Friday, February 23, 2024

On the Role of Agribusiness in Global Warming

Agriculture is a major source of carbon and methane emissions, which in turn are responsible for the general trend of the warming of the planet’s atmosphere and oceans. In fact, agriculture emits more than all of the cars on the roads. 10 percent of the emissions carbon dioxide and methane in the U.S. come from the agricultural sector. Livestock is the biggest source of methane. Cows, for example, emit methane. Methane from a number or sources, including the thawing permafrost, accounted for 30 percent of global warming in 2023. As global population has grown exponentially since the early 1900s, herds of livestock at farms have expanded, at least in the U.S., due to the increasing demand.[1] We are biological animals, and we too must eat. More people means that more food is needed, and the agricultural lobby in the U.S. is not about to let the governments require every resident to become a vegetarian. Indeed, the economic and political power of the large agribusinesses in the U.S. have effectively staved off federal and state regulations regarding emissions. It comes down to population, capitalism, and plutocracy warping democracy.


The full essay is at "On the Role of Agribusiness in Global Warming."

1. Georgina Gustin, “Climate Change and Agriculture,” Yale University, February 22, 2024.

Monday, January 8, 2024

Exfoliating a Hero: On Lincoln's Unconstitutional Overreaching

Lest we get carried away and inadvertantly enshrine our leaders with mythic laurals, it is worthwhile to peel back our societal "remembering" of past figures, such as Abraham Lincoln, who have become larger than life.

Lincoln was a moderate, promising merely not to spread slavery. In his address after being sworn in, he promised not to go after slavery where it existed. Accordingly, radical abolitionists complained. Even so, the 1860 campaign had been viewed, at least in the south, as a referendum on the southern way of life. Lincoln received only 40% of the vote; he was not even on the ballot in ten states.  There were just 33 states in the union at the time. Lincoln's victory suffered from a deficit of legitimacy in some quarters. In fact,he was burned in effigy at a state capitol in the south. With free Kansas becoming a state, the slave states felt that their respective abilities to defend their way of life in the general councils of the union would become even more truncated or dilute. Berift of a sense of influence on general matters that concerned themselves, the confederating republics felt they had no alternative other than secession.

On Feb 18, 1861, Jefferson Davis became President of the Confederate States of America. At his swearing in, Dixie, which had been composed by a northerner, was played. The two sides in the continental dispute were closer than they perhaps realized. Both Lincoln and Davis, for example, were from Kentucky originally.  According to the Confederate constitution, Davis had a line item veto and would have had a six year term had the confederacy lasted that long. Astonishingly, international slave trading was outlawed. Even so, there were fundamental differences involved in the dispute. Ironically, had the southern states freed the slaves before firing on Fort Sumpter--depriving Lincoln of his motivational tactic midway through the way--perhaps something resembling the southern way of life in a loose confederacy would have prevailed. The United States would have been left to consolidate to its heart's content.

On the way to his inauguration, Lincoln declared that he would rather be assassinated than to see even one star removed from the flag. Such a stance reflects the "all or none" mentality that accompanies political consolidation. In spite of Lincoln's line in the sand, the War between the Confederated States and the United States began at 4:30am on April 12, 1861.  Technically, it was a war between a federated alliance and a federal government. The opening act was bloodless, even as the war to come was the bloodiest in American history. Siloh alone matched the casualties at Waterloo, and there would be 27 more to come. 51,000 men lost their lives in the three days at Gettysburg alone. The contest between the old and new federal forms exacted a heavy toll in human loss and suffering. Who would have thought that contending distinctions in political theory could be so bloody. Of course, might does not in itself make right, although the passion of the unjustly oppressed can bring about victories disproportionate to the relative lack in number. Furthermore, in this particular case, the respective populations in the federations and the industrialization of several of the union's states gave the forces of modern federalism an advantage not necessarily sourced in the nature of the type.

At the time, the union states had a combined population of 21 million while the confederacy had only 9 million, 4 million of which were slaves and thus not in the fight. In spite of the fact that so many southerners volunteered to enlist that a third of them had to be sent back home, the confederacy was perhaps destined to lose the bellum given the tremendous disadvantage in terms of population. That the conflict lasted until 1865 may point to the extent of resentment that had been allowed to build up throughout the slave states against what was viewed there as an “intrusive” federal government. For example, the devisive tarriff that had nearly caused South Carolina to secede in 1832 was reimposed by the U.S. Government in 1858. As in 1832, the tax was to finance northern industrialization. The states producing cotton and/or rice were left not being able to defend their interests in Washington. Accordingly, that distant government was viewed as encroaching and increasingly foreign. The root of the festering dispute went far beyond the issue of slavery.

To the confederate citizens, the cause involved the rights of their republics as well as their property rights. Slaves, being viewed as property by their "masters"--a decadent conception of slavery unknown to ancient understandings--were thus in play as part of the wider and deeper southern concern with self-determination, which the southerners identified with their respective countries and associated ways of life. Even Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, which took effect on January 1, 1863 (almost two years into the war), applied only to slaves in the states that had already left the union (rather than to the five slave states that had remained).

The confederate states were not subject to U.S. law as long as they were part of the confederacy rather than the union. Lincoln's proclamation was thus extra-constitutional, and thus without immediate effect other than to motivate an increasingly weary northern citizenry and armed forces. To be sure, Sherman freed slaves as he blazed a trail to the sea. However, even without the proclamation, he would have deprived the confederates of their "property" along with their other means until they surrendered. Slavery was not outlawed in the United States until 1865, when the thirteenth amendment was ratified by the states (the former confederate states excluded even though they had been re-afixed to the union).  There was some duplicity involved in, "Welcome back to the union! But unfortunately your vote doesn't count yet because you don't agree."

Fundamentally, the "north" and "south" interpreted the United States differently. This is what the war was really about, and the issue went all the way back to the contentious debates in the constitutional convention in 1787. The delegates had hotly debated whether the proposed General Government would consolidate power via "general welfare" spending and the potentially unlimited taxation, irrespective of the question of slavery. The people who wanted to secede viewed the U.S. as more like a confederation than a modern federal government. That is, confederates viewed their states as countries and the U.S. more as an alliance having only strictly defined enumerated powers that a national government. Robert E. Lee, for example, was offered command of the union army. He refused and went with Virginia. He could not draw his sword, he said, against his native country. Virginia had to come first; there was never any question about that. Such a view of Virginia and the other republics was to fade even as they still retained residual sovereignty at least into the twenty-first century.

In general, the southerners feared that the federal government would usurp more and more power from their countries; as things turned out, the fear was not without foundation. Even then, Lincoln declared war against the confederated states even though the U.S. constitution clearly stipulates that Congress is the governmental body in the U.S. Government that declares war.  As the president is the commander in chief, there is a conflict of interest in that office also declaring war. So technically speaking, the war was not constitutional, and thus legal.  Lincoln also suspended habeus corpus, though the constitution allows for this in time of rebellion.  To keep the Maryland from seceding, he locked up thirteen of the state's legislators without trial. 

Chief Justice Taney, who had four years earlier concurred with the Dred Scott decision, said that Lincoln had gone too far beyond the constitution in the powers he was exercising. Taney was on firm ground on the declaration of war. Even so, astonishingly, the president simply ignored the chief justice. From the standpoint of an independent judiciary with teeth, Lincoln was laying a precedent very dangerous to the republic.

Because the judiciary has no means of enforcing its decisions by force, the branch depends on the other branches, and, indeed, the people, resisting the temptation to contravene a judicial decision. The basis of the resisted temptation rests on the court's legitimacy, for the judiciary has no troops of its own. In fact, Bickel refers to the court as the “least dangerous branch” for this reason. Lincoln’s precedent in simply ignoring the court put at risk the system of checks and balances that resides in the separation of powers in the federal government. Fortunately for us, Lincoln’s treatment of the Chief Justice's effort to hold the executive branch within its proper constitutional sphere, as though Taney were a mere bystander, has largely been forgotten.  Yet the expediency of an imperial presidency has indeed been on display since Lincoln as Congress has gradually lost power to the commander in chief. The danger is real, and Lincoln's precedent could yet be used by an ambitious commander in chief who has his or her eye on another country to invade. 

Ironically, Lincoln’s unconstitutional actions at the beginning of the war ironically to save the union could be viewed as confirming the charges made by the confederates against the encroaching nature of the federal government.  Lest we miss the lesson as we remember the bloody war 150 years later in 2011-2015 from the standpoint of the victors, we might take note of the susceptibility of power itself to consolidate, ultimately in one person—indeed, even in a hero. The consolidating proclivity is as much a danger in the modern American empire today as it was in ancient Rome.  


Source: Ken Burns’ The Civil War (PBS)

Legislation of the U.S. Government during the Civil War: A Case of Unconstitutional Governance?

Lest history be forgotten, it may come around again to bite us when we least expect it.

During the war between the Confederate States and the United States of America, The Legal Tender Act required debtors to accept “greenbacks,” the U.S. Government’s paper currency. The National Bank Act barred state banks from issuing notes, giving the U.S. Government a monopoly on paper currency. Finally, The Internal Revenue Act imposed a federal income tax and other levies. Henry Brands asks, however, whether “greenbacks” fall under the U.S. Constitution’s wording that the federal government can “coin” money. If money was in coin specie when the constitution was written, the meaning could be widened to include new means without necessarily extending the power of that government beyond what was intended.

Brands also asks, “Did the proscription against state bank notes follow from the [interstate] commerce clause, from the elastic clause, or from Treasury secretary Salmon P. Chase’s imagination?” The fact that state banks had been issuing notes even as the U.S. Government was minting silver and gold coins points to, or illustrates, the dual sovereignty element in the American federal system. Ironically, for nearly the first hundred years of the United States (as alliance, confederation and finally a modern federal system), the states had more currency power than do the state governments that use the euro in the E.U. 

In terms of the interstate commerce justification of barring state banks from issuing notes, that justification does not reach such notes being used within a state’s borders. In terms of interstate commerce, mandating a common currency can be covered by the clause. As per the example of the E.U., it is possible to have both a common currency and currencies particular to certain states. In fact, it is possible, as per the European case, to have the particular currencies displace the common currency in the state of the particular currency. However, if, for example, the euro cannot be used in Britain, this restriction of the common currency in a state would detract from the common market (i.e., out-of-states would be discriminated against).  So while the U.S. commerce clause could be interpreted as allowing for state currencies, any such currencies could not be mutually exclusive with the common currency.

As for the income tax, Brands avers that it “seemed a patent violation of the constitutional ban on ‘direct’ taxes not proportioned to population.”  Indeed, a constitutional amendment was deemed necessary for the purpose in the twentieth century. The unlimited potential of the U.S. Government to raise revenue by taxation was not missed on some of the delegates at the constitutional convention in 1787. They worried that that government would crowd out the governments of the states, which would also depend on revenue. These fears were not without foundation. By the twenty-first century, state governments were under popular pressure not to increase taxes in large part because of the taxes already being taken by the federal government.

In general terms, these federal laws enacted during the Civil War can be interpreted as evincing various degrees of encroachment of the U.S. Government. It was such expansion of power that had been in mind when the confederated states seceded from the United States. Even though Lincoln’s 1860 platform affirmed protecting slavery where it existed at the time, southerners feared that the reach of the federal government would continue unabated. The result, they feared, would be the eventual loss of their self-determination and way of life.  This concern transcended the issue of slavery. Accordingly, the states would have perhaps been wiser to free the slaves then fire on Fort Sumpter—the underlying issue would have been made more transparent thusly. Even in the twenty-first century, the trajectory of the U.S. Government in going beyond its enumerated powers is an issue even if other issues tend to get first play.


Source: Henry W. Brands, American Colossus: The Triumph of Capitalism 1865-1900 (New York: Doubleday, 2010), p. 13.

Wednesday, January 3, 2024

We the People: Invigorating Popular Sovereignty by Referendi

A republic is characterized by the citizenry electing representatives, who in turn legislate (i.e., make law). As an alternative, the citizenry itself could vote directly on legislative proposals. The latter is called direct democracy. Ancient Athens, for example, practiced it. In the United States, the republic form is the prevalent form of government.  In spite of Wilson’s comment made in the constitutional convention that representation “is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act collectively,”[1] direct democracy has typically limited to an occasional “referendum” question even though more vital questions could be put to the body politic directly. 

Typically, referendums have tended to do with elections (and thus with representative rather than direct democracy) or with general taxing or spending limits for a government. The rationale for putting general taxing or spending limits up for referendum is that they apply to a government as a whole—this perspective being from that of popular sovereignty (i.e., the citizenry, whose electoral power transcends their government). Rarely, an “issue” is put up to be decided directly by the voters. By 2024, several of the member-states in the U.S. had had referendi on legalizing marijuana. I contend that many more matters of policy could be decided directly by the voters. 

Since the elected representatives represent the citizenry, the former should not be presumed as having the definitive right of such decision. Deciding on matters of general policy are primarily value-judgements, rather than requiring expertise.  Issues such as abortion, gay marriage, the Bush tax cuts, and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars could—and I would argue should—be decided by the voters directly. Beyond issues, the voters could decide more general governance questions, such as whether federalism should be continued. Such a question could lead to more specific proposals at the next election. 

For example, if the majority of American voters want the US to be of federalism, representatives could work on not only constitutional amendments, but also proposals for the voters on which broad areas of power would be transferred back to the states (or the voters could be asked—assuming a majority still want federalism—whether X or Y areas of power should be transferred back to the States). Should elected representatives counter that we should not trust the people to make such decisions, I would argue that it is nonsensical for an agent to contend that his principal is somehow inferior to himself. In a representative democracy, the representatives are the agents of the people; it is not the other way around.

In short, I contend that popular sovereignty ought to be strengthened rather than vitiated. Elected representatives are best suited to working out the technical details rather than deciding broad questions of policy.  An election campaign is a bricollage of factors; it is rare for a victor to be able to claim a mandate on a particular issue. In fact, a representative may be elected for reasons having nothing to do with his or her positions on “the issues.” 

The midterm election of 2010, for example, could have been informed by a mix of factors; it was not even clear whether people voting Republican, for example, were saying yes to that party’s platform or no to the previous two years of legislation (which was informed by both Democratic and Republican law-makers—neither party being able to enact its platform as given).  Even voters blaming the Democratic Party for the resulting legislation is not strictly speaking accurate, as compromises had to be made with Republicans.  So an election of representatives is a broad brush that cannot be divined as a mandate on particular issues.  

Regarding particular policies—even foreign policy, such as whether the US Government should continue to support Israel—the only way to know if there is a mandate is to put the matters up for decision by the voters. Political parties could have a say on how the questions are worded so they are objective (or two versions could be provided). Courts would still be able to declare the resulting law unconstitutional, but even here constitutional amendment is possible.  Even in terms of amendments, the voters, rather than their constitutional delegates or state or federal representatives, could decide directly.  

For example, the voters could decide whether US Senators should continue to be elected, or whether they should be appointed by the state governments or be the governors themselves (the US Senate being like the European Council of the E.U.). The voters could also decide whether abortion should be decided by the state or U.S. courts, or directly by the voters—by state or US—as an amendment.

At the very least, basic decisions would be made that have been mired in disputes between governmental institutions and/or government officials. We are depending much too much on elected and appointed government officials to “make” policy. Ultimately, the will of the people should be freed up and exercised beyond the confines of simply electing representatives—being subject only to the judiciary protecting individual rights (which can be overruled by constitutional amendment, which can be of the people).  Sadly, those in power—the elected representatives—will naturally and ironically resist efforts to expand the will of the people. 

Because the election of a representative involves many elements, an elected representative could easily get around interpreting his or her victory as a mandate to expand the will of the people.  This is precisely part of the problem, and it maintains the monopoly of power that our elected representatives enjoy.  I suspect this is no accident. Hence I am not optimistic on any expansion of popular sovereignty any time soon.  Even so, I hope my thoughts here are thought-provoking. 

Although not the best person to quote, Richard Nixon pointed in one of his books to the need for political development: “In terms of material progress, the twentieth century has been the best in history, but in terms of political progress the record has been disappointing.”[2]  

What I am suggesting is that our political system is so antiquated that were it to develop as technology has, our use of elections could make quite a leap forward.  In spite of all the technological change, we tend to hold very rigidly to the way things have “always been done” in politics.  It is time for politics to catch up. In fact, the technological progress could facilitate the expansion of popular sovereignty.  For example, voters could surf the internet for information before voting on general policy areas. The challenge may well be in how to enable illiterate voters to be able to take part.  As one possibility, voters could vote at desks (as in a classroom) while a reader reads through the questions on the ballot. My point is that we can begin to think outside the box and shake loose our assumptions.

1. James Madison, Notes in the Federal Convention of 1787. New York: Norton, 1987, p. 74.
2. Richard Nixon, 1999 Victory Without War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988, p. 16.

The Israeli Supreme Court’s Conflict of Interest as Unreasonable

Ironically, in making the ruling on New Year’s Day of 2024 striking down Prime Minister Netanyahu’s amendment to the country’s basic law that would have removed the judiciary’s authority of judicial review of laws based on their reasonableness, Israel’s Supreme Court too unreasonably exploited a conflict of interest. Basic Law, which is essentially constitutional law, includes the basic architecture of a government, such as how the executive, legislative, and judicial functions are related. Self-interest being a salient feature of human nature, we can assume that the governmental functionaries in each of those functions naturally seek to expand their respective jurisdictions relative to those of the other two. I contend that to give one or two of those areas the last word in altering the division of authority involves a conflict of interest. This applies to a constitutional court. Therefore, even though democracy is served by a judicial decision striking down an attempt by the executive and/or legislature to eviscerate the authority of the judiciary to act as a check, giving the latter the last word is fraught with entanglements. 

By eight to seven justices, the court ruled “that a government amendment to the so-called reasonableness law should not stand. The bill had stripped the Supreme Court of the power to declare government decisions unreasonable.”[1] That very officials who make government decisions in the Knesset passed the basic law can be seen as problematic. It was essentially a power-grab by the executive/legislative domains at the expense of the judiciary. Although the court “rejected the amendment because it would deal a ‘severe and unprecedented blow to the core characteristics of the State of Israel as a democratic state,’”[2] the naked power-grab could itself be viewed as unreasonable, even taking for granted the element of power-aggrandizing in governing. The court could also have ruled on the basis of there being an institutional and personal conflict of interest, but the court itself could be charged with the same offense in deciding the matter. It is just this conflict of interest that flew below the media’s radar (and got me to writing).

Even though the ruling did not expand the court’s authority, the decision arrested a decrease, and was thus in the personal and institutional interest of the judiciary in terms of power. Just as the majority in the Knesset had acted in its interests, the majority on the court did as well. The matter was thus a power struggle, and thus giving one side the final, definitive say is unfair. The ruling cites the importance of judicial review of laws passed by the Knesset as being in the broader interest of democracy in Israel, but the relatively narrow personal and institutional interests of the justices and their court could be expected to be exploited, and this may be the real reason for the ruling. To be sure, an independent judiciary is indispensable for the executive and legislative functionaries to be held accountable. Although they could argue that the voters could perform that function at election-time, elections do not include sending corrupt officials to jail, and the sitting Prime Minister was charged with corruption judicially at the time that he was steering the bill to passage (which counts as a personal conflict of interest). Even if the court’s democracy argument is solid, the personal and institutional conflicts of interest in the justices resisting a restriction on the purview of their judicial authority are inherently unethical and thus should be obviated if possible. 

The inherency is explained by just how inherent the self-interest to exploit a conflict of interest, whether personal or institutional, is in human nature.[3] Without doubt a conflict of interest that actually has been exploited is unethical because a private or relatively narrow benefit is put before a public or relatively broad benefit or duty.  

In judicial language, strict scrutiny should therefore be applied to unilateral decisions by legislative, executive, or judicial functionaries or “branches,” of government that self-aggrandize authority at the expense of one or two of the other “branches.” I recommend that such conflicts of interest be obviated by putting such matters to the electorate. So this is not merely a rubber-stamp of the majority parties, a 2/3 majority should be required to change Basic Law. Otherwise, we are left with the unsavory alternative of having the contending governmental interests play out their internecine power-struggles on the constitutional stage with one such interest having to have the final word, which is unfair to the other interests. In a democracy, after all, popular sovereignty is more fundamental than governmental sovereignty.


1. Rob Picheta, Amir Tal, and Lauren Izso, “Israel’s Top Court Strikes Down Key Part of Judicial Overhaul, Reigniting Divisions as War Rages,” CNN.com, January 2, 2024.
2.  Ibid.
3. Skip Worden, Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available on Amazon.


Friday, December 22, 2023

The Colorado Supreme Court Bars Insurrectionist Trump: Who Should Ultimately Decide?

On December 19, 2023, Colorado’s Supreme Court ruled that Don Trump, a former U.S. president, had engaged in insurrectionist activity as a matter of fact, and furthermore, as a matter of law, the U.S. Constitution bars him from holding any office, including the presidency. With an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court a certainty, realized even by the Colorado justices, and some notable (and very visible) Republicans arguing that the American people should have the final say on whether Trump will be president again beginning in 2025, the question of who should have the final say—the judiciary or the people—was pressing, and indeed, very important. I contend that the determination of fact should have been made by a jury in a criminal proceeding, and that even absent that, the ultimate decision should still be made prior to, and thus not during, the election, for the question is whether Trump can be listed as a candidate for the office. Ultimately, the tension lies between the value of a politics-free judiciary and democratic (majority) rule.

Section 3 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution “prohibits anyone who swore an oath to support the Constitution and then ‘engaged in insurrection’ against it from holding office.”[1] The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the decision of a trial judge with the simple logic that the section doesn’t explicitly mention the U.S. Presidency because it is so obviously an office. That it is so because, as the majority of Colorado’s high court’s justices wrote, the presidency serves “we the people” seems more like rhetoric than logic; the majority opinion could have left it at the rather obvious point that the presidency itself is not mentioned in section 3 because that section refers to all offices, federal and state, as being subject to the prohibition. Indeed, in political discourse, “the office of the president” is often mentioned, so the point hardly seems necessary to be made, but for the strange reasoning of the trail judge who had sought explicit mention of the presidency as if it were not included in “any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State.”[2] That both appointed and elected offices are included is also indisputable on the face of it, and that the section expressly names senator and representative in Congress does mean that the presidency too must be named, for the distinction here is between the legislative and the two other branches (a justice is also an office). In fine, the presidency of the United States is indeed a governmental office.

Colorado’s high court was on shakier ground, and this is noted in the dissent in the 4-3 opinion, in accepting the district judge’s determination of fact that President Trump had “engaged in an insurrection.”[3] Insurrectionist activity was at the time a federal crime in the U.S., and yet Donald Trump had not even been charged with the crime, much less convicted by a jury. Rather, a district judge had made the finding of fact, such that not even any criminal sentencing could be done. At Yale more than a month before Colorado’s high-court ruling, I asked James Boasberg, the chief judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, whether someone would first have to be charged and convicted of insurrectionist activity. “No,” he said flatly, without feeling the need to elaborate.[4] I thought I had asked a stupid question until I read in Colorado’s decision that the dissent makes the same point. Presumably someone should be found guilty of the crime before being barred from holding any public office because of said crime. Therefore, I submit that Colorado’s majority opinion erred in accepting the district judge’s determination of fact in lieu of any criminal prosecution and conviction as a sufficient basis apply the 14th Amendment to Donald Trump.

Given the weaknesses in the judicial rulings of both the lower and higher court in Colorado, it is a good thing that the U.S. system of government is federal because the U.S. Supreme Court could make corrections. By implication, perhaps a plurality of state supreme courts should be able to overrule a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. Checks and balances should apply to the judiciary too. Relatedly, the lack of check and balance concerning some of the unethical gifts taken by Justice Thomas of the U.S. Supreme Court from a Republican activist could diminish the legitimacy of the U.S. court in being the final decider on the questions of Donald Trump being an insurrectionist and, furthermore, being barred from holding any office. 

After the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court was made public, some of the Republican candidates for president publicly asserted that the American people should decide through the presidential election whether Trump should be president. A number of serious problems attend to this proposal.

Firstly, it is highly unrealistic, to say the least, that every voter would vote on the basis of the question of whether the U.S. Constitution forbids Trump from holding office. Even if Trump were to lose the election, it could not be inferred that the American people had decided that Trump was barred and thus could not hold any office.

Secondly, such a position incurs the worries noted by James Madison in his Notes on the constitutional convention that excess democracy, such as by having a de facto democratic judiciary (i.e., decided by votes of the people rather than rulings by justices), brings with it insufficient check on the passions of the people. A judiciary is one such check, and judicial review renders that branch a check also on the two other branches of government. In short, leaving the final word in interpreting the constitution to “we the people” leaves us without the ability to protect us from ourselves. For example, the rights of the minority would have no protection against the tyranny of the majority—democracy of course being by majority rule. Not the least of considerations, politics would also inevitably be involved.

Even in the U.S. Supreme Court, politics have likely been more of a force than the public realizes. Justice Sandra Day O’Conner, whose funeral took place just days from Colorado’s high-court ruling, had written the majority opinion for Bush v. Gore (2000) even before oral arguments were heard. She had been active in the Republican Party when she was an Arizona legislator, and her majority opinion sided with Bush. Objections to her partisanship imply a belief that the judiciary should be neutral politically.

Handing over the court’s functions to “we the people” would only add politics to constitutional interpretation. Voters in favor of Trump personally, or his policies, would likely find that he did not engage in an insurrection, and thus that the Constitution does not bar him from holding any office. President Biden’s supporters would be inclined to view Trump’s speech on January 6, 2020 as fomenting an insurrection. Who then should decide? This is the rationale for having a judiciary, especially where criminality is to be decided. Just as politics should not be criminalized, so too criminal proceedings should not be politicized.

I asked James Boasberg, the chief judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, why the federal prosecutor had not included insurrection among the criminal charges against Donald Trump. “It’s messy,” the judge replied. He meant that it is difficult to get a conviction. If so, then the fact that the district judge in Colorado so easily found that Trump had indeed been engaged in insurrectionist activity by urging his supporters to disrupt the counting of the electors’ votes for president warrants strict scrutiny. In other words, if the charge is “messy,” then shouldn’t a jury hear the case and be made to deliberate? Then, of a jury were to convict the former president, then appellate courts, including ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court, would be oriented exclusively to deciding the questions of law concerning section 3 of the 14th Amendment.

Separating the criminal proceedings from the work of the U.S. Supreme Court would buffer the impact of politics inside that court unless its justices would disregard a jury verdict. Such a rationale would have to be strong in its reasoning, least it appear to be part of a political effort to decide the 2024 presidential election by judicial fiat, as in 2000. Such an effort would effectively prioritize a decision by the electorate. Absent such judicial corruption, deciding whether section 3 of the 14th Amendment applies to Don Trump by an election incorrectly treats the United States as a direct democracy rather than a republic in which democracy is a part of the system of the system of government. Especially when democracy itself is in dispute, a judiciary free from politics is so very valuable. Boasberg’s dismissiveness of my two questions at Yale in early November, 2023 left me wondering about the neutrality of the federal judiciary. At the very least, what he took for granted is hardly settled law.


1. Nicholas Riccardi, “The Constitution’s Insurrection Clause Threatens Trump’s Campaign. Here Is How That Is Playing Out,” APNews.com, December 20, 2023.
2. The U.S. Constitution, Section  of the 14th Amendment.
3. Kinsey Crowley, “What Is the 14th Amendment? Why Colorado Disqualified Trump and Removed Him from Ballot,” USA Today, December 20, 2023.
4. Not even the report of the judge’s talk in The Yale Daily News includes any mention of the judge’s answer to my question. Presumably the student-reporter did not think the reply could be controversial.

Monday, December 11, 2023

On the Role of the U.S. Supreme Court in Safeguarding the Peaceful Transfer of Power

In the E.U., the state governments and federal institutions can ask the European Court of Justice (the ECJ) for an opinion on a legal matter. This is rare in the U.S., though waiting for a dispute to winds its way formally through district and appellate courts may be unduly bureaucratic, not to mention lengthy. On December 11, 2023, Special Counsel Jack Smith asked the U.S. Supreme Court the ECJ’s counterpart, to decide whether the former U.S. president Donald Trump had any immunity from criminal prosecution of his involvement in the riot at the U.S. Capitol that interrupted the formal counting by a joint session of Congress of the Electoral College presidential ballots. The trial was set to begin the following March, and the question of the former president’s immunity had to be decided before the trial could begin. Hence the “extraordinary request,” which I contend should not be extraordinary given the time frame and the important role of the highest court in safeguarding American democracy from domestic threats.

The prosecutor asked the U.S. Supreme court to review district Judge Tanya Chutkan’s ruling that Donald Trump is not immune from “the election subversion prosecution case.”[1] Trump’s lawyers had argued that Trump’s actions in speaking outside the White House on January 6, 2020 were part of his official duties because he was protecting the American democratic system from alleged vote-fixing by Democrats. Chutkan rejected that argument, pointing out that the speech was oriented to Trump’s re-election and thus was not part of a president’s official duties—efforts to secure another term extend beyond the performance of the office within the current term of office.  Essentially, applying to continue in an office is not a function of the office. Chutkan classified Trump’s speech as falling under the rubric of campaign speeches even though the election had passed because he was using the speech to try be re-elected by Congress (by disputing the authenticity of several state electoral ballots).

To be sure, it was not as if Trump went with the option that he was considering of surrounding the Capitol with tanks—something President Nixon had also considered doing in 1974 during the Watergate scandal, which by the way ended up prompting him to resign. Instead, Trump was trying to throw the election to the Congress by pressuring it to vote on the validity of several of the Electoral College ballots that had been submitted by the state governments to be counted. The U.S. Constitution does give Congress a role in presidential elections, both in certifying the ballots and electing a president outright if no candidate gets a majority of the Electoral College votes. Had there been evidence of significant election fraud that would justify Congressional votes on the Electoral College ballots from several key states such as Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Michigan, then Congress could have intervened while staying within the constitutional framework. It was Trump’s way of applying pressure, by instigating a mob to disrupt the official counting, that resulted in the federal indictments that run just short of insurrection. By the way, I asked a judge on the D.C. district court why he thought Trump had not been indicted on insurrection. “It’s too messy,” he replied. “Isn’t that charge and a conviction based expressly on it necessary for someone to be barred from running for office in the U.S.?” I asked. “No,” the judge replied. “A judge in Colorado is looking at that now,” he added, presumably without there being a trial. It’s a pity that no one asked the U.S. Supreme Court to rule on what a Colorado judge was doing in lieu of a trial on the facts decided by a jury.

Perhaps even more than the presumption of innocence unless convicted of a crime, the rule of law applied even to U.S. presidents is vital to American democracy. Writing to the U.S. Supreme Court, the prosecutors with the special counsel insisted that “nothing could be more vital to our democracy” than holding a former U.S. president accountable for breaking a law.[2] Indeed, a “cornerstone of our constitutional order is that no person is above the law. The force of that principle is at its zenith where, as here, a grand jury has accused a former president of committing federal crimes to subvert the peaceful transfer of power to his lawfully elected successor.”[3] Many democracies have turned into military dictatorships precisely because the peaceful transfer of power was not respected. With a past of rule by kings, both domestic and colonial, many African countries have had trouble with the peaceful transfer of power. As a result, the foreign direct investment of multinational corporations has not been as large as the continent would need to develop economically. Even though it was hard to imagine a military coup in the U.S. in 2023, the precedent of a president getting away with having violated the U.S. Constitution could begin a slippery slope downward. More than sufficient grounds existed in 2023 for the U.S. Supreme Court to fast-track the question of Trump’s immunity.

The question of whether the trial could go forward was subject to time constraints; were the trial date of March, 2024 delayed pending the question of Trump’s immunity from prosecution going through the lengthy appellate process, the question of Trump’s guilt could still be unanswered by the next presidential election, in early November, 2024. Even though several presidential candidates were insisting that they would support a convicted felon for president, presumably voters would want to know whether Trump had committed a crime in attempting to thwart the results of the 2020 presidential election before casting their respective ballots.

Hence, the prosecutors wrote to the U.S. Supreme Court, “Respondent’s appeal of the ruling rejecting his immunity and related claims, however, suspends the trial of the charges against him, scheduled to begin on March 4, 2024. . . . It is of imperative public importance that respondent’s claims of immunity be resolved by this Court and that respondent’s trial proceed as promptly as possible if his claim of immunity is rejected.”[4] The public importance has to do with the electorate having as much information as possible concerning the charges against the presidential candidate before going to the polls that upcoming November.

The fast-tracking would not be without precedent. In US v. Nixon (1974), the U.S. Supreme Court fast-tracked the question of Nixon’s claim of presidential privilege in being immune from a Congressional subpoena for the Oval Office tapes. “In that case, the high court moved quickly to resolve the matter so that one f the Watergate-era cases could proceed swiftly.”[5] It was not long after the ruling that the White House handed over the tapes to a congressional committee, and Nixon’s political fate was doomed from that point. Indeed, the difference between Nixon’s public persona and what he had been saying behind closed doors stunned many Americans who had no idea that even a “law and order” president could have such a squalid criminal mind. The public interest in furnishing the American electorate in 2024 with as much crucial information as possible on one of the presidential candidates can thus be appreciated. It should not be “extraordinary” for the U.S. Supreme Court to see to it that Trump’s federal trial could take place in time for the 2024 presidential election. Winding down the clock, to use a sports analogy, should not be a tactic that any defendant in a criminal trial should be able to use effectively, especially if accountability protecting the peaceful transfer of power is at issue.


1. Hannah Rabinowitz and Devan Cole, “Special Counsel goes Directly to Supreme Court to Resolve Whether Trump Has Immunity from Prosecution,” CNN.com, December 11, 2023.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

Thursday, December 7, 2023

U.S. Anti-Trust Law: Applicable to Amazon?

In September, 2023, the Federal Trade Commission and seventeen states sued Amazon on ant-trust grounds for restraining trade and excessively raising prices on third-party sellers and consumers. Three months later, a leaked internal memo revealed Amazon’s anti-labor strategies of buying off local politicians and gaining reputational capital through well-publicized charitable work. Such work, as an anti-union strategy, demonstrates that the very expression, corporate social responsibility, is an oxymoron, or at the very least a misnomer (i.e., misnamed); a more accurate, and thus revealing, label would be corporate marketing. One effect of the “responsibility” connotation is that companies such as Amazon with mammoth market power could effectively hide strategic efforts in restraint of trade, and thus curtailing competition. Combined with feckless anti-trust prosecution, the result is an American economy that has not lived up to Adam Smith’s theory wherein competition via the price mechanism is necessary for individual self-interests to have beneficial unintended consequences systemically and thus in terms of the public good.

The civil case accused Amazon “of engaging in anti-competitive practices through measures that deter sellers from offering lower prices for products on non-Amazon sites.”[1] Amazon was being accused of deprioritizing listings of products sold at lower prices on non-Amazon sites, forcing merchants to raise their prices on Amazon’s platform and other sites “in order to keep their products competitive on Amazon.”[2] The customers suffer as relevant results of searches are replaced by paid advertisements that favor Amazon’s own brands. Also, the company was charging third-party sellers nearly half of their total revenue as fees for using Amazon’s platform, the result being higher prices for the consumers. The company was also compelling the sellers to use the company’s logistics service in order to qualify for Amazon Prime. With nearly 40 percent of the e-commerce market, Amazon was allegedly flexing its muscle at the expense of competition.

Yet the chairperson of the Federal Trade Commission, Lina Khan, was not asking the court to break up the mammoth company, preferring instead to limit herself to “liability.”[3] I contend that such an avenue falls short as a vehicle for instituting a competitive market. Firstly, a company with market power of nearly half of the e-commerce market can be expected to use its muscle in restraint of trade even while paying out liability claims because the oligopolistic excess-profits (akin to “monopoly rents”) more than compensate for the (tax deductible) expenses. Secondly, I submit that it is utterly unrealistic to suppose that a company with such overwhelming market power will not use it merely because of external disincentives such as civil fines. The use of “sticks” and even “carrots” to get such a company to not act as a profit-maximizer comes up short because such “motivating” tools are tertiary; they do not shake the fundamentals, whereby a non-competitive market is restructured to be competitive and thus composed of price-takers rather than a price-setter.

It is worth expanding on the tactics that an oligopolistic company can use to protect itself from extraneous attempts to fundamentally change the market. We get a glimpse of Amazon’s “play book” from an eight-page memo that reveals how one of America’s largest companies “executes on its public relations objectives and attempts to curtail reputational harm stemming from criticisms of its business. It also illustrates how Amazon [sought] to methodically court local politicians and community groups in order to push its interest in a region where [the company] could be hampered by local moratoriums on warehouse development, and [where the company was] facing resistance from environmental and labor activists.”[4] Knowing the company’s tactics in Southern California can give us an insight into how the company’s management blunts federal legislative action that could break up Amazon itself in order to create a competitive playing field in e-commerce.

In a nutshell, Amazon’s strategy was to create the illusion of on-going charity work and to pay off elected government officials to, among other goals, resist unionization of the company’s workforce and restrictions on where the company can build. Specifically, the management “’cultivated’ Michael Vargas, the mayor of the town of Perris, through pandemic-related donations” ostensibly to “support the region,” but actually to buy off his support for new warehouse construction.[5] This is proof that companies use money even aside from political campaign “donations” to get elected representatives to affect public policy favorably to the companies themselves. If this is so locally, we can be assured that companies as large as Amazon wouldn’t withhold the tactic from being used to buy federal lawmakers, whose power could include breaking up the company.

In regard to Amazon’s corporate “social responsibility” programs, the leaked document includes plans to have employees drop off food to the Los Angeles Food Bank “in big media moments that are broadcasted/posted.” The illusion of ongoing charitable work would of course work to the company’s advantage in public relations. As the “memo suggested curating similar moments during a back-to-school donation event and a [Christmas] toy drive, where drop offs occur and Amazon executives, as well as groups who receive grants from the company, ‘speak about Amazon’s impact” to the media present, even as the company planned on cutting off groups that “did not result in measurable positive impact,” charity was clearly viewed by Amazon’s managers as a promotional tactic.[6] The false societal image of a benevolent oligopolistic company could be expected to shield governmental efforts to break up the company and perpetuate the erroneous assumption that civil liabilities (i.e., verdicts against the company) are enough to safeguard consumers because the company’s management is benevolent.

In conclusion, the Federal Trade Commission shirked its governmental mandate to enforce the Sherman Antitrust law from the onset of the litigation, thus hampering the ability of the judiciary to order an effective remedy. In a large industry in which one company has 40 percent market share, and that company actively buys government officials and strategically uses public relations, the danger is not just to competitive markets, but also to American representative democracy and the rule of law itself. It is, I submit, no accident that the chairwoman of the FTC did not include breaking up Amazon as a remedy. We need only look at the company's strategially placed political contributions to surmise which elected officials might have put political pressure on the FTC. The company’s memo reveals that Amazon uses its extraordinary wealth to bend public policy away from the public good, like a black hole in space bends even space itself, to protect the company's viability by donating directly or indirectly to elected officials. I submit that plutocracy, rather than mob rule, is the greatest threat to American democracy.  At the very least, private wealth knows how to protect itself politically, and even how to cover its tracks under the patina of corporate social responsibility.


1. Haleluya Hadero, “Amazon Sued by FTC and 17 States over Allegations It Inflates Online Prices and Overcharges Sellers,” APNews.com, September 26, 2023 (accessed December 7, 2023).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Haleluya Hadero, “Amazon’s Internal Plans to Advance Its Interests in California Are Laid Bare in Leaked Memo,” APNews.com, December 7, 2023.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid, for the quoted material, which is both from the article and the memo itself.


Monday, September 4, 2023

On Trump’s Eligibility to Run for President: Who Decides?

The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution “bans anyone who took an oath to uphold the Constitution but who subsequently ‘engaged in insurrection or rebellion against,’ or gave ‘aid or comfort of the enemies’ of the Constitution from seeking any federal or state office.”[1] Did Donald Trump, when he was President of the United States, engage in insurrection? Furthermore, who decides this and bars him from office?

During the summer of 2023, lawyers opined on whether Don Trump is eligible to run for the U.S. presidency in 2024. It is one thing for lawyers on law-school faculties to decide whether Donald Trump, a former U.S. President as of 2023, is ineligible to run for president in 2024; it is quite another thing for the U.S. Supreme Court to make the determination; only the latter has governmental legitimacy that can legally be enforced, for the U.S. Constitution gives the federal supreme court the task of interpreting that constitution. In this case, the high court would be in the position of making decisions of fact—did Trump engage in an insurrection—and applying that decision to the 14th Amendment. “The question of Donald Trump’s disqualification under the 14th Amendment will be decided by the Supreme Court,” Michael Luttig, a conservative former federal appellate judge said in 2023.[2] Aside from the prediction, I contend that it should be.

The comment made by Luttig, who had actually been a judge, didn’t stop lawyers who teach at law schools from writing as if their own opinion were enough to render the former president ineligible to run for president. Just because someone ventures an opinion does not make it so. Even lawyers who specialize on writing in the field of constitutional law are, after all, merely private citizens like the rest of us. Of course, they, along with the rest of the American electorate, could decide indirectly through voting for or against Don Trump on the basis of determinations of whether he engaged in an insurrection. There are several problems with this method.

First, the voters would need to know how the framers used the word, insurrection, assuming an original intent hermeneutic, or else what the word means in its legal sense in 2023. The electorate would also have to “research”—and some potential voters put me off when I canvassed door to door by saying that they needed to research the candidates (yeah, right)—the Trumps various actions that could be considered to be insurrectionist: urging a crowd to pressure Congress on January 6, 2020 when it was counting the states’ respective ballots of electors, telling Vice President Pence that he had the authority to substitute slates of Trump electors in Arizona, Georgia, and other states, pressuring election officials in Georgia to “find” votes so Trump would win the state, and considering the use of the military on the capitol so Congress would use his slates of electors in states that he lost. Thomas Jefferson and John Adams agreed in retirement that an educated and virtuous citizenry is essential to the viability of a republic. They are also necessary for an electorate to apply constitutional vigor even to a candidate whom some voters like.

Secondly, letting the voters decide cannot keep Trump off any ballot prior to the election, not to mention prior to the Republican Party’s nomination process, because an election is the means by which voters would decide Trump’s fate. Former New Jersey governor Chris Kristy’s assertion, “The voters of our party are going to need to determine this question,” is neither competent nor fair to the Republic Party. An election before the election might be feasible, but then perhaps the first election would then de facto be the presidential election itself.

Deciding the matter by whatever means after the Republican Party’s convention would not be fair to the party. If election officials or a court later decide that Trump is ineligible, the party would suddenly be left, after its convention, without a nominee for president.[3] Because the U.S. Supreme Court “keeps its own schedule and is not bound by electoral deadlines, there exists the possibility that Trump could lock down enough delegates to win the Republican nomination—or even be officially nominated—only to be subsequently removed from the presidential ballot.”[4] Perhaps in such a case the Republican National Committee would be tasked with selecting the nominee, opening the door to the possibility of “back room” political deal-making and even bribes. That rather undemocratic consequence would be ironic if the people had been the deciders in a special election or referendum.

So, leaving the matter up to the voters is problematic; the matter of a nominee could ironically be decided by committee. That leaves us with either election officials acting independently of each other or all together, or the U.S. Supreme Court justices to decide. Just because some citizens claim that Trump is ineligible to run for office does not make it so. That almost all lawyers teaching constitutional law in the United States have only one—hence undergraduate—degree in law is all the more reason why their writings should not be taken as binding for election officials. Even if “the case is not even close,” as William Baude and Michael Paulsen wrote, it is not necessarily the case that, “All who are committed to the Constitution should take note and say so.”[5] Not only are articles in law reviews, whose editors are undergraduate law students, not objective analysis at least in constitutional law; such writings can be deemed political, and even instances of political activism claiming that readers should take action of a political sort.

But should election officials of local, state, or federal jurisdiction be the deciders? I contend that they should not. Firstly, if even just a few officials at the local or state level decide to exclude Don Trump, then the judgment in favor of Trump by other election officials would be impaired because he would not be on the ballot in every locale or state. It would be extra-constitutional (i.e., outside of the constitution) should all of the officials in the U.S. vote on whether to exclude him, for all of the officials, as a group, are not organized as a group constitutionally. Secondly, election officials do not necessarily have expertise on what exactly constitutes insurrection. Thirdly, they would inevitably be sued, whatever they decide, so the U.S. Supreme Court would be the final decider anyway.

An alternative way that the high court could wind up deciding on Trump’s eligibility would be deciding the inevitable appeal that would be made if Trump will have been found guilty of insurrection by a jury. It is significant that Trump had not been indicted on the charge of insurrection even though 91 charges were leveled against him as of August, 2023. Presumably Jack Smith, a Special Council in the U.S. Justice Department, would have charged the former president with insurrection had evidence existed to support that particular charge. Unlike the lawyers who teach in law schools, Smith had a formal means—a grand jury and a court with a judge—to make the charge, and he did not. Smith also had access to the evidence, which lawyers in law schools did not have. So, it is odd that the lawyers who claimed that Trump had engaged in an insurrection did so knowing that Smith had decided not to level that charge. Even stranger would be such a lawyer presuming that one’s opinion, whether in an interview or argued in an article in a law school’s undergraduate publication, is sufficient for election officials to keep Trump off their respective ballots.

In short, it could be argued that because Trump has not even been charged with insurrection, he cannot be found to be ineligible for office based on insurrectionist activities. It could also be argued, however, that the inclusion of insurrection in the 14th Amendment is a political rather than a judicial matter. Under this reading, Congress could pass a law—rather than using the word insurrection for January 6th in an award given to three Capitol Hill police employees—declaring that Trump engaged in an insurrection, and the high court would decide the inevitable constitutional challenge in court. But unlike impeaching and removing a president from office, no constitutional language supports applying the political process of how a bill becomes law.

Of all the chatter by experts and non-experts alike, the fact that Jack Smith did not charge Don Trump with having engaged in an insurrection is most salient to me in this case. To be sure, the U.S. Supreme Court justices could find that if he is found guilty of any of the existing charges bearing on January 6, 2020, pressuring Georgian officials to “find” votes, or instigating false slates of electors in a few states, that they constitute insurrectionist activities.  The “finding” of votes, such as probably happened in Chicago in 1960 for Kennedy, constitutes garden-variety corruption in American politics, however. Even so, the justices could find on their own that Trump is guilty of fomenting or agitating an insurrection. The justices would need a suit to be brought to the court, however.

The legitimacy of the court as the final arbiter hinges on the nonpartisan nature of a judicial ruling that is based on legal reasoning. Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court had its legitimacy tarnished by imprints of politics. In 2023, the media reported that Justice Sandra Day O’Conner had written the majority opinion of Bush v. Gore (2000)—the case that effectively handed the presidency to George H.W. Bush—before even the oral arguments. She had been a Republican legislator in the Arizona legislature. In signing onto the court’s majority opinion in Dodds v. Jackson (2022), which overturned both Roe v Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), some of the justices reneged on their confirmation-hearing statements that they would respect Roe v. Wade as precedent on abortion. All of those justices had been nominated by Republican presidents. In this context, the court’s ruling on whether Don Trump is ineligible to run for president would likely be seen as political, especially if the majority were to hold that he is ineligible even though the Special Counsel had not included insurrection among the charges bearing on the riot at the Capitol on January 6, 2020. The need for an impartial, judicially-oriented supreme court could not be more; in fact, the eventual undoing of the United States might be triggered by the absence of any such honest broker outside the reach of political factions.


[1] S.V. Date, “Trump May Need Supreme Court To Say His Coup Attempt Does Not Violate Constitution,” The Huffington Post, September 2, 2023.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.


Saturday, July 15, 2023

The Screen Actors Guild Strike: American Capitalism Is Inherently Unbalanced

On July 14, 2023, Hollywood actors joined the writers in going on strike against the studios, which had changed the business model in ways, according to the Screen Actors Guild (SAG), that were leaving the vast majority of actors out financially. At the time, AI (artificial intelligence) was the red-hot buzzword, promising unheard of advances but also baleful clouds on the horizon. The president of SAG sounded the alarm on not only the threat of AI given the studios' new business models predicated on ubiquitous streaming and digital technology, but also the more long-standing and ingrained American corporate system of Capitalism wherein upper managements get away with not sharing the surplus of corporate wealth due to an inherent or institutional conflict of interest. Indeed, Fran Drescher, the president of SAG, was not far from calling into question the taken-for-granted assumption in Capitalism that residual profits should go to stockholders exclusive. Questioning that default (as well as claiming that CEOs get to set their own compensation by controlling their respective boards of directors) would have made Drescher's announcement of a strike truly revolutionary. She was so close. 

Regarding AI, even Drescher's position can be perceived as short-sighted even though it was an improvement on the studios' new business model. The ability of studios to use the likenesses (images) of actors who have been bodily scanned (creepy) in one project for use as computer-generated “acting” in future movies in which the actors themselves are neither compensated nor participate was among the issues to be arbitrated in which the studios and SAG were far apart. To an actor, the loss of control over one’s image can complicate or even detract from one’s efforts to construct a public image. To be sure, not being paid for such extended likenesses being used was noxious to the actors even though no additional work on their part would be required. This just means, however, that royalties, or residuals, rather than pay for the use of the images would be appropriate, and thus fair. Furthermore, rather than being able to pressure actors on a project to agree to their respective likenesses being used in perpetuity, studios should be required to get permission for the specific uses (rather than a general permission) at the time of each future project. Actors would not feel that they might lose their existing work if they refuse to give a general permission in perpetuity. Even such an arrangement, incorporated into the studios' new business models, might not last long. A student of AI suggested to me that just as non-profit organizations have open-source libraries of written works, such organizations in the film industry might make available, royalty-free, images of volunteers that start-up film companies, students, and even Hollywood studios could use. Extras, or background actors, could conceivably be used only in shots in which mere images won't do. 

Of greater significance, SAG’s position extended to challenge a basic tenet of Capitalism itself. Were the strike a true inflection point, as Fran Drescher, the president of SAG claimed, the union had an opportunity to make the dogmatic, or arbitrary, tenet transparent if for no other reason that Drescher was aware and critical of the long-held assumption that had long before become embedded as a “necessary” plank in the economic system.

I contend that it is arbitrary to set the owners of a corporation as the receivers of the residual from the surplus of revenues over expenditures (i.e., profit), whereas banks and labor get only a fixed amount classified as expenses. All three groups can be thought of as providing inputs, or resources, that a management can use to make a profit. From this perspective, it seems arbitrary to say that only one of the group has a right to the residuals from the profits. The philosopher John Locke claimed that a person “mixing” one’s labor with land gives rise to a property right on said land. Centuries later, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a maker of wedding web-sites could refuse to have same-sex couples as clients because she had expressed herself in her work. It seems rather obvious that screenwriters and actors are also in an expressive profession. In “mixing” their self-expressive labor in a film, writers and actors can be said to have an ownership interest in what is typically referred to as art. Painters, after all, sign their paintings. It is possible that the writers and actors of a film have more of a claim on the profits than do the studios. In depicting the strike as occurring at an “inflection point,” the president of SAG had the opportunity to make such a claim, thus challenging the monopoly on profits hitherto enjoyed by the owners of the studios.

In announcing the strike in 2023, Drescher called attention to the large gap in compensation between the CEO’s of the studios and 99% of the members of the SAG union who were struggling financially. To be sure, the inclusion of “extras,” or background non-speaking roles that are on a per-project pay basis, means that the 99 percent were not depending on acting as a full-time job. Even so, the astounding pay of “A-list” movie actors may give people outside of the industry the misimpression that acting constitutes a wealthy profession.

The impression left by films grossing hundreds of millions of dollars that studios are wealthy is more accurate. The studios plead poverty, the SAG president exclaimed in astonishment, and yet somehow they have the money to pay tens of millions of dollars to their CEOs. In fiscal 2022, for example, the CEO of Disney made $24 million just before the company laid off 7,000 employees.[1] Drescher could have added that Netflix co-CEOs earned $43.2 million and $39.3 million in 2020—when the company raised the monthly price of its subscription.[2] Doubtless the management claimed that the company had no choice but charge customers more. It is interesting that managements can so easily put their companies in convenient straightjackets.

The union president must have sensed an opportunity to challenge the greed of American CEOs more generally as evinced in the increasing inequality between their compensation and the average of their respective workforces. “High seven figures, eight figures, this is crazy money that they make,” she said.[3] Implying that a basic shift in wealth distribution between upper managements and workers was justified, she stated, “What’s happening to us is happening across all fields of labor. . . . When employers make Wall Street and greed their priority, and they forget about the essential contributors that make the machine run, we have a problem.”[4] A basic problem in the American system of Capitalism.

The ratio of CEO compensation to that of the average worker in the U.S. in 2020 was 299.[5] Just one year later, the ratio was nearly 400, according to Statista. Even as the coronavirus shuttered or hampered many businesses, which meant mass layoffs, CEOs made out well nonetheless. Some CEOs made a thousand times that of the average worker. The annual ratios in the E.U. were much lower than in the U.S. That CEOs of American corporations had typically reached complete control of their respective boards of directors, which are technically to function in part as a check on their managements, presents not only accountability issues more generally, but also a situation in which the CEOs can set their own compensation and that of their managerial cadres. At one major corporation in 2023, the stockholders voted to deny the management’s proposed compensation package. Astonishingly, the resolution was nonbinding and the board approved the package anyway. This points to the existence of a major structural flaw in corporate governance in the U.S.

In pointing to the greed of CEOs of American companies in general, Drescher expanded her union’s agenda beyond the immediate financial interest of the members. She was making a societal contribution in claiming that the huge disparity of wealth between managements and workers was by then so large that an inflection point had been reached wherein SAG would try to set an example for other unions to follow in objecting to the arbitrary feature of American Capitalism wherein CEOs do not have to share the surplus of corporate wealth. She could have gone a step further by taking the opportunity to question the underlying assumption that stockholders should get the residual of profits that are not retained or invested. Even though the business model of studios had changed due to AI, the greed of American CEOs and their ability to set their own compensation packages had existed for some time and was finally too much for workers to take. That is to say, it was time for an enduring yet arbitrary (rather than necessary) aspect of American Capitalism to be changed. The system had been broken for some time, and the advent of AI meant that the harm would soon become even more unbearable.