Showing posts with label judiciary ethics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label judiciary ethics. Show all posts

Saturday, June 28, 2025

The U.S. Supreme Court Clipping Judicial Overreach

The separation of powers that characterizes governments in the United States assumes that each branch will act to further its own interests, given the salience of self-interest (and self-preservation) in human nature. It is assumed that the checks and balances between legislative, judicial, and executive branches will keep any one branch from dominating the other two, and, moreover, the government itself from becoming tyrannical at the expense of the liberty of the citizenry. It is not assumed or relied upon that a branch will prune itself without external pressure from one of the other branches. Yet the U.S. Supreme Court may have done so in ruling on June 27, 2025 to limit “the ability of lower-court judges to block executive branch policies nationwide.”[1] I contend that any real wing-clipping by 6 of the 9 justices is illusory rather than indicative of the federal judiciary unilaterally restricting itself.

“With their decision, the justices appeared to upend the ability of single federal judges to freeze policies across the country,” according to The New York Times.[2] The appearance is belied by the fact that the ruling would not go into effect for 30 days and “the justices laid out a potential path for challengers, saying that district court judges could consider whether to take up class-action suits seeking to bar enforcement of the executive order on a statewide, regional or even national basis.”[3] The latter basis would essentially enable a district-court federal judge to block an executive order from going into effect anywhere in the United States.  Groups that had challenged the executive order at issue—invalidating birth-right citizenship for children of illegal immigrants—quickly filed class-action suits in Maryland and New Hampshire, with others expected in the following week—well within the 30 days. As for the validity of the executive order itself, the court would decide that in a case scheduled in the court’s next term.

It is interesting that the justices “split along ideological lines” on a matter of judicial process rather than on the substance of the executive order.[4] Perhaps political ideology has more of an imprint on judicial rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court than most people realize. After all, Justice Sandra Day O’Conner wrote the majority opinion for Bush v. Gore (2000) before oral arguments were heard. Might it be that the conservative justices on the bench wanted President Trump to see a win for him even though the national judicial block of his executive order would likely continue uninterrupted? That president had been very critical of Justice Amy Barrett for another ruling, and she wrote the majority opinion on the case on whether district federal judges could block an executive order nationally. Indeed, the president declared himself the winner from the ruling even though the six conservative justices left open a way for district court judges to be able to continue wielding nationwide injunctions to block the president’s policies issued as executive orders.



1. Abbie Vansickle, “Justices Put Limit on Judges’ Power, In Win for Trump,” The New York Times, June 28, 2025.
2. Ibid., italics added.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Wednesday, January 3, 2024

The Israeli Supreme Court’s Conflict of Interest as Unreasonable

Ironically, in making the ruling on New Year’s Day of 2024 striking down Prime Minister Netanyahu’s amendment to the country’s basic law that would have removed the judiciary’s authority of judicial review of laws based on their reasonableness, Israel’s Supreme Court too unreasonably exploited a conflict of interest. Basic Law, which is essentially constitutional law, includes the basic architecture of a government, such as how the executive, legislative, and judicial functions are related. Self-interest being a salient feature of human nature, we can assume that the governmental functionaries in each of those functions naturally seek to expand their respective jurisdictions relative to those of the other two. I contend that to give one or two of those areas the last word in altering the division of authority involves a conflict of interest. This applies to a constitutional court. Therefore, even though democracy is served by a judicial decision striking down an attempt by the executive and/or legislature to eviscerate the authority of the judiciary to act as a check, giving the latter the last word is fraught with entanglements. 

By eight to seven justices, the court ruled “that a government amendment to the so-called reasonableness law should not stand. The bill had stripped the Supreme Court of the power to declare government decisions unreasonable.”[1] That very officials who make government decisions in the Knesset passed the basic law can be seen as problematic. It was essentially a power-grab by the executive/legislative domains at the expense of the judiciary. Although the court “rejected the amendment because it would deal a ‘severe and unprecedented blow to the core characteristics of the State of Israel as a democratic state,’”[2] the naked power-grab could itself be viewed as unreasonable, even taking for granted the element of power-aggrandizing in governing. The court could also have ruled on the basis of there being an institutional and personal conflict of interest, but the court itself could be charged with the same offense in deciding the matter. It is just this conflict of interest that flew below the media’s radar (and got me to writing).

Even though the ruling did not expand the court’s authority, the decision arrested a decrease, and was thus in the personal and institutional interest of the judiciary in terms of power. Just as the majority in the Knesset had acted in its interests, the majority on the court did as well. The matter was thus a power struggle, and thus giving one side the final, definitive say is unfair. The ruling cites the importance of judicial review of laws passed by the Knesset as being in the broader interest of democracy in Israel, but the relatively narrow personal and institutional interests of the justices and their court could be expected to be exploited, and this may be the real reason for the ruling. To be sure, an independent judiciary is indispensable for the executive and legislative functionaries to be held accountable. Although they could argue that the voters could perform that function at election-time, elections do not include sending corrupt officials to jail, and the sitting Prime Minister was charged with corruption judicially at the time that he was steering the bill to passage (which counts as a personal conflict of interest). Even if the court’s democracy argument is solid, the personal and institutional conflicts of interest in the justices resisting a restriction on the purview of their judicial authority are inherently unethical and thus should be obviated if possible. 

The inherency is explained by just how inherent the self-interest to exploit a conflict of interest, whether personal or institutional, is in human nature.[3] Without doubt a conflict of interest that actually has been exploited is unethical because a private or relatively narrow benefit is put before a public or relatively broad benefit or duty.  

In judicial language, strict scrutiny should therefore be applied to unilateral decisions by legislative, executive, or judicial functionaries or “branches,” of government that self-aggrandize authority at the expense of one or two of the other “branches.” I recommend that such conflicts of interest be obviated by putting such matters to the electorate. So this is not merely a rubber-stamp of the majority parties, a 2/3 majority should be required to change Basic Law. Otherwise, we are left with the unsavory alternative of having the contending governmental interests play out their internecine power-struggles on the constitutional stage with one such interest having to have the final word, which is unfair to the other interests. In a democracy, after all, popular sovereignty is more fundamental than governmental sovereignty.


1. Rob Picheta, Amir Tal, and Lauren Izso, “Israel’s Top Court Strikes Down Key Part of Judicial Overhaul, Reigniting Divisions as War Rages,” CNN.com, January 2, 2024.
2.  Ibid.
3. Skip Worden, Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available on Amazon.