack of trust at the personal, business, or civic level can be said to be a symptom of the shift from the condition of harmony, and thus justice, to discord.

It follows that in a republic or union thereof, it is vital to maintaining justice (as harmony) that the electorate not be as sheep in taking in that which a politician claims regarding what he or she “really believes.” Once a candidate has stupidly lapsed in terms of trustworthiness, the electorate should be cognizant of the conflict of interest in the candidate later dismissing the substance of his or her real feelings or beliefs. In general, if a candidate’s statement is in line with him or her getting elected, a due dose of salt should be taken with that dish.

I have in mind Mitt Romney’s statement at a closed-door fundraiser in September, 2012 that nearly half of Americans don’t pay income taxes, view themselves as victims, and refuse to take responsibility for their lives, wanting to live off entitlement programs instead. Some seventeen days later, after even prominent office-holders in his own party distanced themselves from his view, the presidential candidate stated publically, “In this case, I said something that’s just completely wrong.” The question is whether this electorally-convenient “change in belief” is believable, given its consistency with electoral victory.

              Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan, in an image tailor-made as "brand image" for generic consumption.  Reuters

For an electorate to be like sheep is to ignore the conflict of interest and take at face value whatever a candidate says. Simply being on television brings with it the veneer of official truth, so it is difficult for a “mere viewer” to discount the veracity of the celebrity’s claims based solely on one’s own subjective judgment. In a democracy, however, such judgments constitute popular sovereignty, under which governmental sovereignty is exercised by public officials. Therefore, the citizenry has a responsibility to place its judgment above the larger-than-life asseverations made by candidates or office-holders at mass rallies or on television. The deck, I fear, is stacked against popular sovereignty in favor of the agents, and television has exacerbated the problem even as the medium has enabled voters in an “extended republic” to “see” more of the candidates (or their marketed “brand” image).

To aid the electorate in its subjective judgment made in the privacy of each mind, a few principles may be helpful. First, as stated above, a candidate’s statement made in contradiction to an earlier one and in line with his or her electoral success on election day is subject to a conflict of interest. In other words, the claim that the candidate had been wrong should not be taken at face value if it, unlike the earlier claim, is in line with getting elected.

Mitt Romney’s statement disparaging nearly half of the electorate can reasonably be assumed to be at odds with him winning the election (even making such a statement privately may be a lapse of judgment effectively disqualifying a candidate from any high office in which using good judgment is crucial).  Romney's later claim that his earlier privately-expressed view had been “just completely wrong” can be taken to be in line with his political interest. This pattern, or "switch" in line with political interest, constitutes a conflict of interest because he could reasonably be assumed to be lying in his later statement in order to improve his chances of winning. That the earlier statement had been made in private whereas he announced his “change of heart” publically involves a second principle.

That which is said privately can be taken to have more credibility than that which is stated publically. This is a less direct way of looking at the conflict of interest. A candidate may express his or her authentic beliefs privately because doing so publically would not be in line with winning the election. The switch from private to public after the private statement is leaked is particularly suspect because it is reasonable to assume that the public statement is not genuine, but, rather, is geared to reducing “political damage.”  For the public to assume that the candidate has recognized his or her error and that the public statement is a sort of contrition ignores the conflict of interest. In other words, the sheep mentality is naïve, more a matter of idealistic projection than in what is actually motivating the candidate.

Self-governance, whether of a psyche or in a republic (or union thereof), includes governing one’s own fantasies and projections in order that one can more accurately assess candidates for office and office-holders. Here again is Plato’s notion of justice in the reason-governed psyche being in line with the reason-governed polis (electorate). Being intellectually honest in one’s assessment of even one’s ideologically-favored candidate can be said to be one of the duties of citizenship if self-governance is to apply both to a person and a republic. Letting candidates get away with double-talk is a case of an undisciplined psyche and electorate of a polity not worthy of government by the people.

Whichever way an electorate leans in its collective judgment in a given election, it is my hope that the judgment illustrates the best in popular sovereignty. It is essential, albeit difficult for a large electorate, to hold the agents (even as candidates) accountable to the will of the people, such that the collective will is rendered as clear as possible and that the agents implement it rather than assume (or presume) a superior position to it.

For more on conflicts of interest in government and business, see Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon.

Source:

Colleen Nelson, “Romney Backs Off Remarks About the 47%”, The Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2012.

Was Goldman Sachs Really Politically Impotent amid Public Scrutiny in the Wake of the Financial Crisis?

If the American financial houses on Wall Street are among the most powerful forces in American politics-- powers, as it were, behind the throne--does it make sense that the strongest bank would be politically impotent?  In other words, can a public blemish nullify the power of all that capital?

According to The New York Times, Goldman Sachs employs perhaps the country’s most well-connected stable of Washington lobbyists, and it spent $2.8 million [in 2009] to bend the ear of federal officials and lawmakers. Goldman executives and its political action committee gavve more than $24 million to federal candidates in the first decade of the twenty-first century, including nearly $1 million to Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign. Even so, the pounding in the media that Goldman Sachs took in April, 2010 left it sidelined — at least in public — as Congress moved toward a decision that could reshape the very industry it rules.  In particular, the SEC filing of charges and eleven hours of grueling testimony before Sen. Levin’s Investigations Committee left the bank a lobbyist persona non grata, if only for a day.  However, even then, the reality behind the scenes was doubtlessly very different.  Even as politicians publicly vilified the bank, they were picking up lucrative campaign contributions sourced in the bank, even if through intermediaries; any large scale electorate is notoriously bad at tracing links.  To be sure, The New York Times was reporting that Goldman Sachs was trying to find a way to influence the debate, even if it could not play as visible a role as it otherwise could have.

Goldman Sachs managers declined to comment the day after the hearing before Carl Levin's committee at the U.S. Senate. The question that the bankers were refusing to answer was on the impact that the bank's legal and public relations troubles were having on its Washington lobbying operations. Even so, one person briefed on its plans spoke on condition of anonymity because of the firm’s continuing legal and political troubles. He or she said it was still trying to push its agenda. The New York Times reported that according to industry officials, the bank had been “largely relying on trade groups, like the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association. However, this could have been a smoke screen. The real deals could have been made behind closed doors, even by industry standards.  According to the paper, “More often, the firm — whose lobbyists and outside lawyers include such Washington luminaries as Richard A. Gephardt, the former House majority leader, and Ken Duberstein, the former Reagan administration official — has relied largely on intermediaries because politicians are worried about being associated with it, government and industry officials said.”  Members of Congress were worried about public association, but willing to be influenced through intermediaries. Therefore, even though Sen. Blanche Lincoln, who was in a tight race at the time, canceled a fund-raiser at the bank’s New York offices after the SEC filed its lawsuit, I would not be surprised that she accepted contributions by an intermediary.

Most voters are too far away from Washington to get the real scoop, and journalists who want to continue with their career are not apt to dig too deep. We are left with the surface, and can only guess as to the subterranean dynamics.  It seems to me that traces of the underground rumblings can be discerned in lines such as “at least in public.”  We are left wondering how deep the wells of gold run.  Perhaps only the goldman knows.  The actuality can be far different than appearances.  If possible, a study on the real influence of Wall Street in Washington would be very helpful. For this reason, it is apt to be a difficult task with many self-interested obstacles.  In any case, we ought not be so incredulous as to rest on the public appearances. Even as Lloyd Blankfein was testifying, senators turned increasingly friendly to him–with the exception of Carl Levin and perhaps John McCain.  The Democratic side in particular almost made excuses for the CEO, saying that any number of firms should be there with him. Those senators had given their soundbites to be picked up at home; it was time to make sure they were not cutting off one of the ruddy fat hands that feeds them. This expression comes from Nietzsche’s description of businessmen and their propensity to overreach. 

To be sure, Nietzsche is no advocate of modern morality; he viewed it as a defense of weakness.  Weakness cannot be other than weakness, he writes. So too, strength, he writes, cannot be other than strong.  So I contend that we ought to take reports of the political impotence of Goldman Sachs with a rather large grain of salt (or gold, in this case).  He or she who has the gold makes the rules. There is no natural law stating that this process must be transparent.  My question is: can we, the American public, get to it, or does the well of gold run too deep for our patience and perseverance?


See also "Essays on the Financial Crisis," available at Amazon. 

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/business/29lobby.html

CEO Compensation: How Much Is Too Much?

From the previous year, the medium value of salaries, bonuses and long-term-incentive awards for the CEOs of 350 major American companies increased by 11% in 2010 to $9.3 million, according to the Hay Group.  Corporate net income increased by a medium of 17% and shareholders medium returns, including dividends, increased by 18 percent. Share prices also increased more than the CEO compensation. However, bonuses increased 19.7%, which is just barely more than the percentage increases in corporate profit and shareholder returns.
Of course, comparing percentages can be misleading because the base amounts can differ markedly. Ten percent of 100, for example, is less than ten percent of 1000. The issue regarding CEO compensation may have less to do with comparisons to corporate net income and stockholder returns, as these are different categories, than to the absolute amount of the compensation.
One might compare, for example, the amounts earned by a typical CEO and a typical worker. In 2000, on average, CEOs at 365 of the largest publicly traded U.S. companies earned $13.1 million, or 531 times what the typical hourly employee earned. The corresponding ratio in 1990 was 85 and in 1980 it was only 42, according to Finfacts. It is unlikely that the contributions, and thus value, of CEOs to corporate bottom lines were increasing accordingly--both in absolute terms and relative to the sweat of hourly employees. In fact, Sarah Anderson points out that many of the executives responsible for the financial crisis of 2008 used it as a springboard financially. Specifically, at ten of the financial firms that received bailout money, executives were awarded stock options when the market was at bottom. After the taxpayer funds helped lift the price of the stocks, "the executives who brought the global economy to the brink of disaster" saw their portfolios increase in value by $90 million. This surely violates the maxim of justice as fairness, especially as theorized by John Rawls.
Furthermore, it is doubtful that American CEOs are more talented than those in Europe and Asia. According to Finfact, income inequality in the U.S. was, as of 2003, greater than anywhere else in the industrialized world. One could be excused for asking whether the highest CEO figures are beyond even what one person could reasonably spend (without giving tens of millions away at a time without a thought) even in a very comfortable life of luxury.
Viacom CEO Philippe Dauman, for example, topped the list at $84.3 million, more than double his 2009 pay. Even if a significant portion of this figure are stock options that cannot be sold for several years, the total amount is so far beyond what a person can use even for luxuries that one might wonder what impact it could have on the CEO. Moreover, the amount dwarfs by many times the salaries even of middle level managers, not to mention workers. The amount itself is sufficient to raise some questions.
For example, can the worth of a particular CEO to a corporation really be worth $84 million?  Is that amount necessary to motivate or sufficiently reward a manager who happens to be the CEO? Is the potential CEO labor market really so limited? Is corporate governance itself at issue? Given the influence that CEOs can have over the boards tasked with overseeing them as well as setting executive compensation, the obscene numbers may be indicative of the conflict of interest.  Where a CEO is chairman of the board too (i.e., duality), the conflict of interest is structural and bears on corporate governance itself. That American CEOs get paid more on average than European CEOs suggests that the American compensation amounts may be due to arrangements pertaining to American corporate governance rather than occurring naturally from a competitive labor market.
From a governmental standpoint in a republic, the high CEO compensation signifies concentrated private power. Such power may be an inherent threat to representative democracy wherein each citizen able to vote has one vote. In other words, the pay may incur systemic risk to the republic itself as a representative democracy. Such concerns can and should constrain even private contracts, for individual transations should not be allowed to put the whole at risk.Yet if concentrated wealth already has bought the mainstream candidates and government officials such that they are in its grip, the high compensation amounts are effectively protected and the republic can be expected to run without contradicting this particular powerful vested interest. The only way out of this negative feedback group is for the people to recognize the manipulation and corruption in the halls of their government and vote accordingly. The problem is that such action is apt to be decentralized unless candidates outside the vested interests can raise above the din of the party lines.

Sources:

Joann Slublin, “CEO Pay in 2010 Jumped 11%” The Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2011, p. B1.

Michael Hennigan, "Executive Pay and Inequality in the Winner-Take-All Society," Finfacts, August 7, 2005.

Sarah Anderson, "Can Europe Pop the U.S. CEO Pay Bubble?" CommonDreams.org, September 2, 2009.

See related essay: "Wall Street Bonuses and TARP: A Tale of Two Cities"