The European Union can be distinguished
fundamentally from the previous European Economic Community in several
ways, just as the Articles of Confederation can be distinguished on a
fundamental level politically from the U.S. Constitution. Both Europe and America
have made a qualitative jump, rather than merely as a matter of degree or further
extent. In both cases, politically speaking, governmental sovereignty has been split
between a union and state governments. Furthermore, in both cases, the domains
of power being handled at the federal level have increased. In the case of the U.S.,
the coverage has expanded beyond Washington’s Continental Army. In the case of the
E.U. even by 2024, the union’s coverage had come to extend well beyond a common market
and trade policy to include non-economic domains of power, or competencies, too. In this regard, the E.U.'s federal level resembles a government.
After her reelection as President
of the European Commission, the E.U.’s executive branch, in 2024, Ursula von
der Leyen had some jobs to fill. Among them, each state was to designate one
person to be a commissioner. It was up to the president to assign each person
to an area, or domain, of power, which were hardly all economic in nature.
Among the dream jobs, besides Competition
and Economic & Financial Affairs is Foreign and Security Policy, which is a
traditional domain of a government. To be sure, the Competition Commissioner
has considerable power “to block mergers, fine big companies, and ban state subsidies
that distort markets—and, unlike most other E.U. commissioners, [the
Competition Commissioner] doesn’t need to sign off decisions with governments
or [the European Parliament].”[1]
This represents a transfer of governmental sovereignty has taken effect from
the state governments to that of the European Union (which also means that the
E.U. had indeed a government of its own distinct from those of the states). Even
though I suspect this is most true for economic portfolios, because a majority
of E.U. competencies are subject to qualified majority voting instead of the
principle of unanimity, the E.U.’s governmental sovereignty extends beyond the
economic domain.
Among the rising stars of portfolios
are two: Defense and Enlargement, rather than only Industry and Digital. That
defense in particular was projected to be enhanced in Von der Leyen’s second
administration supports the point that the E.U. was indeed thought of as a
government, even if behind a veil of Euroskeptic (i.e., states’ rights) denial.
Among the golden oldie portfolios
are climate, migration and justice, rather than just energy and trade. To be
sure, on immigration there was still “a lack of real E.U. power.”[2]
But “with concerns about media freedom and judicial independence” on the state
level “on the rise,” the justice portfolio could “set a bold new direction in
protecting the rule of law” within the union—power that can hardly be reduced
to economics. Indeed, in enforcing justice within states rather than only
at the federal level, the Justice Commissioner’s position itself supports the
point that governmental sovereignty was in fact dual in the E.U. even in 2024.
That there were Commissioners of
Agriculture and Budget also points to the E.U. being a government, as
governments typically have their own budgets and have agriculture policies.
Indeed, having territory, which the E.U. does indeed have, is a hallmark of
being a government. The portfolios of Cohesion, Neighborhood, Home Affairs,
Environment, Health, and Social Rights all contradict the supposition that the
E.U. was economic in nature even as late as 2024. Social rights especially do
not reduce to economics, but, rather, are fundamentally political in
nature. Whether or not natural rights exist as John Locke argued, governments
can institute and protect (as well as take away) social rights. The additional
portfolios of Demography, Foresight, the Mediterranean, and “the E.U. way of
life” all also go beyond the economic domain. So many portfolios at a high level
in the Commission are not expressly or even mostly economic that it cannot be
said that the E.U. was an economic organization at least by 2024 when Von der Leyen’s
second term began with an emphasis on defense at the federal level, given
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Among the plethora of implications, the European Union cannot be characterized like the EEC was, as a single-issue organization; rather, in part because the federal competencies had grown broadly by 2024, we can speak of there being a federal government. There are of course other reasons why this is so in contradistinction to both the EEC and the American Articles of Confederation, both of which were solely international rather than a blend of national and international as evinced by the E.U. and U.S. Whereas in the U.S., that the U.S. Senate is founded on international principles has been commonly forgotten, most Europeans conveniently look over the fact that the European Parliament is founded on national rather than international principles.
Ideology is a great distorter, especially in politics and religion. To refer to the E.U. as an economic bloc is the epitome of intransigence in the face of political reality. That such a psychosis has been perpetuated by journalists in the service of ideologues, giving the brain sickness (recall Nietzsche’s use of the expression!) a patina of official legitimacy, is truly astonishing given the breadth of portfolios in the Commission alone.
2. Ibid.
