The E.U. and U.S.: Equal Partners

In 2026, even though the U.S. had 50 member-states and the E.U. had only 27 states, both unions were large enough to constitute what in historical terms, with the European early-modern rather than (the smaller) medieval kingdoms in mind, empire-scale republics. As long as elected representatives hold office at the federal level in both political unions, both unions can be said to be republics (as well as containing republics—or, as Ken Wheare wrote in Federal Government, “wheels within a larger wheel”). Were either union to have only five or so states, the empire definition would not be satisfied. Also, that definition includes the requirement of cultural heterogeneity between (as distinct from within) the states. Being on the same (empire) scale is just one of several ways in which the two unions belong to the same political type. It was in this respect rather than based on the sheer number of states that Sophie Wilmes, vice-president of the European Parliament, said that the U.S. should not regard the E.U. as a little sister (i.e., a junior partner). I contend that she was correct.

Including but going beyond economic and political dependence internationally, Wilmes insisted that the U.S. deal with the E.U. as an equal. “What is very important regarding the United States is that we are talking to each other as equal partners and not as a big brother against the little brother or the little sister.”[1] To be sure, little brothers (and I have one who is a decade younger) are perfectly capable of bossing around older brothers. Even so, concerning the context to which Wilmes was referring, the U.S. was dominate on the Iran War and trade tariffs. In fact, the Commission had acted against giant American computer-technology companies on invasion of privacy and anti-competitive grounds only to be threatened by the Trump administration with (retaliatory) tariffs.

It is arguably from the standpoint of not feeling respected that the E.U. leader was speaking out to assert the E.U. as equivalent to the U.S. and thus worthy of reciprocal respect. Put somewhat crassly, just because the American tech companies could have undue (and anti-democratic) influence in American government does not mean that the latter should not respect E.U. law that differs from U.S. law concerning the tech sector. Equal, or reciprocal respect rather than a claim as to the equivalence of the two unions as falling under the same political type is the basis of Wilmes’ public remarks.

Even so, the demand for equal respect is premised on the unspoken assumption that the E.U. and U.S. are indeed equivalent political unions, whose respective states are thus equivalent. In terms of territory and population, the states cluster. The only exception is Alaska, which is larger than even the European Union, not to mention any E.U. state.  That the political unions are both empire-level, cluster in terms of population (i.e., hundreds rather than tens of millions), GDP, and even territory is the grundlagen upon which comparative politics as an academic sub-field in political science and in practice (including in journalism!) should be based even though this foundation is rarely made explicit. Considering the widespread occurrence of political category mistakes with respect to the E.U. and U.S., scholars, government officials, and especially journalists could have done more to make the equivalence explicit in 2026 when the E.U. official made her statement. In 2025, while speaking with the E.U.’s ambassador to the U.S. at Yale, I made this plea in vain, for E.U. officials were then afraid that making the equivalence explicit would give Euroskeptics such as Viktor Orbán more ammunition with which to dismantle the Union, which was certainly not a “bloc.”

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1. Vincenzo Genovese, “’The E.U. Is Not the Little Sister of the US,’ European Parliament Vice-President Wilkes Says,” Euronews.com, 29 April, 2026.

Behind Political Culture: U.S. President Clinton’s Lying under Oath

The stature that comes with occupying (and even having occupied) public office, whether elected or appointed and especially if high office, combined with the ability to attract the attention of the media such that the (former) official’s statements have the credibility of pronouncements, and thus of being true rather than false statements, is rarely examined for what the stature and societal “mouth-piece” imply (i.e., veracity). A very high former elected representative who has even admitted lying under oath in a court proceeding back while in office can very easily be assumed decades later to be making a true statement by the public even though that statement is practically identical to the statement known (and admitted) to have been false. Even published photos that are strong evidence that the second statement is false can be dismissed by a public too liable to being beguiled by clever political birds of prey. I have in mind here the twin statements of Bill Clinton, who was the U.S. President for two terms in the 1990s and went on to associate with Jeffrey Epstein, the infamous head of the child-prostitute sex-ring, and at least one of his paid girls.

At least three compromising photos of Clinton with girls in close proximity were released by the FBI to my knowledge in 2026. In one photo, Clinton is situated between Maxwell, who was Epstein’s accomplice, and an under-aged girl in an indoor pool at a resort (not in the U.S.). Maxwell would later be convicted (and imprisoned) for her role in arranging girls for Epstein’s clients. In another photo, Clinton is sitting in a hot-tub with an underaged girl. In a third photo, he is seated with one arm (and hand) low around the waist of a girl in what appears to be Epstein’s private jet. To be sure, even though the positioning of Clinton’s arm (and his hand) low around the girl’s waist connotes sexual rather than paternal interest, and that a girl is with Clinton in the hot-tub photo (and the pool photo) are together highly suggestive, none of those photos is evidence that Clinton raped (i.e., had sex with) one or more of Epstein’s girls. Moreover, anyone accused of a crime is assumed to be innocent in any of the United States unless or until the accused is convicted in a court of law of having broken a law.

Even though the arm being around a girl’s waist and being in a pool with an under-aged girl and an adult whom we can now say definitely arranged Epstein’s girls for sex may bring to mind the old phrase, “where there is smoke, there is fire,” I bring up the matter of the photos merely as context to show just how misguided it was for the American public to assume that Clinton was testifying honestly before a Congressional committee in 2026 on his relationships with Epstein and the child-prostitutes. That Clinton was recognizable (i.e., fame) and had political stature as a former U.S. president are not sufficient for the default-assumption to be that even what he has said under oath is truthful rather than mendacious. This is the idea.

Asked under oath while testifying before a Congressional committee if he had had “sexual relations” with the woman in the hot-tub photo, Clinton answered, “No.”[1] Even if the photos make his answer difficult to believe, that he also “denied knowledge of Epstein’s crimes” may be so incredulous that a person could reasonably toss out all of Clinton’s testimony for being deceitful throughout.[2] It is possible that he rationalized lying because, as he had claimed, he believed that the Congressional subpoena, which he had unlawfully ignored, had been politically motivated.  Because Clinton claimed to have been unaware of Epstein’s business (i.e., prostituting girls to the rich and/or famous) in spite of spending leisure time with the criminal and his accomplice, and because Clinton knowingly violated the law by ignoring a Congressional subpoena, a rational basis can be laid for leaning at the very least toward concluding that Clinton lied under oath about having committed statutory rape.

Clinton being asked whether he had had sexual relations with a child-prostitute ought to ring a bell for anyone who was following U.S. politics toward the end of Clinton’s time in the White House. Back in January, 2001, the media reported that in “an 11-hour deal to avoid criminal charges over his sex-and-lies fling with Monica Lewinsky, President Clinton . . . admitted ‘knowingly’ lying under oath.”[3] Clinton had to surrender his Arkansas law license and pay a $25,000 fine. Stating, “certain of my responses to questions about Ms. Lewinsky were false,” on his last day in office, Clinton was referring to his responses made under oath in a deposition to questions including, “Did you have sexual relations” with Lewinsky? His answer under oath was a perjurious “No.” Sound familiar? Why would anyone lend any credence to Clinton’s answer to the same question decades later in regard to a child-prostitute? Why would his answer be reported as though his earlier answer to the same question in regard to another woman were truthful?

I contend that a person who has admitted to having lied, under oath, in answering a question of having had inappropriate sexual relations (with an intern) and is asked the same exact question (regarding a child-prostitute) should at the very least be viewed as questionable in terms of whether his second answer can be believed to be true. At the very least, the media should have inserted a footnote to remind readers that Clinton had lied, “I did not have sexual relations with that woman,” in speaking to the American people about Lewinsky’s “oral” contact with Clinton in the Oval Office. To the extent that the American public’s reaction to reports of Clinton’s Congressional testimony in 2026 was muted rather than publicly raising the obvious point that especially on the matter of sexual relations, Clinton was not to be believed, the undue credit that is implied or inherent in holding (or having held) public office and having a mouthpiece in the established, “main-stream” media can be surmised and judged to be problematic in themselves.

Societal credibility enjoys a certain default that, even if dislodged once as in the case of Clinton, can exist without any real foundation based in the character of the office-holder celebrities.  This is not to say that if they are caught “red-handed,” such as U.S. President Nixon was, and members of Congress have been more commonly, societal credibility can be difficult to regain. My point is that the public tends to swallow too easily that which should at the very least be held as suspect in terms of veracity. That Clinton lied under oath and to the American people about having had sexual relations with Lewinsky in the 1990s should have registered on the media’s radar screen and in popular reaction to Clinton’s answer, again under oath, to the same question, to Congress in 2026. An old dog can indeed learn new tricks, but personal ethical development should not be assumed as if the proverbial dog had not done the old, sordid deed once already.

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1. Leo Briceno, “WATCH: Bill Clinton Grilled on Shirtless Hot Tub Photo amid Swirling Questions on Epstein Relationship,” Foxnews.com, March 2, 2026.
2. Ibid (on the quoted material).
3. Marilyn Rauber, “Finally Admits He Lied under Oath: Dodges Criminal Charges with a Last-Minute Deal,” California Post, January 19, 2001.

Putting a State in Charge of the E.U.

If only Ukraine could become the 51^st member-state of the U.S., rather than the 28^th state of the E.U., given the veto of Viktor Orban of the E.U. state of Hungary on the E.U. annexing Ukraine. Besides the inherent problems that come with relying so much on the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of the E.U., mislabeling the prime minister of the state that chairs the legislative committees known collectively as the Council of the E.U. as the E.U. president not only marginalizes the federal officials, including President Von der Leyen, who, as the head of the E.U.’s executive branch, can rightfully be considered as the president of the European Union. In contrast, government officials of a state chairing legislative committees can hardly be said to collectively be the “presidency” of the European Union. Behind the promotion of this fallacy is the anti-federalist, or Euroskeptic, political ideology that misconstrues the E.U. as merely a network of intergovernmental relations between the states.

Although the E.U., like the U.S., splits governmental sovereignty between two systems—that of the union and that of the states, the two unions have different ways in which state officials participate at the federal level. The official participation roles are greater in E.U. institutions than in U.S. institutions at the union level. In his book, Federal Government, Kenneth Wheare makes the point that federalism has two systems of government, neither of which is a “level” above the other. He is correct because the sovereignty remaining with state governments, which in both unions includes all residual sovereignty, is not “lower” than the exclusive or shared competencies, or enumerated domains of power, delegated to the federal governmental institutions. The fallacy of “levels” is much easier to grasp by looking that the European Union than the United States because of the extent of official roles in certain E.U. governmental institutions for state officials, whereas in the U.S., state officials lost their direct participation when U.S. senators became elected offices rather than by appointment by the respective state chief executives/heads of state/commanders in chief (i.e., “governors” being those who govern) or legislatures. This difference may be why so much governmental sovereignty will not be transferred from the system of state governments to the union’s governmental institutions in the E.U. by 100 or 200 years in the E.U. as in the U.S. as of the 249^th anniversary of the thirteen colonies boldly (as there was considerable risk) declaring themselves to be free and independent countries, then already in a military alliance (i.e., the Continental Congress).

On the day before the 249^th anniversary of 13 British colonies in North America declaring themselves to be sovereign countries, Ukrainian President Zelensky attended “the opening ceremony of the Danish EU Presidency in Aarhus.”[1] Depicting or characterizing Denmark as the “EU Presidency” is misleading, for the reference is to officials of that state chairing policy-domain specific committees rather than standing for the E.U. itself. The exaggeration is at the expense of recognition that the Commission’s head, Von der Leyen, a federal rather than a state official, has a greater claim to speak for the European Union. As president of the E.U.'s executive branch, Von der Leyen delivers the annual State of the Union address at the Parliament chamber, just as the president of the U.S. delivers the State of the Union in the U.S. House of Representatives' chamber. It is revealing that just before the Parliament's vote of confidence in Von der Leyen on July 10, 2025, a lawyer specialized in E.U. law predicted that even if the vote is favorable to Von der Leyen, more "and more [E.U.] citizens will ask themselves, is she really the right person to lead the E.U. in such turbulent times."[2] It is not as though the rotating 6-month "presidency" of whatever state government is chairing the committees known collectively as the Council of the E.U. could claim to be at the helm, and thus step in for a weakened Von der Leyen. 

Generally speaking, putting a state in charge of the E.U. would be loaded with intractable problems. In June of the same year, the governor of the E.U. state of France presumed to speak for the European Union rather than just for his state on foreign policy, effectively (and I suspect intentionally) sidelining the E.U.’s president and its foreign minister, an office that is deliberately mislabeled as the “High Representative” to appease Euroskeptics. 

Regarding the involvement of the state governments at the federal level, the President of the European Council, António Costa, had a greater claim than the chair of legislative committees to be referred to as a president, and Macron of France was not the federal official standing for the European Council. That the governor of the E.U. state of Denmark “vowed to support Ukraine’s accession process” to be annexed by the E.U. and to use the “presidency of the E.U. Council to put ‘maximum pressure’ on Hungary to lift its veto on Ukraine” being annexed by the E.U. is less significant than the pressure than the federal officials António Costa and Ursula von der Leyen could apply on Hungary’s governor.[3] In response the emphasis, for example, of the Danish foreign minister chairing the other state foreign ministers in one of the committees in the Council of the E.U., Viktor Orban could more easily relegate Von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas and António Costa and thus deflate pressure from the E.U. itself, which is greater than a committee of state officials chaired by a Danish state official.

In other words, the paralyzing impact of retaining vetoes in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. is exacerbated by falsely portraying a state government as the “Presidency of the E.U.” The Parliament and the Commission even together may be too weak to counter the power of the states in the E.U. governmental system within the federal system; mislabeling a state as the E.U. Presidency only exacerbates the imbalance, even if it is a policy of officials of that state to resist the veto of another state. The E.U. is more than being the simple aggregate of the states, and the European Court of Justice, the European Commission, and the European Parliament are all institutions of the E.U. that manifest the E.U. being more than the sum of its states. Just as balance is important between the system of state governments and the system of the federal government in a federal system, so too balance of power is important between the branches of government, and in this respect the federal government should be distinguished from state government within a federal system because only in the former are some institutions representing states and others represent federal citizens. It is important that the power of the state officials in union institutions not overwhelm the power of federal officials in other union-institutions, lest particular state interests dominate those of the whole. Denmark may have its own economic and political interests with respect to Ukraine, whereas Von der Leyen and Kallas represent the E.U.’s interests rather than those of any state. Overstating the salience of the state governments in E.U. governance at the expense of federal officials.

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1. Evelyn Ann-Marie Dom and Jorge Liboreiro, “Ukraine Will Do ‘Anything’ to Advance EU Accession Talks Despite Hungary Veto, Zelenskyy Says,” Euronews.com, July 3, 2025.
2. Sandor Zsiros, "EU Parliament Censure Vote Leaves von der Leyen Weakened, even in Victory," Euronews.com, July 10, 2025, italics added.

3.  Evelyn Ann-Marie Dom and Jorge Liboreiro, “Ukraine Will Do ‘Anything’ to Advance EU Accession Talks Despite Hungary Veto, Zelenskyy Says,” Euronews.com, July 3, 2025.

On the American Media’s Hyperbole in Politics

If America can be said to have violent cultures, relatively speaking and especially in countries such as Honduras but also in some U.S. states such as Illinois (e.g., Rockford and south Chicago), the media may simply be reflecting the wider culture in writing of political debates by using words like fight and battle in place of argue and debate. One effect is to exacerbate the problem, culturally speaking. Another effect is to garner more attention, which in turn translates into more revenue from selling advertisements. To the media, the latter counts whereas the former does not; the media can blame the “heated rhetoric” of candidates for office and elected officeholders for an uptick in political violence rather than assume some of the responsibility. I submit that journalists are even more at fault when they magnify the significance of a political event to the point of being mistaken, widely missing the actual mark. The lack of any follow-through in the field wherein one media outlet holds another accountable is also a problem, especially when all of the major outlets are on the proverbial bandwagon.

Before the Harris-Trump U.S. presidential debate in 2024, CNN stated, “Harris’ joyful campaign will Tuesday be hit by the blunt force of reality—a debate with Donald Trump—the most menacing political foe of modern times.”[1] Besides the word Tuesday being awkwardly placed before rather than just after the words, be hit, the journalist’s certainty, as evinced in will be instead of might be hit turned out to be wrong. After the debate, Newsweek titled one of its articles on the debate, “’Trump Was So Bad’: Fox News Voter Panel Declares Harris Debate Winner.”[2] Twelve on the panel thought Harris had won, whereas only five thought that Trump had done so. Time titled its debate analysis piece, “Trump Spent the Debate Walking into Traps Harris Laid for Him.”[3] It was Trump, rather than Harris, who refused after the debate to have another debate. That says it all.

So, where was the headline, “CNN Erred in Declaring Trump the Winner before the Debate”? Even with such a headline somewhere in the public discourse, CNN would probably not smart enough from the virtual slap to resist the temptation to be so certain epistemologically in the future, and I suspect that too many viewers or readers would not recalibrate how much credibility they give to definitive assertions made by CNN in the future. Similarly, too many people tend to believe politicians even with a reputation for being pathological liars as if speaking in front of a microphone and camera mean that the person speaking must be declaring truths.

In short, the refusal of the media companies to hold each other accountable when they get something very, very wrong plus the gullibility of people reading or viewing politicians in public discourse enable journalists (as well as the subterranean politicians) to make outlandish claims, including those that are actually the journalists’ opinions being “reported” as if facts of reason. To claim that Harris’s campaign will be hit is an opinion clothed in a stiff, grizzled suit of fact. Alternatively, the journalist could have interviewed a political analyst, who could have given an informed opinion. That would be reporting.

To be sure, debating who won a debate is of questionable importance, really. In fact, with few exceptions—one being the Biden-Trump debate in 2024 and another being the Kennedy-Nixon televised debate in 1960—winning a presidential debate typically has not had much impact on races. Costin Ciobanu, a political scientist at the University of London, presented a study in which he found “that presidential debates have a weak influence on vote choice . . . due to the importance of longer-term structural variables.”[4] The recession in 1991, for example, is generally recognized by political scientists as having a strong impact on George H.W. Bush’s loss. A debate may be momentarily titillating, but people tend to vote figuratively speaking with their pocketbooks or wallets.

Even so, The Huffington Post’s headline prior to the Harris-Trump debate was: “Tonight: As High Stakes As It Gets.” Politico characterized the debate beforehand as “historic.” That reporter, a national political correspondent, was so brazen that he admits that there is “hype” ahead of the debate, but even that does not keep him from declaring “just how momentous” the debate “will be” as if its HUGE significance were a well-established fact of reason.[5] The opinion and its underlying judgment were grossly incorrect; the race between Harris and Trump remained a toss-up.

Why the preposterous hyperbole? Journalistic marketing. It is in the media’s financial (and personal) self-interest that the “must-see faceoff” be watched by as many viewers as possible.[6] Besides the questionable ethics of overselling a debate as a momentous, even historical event, and especially if fabrication is involved, lying in doing so, negative implications could be ripple through the electoral system. To the extent that debates are entertaining “tit for tats” rather than informative on policy positions and rationales (i.e., making the underlying values explicit and perhaps even debating them!), building a societal political norm wherein one is supposed to vote on the basis of who the voter thinks won the debate can undermine the credibility of popular sovereignty (i.e., the People’s power in voting) as the basis or bedrock of representative democracy in a republic. Additionally, given the obscenely long duration of modern presidential campaigns in the U.S., hyping each event along the way as if it will be decisive can exhaust voters and turn some off completely. Take for instance the Christmas season, which seems to get longer every year. By Christmas Day, I wouldn’t be surprised if many people are more than ready to turn off the Christmas music and go to a movie in ordinary time. Imagine if every weekend between Halloween and Christmas, people are told that it is a must-celebrate (and must shop) weekend. You don’t want to miss out on the Christmas spirit! By Christmas Eve, it might be time for a nap. By election day, it might be a time for gratitude that the thing is finally over.

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1. Stephen Collinson, “Harris Braces for the Most Critical Moment of her Political Career at Debate with Trump,” CNN.com, September 10, 2024. Although the empirical study’s data came from Europe, many American political analysts have reached the same conclusion regarding the American presidency.
2. Joe Edwards, “’Trump Was So Bad’: Fox News Voter Panel Declares Harris Debate Winner,” Newsweek, September 11, 2024.
3. Phillip Elliott, “Trump Spent the Debate Walking into Traps Harris Laid for Him,” Time, September 10, 2024.
4. Costin Ciobanu, “Do Presidential Debates Matter? Evidence from an Eastern European Context,” Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Oslo, 06-09 September, 2017.
5. Brakkton Booker, “It’s a Historic Debate Tonight. No One Really Wants to Talk about It,” Politico, September 10, 2024.
6. Ibid.

Journalism Goes Only So Far in Empire-Scale Democracy

A news story only goes so far; only so much “digging” is possible against a pressing deadline. Moreover, we humans are not particularly good at “connecting the dots” when they are far afield. Through natural selection in an environment in which humans were prey as well as hunters, we are still “hard-wired” to privilege the immediate. So it takes more than a bit of effort to counter this natural predilection in order to make a truly informed judgment that takes into account the relevant tributaries. One such judgment concerns the impact of U.S. President Joe Biden’s age on his fitness to serve a second term.

I submit that after the presidential debate in June, 2024, the American media did not adequately distinguish the issue being how fit the president would be in the future, during a second term, from how he was at the time of the debate (and whether the issue was episodic or of a continuing and gradually worsening condition—the White House had a vested interest in promoting the former over the latter). Even in this respect, the human orientation to the immediate is evident. How the president did a few well-orchestrated appearances in the wake of the debate is relevant if the issue were episodic—one of a bad performance—and the press by in large accepted this paradigm at the expense of asking how the president would be in two or three years—the second term not beginning for six months! Whether the president would be fit in terms of old-age to serve a second term is also not the same as whether he could win the election, yet the media was satisfied to let the latter be the pivotal issue given the political interests of Democrats running for office. The issue concerning the president’s age was how he would be in two or three years, not whether he should immediately resign or whether he could win the election. Both in focusing on particular “performances” and on the political question of whether Biden could win the election, the media was enabling rather than countering the common propensity to privilege the immediacy over the eventual. This orientation to furnishing information to the voters is not conducive to good electoral judgment by any electorate.

Taking the issue to be the president’s likely future fitness to serve a second term, Americans’ horizon could have been deepened in at least two respects. That is, Americans could go beyond their media to consider two additional things.

First, with President Biden down with the “covid” virus, rather than looking for immediate symptoms, people could have recalled that Queen Elizabeth survived the illness itself only to die a year or so after it. After she had recovered from the illness itself, she admitted to two visitors that it had been bad, so it is reasonable to suppose that her death a year or so later came as a result. Given the long-term impact of the virus on organs such as the heart, it is possible that for the elderly who survive the onset of the virus, the life-threatening aspect may kick in a year or two later from a weakened heart muscle. If so, the implications for Biden being able to serve a complete second term should not be ignored or passed over in favor of looking for immediate symptoms. It bears remembering that President Wilson was severely impacted by at least one stroke during his second term, and the White House kept this from the American people. In 2024 just after the June debate, even members of the political elite were angry because Biden’s handlers had kept even just his decline a secret. Perhaps a few news stories on Wilson’s second term could have nudged the electorate in considering what Biden’s handlers might do during a second term.

Second, even in the midst of public discourse on President Biden’s health and age, the media, with the exception of one article by The Washington Post, did not mention that he had had two brain operations for aneurysms in 1988. Although he fully recovered, how or whether the surgeries themselves or the aneurysms could have a negative impact his elderly brain was worth asking following the debate. In short, rather than merely looking at the president’s immediate health, a longer, longitudinal perspective would have been useful, especially as the issue was the impact of old-age on the president’s brain in particular and the surgery had been on his brain.

As to why the media did not include these considerations, the focus on the immediate that is engrained in human nature served not only journalists under pressure to put out a story before a deadline, but also politicians whose political survival instinct to be elected (or re-elected). Whether President Biden could win came to include whether he would take the U.S. House down with him—meaning that the legislative chamber would continue to have a Republican majority. Subjecting Biden’s immediate covid symptoms to coverage and juxtapositioning his slightly increased lethargy with a triumphant Trump at the Republican Convention fit that narrative and the buttressing political interests of the moment. In contrast, whether the covid virus could leave its mark on the president not immediately, but in a year or two, such that he might be more likely to die in his second term did not fit and was thus ignored by journalists and the political elite alike. Whether from collusion or coincident interests, the impact was the same. Up against the human tendency to privilege the immediate and political interests hinging on the 2024 election, the question of whether the president could viably serve a full second term quietly dissipated. Did anyone notice?  I doubt it; the shift was so subtle, and of course in line with our human, all too human propensity to focus on the more immediate.

For the profound thinkers on democracy, a few broader tasks can be suggested to ponder. First, given the human propensity to focus on the immediate, do journalists and media companies have a responsibility to compensate by emphasizing longer-term factors that are relevant to an electorate’s judgment in an upcoming election? If so, should such responsibility be waived if viewers (or readers) simply do not want the less titillating material to be included in the news stories? Against pressure from advertisers, any such responsibility would likely be quickly flailed against the nearest wall without any hindrance from conscience. Second, like the six-year term of U.S. Senators, are there any other structural elements that could be added to the U.S. political system that would counter the hegemony of immediacy in preference to the long-term? Rather than extending the terms of senators even more, or extending the terms of any other elected representative at the federal level, how can the electoral process or system be altered in ways that provide more space for long-term considerations by an electorate? It may be that instituting maximum and not just minimum age qualifications would help, but such a quick fix ought not to relegate the value in analyzing systemic elements of the electoral and governmental systems in terms of whether they lean us toward the immediate. If so, could structural reforms be “invented” that tilt either or both systems to favor medium- and long-term considerations? That the U.S. debt had by 2024 increased to an astronomical figure of nearly $35 trillion—perhaps already a de facto default—suggests that the systems were aligned in favor of the human propensity to emphasize instant gratification over the long-term viability of a republic (or a republic of republics, as in the cases of the U.S. and E.U.).

The American Media Went “Nuclear” on the U.S. Senate's Filibuster: A Case of Hyperactive Marketing?

Is ending the filibuster on appointments to executive-branch offices as well as judicial appointments below the U.S. Supreme Court really “the nuclear option”? Is this expression simply rhetoric gone horribly over the top? Journalists would undoubtedly demur, at least publically, yet without feeling an ounce of shame.
On November 22, 2013, a leading story on the front page of USA Today immediately snagged my fleeting attention with the headline, “’Nuclear’ volleys across aisle signal a Cold War in Congress.”[1] The 52-48 vote in the U.S. Senate on the previous day was neither a “nuclear volley” nor the beginning of a “cold war.” Rather, the reform was yet another legislative device having to do with reducing the gridlock within the chamber and perhaps for a party to gain more control therein. The political tussles between the two major parties had already been going on, so the latest reform could not have been the start of a war, cold or hot.
To be sure, editors look for headlines to be attention-grabbers, and thus sensationalistic—yet even if the claim is false or even misleading? Signaling a cold war flies in the face of the prior existence of such a “war,” as during the U.S. Government’s partial shutdown when raising the government’s debt-ceiling was in jeopardy. Moreover, the reporter continues the sensationalism within the article.
For example, the reporter invokes “the superpower theory of Mutually Assured Destruction—that is, if you use the most powerful weapon against your enemy, your enemy will use it against you—neither side had ever deployed it.”[2] Does not this “theory” apply more to shutting down the government or refusing to raise the debt-limit? The fact that Americans waked up on November 22^nd with a functional federal government belies the journalist’s application of the theory to whether the U.S. Senate would confirm more appellate and district judges. Nevertheless, the reporter “reports” that “Democrats voted for detonation.”[3]  I didn’t hear any sort of blast, or for that matter, see any damage the next day.
As for any realistic (i.e., still incremental rather than radical) consequences, the reporter provides merely a quote at the end of the article. Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-IA) said, “The silver lining is that there will come a day when the roles are reversed. When that happens, our side will likely nominate and confirm lower court and Supreme Court nominees with 51 votes.”[4] As if as an afterthought, the reporter tacked on this quote, which says basically that the Senate would continue to delimit the filibuster’s domain. Crucially, incrementalism is not radicalism. Hence, the war rhetoric is misleading at best, and it displaces reportage on the real significance of the vote.

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1. Susan Page, ““’Nuclear’ volleys across aisle signal a Cold War in Congress,” USA Today, November 22, 2013.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., emphasis added.

Contagion Beyond the Headlines in the E.U.

The E.U. states of Greece and Italy were grabbing headlines during the first two weeks of November 2011, given the dramatic resignations of Papandreou and Berlusconi. The only other state to get some attention was France. The Wall Street Journal noted on November 12^th that concerns had been quietly building about France. According to the paper,“French bond yields rose to four-month highs, one day after Standard & Poor's Ratings Services erroneously issued a message saying it had cut France's triple-A credit rating. The yield on France's benchmark 10-year bond climbed 0.02 percentage point to 3.46%. That was 1.66 percentage points over yields on comparable German government bonds. France now has the highest government bond yields among its triple-A-rated peers in the region.” However, it seems overly dramatic to say that a .02 percent increase evinces a climb. Moreover, 3.46% is well under 7 percent, which is the level that was presumed at the time to signify the need for a bailout. Relative to the changes in the Italian yield, those of the French bonds could be viewed as relatively moderate, The French yield was still closer to that of Germany. Although not a red herring, the concern over France masked some real sleepers that were poised to take a hit in 2012. 

Eclipsed by the headlines, Portugal’s expected GDP for 2012 was revised downward by the E.U.’s executive branch in November from the May estimates of around -1.8% to -3% with an expected unemployment rate of nearly 14 percent. The 2011 numbers were also revised downward, from about -1.9% to around -2.1 percent. Meanwhile, Portugal’s semi-sovereign 10-year bond yield was at just over 12 percent, well over Italy’s “point of no return” rate of 7.5 percent, which was hit for a day during the second week of November. With an expected contraction of 3% in 2012 and a 12% yield in November of 2011, Portugal could be expected to face stronger head-winds in being able to make its interest payments in 2012. I suspect that the press had become so captivated with the circus of personalities in Greece and Italy that the iceberg lying in front of Portugal was simply not seen.

Besides Portugal, some of the states in Eastern Europe faced icebergs of their own—though not necessarily of their own making. These too were receiving too little press coverage in November of 2011. Specifically, the state leaders of the “euro zone” had decided in October to give the “zone’s” major banks until the following summer to raise their capital reserves. With that amount of time, the banks could avoid issuing new stock (which would dilute the holdings of their existing stockholders) and get the added reserves together by cutting back on lending to Eastern E.U. state governments instead. Morgan Stanley figures that Poland, Romania, and Hungary are most vulnerable to a loss of “euro zone” bank lending. Roughly 1 trillion euros of “euro zone” bank assets were in Eastern Europe at the time of the change in governments in Greece and Italy. Hungary’s exposure was the largest, with loans held by the banks amounting to about 37% of GDP. According to the Wall Street Journal, any hit to the E.U.’s eastern states, whose economic growth had been powered the global recovery, would only worsen the E.U.’s economic outlook and its ability to service its debts. That is to say, enabling the “euro zone” banks to raise additional reserve capital by reducing lending rather than raising equity may have been in the banks’ interest, but choking the eastern states could already in November be expected to make it more difficult for Greece, Italy, and Portugal to service their respective debts from reduced economic output in 2012. 

It would have been wiser on the journalists’ part to put France in perspective and take a look at Portugal and Eastern Europe than to have fixated so much on the plights of Papandreou and Berlusconi as they struggled to maintain power only to ultimately lose it.

For more on this topic, see Essays on the E.U. Political Economy

Sources:

Matthew Dalton, “Europe Slashes Its Growth Forecast,” The Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2011. 

Kelly Evans, “Eastern Europe Vulnerable in Debt Crisis,” The Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2011. 

Neelabh Chaturvedi, Stelios Bouras, and Liam Moloney, “Europe Pulls Back From Brink,” The Wall Street Journal, November 12-13, 2011. 

Cases of Unethical Business: A Malignant Mentality of Mendacity

The book, Cases of Unethical Business: A Malignant Mentality of Mendacity, presents a number of cases of unethical conduct at American companies in several industries, along with some cases from other regions of the world for comparative perspective. A variety of industries are represented so to evince a common denominator lurking beneath specific instances of unethical conduct in business. The emphasis here is not on ethical decision-making, for it does not go deep enough. Rather, the underlying mentality out of which the decisions come is to be unearthed to be examined in the light of day. The mentality can be characterized as a mendacious narcissism having little or no regard for other people or institutions; yet even this characterization is incomplete, for a certain presumptuousness or even arrogance is can also be discerned in the cases. The mentality can be deemed to be inherently unethical in itself, regardless of whether any ensuing sordid conduct ensues.

The book, Cases of Unethical Business, can be obtained in print or as an ebook at Amazon.com.

A Federal Court Stays President Trump’s Muslim-Ban: Flawed Reportage?

Judge Ann Donnelly of the U.S. Federal District Court in Brooklyn, New York, issued a nationwide injunction on January 28, 2017 concerning President Donald Trump’s executive order barring people from seven countries from entering the United States. On the same day, BBC (America) radio reported that Trump had been stopped in his tracks. I submit that this instance points to the importance of investigative journalism prior to reporting. Alternatively, the case may illustrate a partisan or otherwise ideological penchant among journalists officially tasked with investigating and reporting rather than interpreting the news.

According to The New York Times, the order was “limited in scope, applying only to people on their way to the United States or already here.”[1] People en route to the United States on January 28^th would not be sent back because of the undue hardship involved. Rather than allowed into the U.S., those few hundred people would be detained. So the federal president’s travel ban was essentially untouched. So the notion that the federal judicial branch had stopped Trump is clearly untrue. The hyperbole to the contrary may “make good press,” whether by opposition groups or journalists. Yet political value in sketching a political reality in which the new president was already going too far and thus had to be stopped cannot be ignored. In politics, perception can indeed become reality. So the possibility of a political agenda cannot be ruled out.

With regard to journalists and media companies, sheer ignorance or ideological preference is no excuse for not reporting the obvious: only people on their way to the U.S. would not be turned back, and they would remain detained until or unless they have been cleared on a case-by-case basis, as the executive order permits. To characterize the judge’s ruling as an injunction staying the order is nothing short of misleading.

The order itself was being taken out of perspective societally, as it was intended to be only temporary, giving the U.S. Government enough time to strengthen its vetting process.  The president is on firm ground in that, as the statement itself reads, “No foreign national in a foreign land, without ties to the United States, has any unfettered right to demand entry into the United States or to demand immigration benefits in the United States.”[2] To take a rather blatant example, a person does not have the right to unilaterally cross an international border, not to mention to go on to insist on a right to benefits for those who have lawfully crossed the border.

The order is on much less firm ground to the extent that the intent and outcome discriminates against Muslims.  “The smoking gun they put in the executive order is the idea that they would grant exceptions for minority religions,” said Anthony Romero of the ACLU.[3] The one thing you can’t do under the establishment clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is favor one religion over another, he added. The clause states that the U.S. Government cannot establish (or favor) a religion, or prohibit the free exercise of religion. 

Would declaring or acting in such a way that only Christians are admitted from the seven countries in the Middle East mentioned in the order be to establish a religion? I submit that this question is more difficult than meets the eye. Clearly, favoring one religion over another runs contrary to the American value of toleration (it is certainly distasteful to me--comparative religion being one of my academic fields!) but does favoring people of a given religion establish that religion as the official religion of the United States? My point is merely that an elastic reading of the establishment clause may be necessary to get to establishment from barring Muslims. 

To be sure, the executive order does not bar Muslims; rather, it may discriminate against them. Yet even this may be a function of security rather than religious preference (which in itself falls short of establishing a religion). From a security standpoint, making distinctions among religions does have "a kernel of truth," given the facts on the ground. It makes sense, therefore, that stricter scrutiny would be entailed where a predominately Muslim country has lax security. I suspect that the selection of the seven countries had to do with weaknesses in the U.S.’s vetting process having to do specifically with those countries. Perhaps their security infrastructures pale in comparison with that of the Saudis--Saudi Arabia being omitted from the list in spite of being a conservative Muslim country! 

So, again, to report or characterize the executive order as a “Muslim ban” implies the sordid presence of either ignorance or a political agenda. Either way, it should be noted that a viable republic wherein the People stand as the ultimate sovereign depends on accurate reporting of the affairs of government to the principals. For intermediaries to become lazy or insert their own agendas is to disrespect the very notion of a republic, and the People as well.

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[1] Adam Liptak, “Rulings on Trump’s Immigration Order Are First Step on Long Legal Path,” The New York Times, January 29, 2017.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

Getting an Election So Wrong: The American Media and Pollsters in 2016

“After projecting a relatively easy victory for Hillary Clinton with all the certainty of a calculus solution, news outlets like The New York Times, The Huffington Post and the major networks scrambled to provide candid answers.”[1] The dynamics likely went beyond even candid answers from the media, with major implications for how much reliance Americans should place on their media-establishment for political information.

“You were in a bubble and weren’t paying attention to your fellow Americans,” filmmaker Michael Moore wrote.[2] To be sure, “all the number-crunching of state polls pointed to resounding success” for Hillary Clinton in the Electoral College.[3] The journalists could simply insist that they were reporting those polls. “Virtually all the major vote forecasters, including Nate Silver’s FiveThirtyEight site, The New York Times Upshot and the Princeton Election Consortium, put [Hillary] Clinton’s chances of winning in the 70 to 99 percent range.”[4] Even so, Chris Wallace, an anchor at Fox News, make the following observation on election day. “A lot of media outlets made a decision sometime after the convention that Donald Trump was beyond the pale and they no longer had to observe the normal rules of journalism and objectivity.”[5] Clearly this was true of The Huffington Post, which declared Hillary Clinton “cleared” by the FBI on the Sunday before election day in spite of the fact that the agency was still investigating the Clinton Foundation, whose fundraising may have involved quid pro quos involving Hillary Clinton’s role as U.S. Secretary of State.

At the very least, groupthink was in the mix, meaning that the mainstream media was “on the same page” concerning assumptions regarding the upcoming election. Besides their being just plain wrong, their narrowness was such that society itself could hardly break free of the force of the narrative. Moreover, the narrowness suggests that the power of the American media was at the time too concentrated, such that alternative views, which can provide a check on groupthink, could not get through. In a representative democracy, a narrow conduit by which information is not only conveyed, but also interpreted and subject to ideology, represents a major flaw. Put another way, that the mainstream media outlets were all singing the same song suggests that societal debate on matters of public policy was also very likely too narrow, and subject to everybody being wrong in a major assumption.

Yet Wallace’s assumption that merely reporting the polls would be objective is vulnerable. Polls can only contribute so much. The “failed election predictions suggest that the rush to exploit data may have outstripped the ability to recognize its limits.”[6] Such limitations include “the potentially flawed assumptions of the people who build predictive models.”[7] Additionally, polling can offer only probabilities that cannot fully capture whether the motivation to vote will actualize at the proverbial ballot-box. For one thing, social desirability may spur poll respondents to say they will vote only because it is a societally recognized duty. Lastly, polls prior to an election cannot account for voters who change their decision at the time of voting.

So even the media’s common assumption that polls can and should receive such overwhelming emphasis was faulty, and the groupthink on this point left the electorate vulnerable to going to vote with a flawed understanding of how Americans had been reacting to the candidates. Just as political campaigns are not objective, journalists (and especially those who serve as commentators) are not merely conduits for facts. Given the subjectivity all around, a certain wideness of narrative (and assumptions) made more likely by a less concentrated mainstream media would enhance the American democracy.

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[1] Jim Rutenberg, “News Outlets Wonder Where the Predictions Went Wrong,” The New York Times, November 9, 2016.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Steve Lohr and Natasha Singer, “How Data Failed Us in Calling an Election,” The New York Times, November 10, 2016.

[5] Jim Rutenberg, “News Outlets Wonder Where the Predictions Went Wrong,” The New York Times, November 9, 2016.

[6] Steve Lohr and Natasha Singer, “How Data Failed Us in Calling an Election,” The New York Times, November 10, 2016.

[7] Ibid.

CEO/worker Pay: Perceptual Shortcomings

According to one study of people around the world, people of different cultures, incomes, religions, and other differences show “a universal desire for smaller gaps in pay between the rich and poor” than was the actual case at the time of the survey in 2014.[1] Interestingly, the respondents didn’t have a clue how much of a gap actually existed in their respective economies. The difficulty in estimation means that the public discourse on economic inequality has been rife with erroneous assumptions. Where the error lies in the direction of minimizing the gap, we can postulate that public policy allows for greater economic inequality than would otherwise be the case.

The United States, for example, surged past Peter Drucker’s wall of 20 to 1 (CEO compensation to average worker pay), hitting 40 to 1 in 1994 and then 400 to 1 in 2005. Why would America’s silent majority put up with such economic inequality? The short answer might lie with the power of corporations in using media corporations to lull television viewers into supposing that the difference in compensation is not very significant—significance involving not only perception, but judgment as well. That is to say, whether the gap is perceived to be significant is a value judgment that can be subtly manipulated.

In spite of an actual gap of 350 to 1 (CEO compensation to unskilled worker pay) in 2014, the Americans surveyed estimated the ratio to be 30 to 1.[2] Such a perceptual judgment could have been influenced by the lack of attention on the topic in the media. The ideologicalization of American broadcast journalism—the blurring of the lines between reporting and advocating—points to just how much estimates of significance can be subject to external influence.

Considering the relatively wide actual gap being allowed to exist in the American States as of 2014, what would the public policy have looked like had the perceptions of the American public been adjusted up to 350 to 1? Would the decentralized individual voters forming majoritarian blocks demanding limits put enough pressure on their elected representatives to mitigate the power of wealth in the halls of legislatures as elections loom?  

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[1] Gretchen Gavett, “CEOs Get Paid Too Much, According to Pretty Much Everyone in the World,” The Huffington Post, September 24, 2014.

[2] Ibid.

The European Parliament: A National Election?

In the wake of the E.U.’s parliamentary election in 2014, the media reported the results as though a number of “national elections” had just taken place. Unlike the European Council, the Parliament does not represent states; in fact, the representatives of the people do not even sit by state, but by federal-level party, renders the reportage as distortive at best. Moreover, its ideological bent can help us situate the E.U. along the interval of federal-state relations possible in federal systems; this situs in turn can tell us something about the likely trajectory for the Union—the electoral success of the Euro-skeptic parties being only a symptom. To situate the election results, I briefly cover a bit of federalism theory before discussing the election-results coverage itself.

Modern federalism, which combines “confederal” alliance governance with principles of national government, requires considerable vigilance to balance the two systems lest one engulf the other. In his seminal work on the subject, Federal Government, Kenneth Wheare contends that modern federalism requires no such balance to operate; all that is necessary is that the states and the federal government each have at least one domain of authority that is autonomous. He would be at pains to show that the nearly-consolidated U.S. “federal” system functions as a federal system rather than as a “one size fits all,” empire-scale government. He would also have trouble explaining how the state-centric E.U. “federal” system enables the federal level to function viably.

Unfortunately, the respective imbalances may worsen. Theoretically speaking, dissolution is the main risk facing a federal system dominated by its state governments, whereas consolidation is the alluring danger for a federal system dominated by its federal, or “general,” government at the expense of those of the member-states. If this hypothesis is correct, then the tendency of a given federal system can be predicted only once it has been situated relative to a threshold point wherein federal/state powers are in balance.  Even though state-rights claims of state sovereignty in the E.U.’s 2014 election season can easily be classified as ideologically fanciful, the preponderance of governmental sovereignty being at the state level portended a probably future of dissolution; the U.S. nearly succumbed to this plight in 1832 (the Nullification Crisis) and then again thirty years later (the USA-CSA war) because the states had most of the power back then. By World War II, the U.S. had “crossed the threshold” in terms of federal-state power, such that consolidation became the probable “end-game.” As E.U. citizens went to the polls in 2014, no one would accuse the E.U. of pursuing that course.

Notably, at least one major European press reported the E.U. legislative election erroneously as “European elections.”[1] Even though “countries” are not represented in the E.U.’s parliament, The Financial Times characterized the election as several national elections—even claiming that the UKIP party’s electoral success was the first time a third party had won a “national election” in Britain.[2] Even in terms of a “state delegation,” the Parliament, like the U.S. House, acknowledges no such grouping formally; in both legislative bodies, the representatives, who represent constituents in federal districts, do not even sit by state.

Marine Le Pen of France's National Front Party. Can the E.U.'s legislative election be reduced to several state-level elections? Je crois que certainment non.

To be sure, the E.U. was at the time much more state-centric than the U.S., as evidenced by the plethora of state-level parties dwarfing the federal-level ones. Even so, the characterization of “national elections” for an election bearing only on the E.U. and its citizens cannot be justified, and is thus likely the manifestation of a states-rights ideological agenda—the major attendant danger to which being dissolution. Put another way, relegating the direct relation between the E.U. Parliament and E.U. citizens in the public’s mind could compromise the Union’s viability more than the electoral success of the Euro-skeptic state-level parties in the national election (the Parliament being in line with national rather than international principles).  

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1. Peter Spiegel and Hugh Carnegy, “Anti-EU Parties Celebrate Election Success,” The Financial Times, May 26, 2014.

2. Ibid.

NBA Team-Owner Faces Wrath of the Mob For Racist Conversation

As the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court were looking at two cases involving cellphone privacy from the standpoint of police access, NBC Commissioner Adam Silver announced that he had banned Los Angeles Clippers owner Donald Sterling from attending any NBA team practice or game for life and was being fined $2.5 million. Interestingly, given the tenor of the public discourse, the Clippers’ owner had not made a public pronouncement regarding his negative view of black people; rather, a tabloid had taped and broadcast a private cellphone conversation. That is to say, Sterling would have to pay a multi-million dollar fine for what he had said in a private conversation with his girlfriend. I contend there is reason to pause at this news, lest such public pressure establish the precedent wherein the passions of the mob is effectively given such reign as to render property ownership and the rule of law as so contingent that might makes right. 

Had the NSA rather than a Hollywood tabloid outfit recorded the conversation and made it public, the absolutist tone in the media’s non-debate would doubtlessly have been muted. Even so, the judgment on Sterling’s less-than-sterling moral turpitude would probably have been just as swift. Interestingly, a judge in Egypt had just announced his sentencing of over 600 defendants to death after what had been a ten-minute trial (with the vast majority of the defendants tried in abstentia). Although no one was publically calling for Sterling’s head literally, the air of la fait accompli would be difficult to miss throughout the American media. The sheer absolutist tone rings particularly shrill in a democratic republic that enshrines the rule of law rather than that of garden-variety dislike (whether that of Sterling or his many detractors).

As one pundit said on CNN, “You can’t fall on the other side of this issue.”[1] He added that the same applies to childhood obesity. Presumably a NBA team owner cannot denigrate fat kids and expect to be able to continue to attend the team’s practices and games. Saying “that player’s kid is a real fattie” on a private phone call thus risks the kid’s big brother coming back with public condemnations and a demand that the team owner be banned and even forced to sell his or her property.  In other words, property ownership can be contingent what a person says in private conversations that can be construed by other people as immoral or out of sync with contemporary societal norms.

Overwhelmed by the lashing out of anger at the octogenarian who had grown up in a very different era—indeed, in another century, when Nazi doctors were measuring facial features to extract impure races from Europe—the media barely mentioned the lack of any precedent in the NBA for removing an owner, and that moral turpitude is not listed in the bylaws as justifying the remove of an owner’s property-interest in a team.[2] Although a provision allows for “the interests of any owner” to be terminated if he or she “wilfully violates” any other provisions of the NBA “constitution,” The Wall Street Journal reports, “Many of the behaviors that constitute a justification for a forced sale involve financial issues, like failing to make payments on time or gambling on NBA games.”[3] If what is said in a private conversation between a man and his girlfriend can constitute a wilful violation of virtually anything stated or implied in the “constitution,” then why even bother with parchment?

One commentator even decried the owners for not having acted immediately to divest Sterling of his ownership, as if the owners would be justified in ignoring the NBA’s board of governors’ bylaws that give Sterling a period to reply and plead his case to his peers.[4] The sudden invisibility of the NBA’s own rules was itself largely off the media’s radar screen, conveniently dwarfed by the cavalcade of calls for Sterling’s head on a silver plate. John Locke, who had penned on the natural rights to life, liberty, and property, would doubtless be more than a bit uneasy at the demands that Sterling be forced to sell his property in such a way. Put another way, if owning a NBA team is so contingent, does ownership even apply?

(Image Source: favimages.net)

We are so human, all too human in fact, in our wilful summary judgments and infallible sentencing—both presumptions being based on the human instinct of dislike and even hatred stemming from an unrequited injury from the past—that we hardly realize collectively (i.e., in our public discourse as a society) that we have all sailed right past the rule of law as though it were some relic from an ancient saint. The irony here is of course that lynching used to be associated with Caucasian racists rather than their foes. 

One of Sterling’s attackers, one of many pundits referred to the need for healing following the “conversation on race.” Yet it fell on Chuck Todd as if to remind both his colleagues and the public at large that “there was no debate; no one defended [Sterling].”[5] This point ought to give us all at least some pause, regardless of which view we hold on this case, presuming we as a civilized society still believe in the rule of law rather than the passions of the mob, and still value the true diversity that is necessary for truly free and open public discourse.

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[1] The Situation Room, CNN, April 29, 2014.

[2] One exception was Chuck Todd of NBC News, as evinced on The Daily Rundown, MSNBC, April 30, 2014.

[3] Ashley Jones, “NBA’s Decision Against Clippers’ Owner: Is It Legal?” The Wall Street Journal, April 30, 2014.

[4] Christine Brennan, “Owners Drop Ball,” USA Today, April 29, 2014.

[5] Chuck Todd, The Daily Rundown, MSNBC, April 30, 2014.