Showing posts with label Christianity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Christianity. Show all posts

Thursday, February 6, 2020

Politics and Religion: President Trump at a National Prayer Breakfast

Politics and religion intermeshed can be a nasty business. Franklin Graham, son of Billy Graham, witnessed every venue of his planned tour in Europe cancel because Franklin had “called Islam ‘evil,’ attacked laws increasing rights for transgender people, and told his followers that the legalization of same-sex marriage was orchestrated by Satan.”[1] Although criticizing another religion is religious in nature, turning to laws renders the attack political too. Although Franklin Graham may have assumed that many of his co-religionists would agree with him both in religious and political terms, wading into controversial political matters risks alienating people who are or would otherwise be religious followers. Even the willingness to traverse into the political realm may not be liked by some religionists, whether followers or not, especially if the incursion is into a controversy. Some co-religionists may agree with the distinctly religious belief, yet hold dissimilar political views. Such distance created between religionists can weaken a religious leader’s credibility and even following in the religious domain. Politicians dragging their respective religious faiths into the political domain can also be problematic, though authentic applications can pay off even if there is a cost politically. The incursion of Christianity at the end of U.S. President Trump’s trial in the Senate and as he took a victory lap can demonstrate the complexities of religion distended into another domain.



[1] Rob Picheta, “Evangelist Preacher Franklin Graham Planned a Seven-City UK Tour. All Seven Venues Have Dropped Him,” CNN.com, February 6, 2020(accessed same day).

Friday, December 27, 2019

American Federalism: Christianity as the Official Religion in North Carolina

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or preventing the free exercise thereof.” Congress. The writers of the First Amendment of the U.S. federal Constitution were obviously excluding the state governments. Even so, the U.S. Supreme Court has established that the amendment applies to the states as well as Congress. From Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Court gave us what is known as the Lemon test. State funding for parochial schools (e.g., Catholic schools) must have a secular legislative purpose (e.g., education), neither advance nor inhibit religion in its consequences, and not foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.” Yet the leap in claiming that the amendment bears on the states must deal with the explicit language that “Congress shall make no law.” Even so, it did not seem constitutional to many people in 1913 when the North Carolina legislature tried to make Christianity the republic's official religion. Even so, because the United States is essentially a federal empire of fifty republics, care ought to be taken when applying a one-size-fits-all approach as it does not take into account interstate political, religious, and cultural differences. Much is made of these in the European Union, but not in the United States.  
When the 13 original American states that formed the United States had been colonies, Calvinism was the “state religion” in all of the New England Confederation, which excluded Rhode Island on account of its freedom of religion. Pennsylvania was known as the Quaker experiment. Maryland was heavily Catholic. Virginia was Anglican. New Jersey split in two for a few decades in the late seventeenth century, with the Calvinists taking East New Jersey and the Quakers taking West New Jersey. Even by the time the U.S. Constitution was being considered, the notion of a state religion in a particular state would have been familiar to most Americans. The U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent seems artificial in comparison.
Even so, the North Carolina General Assembly would have gone too far had it passed the bill in 2013 stating in part that the North Carolina General Assembly “does not recognize federal court rulings which prohibit and otherwise regulate the State of North Carolina, its public schools or any political subdivisions.”[1] The bill also states that the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit states from making laws respecting an establishment of religion. While this assertion is probably correct in theory, the precedent set down by the U.S. Supreme Court makes the prohibition the law of the land. Refusing to recognize the U.S. Supreme Court as bearing on the states harkens back to the Nullification Crisis centered on South Carolina. President Andrew Jackson pointed out in 1831 that the Union would not long last if the states could decide for themselves whether they would be bound by federal law.
Rep. Carl Ford of the NC Assembly. He proposed the bill that would have sidelined the U.S. Supreme Court and paved the way for Christianity as the state's official religion. 
The challenge is to get back to the wording, “Congress shall make no law,” without throwing out the U.S. Supreme Court. Proposing state laws, whether on religion or abortion, that are obviously unconstitutional under the Court’s rulings makes a state body look foolish. Rather than having selective amnesia, state representatives could seek to reverse the Court’s precedent either through the consent power of U.S. senators or by proposing a federal constitutional amendment. The first route may require state governments to have greater sway over the senators. Originally, they were to represent their respective states by representing the governments.
In terms of an official religion at the state level, Utah would obviously be Morman, but not every state has such a concentration of one particular denomination. Nor is religion itself equally strong in every state. Not every state would want to institute an official religion. All of this suggests that the United States would be a richer quilt to the extent that states can differ on religion as a phenomenon and with respect to the particular religions. Put another way, the U.S., being imperial in scale, is innately more diverse than can be seen by the extent of one-size-fits-all Congressional action. Allowing the states to fulfill their particularities more fully would make the U.S. itself a richer tapestry and thus a strong union.
If some of the American republics in the U.S. were to have established state religions, a person in the minority in one of those states might feel more like an outsider in one’s own town. Being a non-Mormon in Utah would be even harder were Mormonism the official state religion.  However, is it not already awkward for atheists in the small towns of several states, such as Alabama and Mississippi? Is there really so much difference between an overwhelmingly Christian population and making Christianity the official state religion? It would not be as though the heretics could legally be burned alive. To counter any unfairness more generally, equal protection under the law and due process could be used in a non-Christian’s defense.  
I would even say that it should not be the case that the typical American feels equally at home in every state, for that would mean that the one-size-fits-all approach of Congress has effectively homogenized an empire that is inherently diverse.[2] In terms of historical political theory, an empire is “different in kind” (i.e., qualitatively) than the kingdom-level on the next scale down. It is not only that an empire is larger than a kingdom (i.e., quantitatively). Whereas a kingdom is only large enough that it may or may not be diverse within, an empire by definition consists of kingdom-level polities and is thus inherently diverse because kingdoms are different. From the beginning, the American colonies/states were mapped on the scale of the then-extant early-modern kingdoms in Europe. The European countries and American republics generally are comparable. France is a bit smaller than Texas, Germany is roughly the size of Montana, Spain matches Arizona and Italy is the size of California. Among the respective smaller states, Malta, Luxemburg, and Cyprus cluster with Rhode Island, Delaware, and New Jersey. Belgium and Maryland are both mid-sized states in their respective unions. To compare the U.S. and France or the E.U. and Texas thus evinces a category mistake. Flawed conclusions should be expected.
The United States altogether thus form an empire, which is composed of kingdom-level polities/cultures/territories.[3] We should not be surprised to find that the culture in Texas differs from that of Massachusetts, for example. One of the benefits of living in the U.S. is that one can live in a republic that fits one’s ideology or lifestyle. For example, a gay person can move to a culture such as Massachusetts or California in which greater acceptance exists. People in the majority cultures in Oklahoma and Arkansas would not have to be pushed into changing their respective cultures into accepting homosexuality, though the marriages made in the other states would have to be recognized due to the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution.  A fuller happiness for both gays and traditionalists/Biblicalists would result if each can find a fitting environment than would be the case were Congress to pass an empire-wide one-size-fits-all “solution.”  Were it made under one giant compromise, U.S.-wide, it is likely that the result is not a fit for any American. Moreover, to suppose that every state should be virtually the same just because the U.S. is recognized as “a” country ignores the intrinsic diversity that exists within an empire-scale complex-polity. Even the poll finding that roughly a third of Americans want Christianity to be the official religion in their own state cannot be generalized using a broad brush across the United States. I suspect that a much higher percentage of Arkansans than New Yorkers or Californians want Christianity to be their official religion.
In short, the establishment of state religions in some of the states even as strong majorities in other states prefer their respective cultures (and governments) to remain primarily secular would provide a closer fit for not only the people involved, but also the diversity that exists anyway within an empire that is composed of kingdoms and/or republics. To treat an empire as though it were synonymous with one of its republics or kingdoms evinces a category mistake. The benefits of diversity that can be enjoyed within an empire are threatened when Congress makes the mistake by acting like a state legislature. Put another way, the United States would be stronger were the strictures relaxed such that they could more fully manifest their uniqueness. Seeing a strip-mall with a McDonalds restaurant in every town from coast to coast is appreciably more bland. “Sameness” multiplied across a continent is not only tiring; it fails to take advantage of the inherent diversity that springs from distance and more than one government. One need only look at the E.U. states to get a sense of how little distance is necessary for culture to differ. Even though the North Carolina’s General Assembly was pursuing a foolish strategy in proposing a bill that would have the government ignore the U.S. Supreme Court when convenient, the presumed article of separation between church and state at the state level can and should be re-considered.

1. John Celock, “North Carolina House Speaker Kills Bill to Create State Religion,” The Huffington Post, April 4, 2013. See also Emily Swanson, “Christianity As State Religion Supported By One-Third of Americans, Poll Finds,” The Huffington Post, April 6, 2013.
2. Skip Worden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire. Available at Amazon.
3. Ibid.

Sunday, January 27, 2019

Is God the Invisible Hand?

A Baylor University survey on religion and economics in 2011 revealed something that may be distinctly American, culturally speaking. The results indicated that about “one in five Americans combine a view of God as actively engaged in daily workings of the world with an economic conservative view that opposes government regulation and [advocates] the free market as a matter of faith.”[1] Specifically, those Americans believed that the “invisible hand” of a competitive market is actually God at work. Put another way, the assumption is that the economy “works” because God wills it to by intervening directly in the market mechanism itself. Government regulation, in diverting economic supply and demand from “the invisible hand,” is thus sinful. Regulating the economy challenges God’s omnipotence (i.e., power) by interfering with God’s intervention in our daily lives via the operation of the market mechanism. 

The full essay is at "Is God for Regulation?"

1. Cathy Lynn Grossman, “Religion Colors Money Views,” USA Today, September 20, 2011. 

Friday, January 11, 2019

Self-Delusion Enabled by Religion: Former U.S. House Minority Leader Tom Delay and Monopolist John D. Rockefeller

It is hardly news that religion, even one based on divine love reaching down to “love thy neighbor,” can be stretched or simply ignored as needed by the desires for power and money. When these two are both engaged, religious rationales may be attempted nonetheless. I have in mind here the cases of former U.S. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-TX) and the monopolist John D. Rockefeller. Just in evoking their Christian faith to justify their sordid conduct in politics and business, respectively, these two men may be seen as astounding cases of the length to which adherents can go in using religion even in spite of obvious hypocrisy.

The full essay is at "Self-Delusion Enabled by Religion."

Monday, November 26, 2018

Christianity by State: The Religious Dimension of Federalism

According to the  2010 U.S. Religious Census of Religious Congregations & Memberships Study by the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies, less than 50 percent of the people living in the United States identified themselves as Christian adherents in 2010. There were more than 150.6 million out of 310 million. Even so, candidates for the U.S. presidency still felt the need to vocalize the fact that they are Christian (while the opponent doesn't quite measure up in that respect). President Obama made a point during his first two years in office to stress his Christianity as if it were the membership card to the Oval Office. It would seem that the litmus test was already antiquated and thus needlessly constrictive on potential candidates.
The study also discerned differences between the states, once again giving evidence of the heterogeneous nature of the empire of fifty republics. States where more than 55% of the residents identified themselves as Christian were either in the South or in the Midwest. Mississippi (59%), Utah (57%), Alabama (56%), and Lousiana (54%) top the list. Interestingly, the two clusters of dark red on the map point to two distinct Christian cores in the United States. It would be interesting to study whether or how the two cores differ. One indication is that there were differences is that all of the states in the southern core had the death penalty at the time, whereas two of the three states in the northern core did not. I suspect that the southern core was more ideologically conservative in nature (i.e., social issues)--the Northern core's conservatism being moderated perhaps by the tradition of Hubert Humphrey.
States where less than 36% of the residents identified as Christian were in the West and New England. Vermont (23%), New Hampshire (23%), Maine (25%), and Massachusetts (28%) have the fewest Christians on a percentage basis (the map incorrectly shows MA as bright red). In these states, it would be particularly untenable were public services and offices to close on Good Friday and the following day. Unlike Christmas, Easter does not have the secular holiday component (which is recognized as a national holiday in the U.S.).  In fact, the sheer extent of difference between states like Mississippi (high 50s) and those like Vermont (low 20's) suggests that holidays should be declared on the state rather than the federal level. The question of whether the U.S. Constitution's establishment of religion clause applies at the state level is also relevant.
In short, the multi-colored map of the U.S. in terms of Christianity suggests that a "one size fits all" approach through Congress has the significant downside of ignoring significant cultural and religious differences. In other words, to take Vermont and Mississippi and "split the difference" is not likely to fit with the condition in many states. The fact that those two states are in the same union testifies to the fact that the union itself is on the empire-level, meaning that its member states are themselves commensurate with countries around the world that are not themselves on the empire-level. It should be no surprise, then, that federalism, which originated at the empire level in alliances, is a system of governance particularly well-suited to accommodate the sort of diversity that exists in the U.S. (and E.U.). The key to enabling federalism to accommodate the different religious makeups of the states is to keep the imperial-level government from stifling the state governments. In other words, they need to have enough space to produce legislative action that is tailored to their respective religious cultures. In states that are dark red, it makes sense that Good Friday would be a recognized holiday, whereas such a practice in Vermont or Oregon would impose too much on too many people. 

On Federalism in America and Europe, see Essays on Two Federal Empires: Comparing the E.U. and U.S., Essays on the E.U. Political Economy: Federalism and the Debt Crisis, and British Colonies Forge an American Empire, all available at Amazon.

Source:

The Huffington Post, "Most and Least Christian States in America," May 29, 2012. 




Sunday, November 25, 2018

God's Gold through the Centuries

In the wake of the financial crisis that came to a head in September of 2008, people might have been wondering if sufficient moral constraints on the greed on Wall Street are available, even possible. The ability of traders to create complex derivative securities that are difficult for regulators to regulate, much less understand, may have people looking for ethical or even religious constraints. It would be only natural to ask if such “soft” restraint mechanisms really do have the puissance to do the trick. Here’s the rub: the tricksters are typically the last to avail themselves of ethical or religious systems, and they the wrongdoers are the ones in need of the restraint. Blankfein said of his bank, Goldman Sachs, that it had been doing God’s work. About a week after saying that, he had to walk his statement back and admit that the bankers had does some things that were morally wrong. Although divine omnipotence is by definition not limited by human ethical systems, it is hard to imagine a divine decree telling bankers to tell their clients one thing (buy subprime mortgage derivatives) while taking the opposite position on the bank’s proprietary position (shorting the derivatives, beyond being a counterparty to clients). Divine duplicity seems to represent an oxymoron on a megascale rather than a justification for greed. As the crisis erupted and was subsequently managed by public officials in government and new managers brought in to salvage AIG, I was researching the history of Christian thought on profit-seeking and wealth. I have since published an academic text and a nonfiction book, which develops further on the treatise on the topic. As the book is too recondite for sane people (i.e., outside of academia), I am writing a non-fiction book on the topic for a broader readership. To whet the appetites of those of you who are waiting for something more readable that a recondite thesis, I present a brief account of my original research on the topic here. 


For the full essay, see "God's Gold through the Centuries."
________________________

See related essay: "Religious Sources of Business Ethics"

The academic treatise: Godliness and Greed: Shifting Christian Thought on Profit and Wealth 

Friday, June 8, 2018

Is Modern Banking Fundamentally Flawed?

Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase and board member of the New York Federal Reserve (a banking regulatory body), advocates not only that financial regulation reform is not necessary, but also that deregulation is the best course for the American financial sector. Meanwhile, JP Morgan lost $2 billion in an effort to reduce risk. President Obama quickly pointed out that if one of the smartest bankers in the room can preside over such a massive loss, then a deregulated financial sector would likely present us with an unacceptably high level of risk to the entire financial system (and economy). Elizabeth Warren suggested that relying on bankers to regulate themselves would not reduce the systemic risk. The alternative would seem to be strengthening financial regulation, even though—according to Sen. Dick Durbin—“the banks own Congress.”

Perhaps the problem with systemic risk in modern banking goes deeper—beyond how it can be effectively regulated—meaning made regular in line with the public good—and, moreover, beyond what our reigning modern perspective will permit us to acknowledge, let alone see. In ecclesiastical terms historically, lending was classified as a kind of charity, specifically to the poor, as the rich presumably are not in need of lent funds (by definition). In other words, the leverage assumed by the wealthy and corporations is unnecessary. Starbucks needs the funds to build four hundred more stores in China. Wal-Mart needs additional money to buy land for new stores in major American cities. Capital from stockholders is presumably not good enough. The capped cost of leverage relative to a lack of limit on profit attracts greed to favor borrowing over raising capital through stock. The vested interests of existing stockholders (often including the executives who control their corporate boards) seals the deal on leverage as the drug of choice, even if it is not in the long-term best interests of the respective companies. Such a view of borrowing and paying (and earning) interest is worlds away from the original purpose of lending.

Viewing a loan as alms to the poor, lending with interest was originally thought to be unjust. At the very least, it was viewed as unseemly to profit in the giving of charity (although modern corporations do it all the time and get tax deductions for it, besides good public relations). Furthermore, the property (i.e., the substance of the money) lent was viewed as being inseparable from its use (i.e., as a means of exchange). The substance of money is its use, according to that view, so charging more than the money itself (i.e., the principal) is undeserved surplus. Such profit was historically reckoned as being theft. It is not good form to steal from the poor to whom one is giving alms. It is like biting someone while handing him a $20, which he needs to buy lunch (and will return later).  “Hey, I forgot my wallet today and I didn’t bring my lunch. Can you help me out? I’ll pay you back tomorrow.” If of charitable good-will, the acquaintance would reply, "Sure, here you go." If of ever greater (i.e., self-less) good-will, the lender would add, "and don't worry about paying it back." This is lending at its finest. Demanding that the borrower pay more than simply returning the $20 would represent far less than accepting the principal back. Beyond unfairness, taking interest regardless of the borrower's circumstance evinces self-idolatry.

Specifically, for a lender to receive surplus (above the principal) without labor or uncertainty (having transferred the risk to the borrower by requiring repayment) is not only unjust because it violates the risk/return relationship (i.e., a higher return is justified by assuming more risk), the certainly assumed (artifiically) by refusing to accommodate or share in any losses incurred by the borrower is rightfully only that of God. That is to say, it is self-idolatry to assume a divine quality like certainty. Furthermore, the power that some lenders presume to have over delinquent borrowers can be interpreted as an attempt to claim God's power (omnipotence) for oneself. Altogether, arrogance and the infliction of harm come from making oneself an idol (i.e., as if divine).

That which usury risks in terms of morals and self-idolatry is utterly foreign to us moderns. The original charitable purpose of lending is also lost to us in part because we are so used to our own view of lending being the default and the necessary of commercial lending in our economy. Moreover, we assume our assumptions cannot be wrong, and so we do not question whether merely charging interest is inherently unjust and a sin against God. We assume we know the purpose of lending as if it had no history.

In 1612—exactly 400 years before this writing yet late enough that commercial lending was already well-ensconced in the economy—Roger Fenton, a Puritan divine in England, opined strenuously that the sin of usury is inherently unjust. “Where we finde no iustice, what hope can there be of charitie?” Salomon puts mercy as the opposite of usury. “Wherefore vsurie may well be termed a biting . . . it eateth out the very bowels of compassion.” Usury perverts the act of charity, “turning it into an act of selflove.” Usury is against “the Canon of that Charitie which seeketh not her owne, to respect the good of others; [usury] is turned to his owne proper lucre and gaine.” (Fenton, 1612, p. 106)

Injustice does not admit of mercy manifesting as charity. We moderns are so wrapped up in our self-love that we can scarcely imagine lending as an act of compassion. The Canon of Charity to which Fenton refers is the Golden Rule, whose equity guides the Calvinist view of justice as love and benevolence to all. Such benevolence is fueled by selfless love (agape), rather than higher self-love (caritas) directed to God. We moderns can scarcely recognize this theory of justice, so used are we to strict legal justice which limits one’s duty to paying for one’s crime. That the other theory of justice might be applicable to lending is apt to strike us as odd at best.

Nevertheless, the problem behind even the best bankers of today being reckless even as they advocate for deregulation may extend beyond the antiquated debate on regulation to include the making of something borne of something natural (compassion) into something artificial. That lending was designed to be a species of charity may mean that problems are necessarily entailed in using banking for leverage.

By analogy, a person might have been brought up one way and therefore have considerable trouble in adjusting to a way of life that is at odds with that upbringing. The problem facing the person would go beyond simply regulating the new life because a basic inconsistency is in such a drastic change. Were the person to know only the new life, having forgotten one’s upbringing, she would have no clue as to why she feels fundamentally ill at ease. She would look for things in her new life to assuage the difficulties, which nonetheless transcend that environment and therefore require a more basic solution.

Besides relying too much on debt for personal and business use, we as a society are cut off from the original (i.e., designed) use of lending as a means of mercy rather than to profit. Perhaps our perspective is more limited than we think, and the problem much deeper than we realize. Given that “cloudie conceits do hang in the braines of men, which cast a dye and tincture vpon the vnderstanding,” seeing usury “so much practiced of all sorts . . . men are euen thereby without further examination much moued to thinke it lawfull.” (Fenton, pp. 108-9). Yet further examination demonstrates just how limited our tiny window in modernity is—even in spite of our lauded technological development. Our “advancement,” in other words, may blind us to being so wrong about lending even as it is ubiquitous in our world.

By 2012, for example, $1 trillion in student loan debt had accumulated in the United States. Rather than the mercy of charity in waiving interest and even the principal in particular cases of dire need, such a load on poor students represented the hubris of a society run amuck on its own conceit and greed. Such a disparity exists between such selfishness and charity that the notion of debt forgiveness even for the poor is thought of as an unforgivable unfairness rather than as charitable equity that is essentially agape seu benevolentia universalis.

Source:


Fenton, Roger, A Treatise of Usurie (London, 1612). In The Usury Debate in the Seventeenth Century: Three Arguments (New York: Arno, 1972).

Tuesday, December 5, 2017

On the Place of Religion in Business: Refusing to Serve Gays

The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in December 2017 in a case on whether a baker in Colorado had been justified in refusing to sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple. He claimed that his Christian faith forbid him from making wedding cakes for gay couples. “I follow Jesus Christ,” he declared when interviewed at his store. The Gospels are silent on the issue of homosexuality—it being said to be a sin only in the Old Testament—so the inference that following Jesus requires opposition to gay marriage (not to mention that homosexuality is an important issue in following Jesus) can be questioned. If the inference is tenuous, then it is the baker’s ideological stance that was actually at issue before the court. More broadly, is religion vulnerable to acting as a subterfuge, or cover, for what are really personal prejudices?
In terms of constitutional law, the baker contended that the First Amendment, “whose guarantees of free speech and religious exercise supersede any state law, exempts him from [Colorado’s] antidiscrimination act,” which has covered sexual orientation since 2007.[1] The question, I submit, is whether free speech and religious exercise are salient in a business context. Colorado was not contesting the baker’s freedom to speak out against gay marriage and engage in religious worship (i.e., expression) on his own time; the problem is the baker’s assumption that political speeches and religious practice apply directly in business. To claim that decorating a cake—and artistic expression more generally—is free speech over-applies the constitutional doctrine and ignores the fact that a product to be sold is being produced.
Moreover, the domain of business can be distinguished from both the political and religious domains. Even though they may be related, each has its most salient attributes, customs, and laws. In opening a business to serve the public, serving customers trumps making political or religious statements or decisions at the expense of customers. Put another way, in opening doors to serve the public, political and religious differences cannot justify refusing some of the public; the responsibility in serving the public thus supersedes circumscribing service based on personal political and religious prejudices.
“’No one disputes that [the baker] is ‘a man of deep religious faith whose beliefs guide his work, or that the Free Speech Clause protects his right to give voice to those beliefs,’ Colorado’s brief argues. ‘But when a business opens its doors to the public, a state may require that [the business] serve customers on equal terms, regardless of their race, sex, faith, or sexual orientation.”[2] The baker’s religious faith is most salient in the religious domain (e.g., at church), while serving the public is most salient in business. That which is foremost in one domain cannot legitimately claim such a status in another domain, even over its foremost customs and laws. In assuming that his business was a place for free speech and expression of his religious faith at the expense of serving the public, the baker misconstrued the distinct nature of business. In being open to the public, a business takes on an obligation to be open to the public rather than a part thereof based on religious grounds, especially if the religiosity is mere cover for what is actually a personal prejudice.  Overstating the importance or status of minor factors even over major ones in a given domain applies also in giving priority to an Old Testament dictum in what it means to follow Jesus Christ. In Christianity, as distinct from Judaism, the New Testament is more important than the Old Testament. The baker seems to have overlooked the main point in the New Testament: self-giving love towards others, especially when it is inconvenient (i.e., even toward enemies).



[1] Jess Bravin, “Supreme Court Set to Hear Gay-Rights Case,” The Wall Street Journal, December 4, 2017.
[2] Ibid.

Saturday, November 25, 2017

Uncovering the Root of Poverty: An Addictive Habit

Addictive pain-killers killed 64,000 residents in the U.S. in 2016, in part because physicians tended to rely on patients’ self-determined ratings of pain on a scale of 1 to 10.[1] Such subjective ratings were of course vulnerable to self-seeking motives willfully negligent or even reckless in terms of health. A habit or marked tendency in favor of choices at the expense of a person’s own long-term well-being stems, I submit, from weak impulse-control. This, plus the related lack of consideration for other people, either causes or is associated generally with poor people at least in the United States.
Poverty, it has been said, is the cruelest form of war, for such war can go on and on and wreck subtle though tremendous damage on the afflicted. Yet the mentality that can get a person into such a war and associated bad choices can be easily overlooked by elites that deign to study the problem of poverty.

The full essay is at "An Addictive Habit."

[1] Gregory Korte, “U.S. Waging Tech War against Opioid Epidemic,” USA Today, November 24-26, 2017.

Friday, April 21, 2017

On the Spread of Private Governments in a Democracy: Should Churches and Universities Have Their Own Police Forces?

In mid-April, 2017, Alabama’s Senate approved a bill that would authorize Briarwood Presbyterian Church to create a police department. At the time, the church hired off-duty police employees to provide security-- “a common practice among nonprofit organizations.”[1] With 4,000 congregants, a K-12 school and thousands of events on its land each year, church officials had difficulty finding enough off-duty cops who were available. More important than being able to make up for any shortages, the proposed law “would empower a religious group to do a job usually performed by the government.”[2] That the group is religious in nature whereas police power is governmental (i.e., “church and state”) is less important than that the “job” had come to be viewed societally, as per the quote from The New York Times, as usually performed by government. In other words, the slippery, subtle slope is itself a red flag.

Briarwood Church is essentially a village, albeit a privately-held one. (source: Briarwood Church)

“Police powers are a quintessential government role,” said Randall Marshall of the ACLU of Alabama.[3] In U.S. constitutional law, the Tenth Amendment is judicially interpreted as giving the states police powers in line with the protection and maintenance of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens.[4] In other words, the police power resides with the state governments. That the elected representatives in state offices are “closer to the people”—meaning smaller districts—means that the police power is tightly woven with democratic accountability and thus democratic legitimacy, at least in theory. That state governments delegate the power to local subunits (i.e., counties and municipalities) introduces a wrinkle in this feedback loop, especially if the county or city government is corrupted by local wealth, which is by nature pro-police qua property-protection.
Randall Marshall of the ACLU of Alabama overlooks the key governmental basis of police power in privileging the problem of church and state in his conclusion, “Giving the powers of the state to a private religious organization is a …violation of the establishment clause” of the U.S. Constitution.[5] I submit that for a government to allow a church to have employees with the powers to arrest and use deadly force is not to establish a state religion. The decisive problem is rather that a non-governmental entity—a non-profit organization—would assume a governmental role. That democratic legitimacy would be replaced by managerial prerogative is the sort of shift that is not typically transparent to translucent daylight.
The church employees would have “all of the powers of law enforcement officers” in Alabama, including “the powers to make arrests and use deadly force.”[6] They would have to be certified by the Alabama Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission, making them a real police department. The church pastor and his board of directors—private citizens, not government officials, in a private association—would be the bosses of a full-fledged police force. As troubling as this may sound, precedent exists in another domain of non-profit organizations.
Universities have their own police forces, which are accountable, in theory at least, to academic administrators (i.e., managers) rather than to a city council or mayor. In the case of state universities, their respective state governments are at a distance; typically a board of regents is the go-between. A university administration’s over-reaches can easily go under such a board’s radar—not to mention that of a state capitol. Even assuming adequate accountability, the interest of a university’s administration is not that of a state government—the former being considerably narrower in scope.
A government, unlike an organization’s board and management, stands for and protects society as a whole, so a police force answers to officials who are tasked with looking after the interests of the whole, rather than those of a part thereof. In theory, police can serve in an unbiased way between two contending groups within society, unless one of those groups is the government itself; but that group is not in society. Government as an organization differs qualitatively from organizations in society because only government represents the whole (i.e., the entire society, and thus the common good). This difference is crucial as to why giving organizations in society police forces of their own; organizational “police” are subject to a part (of society) rather than the whole and therefore something partial rather than the general good. Rather than the whole acting in its interest with respect to two contending parts of the whole, one part gains a lever over another part—a lever of such power that the U.S. Constitution assigns that prerogative to governments.
The issue at hand, whether the organizations are religious or educational (or both, as is Briarwood), is thus not the particular flavor of the organization. Even beyond whether a governmental power is misappropriated, the ultimate concern for the general public ought to be the risk of unaccountable police overreach at the expense of the members of organizations—whether parishioners, students, staff, faculty or even visitors. The risk is real because an inherent bias exists in the institutional arrangement itself, which unfortunately comes part and parcel with the misappropriation.
The troubling matter of accountability is so important because a serious, albeit unfortunately overlooked conflict of interest exists when a “police force” is beholden to an organization (i.e., its management) rather than a government, which represents the public good. Anytime such a “police force” intervenes in a conflict between the organization’s administration and its members, the “police” employees are subject to an inherent bias in favor of their bosses higher up in the organization. The bias is institutional in nature; employees are going to lean in the direction of the people who pay and direct them. A “police chief” in an organization is naturally going to side with the administration of which he or she is a part, rather than with members, and the “chief’s” subordinate employees are going to follow along even if they harm or intimidate members unjustifiably.
An organization’s management can order its “police force” to take action against “troubling” members, whereas they in turn face an “uphill climb” in convincing the administration’s “police” to take action against administrators who are out of line. “Police” employees of a church are likely to be hesitant at best to remove an irate, abusive pastor at the behest of some offended members, but those same employees would not blink an eye before removing a parishioner, who is orally challenging the pastor on a hitherto-secret regarding his salary or expenses, at the pastor’s request. This asymmetry is the fault-line in the conflict of interest. Any tense relation between an administration and the organization’s members suffers from the lack of a fair resolution mechanism because the security, or “police,” employees are subject to the institutional bias. In other words, the umpire or referee works for one of the teams.
As a result, administrators can potentially take liberties with more assurance than warranted of practical impunity, whereas the members and the general public (e.g., visitors) are potentially without the protections of liberty that are guaranteed citizens as per abuse of power by a government but interestingly not members as per abuse of power by an organization’s management or its armed “police force.”
More commonly, the board and pastor of a church and the administration of a university are likely to look the other way as members feel uncomfortable or even subtle intimidation on a daily basis due to an excessive “police” presence enabled by the bias in favor of the organizational leadership. That is, an organizational “police force” is not likely to be managed in such a way that the protection of the organization’s property and enforcement of its rules and even local law is balanced against the prerogative of members to feel at ease while at the organization.  Unfortunately, the risk of damage or violations of rules or laws cannot possibly reach absolute zero, so police forces, whether local or of organizations, are going to try to maximize their presence—caring less about member comfort in the process.
In short, giving non-profit organizations powers that are quintessentially governmental is inherently problematic, for to do so creates private governments without democratic legitimacy or accountability. Accordingly, universities and churches should be allowed to have security employees, who are empowered to guard the assets and enforce organizational rules yet without weapons and the power to arrest. Instead, they should be able to the local police rather than assume such governmental powers themselves. Otherwise, I fear the perpetuation of private governments—even at state universities!—with little or no real accountability. In a democracy, such a sordid spread should be a matter of concern rather than indifference or support.



[1] Ian Lovett, “Alabama Church Wants Police Force,” The New York Times, April 17, 2017.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] “Police Power,” Encycyclopaedia Britannica (accessed 4/18/2017)
[5] Ian Lovett, “Alabama Church Wants Police Force,” The New York Times, April 17, 2017.
[6] Ibid.

Friday, March 18, 2016

SEC Investigating a Hedge-Fund Priest: Christianity’s Pro-Wealth Paradigm Lapsing into Greed?

It is against U.S. securities law to knowingly make false statements or publish false information about a company you are shorting (selling stock now and buying the shares later, hence betting the stock price will go down). In other words, you can’t try to drive the company’s stock price down you are shorting so you can profit from the trade. Besides being illegal, the practice is unethical. Just go to Kant for that! The guy was fanatical against lying.

You wouldn’t expect to read, therefore, that the SEC is investigating a Greek Orthodox priest who sidelines as a hedge-fund manager for trashing commercial reputations in order to make money off shorting stock.  BloombergBusiness reported on March 18, 2016 that the SEC was “examining whether the Reverend Emmanuel Lemelson of Massachusetts made false statements about companies he was shorting.”.”[1] He reportedly referred to his trading skills as a “gift from God.”[2] Such a claim is on a slippery slope, theologically speaking.

The priest who may have lapsed off the plank of Christianity's pro-wealth paradigm onto outright greed hidden under rationalizations as to means and ends. Is Christianity itself at risk for having gone so far into this worldly realm? The again, the Medieval Roman Church was very worldly as a political power.

When the story broke, I had just days earlier finished revising my second book on Christian attitudes toward profit-seeking and wealth in relation to greed. Lemelson’s “gift from God” language reminds me of the pro-wealth writings during the Italian Renaissance two centuries before the Calvinist work-ethic of industriousness. The Italian theologians of the fifteenth century tended to lighten up on profit-seeking and wealth. Cosimo de Medici got a pass from Pope Eugene IV in spite of a fortune based on usury (lending at interest). One priest, Fancini, went so far as to claim that humans are gods on Earth, given the dominion we have over its resources. Far from the camel who could not get through the eye of the proverbial needle, a Christian during the Renaissance (and after) knew he had to be rich in order to exercise the Christian virtue of munificence. Whereas liberality pertains to typical gifts, munificence involves donating money to build a cathedral, for instance. Being able to make a lot of money was a “gift of God” that would enable the successful Christian to give philanthropically on a scale worthy of God’s majesty.
Of course, the pro-wealth paradigm in Christianity is vulnerable to lapsing into love of gain (i.e., greed). Luther’s extremely anti-wealth stance can be interpreted as an effort to put on the brakes before the by-then dominant pro-wealth attitude in Christianity hit the skids and flipped over into greed. Luther did not succeed. Nor did Calvin or the Puritans, though they were more accommodating to the dominant perspective. The result was a clear line to the Prosperity Gospel—the notion that God rewards true believers with not just salvation, but material wealth as well. This idea came from the Old Testament, wherein God promises Israel that material wealth would come if His People hold to the covenant.
In my book, God’s Gold, I search for a theological undercurrent below the graduate shift from anti-wealth to pro-wealth dominance. I discount the impact of the commercializing context. With regard to the hedge-fund priest, I would be hesitant simply to say he was a manifestation of a pro-business American culture. This may be so, more significant, I submit, are the rationalizations presumably going on in the guy’s head. Bearing false-witness (i.e., lying) to harm others is difficult to view as a gift from God. Even as a means to a salubrious end, the juxtaposition of a gift from God and lying without concern for others’ welfare is odd at best.
In the book, I come to a discussion of how the human brain functions in the domain of religion. If we are vulnerable to certain “short-circuiting” cognitively and yet we have a religious instinct, are we not as a species in a double-bind? Put another way, if Lemelson can neither cognitively nor perceptually recognize his own rationalization, is his urge to be religious compromised? I don’t think so; rather, other aspects of the brain, or mind, may obstruct or circumvent it as it manifests itself. I do think these short-comings can be made transparent, and thereby reduced at least somewhat in severity, or swollenness, but denial is indeed a formidable and intractable obstacle. I suppose the dominance in Christianity since the Renaissance of the pro-wealth paradigm (i.e., profit-seeking and wealth decoupled from the stain of greed) renders the “mind-games” that much more harmful in terms of rationalizing some rather un-Christian behavior toward others. For one thing, in order to make money in order to serve God better can enable some pretty nasty means-ends justifications.  In this way, Christianity itself is now more vulnerable than the religion was when being wealthy and Christian were presumed to be mutually exclusive (i.e., greed was assumed to be tightly stapled to virtually any wealth). Ironically, the theology may be partially to blame, in so far as anthropomorphism unwittingly lifts the religious status of money and property.[3]



1. Matt Robinson, “Hedge Fund Priest’s Trades Probed by Wall Street Cop,” BloombergBusiness, March 18, 2016.
2. Ibid.
3. The secret to that sauce is in chapter 12 of the book, God’s Gold. I got so into the writing of that chapter in revising it that in retrospect the chapters on the historical shift seemed a bit like a very long preface.

Wednesday, April 15, 2015

God's Gold: Banking and Monopoly

A decade or so into the twenty-first century, a typical business practitioner might suppose that godliness and greed live in two utterly different universes—Wall Street and Main Street both being subject to the sway of greed rather than the bliss of the heavenly hosts. The world is profane, while the sacred lives in some other shoebox. Even so, the oil and water have been allowed to mix, though of course without fusing into one compound. For example, God has been invoked to justify profit-seeking and wealth, and even love of gain, or greed. The relationship between greed and what we take to be the divine is actually more complex than meets the eye.

In my book, God's Gold, I set out to identify and trace certain clusters of stances on the relationship of profit-seeking and wealth to greed in the history of Christianity through the seventeenth century. From Christianity’s beginning through the major reformers in the Protestant Reformation, a subtle shift (and backlash) can be detected in what constituted the dominant thought on the relationship. Beyond simply mapping this out as if it were a line (with a hook) on a graph, my objective is to explain the shift itself in terms of Christian theology, rather than merely pointing to the changing economic context through the centuries. A chapter on John D. Rockefeller effectively applies the positions of two of the major Calvinist theologians from the seventeenth century to a practitioner working in the second half of the nineteenth century, and this preface discusses the context more contemporary with the writing of this book. This is the book in a nutshell, with an underlying intent to give Christian theology its due without being uncritical.

Before diving into the historical theology, which I have endeavored to describe in a readable format for virtually any college-educated general reader who has an interest in the topic, I want to take a look at the surprising ways in which God has been invoked by participants in the financial crisis of 2008. After having read the historical stuff, the usages of God in the contemporary financial world may not be so surprising after all.

For decades in the second half of the twentieth century, after WWII, the American housing markets were on a course shooting “ever” upward as if the party would never end. Homeowners felt free to use the equity that had been added to their property by the upward market itself as leverage to borrow still more, whether for a vacation, a new car, sending a few (of one’s own) kids to college, or even for a second house. The equity was viewed, in other words, as wealth. There was just one problem. The added wealth was not real; rather, it was dependent on supply and demand. As the tulip craze of the seventeenth century in Holland attests, what goes up can come busting down. Moreover, just because something is in more demand does not mean that it is any more valuable, at least inherently. At the very least, such value is temporary, dependant on what people want at a particular moment and given supply, which also can change.

In September of 2008, two years after the housing market had peaked, the hens came home to roost in the American financial sector. The housing bubble had burst, just as the overvalued “dot.com” boom had caved a decade earlier. As home values dropped, so too did the equity, triggering millions of foreclosures. This was so particularly in the sub-prime mortgage sector for lower-income (especially Black and Hispanic) borrowers. The foreclosures in turn reduced the market value of bonds consisting of bundles of those sub-prime mortgages. Astonishingly, some of those securities had been rated triple-A by rating agencies. The agencies’ lapses can be attributed to succumbing to the conflict of interest in the issuer-pays method. That is, an investment bank issuing a bond paid a rating agency to rate the bond. How it is that the agency could ever do so independently, especially where more can be earned by issuing a higher rating, attests to how blind we as a society can be to corruption. It is as though we expect people to behave as angels then act surprised when greedy conduct ensues.[1]

Just over a year after the crisis of 2008, Lloyd Blankfein, the CEO and chairman of the board (another conflict of interest) at Goldman Sachs, found himself criticized in the press for his bank’s quick resumption of risky trading on its own books (i.e., proprietary trading). That the bank had become a bank holding company—a commercial bank—at the height of the crisis in order to have access to help from the Federal Reserve—made no nevermind in terms of risk. The public’s resentment was especially harsh against the hefty bonuses at Goldman, especially because the bank had received taxpayer-funded “bailout loans” and $14 billion through AIG in a dollar-for-dollar payment to Goldman as a counter-party to AIG. Typically in such a case, the counter-party payments would have been negotiated as something less than dollar for dollar because AIG was in such a dire financial condition. That the Treasury Secretary at the time, Henry Paulson, was a former CEO of Goldman Sachs only made his approval of the taxpayer-financed payments to AIG’s counter-parties yet another instance of a conflict of interest. At the time of the financial crisis, the American political economy was riddled with such conflicts. Meanwhile, the public seemed blind to the self-serving that a conflict of interest can trigger. Even though the public was angry at Goldman Sachs for its risky proprietary trading and its bonuses after the crisis, that the bank had alums at high levels of the U.S. government went largely unscathed. Besides being in the blindspot of bystanders, a convenient conflict of interest can—incredibly enough—actually be accompanied by a certain arrogance. One might call it the arrogance of greed, as greed is scarcely able to recognize itself.

For example, Blankfein—the highest-paid CEO on Wall Street at the time—dismissed (in a published interview) the criticism of his bank out of hand and defended his exclusively market-making machine and its lavish bonuses in the wake of the taxpayer-funded bailout.[2] He claimed that in addition to being the engine of economic recovery, Goldman Sachs was providing a social function in making capital available to companies so they could expand. Astonishingly, he even claimed that Goldman Sachs was doing God’s work! One might wonder what God has to do with peddling triple-A sub-prime-based securities even while knowing they are “crap” and betting against them by borrowing some in order to sell them (at a higher price) before buying them (at an expected lower price).

Moreover, unless one takes God as being opposed to political liberty, Blankfein’s claim of Goldman’s stewardship of God’s gold is difficult to reconcile with Thomas Jefferson’s warning that banking institutions are more dangerous to liberty than are standing armies.[3] As if engaging in contrition for having overreached in invoking God, Blankfein issued a statement the next week in which he admitted: “We participated in things that were clearly wrong and have reason to regret. . . . We apologize.”[4] To be sure, Blankfein’s claim to have been doing God’s work and even his apology could have been sheer public relations. Nonetheless, it is striking that religious rhetoric had been expressed in a public square as secular as Wall Street.

Less than a century before Lloyd Blankfein, when America was a far more overtly religious society of churchgoers, John D. Rockefeller had characterized his role in expanding Standard Oil similarly in having done God’s work as a dutiful steward. In viewing Standard as saving the refining industry from its destructive competition of the late 1860s and early 1870s, Rockefeller had the Christian salvific sense of the word in mind. Adding a Jewish motif, he claimed to have offered his competitors the choice of being pulled aboard his ark or drowning. However, notably differing from Noah and Jesus, Rockefeller saw nothing wrong with facilitating the drowning of the refiners who refused to be bought up by his huge company. It was their own fault—those small, proud men who refused to join Rockefeller’s giant project of cooperation in place of the destructive competition that had caused so many refiners to go out of business in the 1860s.

Both chief executives, Blankfein and Rockefeller that is, provide us with examples of human overreaching in making commercial-religious declarations amid charges of unethical conduct. Strictly speaking, however, unethical conduct does not necessarily nullify a religious mission. Unethical divine decrees, such as God’s instruction to the Hebrews to kill even the women and children of Jericho for not converting and worshipping Yahweh exclusively, are not uncommon in the Hebrew Scriptures. God giving the devil permission to torment Job is hardly fair to that righteous man. Faith transcends what is ethically fair, perhaps because more is on the line. So Rockefeller and Blankfein could have claimed that unethical business conduct was part of their respective commercial-religious missions. In other words, unethical conduct does not in itself mean that we should disregard claims of a religious basis of a company.

It could be argued, however, that unethical divine decrees do not justify religious persons acting unethically in religions wherein humans are commanded by the divine to behave ethically. The moral commandments in the Ten Commandments, for example, such as the one that forbids bearing false witness (i.e., lying), undoubtedly render virtually any unethical business practice as incompatible with a mission based in one of the three Abrahamic religions. For example, salesmen at Goldman not telling potential clients that the mortgage-backed derivative securities are “crap” while the bank betted against them on its own books constitutes lying. The practice violates the divine prohibition against bearing false witness, and is thus incompatible with any religion that recognizes the Ten Commandments as valid in a religious sense. In other words, Goldman Sachs could not have been doing God’s work while bankers at the firm were lying to clients. Even though God, being all powerful, cannot be limited by one of our ethical principles, humans can be constrained by a divine moral decree. At the same time, as discussed above, humans can also be subject in the sense of a religious obligation to an unethical divine decree and still be in sync with the religion. It becomes tricky if following such a decree violates one of the moral Commandments. God cannot act at cross-purposes with itself, so it could be argued that no specific divine decree (in any of the Abrahamic religions) could be valid if it violates one of the Ten Commandments.

The relationship between business ethics and religion pertains to the financial crisis of 2008 on the company-end. This is not to say that religion did not also play a role on the consumer-end. Most significantly, a specifically Christian theological stance called “the prosperity gospel” was adopted by some of the sub-prime mortgage borrowers. In fact, that particular theology helps explain why they got in so far over their heads—in some cases even knowing it at the time!

Unlike Blankfein’s (and Rockefeller’s) stewardship notion, wherein doing something for God obligates one in some way, the prosperity gospel treats being rich as an entitlement not hinging on fulfilling a duty. Those first-time, lower-income mortgage-applicants subscribing to the prosperity gospel deemed being rich as a deserved entitlement granted by God as a reward for having true belief in Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior. Right belief, in other words, rather than obligation, is the justification for riches. Simply stated, the prosperity gospel holds that God wants the faithful to be rich in this world—meaning in terms of earthly goods. Adherents can cite the third epistle of John (2), which reads: “I wish above all things that thou mayest prosper and be in health.” Poverty and sickness are temporary in terms of God’s plan. Therefore, because all things are possible for God, who can move mountains after all, a true believer wanting to buy a house could be certain that he or she could take risks financially—even act recklessly—because God’s grace could deliver a miracle even if the circumstances seemed adverse at the time.[5] Paul writes, “We know that God makes all things cooperate for good for those who love him.”[6] Rockefeller built a giant monopoly to save the refining industry through the logic of cooperation rather than competition so as to minimize risk. In contrast, the homeowners who signed up for high-risk, sub-prime mortgages that they knew they could not afford left the risk to God, who can work miracles. The religious-based speculation, plus Blankfein’s denial made possibly by his claim of doing God’s work, is like a religious sandwich around the financial crisis of 2008.

From the standpoint of our earthly existence, both Blankfein’s assertion that his bank was doing God’s work and a mortgage applicant’s belief that God rewards one’s true belief with material riches involve a certain amount of presumption concerning one’s knowledge of God. To be sure, the belief that revelation comes from the source of the divine plays a role in the assumed knowledge of God’s ways. Even with Biblical passages as one’s guide, however, both denial and great risk can ensue from assuming the “divine” stewardship or prosperity gospel perspective.

Can we as mere mortals translate stewardship as God’s work down to specific concrete plans without making the Kingdom of God too much of this world rather than reflecting God’s “wholly otherness”?  This is a critique of liberation theology, by the way: that the Kingdom of God comes to be too identified with particular socio-economic structures in this world. Furthermore, can we finite beings really be so certain that we are correctly interpreting what we take as “true belief,” and, by extension, that God necessarily rewards everyone affirming that particular belief with earthly wealth?  Is the connection between religion and economics really so tight—so deterministic?

Assuming Blankfein’s “God’s work” comment was not a ploy to improve Goldman Sachs’ public relations, his application of stewardship to himself and his bank could have blinded him to the possibility that he was sailing his bank into the eye-wall of a hurricane—even strengthening the winds in so doing. Poor mortgage borrowers could have been setting themselves up to lose their homes by being blind-sided by complicit  banks stubbornly insisting on the sanctity of contract regardless of their contributory negligence and even whether they lose more money on the foreclosures than in reducing the higher payments in the out-years of the adjustable-rate mortgages.

On both sides of the mortgage/security equation, “I can’t be wrong” was given far too much validity. As Socrates points out in his dialogues, a person who is certain he or she knows piety, for instance, can be reduced to utter confusion on what the term means. The culprit here does not seem to me to be limited to pride. The human psyche may have trouble distancing its opinions from knowledge—being too friendly to our own views but also overstating a declaration’s claim to be rightly counted as knowledge. In other words, we may naturally assume that we know more than we do, even aside from the impact of pride. Treating an opinion as if it were knowledge blurs two very different categories. The human mind may be susceptible to this type of error, when enables the overemphasis on opinion (as fact).

Given the lapses to which the human mind is susceptible, even taking the validity of revelation as a given means that our grasp of the nature of the divine is as though looking through a stain-glass window. By analogy, looking at such a window in a chapel, one can see the green glass leaves in the window. Even the moving shadows of the oak leaves on the large tree just outside the window can be seen. However, the tree’s actual leaves cannot be seen through the window, and it would be foolhardy to assume that either their moving shadows on the glass or the glass leaves can be taken as the leaves themselves. Even though both the shadows and the glass leaves provide us with some sense of what the actual leaves are like, we are wont to minimize the differences and assume we are looking at the actual leaves themselves. Adding insult to injury, we typically assume that we cannot be wrong about our assumption, and we seek to disgorge any heretic for having the gall to contradict our opinion, which we take as being based on truth (i.e., the actual leaves). From the standpoint of the leaves themselves, we may be the heretics and those who disagree with our opinions could be the truth-seekers.

In short, we may subtly suffer from a natural tendency to insufficiently question (not to mention fail to notice) our assumptions even though we rely on them, and from the related lapse wherein we treat our own opinions as though they were royal facts of knowledge. In turning our opinions into little gods, we engage, in effect, in self-idolatry. Anyone who dares to commit heresy by disagreeing with one of our opinions gets fire from hell, emotionally-speaking.

Greed is a related species of self-idolatry, as the limitlessness of the internal desire for more puts its objects above the only truly unlimited good (i.e., God). In other words, greed applies a lack of limitation to the motivation for a finite, lower good as though the good were God. The lack of limitation is a signature aspect of greed. In affecting our perception, the desire that is inherently without satisfaction can cement or even extend the assumed certainty that one has regarding the validity of his or her assumptions and opinions. Accordingly, greed can blind one to one’s assumption of greater risk or severely discount its severity.

Great financial risk to oneself or one’s company, and even to the economy itself, can be assumed without the person even realizing it. Excessive systemic risk was one of the hallmarks of the financial crisis of 2008. I have already suggested how presumed godliness aided greed in enabling Blankfein and the sub-prime mortgage borrowers to discount or dismiss their respective risks. Even without the element of godliness in the economic equation, greed can motivate a person or group of people to assume much more risk than they realize and perhaps even would want in the clear light of day after a cold shower and perhaps a slap or two.

BP’s repeated shirking of safety regulations and contingency plans before the deep-water  oil rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 is a case of greed disregarding risk in the absence of a religious rationale.[7] The chairman of Exxon Mobil told a subcommittee of the US House Energy and Commerce Committee on June 15, 2010, that BP took risks that went beyond industry norms in pressuring Halliburton to cut corners at the Deepwater Horizon oil rig.[8] Defying common sense not to mention prudence, BP coupled profits of $16 billion in 2009 and $2.56 billion in the first quarter of 2010 with statements of zero risk of a deep-water off-shore well catastrophe. Accordingly, the company invested very little R&D in capture and clean-up technology. In their negligence that virtually assumed-away any risk because it was so far removed whereas profits could be grasped (i.e., greed), the BP managers were like the sub-prime borrowers who also ignored rather blatant risks, though the borrowers did so on account of God’s ability to work miracles rather than by distorting an assumed low-probability/high risk scenario.

To sum up, this discussion of the financial crisis of 2008, accompanied by references to Rockefeller’s commercial “Christ-spirit” and BP managers’ reckless secular greed, suggests that godliness and greed may not be as separated into different domains as might be initially supposed. In the business world, a religious rationale can actually enable greed, at least with respect to taking on excessive risk. Such a rationale can even be interpreted as a manifestation of the self-idolatry that may lie just behind godliness serving greed, even if unknowingly as under the cover of an assumed righteousness that cannot be wrong. Rather than being intentional, the enabling of greed is perhaps like that of enabling an alcoholic by supposing that just one drink won’t cause a problem.

In historical Christianity, theologians have held differing assumptions on whether profit-seeking and/or accumulated wealth point to or even trigger greed as a motive. Vulnerabilities to greed exist whether one “couples” it to wealth and/or profit-seeking or not. I contend that the vulnerabilities in the “decoupled” camp lay behind Rockefeller’s self-proclaimed incarnation as Noah or Christ at Standard Oil, and the sub-prime borrowers’ prosperity gospel (as well as Blankfein’s presumably Judaic claim of doing God’s work at Goldman Sachs while clients were being sold “crap”). Vulnerabilities in the “coupled” stance in turn kept that “camp” from functioning as a viable check. In other words, the financial crisis of 2008 and Rockefeller’s monopoly in restraint of trade were facilitated by the temptation of greed that resides in the assumption that profit-seeking and wealth need not entail or involve greed. Meanwhile, weakness in the assumption that greed is entailed or involved kept it from acting as a restraint in Rockefeller, Blankfein, and the mortgage borrowers as in, hey, maybe I’m rationalizing greed here?

Somewhere along the line in the history of Christianity, profit-seeking activity and wealth itself became unhinged from greed as the dominant theological assumption on business. I refer to the de-coupling as the “pro-wealth paradigm” and the previously-dominant “coupling” assumption as the “anti-wealth paradigm.” The term paradigm warrants some explanation.

Formally, I use the term paradigm throughout this book to mean a basic framework (e.g., of assumptions) into which theological interpretations and even schools of a similar nature on a given topic can be placed, or clustered. More than one “school” can be included in a paradigm, which after all is pretty broad. For example, I contend that two schools exist in the “coupled,” or anti-wealth, paradigm. One maintains a strict coupling, while the other loosens, or modifies, it. A more familiar example of paradigm is the laissez-faire (or free-market) ecomomic perspective, which assumes that government regulation would be harmful. That paradigm contains the assumption that a market is self-regulating (which, as Alan Greenspan would admit to a Congressional committee, was undercut by the credit freeze during financial crisis of 2008). The European “social model” is also a paradigm. That one assumes that government has a legitimate role in providing a “survival floor” or “safety net” for the citizens. If the word paradigm itself is too abstract, simply think general framework of a few basic assumptions and you will be good to go.

In arguing that a shift took place wherein the pro-wealth paradigm came to dominate the anti-wealth paradigm, I am well aware that no one period or culture has but one interpretation on a given topic. Therefore, for any given period, I try to include views that did not dominate among the theologians. Out of such diversity, I assume that a dominant paradigm, school of thought, or even a particular stance can be discerned for the period by looking at the writings of its theologians, and even at how later theologians react to the various positions in the period. If most of the later writing punce on the dangers in a certain paradigm as represented a century or two before, for example, chances are that paradigm held some sway or the dangers would not have aroused so much attention. Very little if anything was written in 2000 on the dangers of communism in the U.S. because the U.S.S.R. had collapsed roughly a decade before and the ideology was not much of a threat in the U.S. as a result. In contrast, following the financial crisis of 2008, quite a bit was written about the free-market economic paradigm because it had been dominant since the Reagan administration.

Taking a drive through history pointing to tussles between paradigms or even schools within a paradigm can be a pretty abstract journey. Therefore, I try to accommodate readers who want at least a few pictures for their imagination by including three historical businessmen who can be taken as personifying important stages in the history of ideas covered in this book. In turning now to a brief overview, or “map,” of our upcoming journey through the historical ideas, I begin by discussing the three men we will meet along the way as a way into the material.

The first case study is on Godric of Finchale, a former merchant trader who lived as the Commercial Revolution of the eleventh and twelfth centuries was getting under way. In spite of having traded ethically, he assumed he had to give up all of his accumulated “buried treasure” in order to gain salvation. As a hermit, he lived in the tradition of Cuthbert. For our purposes, Godric can be viewed as personifying the assumed coupling of profit-seeking and wealth to greed quite strictly. That anti-wealth school had been dominant in early Christianity before Augustine’s later works, which modified the school by loosening the assumed coupling of wealth and greed. That moderated school of thought would not be chosen weapon, however, to face an awakening pro-wealth consciousness during Commercial Revolution. Rather, in line with the monastic teachings of Francis of Assisi and example of Godric of Finchale, the strict school would trounce Augustine’s relatively vulnerable moderated school.

How long the anti-wealth paradigm’s dominance lasted and when the shift toward a dominant de-coupling took place are major questions that I address in this book—including most importantly why it took place. The journey itself must be taken before we can look back on the entire route and fully appreciate the value in the why, so on we go with our preface tour.

The other two major case studies in the book are on two major figures in the history of business, representing the banking and the refining industries, respectively. Cosimo de Medici personifies Christianity with respect to profit-seeking and wealth during the Renaissance. I contend that wealth (and profit-seeking) had been de-coupled from greed in Christianity by Cosimo’s retirement in the mid-fifteenth century. Therefore, he personifies the pro-wealth paradigm before the Reformation. Even though the paradigm had achieved dominance as if by de Medici’s say, pro-wealth “decoupling” had been a minority report of sorts among theologians in Godric’s day, as well as when the paradigm had been presented in Augustine’s early works and to an extent before then in Clement of Alexandria’s sermon on the rich man.

John D. Rockefeller at the helm of the Standard Oil Co. can be viewed as personifying not only the pro-wealth paradigm, but also how successful the Reformers were in keeping it from lapsing into (unintentionally) advocating greed. The prosperity gospel itself can be understood as the ultimate outcome as far as the Reformers’ various defenses are concerned.

In short, Godric, Cosimo and John D. represent the dominance of the anti-wealth paradigm, the triumph of the pro-wealth paradigm, and the Reformation as a reaction to this shift. Our story actually begins before the anti-wealth theologies of early Christianity, back with the pre-Christian, Greco-Roman thought of Homer and Aristotle on natural wealth and Plato and Cicero on justice; both of these concepts would find their way into Christianity. My formal thesis—that which all the preliminaries lead up to—concerns the shift from the dominance of the anti-wealth paradigm to that of the pro-wealth paradigm. I contend that the transition got off the ground with Aquinas and was complete in the writings of many of the fifteenth-century Christian “Humanist” theologians who lived in thriving Itialian city-states two centuries before the Protestant work ethic.

The shift itself was gradual and in a “back and forth” manner, rather than turning on a pivot as if a light switch had been turned on (or off) on New Year’s Eve at midnight in 1250 or 1450. Contrary to Max Weber’s interpretation that treats the Calvinists of the Reformation as the turning point, I contend that no event or even period can be pointed to as the definitive pivot in the decoupling of profit-seeking and wealth from greed.[9] Moreover, intellectual history is not as smooth as it may seem in a generalized retrospective skimming over the centuries. I tend to view the twentieth century as decadent, though such a generalization does not do justice to the incredible technological progress (though even this, as per an implied materialism, could be indicative of a culture in decline).

Because my thesis on when the shift took place may be viewed as a refutation of Weber’s famous thesis, I want to address any relation to Weber here at the outset before launching into the history. It is partially true that my thesis refutes Weber’s theory. I argue that rather than developing further in the Reformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the pro-wealth paradigm was checked, although only temporarily, by the Reformers’ various degrees of pessimistic thought on wealth. Luther’s ideas are definitely in line with the economy of antiquity as well as  with coupling wealth with greed, and even Calvin’s writings on the topic do not include industriousness as a virtue (which favors profit-seeking), unlike the Calvinists who followed him in the seventeenth century. We know in retrospect that in spite of the Reformers’ efforts to halt the “de-coupling” that permits great wealth out of concern that the latter could stimulate greed (i.e., the old “coupled” assumption), the pro-wealth paradigm would go on to eventually embrace the prosperity gospel. It is almost as if I can hear Luther and even Calvin looking at the twentieth-century pro-wealth gospel from beyond the grave and letting out an exasperated, “Oops, looks like we didn’t pull back enough on that horse’s reins!” In other words, the horse had run out of the barn.

Weber argues that psychological motivation related to Calvinism contributed to the impetus requisite for the formation of capital in capitalism. I argue that the theological interpretations on profit-seeking and wealth of the major seventeenth-century Puritan Calvinists “split the difference” as far as the two paradigms are concerned. This claim is different than that which is oriented to psychological motivation. It is possible, for example, that a theological statement, such as one that values asceticism, is theologically against profit-seeking and yet sparks psychological motivation that furthers capital accumulation. Theological interpretation and psychological motivation are different things, even as they can be related. In other words, theological statements can be distinguished from their psychological effects, potentially allowing for my unknown thesis and Weber’s celebrated theory.

However, if the “decoupled” theological writings of the Christian Humanists of the fifteenth century triggered psychological motivation to earn and accumulate wealth even if it was not pooled as capital, Weber’s privileging of the psychological motivation from seventeenth-century Calvinism may be unjustified. Furthermore, if Weber’s thesis includes the claim that Calvinist theology (i.e., aside from the motivation) is wholeheartedly pro-wealth (i.e., “uncoupled”), then my thesis on Calvinism challenges his thesis in this respect too.

Rather than viewing the Calvinists following Calvin as pushing along the already-dominant pro-wealth paradigm, I argue that they, as well as the major Reformers generally, feared that the fifteenth-century Christian Humanists as a whole had moved Christianity too close to the brink of advocating greed. That is to say, the Reformers’ theological writings on economics are oriented to forestalling love of gain from gaining respectability (or even inclusion) in Christianity. I examine relevant writings from Luther, Calvin, and major Calvinist Puritan divines.

Regarding how the Reformers attempt to pull back on the pro-wealth paradigm in their writings, I argue that the theologians draw on the tradition of justice as love and benevolence. This tradition, which quite a bit from principles of modern legal justice as personified by Shylock demanding a pound of flesh in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice,  had entered Christianity through Augustine, who in turn had drawn on Plato and Cicero. After Leibniz, the tradition lost out to theories of positive legal justice. Although Augustine and the Reformers draw on the tradition in line with the anti-wealth paradigm (universal benevolence being quite a drain on wealth), I contend that the various Christian versions are vulnerable to internal tension. This weakness partly explains why the pro-wealth paradigm succeeded in achieving and maintaining its dominance. What the Reformers were worried about can be seen by contrasting Godric, who personifies the anti-wealth paradigm, with Cosimo de Medici and John D. Rockefeller, both of whom personify the pro-wealth paradigm. I contend that both de Medici and Rockefeller illustrate how godliness can be put in the service of greed in line with the pro-wealth paradigm.

Although most of this book’s pages are dedicated to laying the groundwork for the anti-wealth paradigm and tracing the actual shift of Christian thought on profit-seeking and wealth in relation to greed, the dramatic climax comes when the focus turns to explaining the shift and paradigms’ respective susceptibilities to greed. Although vulnerabilities in the anti-wealth paradigm compromised its ability to accommodate or check the oncoming pro-wealth ferver, I look particularly at the lapses of the pro-wealth paradigm and problems with the Reformers’ various degrees of defense against such lapses in asking why.

Rather than merely examining contextual (i.e., economic) changes such as increasing trade or commercial activity, I train my lenses on Christianity itself  to ask whether some element in Christian theology is at fault, or whether the source is merely a misinterpretation that has taken root since it arose sometime during or after the Commercial Revolution. If the source of the problem is in the theology itself, can the “damaged gene” be fixed? If the problem is merely a pattern of misinterpretation that inadvertently risks creating an opening for greed in Christian thought, can the faulty assumption be found and replaced with another that is more solid? In short, the question is whether Christian theology is too much of the world rather than merely in it.


1. As a recent college graduate working in public accounting, I was completely unaware of the inherent conflict of interest in the tick-mark, “As per comptroller, discrepancy resolved.” The regularity of the tick-mark among others in everyday use kept me (and I assume my colleagues) from recognizing the lapse involved in the tick-mark itself. How could an independent audit take a comptroller’s word for a discrepancy?
2. John Arlidge, “I’m Doing God’s Work. Meet Mr. Goldman Sachs,” Sunday Times, November 8, 2009.
3. Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, Monticello, May 28, 1816, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul L. Ford (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1892-1899), 11: 533.
4. Graham Bowley, “$500 Million and Apology from Goldman,” New York Times, November 17, 2009, A1.
5. Hanna Rosin, “Did Christianity Cause the Crisis?” Atlantic Monthly 304, no. 5 (2009), 38-48.
6. Rom. 8:28.
7. Trading safety for saving on cost and time, BP managers opted for a “long string” pipe for the well rather than a liner tieback that would have cost $7 million to $10 million but would have added barriers to prevent gas from reaching the surface. Also, BP engineers used just six “centralizers,” rather than twenty-one as recommended by Halliburton, to stabilize the well before cementing it. According to an April 16, 2010, email from BP’s well team leader, the problem was that the extra centralizers would have taken ten hours to install. Another official emailed later that day of the decision: “Who cares, it’s done, end of story, will probably be fine.” BP also skipped a test to determine if the cement had properly bonded to the well and rock formations. A petroleum engineer independent of BP told a congressional committee that the decision not to conduct the test was “horribly negligent.” BP managers also decided not to take twelve hours to completely circulate the heavy drilling fluid in the well that would have enabled detection and removal of any leaking gas. Lastly, BP managers ignored reports from employees at the rig that bits of rubber were coming up from the blowout preventer. Neil King, Jr., and Russell Gold, “Congress Says BP Crew Focused on Costs,” Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2010, A5. In terms of BP’s contingency planning for a well rupture, technological claims were made that turned out not to be the case because the actual capture and clean-up measures attempted did not reflect them. Chairman Ed Markey of the U.S. House Energy and Commerce subcommittee on energy and environment said his subcommittee found several oil companies’ oil spill response plans to be “identical” and “ineffective.” Markey noted that “(i)n some cases, they use the exact same words”—right down to the same irrelevant promises to protect walruses, which don’t live in the Gulf of Mexico (the arctic being a bit further north). Alex Johnson, “Oil Patch Rivals Turn the Screws on BP,” MSNBC 2010, http://fieldnotes.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2010/06/15/4511915-watch-live-competitors-turn-on-bp (accessed June 15, 2010).
8. Johnson, “Oil Patch Rivals.” The use of the term “stewardship” here comes from the journalist rather than the executive.
9. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1958).