Thursday, February 6, 2020
Politics and Religion: President Trump at a National Prayer Breakfast
Friday, December 27, 2019
American Federalism: Christianity as the Official Religion in North Carolina
When the 13 original American states that formed the United States had been colonies, Calvinism was the “state religion” in all of the New England Confederation, which excluded Rhode Island on account of its freedom of religion. Pennsylvania was known as the Quaker experiment. Maryland was heavily Catholic. Virginia was Anglican. New Jersey split in two for a few decades in the late seventeenth century, with the Calvinists taking East New Jersey and the Quakers taking West New Jersey. Even by the time the U.S. Constitution was being considered, the notion of a state religion in a particular state would have been familiar to most Americans. The U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent seems artificial in comparison.
Even so, the North Carolina General Assembly would have gone too far had it passed the bill in 2013 stating in part that the North Carolina General Assembly “does not recognize federal court rulings which prohibit and otherwise regulate the State of North Carolina, its public schools or any political subdivisions.”[1] The bill also states that the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit states from making laws respecting an establishment of religion. While this assertion is probably correct in theory, the precedent set down by the U.S. Supreme Court makes the prohibition the law of the land. Refusing to recognize the U.S. Supreme Court as bearing on the states harkens back to the Nullification Crisis centered on South Carolina. President Andrew Jackson pointed out in 1831 that the Union would not long last if the states could decide for themselves whether they would be bound by federal law.
In terms of an official religion at the state level, Utah would obviously be Morman, but not every state has such a concentration of one particular denomination. Nor is religion itself equally strong in every state. Not every state would want to institute an official religion. All of this suggests that the United States would be a richer quilt to the extent that states can differ on religion as a phenomenon and with respect to the particular religions. Put another way, the U.S., being imperial in scale, is innately more diverse than can be seen by the extent of one-size-fits-all Congressional action. Allowing the states to fulfill their particularities more fully would make the U.S. itself a richer tapestry and thus a strong union.
If some of the American republics in the U.S. were to have established state religions, a person in the minority in one of those states might feel more like an outsider in one’s own town. Being a non-Mormon in Utah would be even harder were Mormonism the official state religion. However, is it not already awkward for atheists in the small towns of several states, such as Alabama and Mississippi? Is there really so much difference between an overwhelmingly Christian population and making Christianity the official state religion? It would not be as though the heretics could legally be burned alive. To counter any unfairness more generally, equal protection under the law and due process could be used in a non-Christian’s defense.
I would even say that it should not be the case that the typical American feels equally at home in every state, for that would mean that the one-size-fits-all approach of Congress has effectively homogenized an empire that is inherently diverse.[2] In terms of historical political theory, an empire is “different in kind” (i.e., qualitatively) than the kingdom-level on the next scale down. It is not only that an empire is larger than a kingdom (i.e., quantitatively). Whereas a kingdom is only large enough that it may or may not be diverse within, an empire by definition consists of kingdom-level polities and is thus inherently diverse because kingdoms are different. From the beginning, the American colonies/states were mapped on the scale of the then-extant early-modern kingdoms in Europe. The European countries and American republics generally are comparable. France is a bit smaller than Texas, Germany is roughly the size of Montana, Spain matches Arizona and Italy is the size of California. Among the respective smaller states, Malta, Luxemburg, and Cyprus cluster with Rhode Island, Delaware, and New Jersey. Belgium and Maryland are both mid-sized states in their respective unions. To compare the U.S. and France or the E.U. and Texas thus evinces a category mistake. Flawed conclusions should be expected.
The United States altogether thus form an empire, which is composed of kingdom-level polities/cultures/territories.[3] We should not be surprised to find that the culture in Texas differs from that of Massachusetts, for example. One of the benefits of living in the U.S. is that one can live in a republic that fits one’s ideology or lifestyle. For example, a gay person can move to a culture such as Massachusetts or California in which greater acceptance exists. People in the majority cultures in Oklahoma and Arkansas would not have to be pushed into changing their respective cultures into accepting homosexuality, though the marriages made in the other states would have to be recognized due to the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution. A fuller happiness for both gays and traditionalists/Biblicalists would result if each can find a fitting environment than would be the case were Congress to pass an empire-wide one-size-fits-all “solution.” Were it made under one giant compromise, U.S.-wide, it is likely that the result is not a fit for any American. Moreover, to suppose that every state should be virtually the same just because the U.S. is recognized as “a” country ignores the intrinsic diversity that exists within an empire-scale complex-polity. Even the poll finding that roughly a third of Americans want Christianity to be the official religion in their own state cannot be generalized using a broad brush across the United States. I suspect that a much higher percentage of Arkansans than New Yorkers or Californians want Christianity to be their official religion.
In short, the establishment of state religions in some of the states even as strong majorities in other states prefer their respective cultures (and governments) to remain primarily secular would provide a closer fit for not only the people involved, but also the diversity that exists anyway within an empire that is composed of kingdoms and/or republics. To treat an empire as though it were synonymous with one of its republics or kingdoms evinces a category mistake. The benefits of diversity that can be enjoyed within an empire are threatened when Congress makes the mistake by acting like a state legislature. Put another way, the United States would be stronger were the strictures relaxed such that they could more fully manifest their uniqueness. Seeing a strip-mall with a McDonalds restaurant in every town from coast to coast is appreciably more bland. “Sameness” multiplied across a continent is not only tiring; it fails to take advantage of the inherent diversity that springs from distance and more than one government. One need only look at the E.U. states to get a sense of how little distance is necessary for culture to differ. Even though the North Carolina’s General Assembly was pursuing a foolish strategy in proposing a bill that would have the government ignore the U.S. Supreme Court when convenient, the presumed article of separation between church and state at the state level can and should be re-considered.
2. Skip Worden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire. Available at Amazon.
3. Ibid.
Sunday, January 27, 2019
Is God the Invisible Hand?
The full essay is at "Is God for Regulation?"
Friday, January 11, 2019
Self-Delusion Enabled by Religion: Former U.S. House Minority Leader Tom Delay and Monopolist John D. Rockefeller
Monday, November 26, 2018
Christianity by State: The Religious Dimension of Federalism
On Federalism in America and Europe, see Essays on Two Federal Empires: Comparing the E.U. and U.S., Essays on the E.U. Political Economy: Federalism and the Debt Crisis, and British Colonies Forge an American Empire, all available at Amazon.
Sunday, November 25, 2018
God's Gold through the Centuries
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See related essay: "Religious Sources of Business Ethics"
The academic treatise: Godliness and Greed: Shifting Christian Thought on Profit and Wealth
Friday, June 8, 2018
Is Modern Banking Fundamentally Flawed?
Source:
Tuesday, December 5, 2017
On the Place of Religion in Business: Refusing to Serve Gays
Saturday, November 25, 2017
Uncovering the Root of Poverty: An Addictive Habit
Friday, April 21, 2017
On the Spread of Private Governments in a Democracy: Should Churches and Universities Have Their Own Police Forces?
In mid-April, 2017, Alabama’s Senate approved a bill that
would authorize Briarwood Presbyterian Church to create a police department. At
the time, the church hired off-duty police employees to provide security-- “a
common practice among nonprofit organizations.”[1]
With 4,000 congregants, a K-12 school and thousands of events on its land each
year, church officials had difficulty finding enough off-duty cops who were
available. More important than being able to make up for any shortages, the
proposed law “would empower a religious group to do a job usually performed by the
government.”[2] That
the group is religious in nature whereas police power is governmental (i.e.,
“church and state”) is less important than that the “job” had come to be viewed
societally, as per the quote from The New
York Times, as usually performed by government. In
other words, the slippery, subtle slope is itself a red flag.
“Police powers are a quintessential government role,” said
Randall Marshall of the ACLU of Alabama.[3]
In U.S. constitutional law, the Tenth Amendment is judicially interpreted as giving
the states police powers in line with the protection and maintenance of the
health, safety, and welfare of the citizens.[4]
In other words, the police power resides with the state governments. That the
elected representatives in state offices are “closer to the people”—meaning
smaller districts—means that the police power is tightly woven with democratic
accountability and thus democratic legitimacy, at least in theory. That state
governments delegate the power to local subunits (i.e., counties and
municipalities) introduces a wrinkle in this feedback loop, especially if the
county or city government is corrupted by local wealth, which is by nature
pro-police qua property-protection.
Randall Marshall of the ACLU of Alabama overlooks the key
governmental basis of police power in privileging the problem of church and
state in his conclusion, “Giving the powers of the state to a private religious
organization is a …violation of the establishment clause” of the U.S.
Constitution.[5] I
submit that for a government to allow a church to have employees with the
powers to arrest and use deadly force is not to establish a state religion. The
decisive problem is rather that a non-governmental entity—a non-profit
organization—would assume a governmental role. That democratic legitimacy would
be replaced by managerial prerogative is the sort of shift that is not typically
transparent to translucent daylight.
The church employees would have “all of the powers of law
enforcement officers” in Alabama, including “the powers to make arrests and use
deadly force.”[6] They
would have to be certified by the Alabama Peace Officers Standards and Training
Commission, making them a real police department. The church pastor and his
board of directors—private citizens, not government officials, in a private
association—would be the bosses of a full-fledged police force. As troubling as
this may sound, precedent exists in another domain of non-profit organizations.
Universities have their own police forces, which are
accountable, in theory at least, to academic administrators (i.e., managers)
rather than to a city council or mayor. In the case of state universities, their
respective state governments are at a distance; typically a board of regents is
the go-between. A university administration’s over-reaches can easily go under
such a board’s radar—not to mention that of a state capitol. Even assuming
adequate accountability, the interest of a university’s administration is not
that of a state government—the former being considerably narrower in scope.
A government, unlike an organization’s board and management,
stands for and protects society as a whole, so a police force answers to
officials who are tasked with looking after the interests of the whole, rather
than those of a part thereof. In theory, police can serve in an unbiased way
between two contending groups within society, unless one of those groups is the
government itself; but that group is not in
society. Government as an organization differs qualitatively from
organizations in society because only
government represents the whole (i.e., the entire society, and thus the common
good). This difference is crucial as to why giving organizations in society police forces of their own; organizational
“police” are subject to a part (of society) rather than the whole and therefore
something partial rather than the
general good. Rather than the whole acting in its interest with respect to two
contending parts of the whole, one part gains a lever over another part—a lever
of such power that the U.S. Constitution assigns that prerogative to governments.
The issue at hand, whether the organizations are religious
or educational (or both, as is Briarwood), is thus not the particular flavor of
the organization. Even beyond whether a governmental power is misappropriated,
the ultimate concern for the general public ought to be the risk of
unaccountable police overreach at the expense of the members of organizations—whether
parishioners, students, staff, faculty or even visitors. The risk is real
because an inherent bias exists in the institutional arrangement itself, which
unfortunately comes part and parcel with the misappropriation.
The troubling matter of accountability is so important
because a serious, albeit unfortunately overlooked conflict of interest exists
when a “police force” is beholden to an organization (i.e., its management) rather
than a government, which represents the public good. Anytime such a “police
force” intervenes in a conflict between the organization’s administration and
its members, the “police” employees are subject to an inherent bias in favor of
their bosses higher up in the organization. The bias is institutional in
nature; employees are going to lean in the direction of the people who pay and
direct them. A “police chief” in an organization is naturally going to side
with the administration of which he or she is a part, rather than with members,
and the “chief’s” subordinate employees are going to follow along even if they
harm or intimidate members unjustifiably.
An organization’s management can order its “police force” to
take action against “troubling” members, whereas they in turn face an “uphill
climb” in convincing the administration’s “police” to take action against
administrators who are out of line. “Police” employees of a church are likely
to be hesitant at best to remove an irate, abusive pastor at the behest of some
offended members, but those same employees would not blink an eye before
removing a parishioner, who is orally challenging the pastor on a
hitherto-secret regarding his salary or expenses, at the pastor’s request. This
asymmetry is the fault-line in the conflict of interest. Any tense relation
between an administration and the organization’s members suffers from the lack
of a fair resolution mechanism because the security, or “police,” employees are
subject to the institutional bias. In other words, the umpire or referee works
for one of the teams.
As a result, administrators can potentially take liberties
with more assurance than warranted of practical impunity, whereas the members and
the general public (e.g., visitors) are potentially without the protections of
liberty that are guaranteed citizens as per abuse of power by a government but
interestingly not members as per abuse of power by an organization’s management
or its armed “police force.”
More commonly, the board and pastor of a church and the
administration of a university are likely to look the other way as members feel
uncomfortable or even subtle intimidation on a daily basis due to an excessive “police”
presence enabled by the bias in favor of the organizational leadership. That
is, an organizational “police force” is not likely to be managed in such a way
that the protection of the organization’s property and enforcement of its rules
and even local law is balanced against the prerogative of members to feel at
ease while at the organization. Unfortunately, the risk of damage or violations
of rules or laws cannot possibly reach absolute zero, so police forces, whether
local or of organizations, are going to try to maximize their presence—caring
less about member comfort in the process.
In short, giving non-profit organizations powers that are
quintessentially governmental is inherently problematic, for to do so creates
private governments without democratic legitimacy or accountability.
Accordingly, universities and churches should be allowed to have security
employees, who are empowered to guard the assets and enforce organizational
rules yet without weapons and the power to arrest. Instead, they should be able
to the local police rather than assume such governmental powers themselves.
Otherwise, I fear the perpetuation of private governments—even at state
universities!—with little or no real accountability. In a democracy, such a
sordid spread should be a matter of concern rather than indifference or
support.
Friday, March 18, 2016
SEC Investigating a Hedge-Fund Priest: Christianity’s Pro-Wealth Paradigm Lapsing into Greed?
Wednesday, April 15, 2015
God's Gold: Banking and Monopoly
1. As a recent college graduate working in public accounting, I was completely unaware of the inherent conflict of interest in the tick-mark, “As per comptroller, discrepancy resolved.” The regularity of the tick-mark among others in everyday use kept me (and I assume my colleagues) from recognizing the lapse involved in the tick-mark itself. How could an independent audit take a comptroller’s word for a discrepancy?
2. John Arlidge, “I’m Doing God’s Work. Meet Mr. Goldman Sachs,” Sunday Times, November 8, 2009.
3. Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, Monticello, May 28, 1816, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul L. Ford (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1892-1899), 11: 533.
4. Graham Bowley, “$500 Million and Apology from Goldman,” New York Times, November 17, 2009, A1.
5. Hanna Rosin, “Did Christianity Cause the Crisis?” Atlantic Monthly 304, no. 5 (2009), 38-48.
6. Rom. 8:28.
7. Trading safety for saving on cost and time, BP managers opted for a “long string” pipe for the well rather than a liner tieback that would have cost $7 million to $10 million but would have added barriers to prevent gas from reaching the surface. Also, BP engineers used just six “centralizers,” rather than twenty-one as recommended by Halliburton, to stabilize the well before cementing it. According to an April 16, 2010, email from BP’s well team leader, the problem was that the extra centralizers would have taken ten hours to install. Another official emailed later that day of the decision: “Who cares, it’s done, end of story, will probably be fine.” BP also skipped a test to determine if the cement had properly bonded to the well and rock formations. A petroleum engineer independent of BP told a congressional committee that the decision not to conduct the test was “horribly negligent.” BP managers also decided not to take twelve hours to completely circulate the heavy drilling fluid in the well that would have enabled detection and removal of any leaking gas. Lastly, BP managers ignored reports from employees at the rig that bits of rubber were coming up from the blowout preventer. Neil King, Jr., and Russell Gold, “Congress Says BP Crew Focused on Costs,” Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2010, A5. In terms of BP’s contingency planning for a well rupture, technological claims were made that turned out not to be the case because the actual capture and clean-up measures attempted did not reflect them. Chairman Ed Markey of the U.S. House Energy and Commerce subcommittee on energy and environment said his subcommittee found several oil companies’ oil spill response plans to be “identical” and “ineffective.” Markey noted that “(i)n some cases, they use the exact same words”—right down to the same irrelevant promises to protect walruses, which don’t live in the Gulf of Mexico (the arctic being a bit further north). Alex Johnson, “Oil Patch Rivals Turn the Screws on BP,” MSNBC 2010, http://fieldnotes.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2010/06/15/4511915-watch-live-competitors-turn-on-bp (accessed June 15, 2010).
8. Johnson, “Oil Patch Rivals.” The use of the term “stewardship” here comes from the journalist rather than the executive.


