Showing posts with label paradigm shift. Show all posts
Showing posts with label paradigm shift. Show all posts

Monday, March 30, 2020

Strong and Weak Management: The Case of American Bus Companies and Regional Transit Authorities

By the end of the 2010’s, city officials in several American cities were rethinking bus service in a fundamental way; the passenger-fare revenue model was being questioned, and in some cases replaced with a model that fit better with serving poor people and changed local business environments. Yet the downside effects on the bus companies of trends, especially regarding ridership, may have been the result of internal organizational factors immune to a change in the revenue model. I contend that city officials and the managers of bus companies should resist the temptation to view a new model as a cure precisely because some problems, internal to the companies, could go on and silently undermine analysis of the new model such that it could erroneously be discontinued. To be sure, being willing to question a longstanding model is a mark of managerial strength. Indeed, it is precisely the managers of bus companies and regional authorities who are mired in longstanding assumptions who would tend to have the most difficulty in dealing with troublesome internal problems. 

Providers of goods or services must adjust to changing local environments, which in turn are impacted by broader trends. Bus companies and regional authorities in the U.S. faced increasing traffic congestion as well as decreasing ridership from 5.6 billion in 2008 to 4.67 billion in 2018.[1] Also, competition ranging from electric scooters to ride-hailing services like Uber and Lyft were literally driving people away from buses nationwide, according to transit officials. Light rail and subways, which do not have to fight street congestion, also saw ridership decline, but not as much as buses. There was also the argument that the very poor, including the homeless, who generally rely on bus service, are least equipped to pay for it. Many universities were already using the student-fee model for university bus service, spreading the cost wide enough that the students could afford the service. Alternatively, only students who used the service could have paid for it, which would have been particularly hard on poor students.

In the altered environment in which bus companies found themselves by 2020, the concept of free fares on some or all bus routes was drawing increasing support in several cities. “Advocates in Massachusetts claimed that free buses would speed up boarding times, draw more passengers, aid poor residents and help reduce greenhouse-gas emissions.”[2] Michelle Wu, a member of the Boston City Council who supports free transit, remarked, “If we’re truly treating it as a public good that has benefits to everyone when everyone uses it, then we should remove barriers.”[3] To the extent that poor people are especially in need of a public good, charging a user free can essentially privatize the good for the poor.

The poor may go without transportation needed for their very sustenance, or resort to fraud. In Phoenix, Arizona, for example, people needed only go to a convenience store to buy reduced-fare cards otherwise reserved for the elderly and disabled. As of 2020, enforcement on the buses was rare; few if any drivers asked to seek the accompanying ID of discount fare-riders. Even on the light rail, security employees intent on staring at passengers as if they were all conducive to violence would not bother to even ask to see the ID. In fact, passengers who had not paid were let out at the next platform, from which they could easily board the next train. Lest the shady passengers get all the blame (though surely they deserve a lot for their sordid attitude alone), the revenue model itself was culpable because it did not adequately take into account the extremely limited financial resources and vital transportation needs of the very poor. Such a regional transit authority and its bus operating companies would not likely be willing or able to address internal problems, such as rude drivers and horrendous (and risky) driving. Phoenix buses were widely known locally for these two things. Also, it was not uncommon to see three or four transit security employees in half of a light-rail train car staring at passengers as if the latter were prisoners.

Put another way, city and transit officials in the Phoenix metro would not be likely to analyze, let alone perceive the free-rides option because they were so preoccupied with, and yet unsuccessful at, stopping the ticket fraud in order to boost revenue from riders. Getting serious with bus drivers who were rude and/or bad drivers was something beyond the reach (and will) of the bus operating management and regional transit authority. Moreover, the political environment in Arizona was such that a majority of the voters would have balked at the prospect of paying for poor people to ride free. Minimizing tax increases fared much better in that political climate.

A world away, in Lawrence, Massachusetts, the region’s transit authority in September, 2019 stopped collecting money on three routes that go through the poorest parts of the city. Lawrence used $225,000 in reserves to waive fares for two years. Lawrence Mayor Dan Rivera explained the rationale for free rides. “We could support those citizens to mobilize themselves out of poverty.”[4] The regional transit agency said ridership on the three free lines climbed quickly—up about 24% in the first few months from a year earlier.

In Olympia, Washington’s capital, a ballot measure in 2019 that boosted transportation funding helped the Intercity Transit agency start offering free service on all buses in January, 2020, according to Ann Freeman-Manzanares, the system’s general manager. Fares there amounted to $2.7 million annually, a small portion of the agency’s budget, and some of that is spent maintaining fare boxes and collecting cash. “It actually was surprising to us when we started digging deep how much it costs to collect fares,” Ms. Freeman-Manzanares said.[5]

In Kansas City, the local transit authority was overhauling its bus service and already offered free rides to veterans and students. The authority aimed to completely cancel fares by May, 2020, Chief Executive Robbie Makinen said. The city council voted unanimously in December, 2019 to find about $8 million a year to cover free buses, which were already heavily supported by taxpayers.

Meanwhile in Phoenix, bus drivers regularly held up their buses waiting for passengers to dig for more coin—not having bothered to do so before boarding. Also, the fare machines on the buses were old, and thus particularly susceptible to breaking down, in spite of the priority on revenue from passengers. The bus operating companies and the regional authority erroneously accepted these intangible and tangible costs as necessary in part because the managers assumed the passenger-revenue model being used to be fixed rather than possibly replaced.

Generally speaking, a mind wetted to one way of thinking as if a blind card set in a highly rutted dirt road is likely to accept as necessary too many costs because another way of thinking, a broader one, would be necessary to take into account other models even though their costs would be lower. A mind willing and able to perceive and think beyond its groves is necessary. Though such a mind is likely to be more motivated and able to take on seemingly intractable internal problems, such as rude drivers and bad driving (e.g., accelerating too fast, and braking too hard), even being willing to think wider may not be sufficient. Hence it is possible that the continuing internal factors (i.e., problems within a bus company) could sabotage a new model’s perceived efficacy.


[1] Jon Kamp, “Cities Offer Free Buses in Bid to Boost Flagging Ridership,” The Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2020.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.

Monday, December 9, 2019

Congress: Hitched to the Status Quo

To lead is to be out in front, pointing the jet’s nose one way rather than another. Leadership is not that which causes drag at the back of the plane. Leadership is not that which holds a society in place or protects the vested interests. Whether envisioning something new or a return to a better time, a leader is not oriented to the status quo. It is significant, therefore, that the Minority Leader of the U.S. House of Representatives, one of the two chambers in the American Congress, has stated publicly that the Congress is rigged to advantage the status quo. The stunning implication is that members of Congress are actually anti-leaders.
In an interview in 2013, Nancy Pelosi admitted, “This is an environment that is almost rigged, intentionally or not, wittingly or not, rigged so that the status quo just goes on.”[1] This amazing line can be read as confirmation that the fears of some of the American Founders has come true—namely, that the U.S. House would itself become an aristocratic body rivaling the U.S. Senate. With just 435 representatives for over 310 million people, George Washington’s plea on the last day of the Constitutional Convention that a minimum of 30,000 rather than 20,000 in a district would not be sufficiently democratic sounds trite, even antiquarian. With so few representatives relative to the total population, the U.S. House could not help but be aristocratic, each member being like a magnet to huge “gifts” from vested interests. “We have to kick open the door and make our own environment” in the Congress, Pelosi urged, “reduce the role of money [in campaigns], insist on the civility of debates, and bring more women here, and that’s a better reflection of our country.” In painting this picture for us, the Minority Leader was indeed leading, for she was intrepidly venturing out beyond the status quo. Nevertheless, the thrust of leadership is not always enough to counter the gravity of the vested interests grounded in the status quo.
For example, as long as so few representatives hold such power, the money of the vested interests will inevitably find its way to the campaigns and the Congressional bills will continue to be written by the vested interests themselves. In approaching this problem systemically, more is needed. One possibility is to sift the E.U.’s lower legislative chamber for possible solutions. 

The U.S. House of Representatives (top) and the European Parliament (bottom). 

At the beginning of 2012, European Parliament had a maximum of 751 representatives to cover a population of about 504 million, which works out to an average of 671,105 people in a district. Meanwhile, the U.S. House had 435 representatives to cover a population of about 313 million, which corresponds to an average of 719,540 people in a district. The difference is 48,435 people per district. To get down to 671,105 people per district, the U.S. House would need to add 31 seats. Were the House to have 751 representatives, the average number of people in a district would be 416,777. While more democratic than districts with an average population of 719,540, neither figure comes close to satisfying George Washington’s objection that 30,000 people in a given district is not sufficiently democratic (i.e., too many constituents for a given representative).
Therefore, in addition to increasing the number of seats—with the knowledge that 751 in a chamber can work—further reduction in the centralized power would be needed to reduce the money magnet’s power. One option would be returning more domestic policy areas to the state legislatures. At the time of Pelosi’s statement, the U.S. states had 7,382 state legislators altogether. [2] Spreading around additional powers, taken from the Congress, to so many more representatives would not only make American federalism more democratic, but also open up possibilities for real change beyond the grasp of the status quo. As a few examples even without the additional power, some states had legalized gay marriage, two had legalized pot, and one had achieved universal health-insurance. Admittedly, the status quo has a greater grip in some states (e.g., Kansas) than others (e.g., California). However, spreading out governmental power could perhaps be sufficient to give leadership a chance to outpace the moneyed interests in the status quo.     

1. Laura Bassett, “Nancy Pelosi: Congress Is ‘Rigged’ to Maintain the Status Quo,” The Huffington Post, June 5, 2013.
2. National Conference of State Legislatures, “Sizes of Legislatures,” 2013.

Tuesday, January 8, 2019

News to the Wall Street Journal: The E.U. Has a Common Market

The European Union has a common market. This would seem to be news to The Wall Street Journal, at least back in 2010. This is not to say that the E.U. is a common market, for the E.U. is much more than an economic market. For instance, the Union has governmental institutions, including a parliament, a senate (i.e., the European Council), an executive branch (i.e., the Commission), and a supreme court (i.e., the ECJ).  So it is surprising when journalists forget that the E.U. even has a common market by treating each of the States as having its own economy. To be sure, regions of the E.U. perform differently economically.  In the U.S., the States in New England, as well as New York, and California tend to have much higher GDPs than say South Carolina, Wyoming, and Iowa. Therefore, I contend that The Wall Street Journal erred in applying the concept of contagion to the E.U. financial crisis of 2010. 
A contagion occurs “when a loss of market confidence in one economy transmits to others.” It can occur through trade connections, economic similarities, and financial linkages. There are no “trade connections” within the E.U. because there is a common market within its borders. Economic similarities and financial linkages naturally exist within an economy; they need not evince contagion. 
In terms of the E.U. States that were variously suffering from budget deficits, high government debt and low growth in 2010, both the problems and solutions can be viewed in systemic terms with respect not only to the state governments, but also to the EU in terms of its common market and governance. Reducing the E.U. to its States misses this point and, frankly, is rather antiquated. 
Beyond the financial matters in the E.U., the reporting itself has been excessively rooted in “the same old, same old” at the expense of a changing world.  In other words, perspectives seem to have a nasty habit of being too sticky or rigid, and this is a problem that may dwarf those facing the E.U., as it has existed only since 1993, much less than the U.S., where in its first century it was common to view the member states as countries in themselves. Though I do not think contagion was much applied to the effects of one economy on another--perhaps because less denial existed on the political nature of the U.S.


Source: Tom Lauricella, “Fears of Domino Effect Pervade Europe,” The Wall Street Journal, November 24, 2010, pp. C1-2

Tuesday, December 18, 2018

Alan Greenspan on the Self-Regulatory Market

Two days after the LTCM bailout was agreed to in 1998, a worried Alan Greenspan, leaning toward raising rates at the time, cut the federal funds rate. It was not enough to calm the markets, and he cut it again three weeks later. . . . It was not the self-correcting powers of the markets but aggressive central bank intervention plus a new round of irrational speculation that provided a floor under the downward financial prices and the calamitous consequences of bad Wall Street decisions. It was not even the LTCM rescue alone by private banks that saved Wall Street” Madrick, p. 281). “Alan Greenspan learned no lessons from these events about the inherent instability of a completely free market in finance. He still insisted markets regulate themselves” (Madrick, p. 282).
Analysis:
Milton Friedman believed that government regulation keeps markets from being efficient; he assumed that the market mechanism is capable of regulating itself. That increasing uncertainty and risk might reach a point that a market mechanism would freeze up, or collapse, rather than simply incorporate the increased volatility through pricing is a point extrinsic to the efficient market thesis. That theory submits that markets tend toward equilibrium, rather than spiraling out of control.
Testifying before Congress after the credit crisis of 2008, Alan Greenspan was asked by Henry Waxman (D-Calif) whether the government-averted credit-market collapse had prompted any revision of the retired Fed Chairman’s economic paradigm. Greenspan admitted to a flaw in the ointment of self-regulatory market theory. In spite of 40 years of evidence to the contrary, official Washington’s font of economic wisdom had drawn a blank.
Lest the human mind be left without an operative paradigm by which one can make sense of the world, by mid June 2011, Greenspan had mentally reduced the fly in the ointment to a mere footnote. Asked by Charlie Rose on The Charlie Rose Show what how the crisis had changed his understanding of the market mechanism and economics, Greenspan admitted his surprise that bank CEOs do not always operate their banks so as to keep them solvent. This is how the financial crisis of 2008 had changed his view of the market mechanism after all. Of course, such a fault could be attributed to distortive government regulation (e.g. regulation Q limiting deposit interest) rather than to some inherent weakness in the market mechanism being able to regulate itself.
Greenspan had backtracked; he had unlearned his lesson much like an alcoholic “forgets” that he or she has admitted to having a drinking problem.  Faced with a fundamental flaw in a paradigm on which it relies, the human mind can succumb to retreating to the safety of denial. In his Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn tells us that it can be a generation before the downfall of a reigning paradigm is finally recognized, after the current proselytizers have passed and the people to come, without a vested interest in the prevailing paradigm, have taken their place. Perhaps it is only the human mind writ large (i.e, intergenerational) that advances, or really learns.
Lest we have to wait for the dead to bury themselves, we can affirm and acknowledge right now that the market-mechanism is not inherently self-regulating, and that this flaw is not caused by government regulation. Instead, markets can collapse—just as a human being freezes up from fear when risk and uncertainty hit a certain threshold—only to be revived by governmental intervention.  
Source:
Jeff Madrick, Age of Greed: The Triumph of Finance and the Decline of America, 1970 to the Present (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 2011).

See also Skip Worden, Essays on the Financial Crisis, available at Amazon.

Tuesday, June 12, 2018

Was U.S. President Obama the Antichrist?

In the twentieth century, Christian apocalypticism thought it saw the end of days in the midst of baleful signs, including historical biblical criticism, the return of the Jews to the Holy Land, evolutionary science, and the United Nations. In the United States, the consolidation of power in the federal government at the expense of federalism (and, theoretically, liberty as well) was apocalyptically taken as a precursor to the end. According to Matt Sutton, “As the government grew in response to industrialization, fundamentalists concluded that the rapture was approaching.” The trajectory, in other words, was viewed as headed toward a global super-state under the thumb of a seemingly benevolent ruler. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “consolidation of power across more than three terms in the White House, his efforts to undermine the autonomy of the Supreme Court, his dream of a global United Nations and especially his rapid expansion of the government confirmed what many fundamentalists had feared: the United States was lining up with Europe in preparation for a new world dictator. This “leader would ultimately prove to be the Antichrist, who, after the so-called rapture of true saints to heaven, would lead humanity through a great tribulation culminating in the second coming and Armageddon.”

Thanks to Obamacare and the Dodd-Frank financial regulation law of 2010, some of the anti-state apocalyptic voters viewed Barak Obama during his first few years as president as possibly being the antichrist. Questions about Obama’s birth only fueled the speculation. According to Sutton, the “specious theories about his place of birth, his internationalist tendencies, his measured support for Israel and his Nobel Peace Prize fit their long-held expectations about the Antichrist. So does his commitment to expanding the reach of government in areas like health care. In 2008, the campaign of Senator John McCain, the Republican nominee, presciently tapped into evangelicals’ apocalyptic fears by producing an ad, ‘The One,’ that sarcastically heralded Mr. Obama as a messiah.” On the Fox News network, one host regularly referred to Obama as “the anointed one.” This reference was not lost on evangelical apocalyptic voters.  

Analysis:

The sheer paradigmatic distance between twenty-first century secularists and evangelical apocalyptics may go a long way in explaining the blockages between the U.S. House Republicans and the U.S. Senate Democrats (and the president). In other words, the voters represented by the two parties are not only on different pages—the two groups are reading different books. Indeed, beyond having radically different theological assumptions and beliefs, the two groups may differ even on whether religion is legitimate. For example, a modernist secular voter might characterize the apocalyptics as superstitious. The voter could point to the failure of the world to end in the twentieth century in spite of all the signs of the impending rapture and period of tribulation. Indeed, “the sky is falling” Christian reading goes back to the pre-Constantine persecutions. 

In spite of the problems with the apocalyptic interpretation (which seems to have been applied in any decadent or disruptive period in the history of Christianity), definite trends can be identified, such as the U.S. Government’s increase of power at the expense of the several states. Furthermore, increasing global interdependence—such as in regard to health, nuclear weapons, and climate—has indeed increased pressure on politicians to increase the power of the U.N. The proliferation of empire-scale federal unions beyond that of the U.S.—as evinced by the E.U. and even the A.U.—can also be viewed as a trend toward globalized governance (i.e., a federation of regional federations, which themselves are made up of kingdom-level states).

How such trends are interpreted is what triggers the gulf between the apocalyptics and the secularists (and even the mainline churches). My main point is that political intransience can be expected with such divergent views of social reality and its basis. For instance, does society (and government) result from a social contract (e.g. Hobbes, Locke, Kant) or a divine decree (e.g., Augustine and Aquinas)? Is increasing statism a sign of the Antichrist or simply a response to problems of industrialization? The interpretations go beyond whether the trends are good or bad. Accordingly, discourse itself can be expected to be extremely difficult. It is not, however, impossible, and solutions are possible.

For example, federalism can accommodate such divergent views as long as the federal units have enough autonomy from the general government. The E.U. is in a better condition in this respect than is the U.S., though the European Union risks dissolution (e.g., the state debt crisis) because the E.U. Government does not have enough competencies to effectively manage the integration already accomplished.  However, federalism should not be viewed as a panacea. It is possible that the fundamentally disparate differences between the apocalyptics and the secularists regarding the role of government are such that political separation is the only suitable solution. This may be why Texas under Rick Perry flirted with succession in Obama’s early years. In any case, as difficult as discourse between the representatives of the two groups may be, being in political union demands tolerance and discussion, which in turn require humility (including a recognition that one can be wrong). Yet even here, Biblical inerrancy throws in a wrench, making discourse tortuous for both sides.

The distance between the parties is indeed formidable and perhaps even intractable. Even deciding whether to separate would be daunting. A union containing a very deep cleft is thus what we Americans suffer to manage amid political paralysis, finger-pointing, and shouting. God must surely be diverting his eyes in utter disgust and ultimately sadness—not about the signs or trends necessarily, but, rather, concerning the sheer anger being evinced in such tight quarters. Were there any adults willing to come to the fore, a secular voter might lightheartedly proffer in generosity, God shines His light on this city on a hill. Otherwise, we are together in quite another place.


Source:

Matthew A. Sutton, “Why the Antichrist Matters in Politics,” The New York Times, September 25, 2011. 



Tuesday, January 16, 2018

BP and MMS: A Case of Regulatory Capture

In the U.S. Constitutional Convention, James Madison in particular stressed the nepharious quality of faction in relation to the public good. He argued that if a republic is extended in scope sufficently that there are more factions, none of them would be able to dominate and the public good would emerge. In a republic in which there are only a few major parties, the people's perspectives can become delimited by the parties' paradigms in an either-or dual macro-framework. That is to say, societal blind-spots can exist. To the extent that both BP and the relevant U.S. Government regulatory agency, MMS, were both culpable in the Deep Water Horizon rig explosion in 2010, both the Republican defense of business and the Democratic defense of government fall short. Even so, these respective defenses went on undaunted in the wake of the disaster and in the next year. To be sure, old paradigms die hard.

Albeit an oversimplification, it can be said that the Democratic party in the United States stresses the power of business as the problem, whereas the Republican party there views the problem as being government.  In campaigning for President in 1980, Ronald Reagan bluntly said that government was indeed the problem.  Deregulation ensued and industry self-regulation was like a fad. The idea was that the checks and balances in goverment that protect the liberties of the citizens could be applied at the industry level such firms would provide a check on eachother automatically. Lost in the buzz was the extent to which an industry would be willing to sacrifice its own long-term viability in order to protect even the bad among its own.

In 2010, the Republican paradigm whereas business is good and government is bad resulted in some Republican office holders defending a piriah (BP) and continuing to urge deregulation in order to excoreate against the US Government and frustrate the Obama Administration.  The ranking Republican on the US House Energy and Commerce committee apologized to BP’s CEO for the “shakedown” by Obama in extracting a $20 billion fund for the claims in the Gulf region. Meanwhile, Democrats were hard-pressed to admit that a goverment regulatory agency, namely MMS, could be so inept and corrupt.  It was not so much a matter of more regulations being needed; rather, the problem was government regulation itself.

Democrats could point to the encroaching nature of big business over the regulators, but absent a shakedown in the size of the biggest companies, the wherewithal of the regulators not to “partner up” with the regulatees may be an intractable problem in government regulation.  The traditional argument in capture theory that regulators depend on their respective industries for information doesn’t even break a sweat in what is needed to explain the extent of the power of big business over government regulatory agencies.  The imbalance of power is systemic: government officials being too feckless and corrupt. and big business being too powerful for the good of the republic.  In their letters, Jefferson and Adams agree on the need for a natural aristocracy of virtue and talent, rather than the artifical sort of wealth and birth.  Absent a natural aristocracy, systems whether business or government, cannot but be ineffective and corrupt.

In 2010, BP’s sordid safety record and its explosion in the Gulf of Mexico challenged the paradigms of both parties.  In actuality, business and goverment, as well as business and government, contain problems that exceed and transcend a particular paradigm. In treating the two party paradigms as a dichotomy, we miss the interaction effect that exists among the respective sectors’ problems.  It might be that the founders were correct in their suspicion of factionalism, as it does indeed detract from the common good.  Where a paradigm keeps one from acknowledging problems that are in the radar of an “opposing” paradigm, a person is not apt to serve the public interest.  In other words, both paradigms are limited.  The BP-MMS interaction and the subsequent explosion and responses exposed the delimited nature of the partisan paradigms.

For more on MMS, see Cases of Unethical Business, which is available in print and as an ebook at Amazon.

Friday, November 24, 2017

Conflicting Business Models at Singapore’s Airport

Singapore’s Changi may have been “the world’s most fabulous airport” in 2011, according to Scott McCartney of the Wall Street Journal. To be sure, the airport’s amenities were amazing. How they are were being operated, however, detracted in certain respects with the goal. “We wanted to transform the way travel is done and create a stress-free experience,” Foo Sek Min of the airport’s management said. This goal dovetailed with the airport being “a key economic development element” for Singapore. Accordingly, the state-owned company that ran the airport received “plenty of government support.” In line with these goals was there a business model that was long-term oriented? Rather than trying to “nickel and dime” customers so as to minimize the funding from airlines and the government while maximizing revenue on a daily basis, resisting such urges in order to provide a truly stress-free experience would, I contend, be more consistent with the goals. 

I contend that a stress-free experience in a pure (and realistic) sense does not include feeling manipulated or pressured to do or buy something. More concretely, paying for X and Y during one’s stay brings with it stress. Even the thought of one’s credit card or cash balance brings with it some stress. To be stress-free, an experience should not include even the thought of money—much less using it. This is where Changi fell short of its own mission: to attract more flyers to the airport and ultimately to (indirectly) add positively to Singapore’s economic development.

Not charging for the local bus tour that for immigration purposes was considered within the airport is perhaps the epitome of how the stress-free and economic development objectives dovetail with a business model. The lack of stress that comes with not having to do anything but get on the bus and take in the sights could have led to interest in investing in Singapore in some way. Indeed, potential business deals may even have been negotiated during the tour as tourists chatted. The lack of stress (i.e., lack of demands) on the people using the airport could thus have benefitted Singapore down the line, whereas charging for the tour, collecting the fare, and having the passengers go through immigration would hardly have been conducive to a mood to invest or even visit Singapore.

Generally speaking, charging for each service in order to (ideally) cover the airport’s operating costs on a daily basis is eons away from the business model that is oriented to long term investment even with regard to particular services. Having the roof-top pool free to customers who stayed in one of the airport’s in-transit hotels while costing people going through the airport $11 not only added to stress monetarily, but also insinuates an insider/outsider exclusivism that was not going to endear the travelling public to Singapore, whether to visit or invest in economically. Similarly, having a four-story amusement-park type slide “tied into retail” at the airport by requiring users to show a receipt from an airport merchant showing roughly $8 or more in purchases or else only the bottom one and a half stories of the slide could be ridden evinces a pettiness that even in itself could be expected to have given rise to stress in others—not to mention the stress involved making sure your receipt is “enough” as your kids pull at you demanding a FULL ride. Feeling manipulated to buy something at the airport’s “mall” just added to the stress. Considering the limited cost of the slide and how eliminating the financial “rules” and price itself would make a huge difference in terms of stress (both for the employees and the public), one might wonder if the stated goals were authentic, or even known by the managers themselves. 

My favorite example of Changi’s management working at cross-purposes with its own mission unnecessarily would have to be the $17 for 20 minutes—are you ready for this?—“to put your feet in a tank with tiny fish that eat dead skin.” Similarly, charging $23 for three hours in a nap room could paradoxically add to wallet-stress for people already under stress en transit. 

Thank goodness the bus tour of Singapore was free—people could finally relax after having their dead skin eaten off and being woken up by some noise or demand for more money after having had to deal with a child not terribly convinced by the need for only a $7.50 receipt. Lest the butterfly garden seem like an alternative escape (it was free), it was also apparently a smoking garden. There were, however, two (smoke-free) complimentary movie theaters. 

In short, while the innovative approach at Changi airport does warrant some praise (e.g., free wifi and movies, and in general for the extent of amenities), the major inconsistencies within this business model demonstrate how difficult it is to shift from the dominant model in business to one characterized more for its long-term investment orientation to eventual pay-offs. Given the government’s involvement in the state-owned corporation, the airport’s management company should have had enough cushion from competitive pressures to be able to go all-out with the new model. Either amenities like the pool and nap rooms would have been free, or else perhaps everyone passing through the airport could have paid a general airport fee that would cover all of the perks (other than in the merchants’ stores, of course). The fee would either have been low enough that it was not stressful and inconvenient (given the sheer volume) or, more ideally in terms of the new model, money would have been “recouped” in future tourism and foreign investment instead of any fee on air travelers. The government’s involvement in the operating company could effectively support the longer-term and less direct financial loop, as well as buffer any “pressures” from the old model for specific charges to be added during customers’ “experience.”

Imagine the stress-relief among the flying public just in knowing that for a few hours nobody would demand money for something or other. Business managements seem blind to the benefit to a business from such an approach. In knowing that you don't have to worry about money—even from being reminded of it in being manipulated into using it—you could spend a few hours in an oasis of sorts where “real life” is put on hold. Is this not part of the allure of going to a movie theater, where you can sit for a couple of hours without any demands or pressures?  

So my verdict on the most fabulous airport in the world—which, admittedly, I have not seen in person—is: so close and yet so far. The sad thing is that the airport’s management need not have been so far from it's own objectives. Given the gravity of the “maximize daily revenue” business model that assumes that a constant focus on getting and an uncompromising rigidity are necessary in dealing with customers, a rocket—rather than merely a jet—is undoubtedly necessary to travel to the sort of business model that I have in mind, and not just for airports. If I am correct in this, then business schools are perpetuating the problem in their training rather than teaching alternative business paradigms. That dog is chasing its own tail.

Behind the new model hinted at (but not achieved) by the example of Changi airport is the basic feeling that life doesn’t have to be as hard as we make it. We don’t have to check receipt totals before letting a kid slide down a slide. It is as though managers set up jungle-gym bars right in front of themselves (and their customers) and then convince themselves (and others!) that the equipment must be navigated in order to get to the other side. Moreover, managers seem to have great difficulty simply in relaxing enough to play and enjoy other’s playing. Beyond the greed and urge to manipulate others (i.e., selfishness), the modern managerial mentality is too constricted, even as it paradoxically assumes that societal rules do not apply to it. So, for example, we have managers redefining words such as “guest” to suit a business interest; the rest of us are somehow obliged to recognize the validity of the misuse as a legitimate use, as in “customers are guests” (who must pay nonetheless). It is as though managers as so fixated on manipulating others without any limit or external constraint that the too-serious creatures cannot let themselves or other people simply enjoy something without required procedures and an immediate monetary exchange. The new model rejects the typical managerial mentality as too petty—too small.

I suspect that many elderly people on their death-beds shake their heads as if in achieving distance from us they have suddenly been freed in the awareness that the world is much more petty in what it takes as important and necessary that it knows. We moderns, complicit stewards of the hegemonic business model, micromanage ourselves right out of life experience itself, and we even impose our modern sickness on others. Then we act surprised when they get annoyed at us!

It is like the steward on the Titanic who (in Cameron’s film at least) shouts (little men do that), “You’ll have to pay for that!” to the young couple just after they have broken through a wall to escape the rapidly rising water. Everything must be paid for. No free ride, even on the Titanic on its way down to the darkness. This is the modern dogma that has been instilled in all of us, and we are utterly ignorant of the fact that it is exceedingly petty and narrow-minded even in its ideal. In the movie, the steward gets hit (justifiably) by the hero.  In cheering this, we, the audience, feel the hero’s natural reaction is our own, vicariously. We regard it as a valid verdict on the extant business model that stood for modernity itself back in 1912. A century later, that model had become the default—“the way the world is.” Even so, this need not have been so. Modernity could have developed differently than it did. The example of Changi airport hints at a better alternative in terms of business models. So in advertising a “stress-free experience” only to undercut it by demanding money for various “amenities” and making explicit (or creating) different classes of customers (which is also a theme in Titanic), the managers running Changi airport deserve annoyed customers and charges of insufficiency and even outright hypocrisy. Even so, we can take the Changi example as at least pointing to a different alternative.

Source:
Scott McCartney, “The World’s Best Airport?” The Wall Street Journal, December 1, 2011. 

Friday, October 27, 2017

The Receding Chinese-American Economic Paradigm in 2011: Imbalances within Mutual Benefit

“For decades,” according to The Wall Street Journal, “plentiful Chinese labor kept down costs of a range of goods bought by Americans.” Then, roughly in 2010, the Chinese government began supporting higher wages to reduce labor unrest and boost domestic consumption while reducing reliance on exports. Partially as a result of this, the world saw higher prices for commodities in 2011; oil was another factor as protests in the Middle East increased political risk in the calculations of future supply (amid speculation). A shrinking workforce in China was also putting pressure on the labor cost. Even though relatively cheap labor was still in the interior of the country, higher transportation costs mitigated the cost advantage. The prevailing paradigm was showing cracks. To be sure, it certainly had them.

In that paradigm, inflation was “damped pretty dramatically in the U.S. because it exported work to China and other places at 20% or 30% of the cost,” Hal Sirkin of the Boston Consulting Group said. Imports into the U.S. from China had increased China’s foreign currency reserves to over $3 trillion in the first decade of the twenty-first century; two-thirds of the reserves were U.S. dollars. The Chinese government used some of those dollars to purchase U.S. Treasury bonds; those purchases in turn relieved pressure on U.S. interest rates to increase. The continued cheap credit made it more possible for American consumers to purchase Chinese imports. It was a marriage of Chinese workers and American consumers, with both governments happy to oversee the nuptials.

Although in some ways good for all parties, the positive feedback loop made it difficult for China and the U.S. to have balanced economies. China relied too much on exports—with a supportive yuan currency making them artificially cheap for Americans—while the U.S. was enabled to accumulate trillions in additional federal debt without much self-discipline.  Therefore, from the rising labor costs in China and the related emphasis on domestic consumption (and a slowing appreciating yuan), inflation in both China and U.S. could be expected. It is no coincidence that the price of gold was quite high as the paradigm began to shift.

As the paradigm began to shift, it could be expected that should the Chinese foreign currency reserves be reduced, less foreign demand of U.S. Treasury bonds could eventuate, which in turn would put pressure on U.S. interest rates to increase. The rates could increase anyway to thwart the import-led inflation even if there is not excessive money supply. In other words, it could be expected that the imbalances in the slipping paradigm would give rise to corresponding imbalances afterward.

It is perhaps all too easy for us to tolerate imbalances as long as there is an overall equilibrium. China’s increasing dollar reserves and the U.S. Government’s increasing debt could co-exist with a tacit agreement wherein both Chinese workers and American consumers would benefit. Mutual benefit is not, however, a sufficient justification for tolerating fundamental imbalances either within a country or in the global economy.  For a sustainable economic paradigm, mutual benefit is necessary but not sufficient; they system as well as its parts should be in balance. To insist on this amid mutual benefit requires self-discipline because part of the benefit is spent in the restoration and playing out of balance. It is thus perhaps not an accident that the paradigm of imbalances amid mutual benefit was dominant for decades; the system itself might tell us something about modernity and ourselves.


Source:

Shai Oster, “China’s Rising Wages Propel U.S. Prices,” Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2011, p. A2.



Monday, May 1, 2017

President Trump: Revisiting Presidents Jackson and Lincoln on their Statesmanship


In an interview in 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump said he wondered why the issues leading to the U.S. Civil War “could not have been worked out” to prevent the republics from exiting the U.S.[1] “People don’t realize, you know, the Civil War, if you think about it, why?”[2] In particular, “People don’t ask . . . why was there the Civil War? Why could that one not have been worked out?”[3] The reigning assumption has been that President Lincoln could not have resolved the dispute short of going to war. Trump then suggested that had President Andrew Jackson been president rather than Lincoln, we “wouldn’t have had the Civil War.”[4] Aside from the point that Jackson was a Southerner, his feat in resolving the Nullification Crisis without a shot being fired suggests that Trump had a point; the war between the C.S.A. and U.S.A. could have been averted. More importantly, the mentality that won the war may not be as salubrious as we suppose.

In 1828, when John Quincy Adams was the federal president, a tariff—a tax on imported manufactured goods that originally went into effect in 1816—was increased even beyond the increase in 1824. The intent was to protect the nascent American manufacturing sector, which was mainly in the Northern states, from cheaper European imports. As a result of the tariff, Southern plantation owners had to pay more for manufactured goods from Europe, and Europeans had fewer dollars with which to buy Southern exports, of which cotton and rice were particularly important to the Southern agrarian economy.
In 1829, Andrew Jackson became the U.S. President and John C. Calhoun became the Vice President. The latter, who was from South Carolina, proposed the doctrine of nullification, wherein a state government could constitutionally nullify any federal law injurious to the state’s interests. Even from the standpoint of a loose federation, or a confederated Union of mostly sovereign republics, the doctrine was specious; for it would eviscerate virtually any federally-agreed-to constraint on the states. The former president John Quincy Adams argued more practically that the U.S. Supreme Court, not the state governments, had the ultimate authority to declare federal law unconstitutional. For his part, President Jackson sided with Adams out of fear that state-nullification could potentially lead to the break-up of the Union.
Meanwhile, South Carolina’s government declared the tariff to be unenforceable in the state. European firms could export their goods to buyers in South Carolina without having to pay the tariff. Hence, the buyers would get the lower prices, and the sellers and their compatriots would have more dollars with which to buy South Carolina rice and cotton. The tariff would remain in effect in the U.S. where the toll on economies was less. Interestingly, Calhoun also argued that the federal government had constitutional authority to use tariffs only as a means to raise revenue for that government, rather than to favor certain economic sectors; such picking and choosing—essentially between states—was going too far, especially as a certain region of states was losing power in Congress as the Union added new states. I submit that South Carolina’s government officials and Calhoun pushed their favored confederal approach or interpretation of American federalism too far in incorporating the nullification doctrine precisely because the plantation economy was becoming less and less, proportionally speaking, of the American economy, and the Southern states, less and less, also proportionately, of the total number of states in the American Union. This dynamic, not its symptom of slavery, was the underlying cause of the war between the C.S.A. and the U.S.A. How this interpretation differs so from the victor’s moralistic, almost apolitical narrative! How bound we are, without even realizing it, to the narrative!—alternatives being deemed nothing short of heresy! Abominations!
President Jackson diffused the changing dynamic—shifting regional power in the Union in the midst of two starkly different preferences of federalism (confederalism and modern federalism, respectively)— by signing tariff legislation in 1832 and again in 1833 that lowered the tariffs even as he stated that South Carolina’s nullification law was null and void and sent federal troops down to the state to enforce the law. The deal, in other words, was a much lower tariff in exchange for the state’s repeal of its nullification law. Because the president pressed Congress to repeal its increased tariff, essentially giving that one to Calhoun’s point on the federal use of tariffs for revenue only, Jackson cannot be said to have been staunchly on the side of the federal government—which is something, considering that Jackson headed one of its three branches! Rather, the president gave something to South Carolina—putting the state’s interests ahead of the other states and the federal government. Yet the state’s government had to pay a price—giving up on its cherished, albeit over-extended, doctrine of nullification.
South Carolina’s legislature had prepared a secession, or “exit,” document—Calhoun himself was involved in crafting it. The same document would be used in 1861 for the “SoCarexit”—to borrow from the E.U. secessionist state’s lexicon. Interestingly, Congress had again just enacted a tariff increase in 1858. It is possible that this old issue, as much as new free states being admitted to the Union, sparked renewed impetus to divorce from the U.S.[5]
The threat to the Southern plantations in 1861 was not the imminent end of slavery there. The threat was indirect and more diffused, coming in the form of new states with different economies being admitted to the Union. The theory of confederalism insists that the enumerated and residual sovereignty of each state is protected—hence the balance of power resides with the states. The Southern fear was that the balance was already shifting in favor of the federal head, and this made the decreasing proportion of the Southern states in the enlarging Union particularly worrisome. In other words, the “nationalist” variant of federalism (modern federalism) was gaining over confederalism, and the interests of the Southern states—political, economic, cultural, religious—were becoming more of a minority in an increasingly heterogeneous, larger empire: the United States. The tariff and slavery were only symptoms.
Jackson’s peaceful resolution of the Nullification Crisis lays in stark contrast to Lincoln’s “take it or leave it” approach to the Southern secessionist states. Whereas Jackson had the federal government retreat voluntarily on its tariff, Lincoln’s approach can be seen as being one-sided because he did not even offer to have the federal government step back at all from its position. When all the political heavy-lifting is put on the other side—for it to do the backing down—it is no wonder that resistance is encountered and a long, bloody war results. I submit that Lincoln could reasonably have compromised and yet save the Union in the sense of retaining all of its existing states.
For example, Lincoln could have assuaged the Southerners’ fears by proposing a qualified majority voting system in the U.S. Senate and perhaps even in the U.S. House of Representatives. Such a system would be designed such that legislation could not pass without at least some Southern support. The federal government would thus not be able to turn on the South—which I submit was the underlying fear. In the E.U., for instance, qualified majority voting in the federal legislative chambers—the European Council and the European Parliament—requires at least 55% of population of the Union and 55% of the states be represented on the yes side of votes for the bills to become law. Lincoln and Congressional leaders could have entertained novel ideas on how to craft such a system. A Council of Regions, for instance, wherein only the major regions of the U.S. were represented—each region having a veto--could have been added as a third legislative chamber, or perhaps even to replace the U.S. Senate! Even beyond Jackson’s fine job in 1832, thinking outside the box in such occasions is invaluable in thwarting violent conflict from engulfing all other possibilities of resolution.
For the slavery-reductionist advocates, I submit that the Southern states were a significant portion of the Union and so were justified politically in wanting to feel that they would not be rolled over in federal chambers—even though the institution of slavery was squalid, especially to our modern sensibility in the twenty-first century. The institution is for us unthinkable, undenkbar, vorbotten even in retrospect (i.e., in a historical context). For us, to think of other human beings as wild animals or property is nothing short of pathological. Even so, we must allow ourselves to admit that because the Emancipation Proclamation did not occur until 1863 (and did not apply to the five slave states that remained with the Union, and had no effect in the rebel states), the immediate point of contention in 1861 was not slavery itself where it existed. The fear was more future-oriented, and generalized, and the anger was informed by political theory—namely, two contending versions of federalism—and declining political power. Accordingly, the conflict at hand could have been resolved short of war without the South having to give up the institution of slavery. The demand that Jackson's approach applied back in 1861 include the abolition of slavery where it then existed is unfair, for not even the new Republican Party was demanding then that the South give up its sordid institution! 
Had Lincoln adopted Jackson’s approach at that time, the South might then have moved years later to put its slavery in play. Perhaps the Southern states would have accepted federal financial help with a new plantation labor system in exchange for a repeal of the 1858 tariff, combined with the region having a veto on federal legislation in a Council of Regions or a stiff qualified-majority voting system in the U.S. Senate—either of which could have been enshrined as a constitutional amendment. To be sure, any of these items could have been used in 1861 to walk back from war. At any rate, ensuing incremental agreements, progress without war, might have been possible once cooler heads could again prevail. My point is that we cannot assume that were Jackson’s approach put in place in 1861, slavery would have endured for decades. But I digress.
Jackson was able to resolve his “either/or” by putting together a deal in which both sides—the federal government and the state—gave something and got something in return. Such an approach is superior to Lincoln’s “my way or the highway” stance—that of making demands of the other side without any accommodation or retreat on his side. Rigidity begets rigidity, and much harm came ensue when two pieces of sandpaper are rubbed against each other. Even beyond Jackson’s paradigm, however, of resolving a seemingly intractable “either/or” within itself is the ability to see a third, fourth, and even fifth alternative that may never be even thought of in holding fiercely onto the typical “either/or” paradigm. In short, I think we make things more difficult than they need be, even in assuming that the Civil War had to be fought. We do not even recognize our own mental cages, so we go on making the same mistakes over and over. To arrest this pattern, revisiting even “sacred cows” can be invaluable.




[1] Jonathan Lemire, “Trump Makes Puzzling Claim About Andrew Jackson, Civil War,” The Sacramento Bee, May 1, 2017.


[2] Ibid.


[3] Ibid.


[4] Ibid.


[5] The use of the term divorce is incorrect as it assumes two equal or equivalent parties. A state is not equivalent to a union of such states, hence the use of the term for the secession of a state involves a category mistake. In the context of “Brexit,” for example, “divorce” can be read as presumptuous for the secessionists.