If only Ukraine could become the
51st member-state of the U.S., rather than the 28th state
of the E.U., given the veto of Viktor Orban of the E.U. state of Hungary on the
E.U. annexing Ukraine. Besides the inherent problems that come with relying so
much on the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of
the E.U., mislabeling the prime minister of the state that chairs the legislative
committees known collectively as the Council of the E.U. as the E.U. president
not only marginalizes the federal officials, including President Von der
Leyen, who, as the head of the E.U.’s executive branch, can rightfully be
considered as the president of the European Union. In contrast, government officials
of a state chairing legislative committees can hardly be said to collectively be
the “presidency” of the European Union. Behind the promotion of this fallacy is
the anti-federalist, or Euroskeptic, political ideology that misconstrues the
E.U. as merely a network of intergovernmental relations between the states.
Although the E.U., like the U.S.,
splits governmental sovereignty between two systems—that of the union and that
of the states, the two unions have different ways in which state officials
participate at the federal level. The official participation roles are greater
in E.U. institutions than in U.S. institutions at the union level. In his book,
Federal Government, Kenneth Wheare makes the point that federalism has
two systems of government, neither of which is a “level” above the
other. He is correct because the sovereignty remaining with state governments,
which in both unions includes all residual sovereignty, is not “lower” than the
exclusive or shared competencies, or enumerated domains of power, delegated to
the federal governmental institutions. The fallacy of “levels” is much easier
to grasp by looking that the European Union than the United States because of
the extent of official roles in certain E.U. governmental institutions
for state officials, whereas in the U.S., state officials lost their direct
participation when U.S. senators became elected offices rather than by
appointment by the respective state chief executives/heads of state/commanders
in chief (i.e., “governors” being those who govern) or legislatures. This difference
may be why so much governmental sovereignty will not be transferred from the system
of state governments to the union’s governmental institutions in the E.U. by 100
or 200 years in the E.U. as in the U.S. as of the 249th anniversary
of the thirteen colonies boldly (as there was considerable risk) declaring
themselves to be free and independent countries, then already in a military
alliance (i.e., the Continental Congress).
On the day before the 249th anniversary of 13 British colonies in North America declaring themselves to be sovereign countries, Ukrainian President Zelensky attended “the opening ceremony of the Danish EU Presidency in Aarhus.”[1] Depicting or characterizing Denmark as the “EU Presidency” is misleading, for the reference is to officials of that state chairing policy-domain specific committees rather than standing for the E.U. itself. The exaggeration is at the expense of recognition that the Commission’s head, Von der Leyen, a federal rather than a state official, has a greater claim to speak for the European Union. As president of the E.U.'s executive branch, Von der Leyen delivers the annual State of the Union address at the Parliament chamber, just as the president of the U.S. delivers the State of the Union in the U.S. House of Representatives' chamber. It is revealing that just before the Parliament's vote of confidence in Von der Leyen on July 10, 2025, a lawyer specialized in E.U. law predicted that even if the vote is favorable to Von der Leyen, more "and more [E.U.] citizens will ask themselves, is she really the right person to lead the E.U. in such turbulent times."[2] It is not as though the rotating 6-month "presidency" of whatever state government is chairing the committees known collectively as the Council of the E.U. could claim to be at the helm, and thus step in for a weakened Von der Leyen.
Generally speaking, putting a state in charge of the E.U. would be loaded with intractable problems. In June of the same year, the governor of the
E.U. state of France presumed to speak for the European Union rather than just
for his state on foreign policy, effectively (and I suspect intentionally)
sidelining the E.U.’s president and its foreign minister, an office that is deliberately mislabeled as the “High Representative” to appease Euroskeptics.
Regarding the involvement of the state governments at the federal level, the President of the European Council, António Costa, had a greater claim than the chair of legislative committees to be referred to as a president, and Macron of France was not the federal official standing for the European Council. That the governor of the E.U. state of Denmark “vowed to support Ukraine’s accession process” to be annexed by the E.U. and to use the “presidency of the E.U. Council to put ‘maximum pressure’ on Hungary to lift its veto on Ukraine” being annexed by the E.U. is less significant than the pressure than the federal officials António Costa and Ursula von der Leyen could apply on Hungary’s governor.[3] In response the emphasis, for example, of the Danish foreign minister chairing the other state foreign ministers in one of the committees in the Council of the E.U., Viktor Orban could more easily relegate Von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas and António Costa and thus deflate pressure from the E.U. itself, which is greater than a committee of state officials chaired by a Danish state official.
In other words, the paralyzing impact of retaining vetoes in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. is exacerbated by falsely portraying a state government as the “Presidency of the E.U.” The Parliament and the Commission even together may be too weak to counter the power of the states in the E.U. governmental system within the federal system; mislabeling a state as the E.U. Presidency only exacerbates the imbalance, even if it is a policy of officials of that state to resist the veto of another state. The E.U. is more than being the simple aggregate of the states, and the European Court of Justice, the European Commission, and the European Parliament are all institutions of the E.U. that manifest the E.U. being more than the sum of its states. Just as balance is important between the system of state governments and the system of the federal government in a federal system, so too balance of power is important between the branches of government, and in this respect the federal government should be distinguished from state government within a federal system because only in the former are some institutions representing states and others represent federal citizens. It is important that the power of the state officials in union institutions not overwhelm the power of federal officials in other union-institutions, lest particular state interests dominate those of the whole. Denmark may have its own economic and political interests with respect to Ukraine, whereas Von der Leyen and Kallas represent the E.U.’s interests rather than those of any state. Overstating the salience of the state governments in E.U. governance at the expense of federal officials.
2. Sandor Zsiros, "EU Parliament Censure Vote Leaves von der Leyen Weakened, even in Victory," Euronews.com, July 10, 2025, italics added.
