The U.S. Supreme Court: Free Speech Trumps Public Accommodations Law

I contend as a matter of reasoned opinion rather than infallible fact that the Free Speech protection in the U.S. Constitution applies to not only human beings, rather than to non-human legal “persons” (e.g., corporations), but also to speech where the purpose is speech rather than something else. I have written elsewhere on the mistake in treating corporations as if they were human beings, so I treat only the second claim here. I reference the first claim only as context for my broader claim that the U.S. Supreme Court has tended to over-extend applications of the free-speech clause not only beyond its original intent, but also common sense. The latter violation is particularly astonishing. 

That clause, I submit, is oriented to forbidding the state from blocking or punishing what a person would otherwise say or write. The state compelling speech is a different matter, though that too ought to be prohibited in a free society. Also, where the purpose is business, standing up to the state in what a person says or writes is yet another matter. So if I open a business that sells ice-cream, for instance, I would be mistaken were I to view having chocolate ice-cream as a matter of free speech. I would not be selling chocolate ice-cream in order to say something, but to sell a product.

In Creative LLC v Elenis (2023), the U.S. Supreme Court decides in favor of an evangelical Christian whose business includes web-page design for weddings. She maintained that her religious belief against gay marriage should be an exception to the state’s public accommodations law, which bars discrimination against a protected class. Colorado, on the other hand, “argued that its Anti-Discrimination Act regulates sales, not speech, to ensure ‘equal access and equal dignity.’”[1] In other words, making and selling a product (or service) in order to profit financially is not speech. 

So Gorsuch, who wrote for the majority, incorrectly refers to “speech like Ms. Smith’s conveyed over the internet.”[2] At the very least, it is misleading to characterize Smith as conveying speech on the internet, for her purpose and the contours of her activity was to make and sell a product. She was not posting essays, for instance, or constructing her own website (her company’s website too was oriented to selling products rather than conveying “speech”). For a bit of context, the Russian bloggers posting essays online on the Ukraine war at the time would have shaken their heads in disbelief had someone told them that the website of a business engaged in selling products is really about speech rather than business. Even Target, an American retail company, did not put gay Pride flags for sale on the company’s website to make a statement; rather, the company was selling a product. Were the company making a political or ideological statement by adding gay Pride colors to the website, then that would fall under free speech. Smith was not making a political or ideological statement; rather, she was selling a product—webpages for weddings.

Gorsuch attempts to hold the ruling back from enveloping business in its entirety by carving out the production of a product that is "expressive" of the person who makes the product. But a web-page is not a piece of art unless that is the purpose. Also, virtually any product could be said to be "expressive," for product-design itself expresses the work of a designer. Put another way, Smith's own personal website, or even the website of of her business, can be said to express herself in a way qualitatively different from the websites she makes for clients. Gorsuch conflates the two and thus ignores the distinction. He thus unwittingly set up a slippery slope by which virtually anyone in business can obviate public-accommodations law simply by arguing that one's work expresses oneself in some way. Locke, after all, argues that a person mixing one's labor with a piece of land is sufficient to turn it into private property. 

The real tension associated with public-accommodations law is not free-speech; rather, the right of private property is that which is circumscribed by the government mandating that protected classes be served. Smith could have argued that her business’s niche was Biblically-based weddings, based on the fact that the business was her private property. For she was using her property for productive rather than speech purposes, and the substance of her enterprise was making and selling products rather than publishing speeches or essays, or even making a political or ideological statement.

Public accommodations law is not absolute. A store manager of a Starbucks coffeeshop had demonstrated this in having two people removed because they had refused to purchase anything and then ignored the manager’s authority, which in turn is rooted in the right of private property. That those two people were of the Black race is besides the point; anyone, protected class or not, who sits at a table in a restaurant but refuses to order anything is subject to the right of private property. Insecure, Starbucks’ upper management capitulated to the unfair criticism by showing the public that the company could discriminate against Caucasian employees, including a regional manager, who had won her case in court less than a month before the Supreme Court’s decision on “free speech.”

Unfortunately, the dissenting opinion of the court obsesses over discrimination, and President Biden said the court’s decision was unthinkable. The opposition missed an opportunity to point to the jurisprudential mistake in the majority opinion, wherein selling a product is itself characterized as free speech. This rather basic category mistake was missing from the dissent, given the salience of ideology on the court, which in turn is another problem.  I submit that public discourse in the U.S. too often skirts or overlooks underlying problems, while obsessing on flash-point ideological agendas. I write in large part to uncover depth such that it might be more highly valued and sought after.

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1. Andrew Chung, “US Supreme Court Deals Blow to LGBT Rights in Web Designer Case,” Reuters, June 30, 2023.

2. Ariane de Vogue and Devan Cole, “Supreme Court Limits LGBTQ protections with Ruling in Favor of Christian Web Designer,” CNN.com, June 30, 2023 (accessed same day).

American religion and politics: Overreaching Realms

Even though they are formally separated in the U.S. under the constitutional rubric that the federal government cannot lawfully establish a religion and infringe on the free exercise of religion, religion has ventured into politics and vice versa. Valued ideals pertain to both even though the highest in religion are transcendent, meaning that they extend beyond the limits of human cognition, perception, and sensibility, according to St. Denis (aka Pseudo-Dionysius) in the sixth century. So far is the political variety from such ideals as being in heaven! Yet the political sort has enjoyed a near monopoly in the world, including its public discourse. At least as 2019 was giving way to a new decade, captivation on President Trump’s tweets (i.e., brief statements made on the internet’s social media) and the process of impeaching him in the U.S. House of Representatives was strangely devoid of any religious discussion in the public square. This is all the more extraordinary because of the significant role that religion had played historically in presidential politics.

During the U.S. presidential campaign of 1928, for example, Al Smith was chastised for being a Catholic, and therefore thought to be under the sway of the Pope in Rome. During the campaign of 1960, John F. Kennedy found himself subject to the same charge. The simple assumption of papal dictate turned out to be naïve. For one thing, the American presidency is firmly within the governmental realm, and the Second Amendment bars the use of the office to establish (or give preference to) a religion or sect/denomination thereof. Kennedy ran against Richard M. Nixon, whose Quaker background, which presumably disdained lying, turned out in his own presidency (1968-1974) to be particularly lacking as revealed in the Watergate hearings. In short, the impact of a president’s inner religious sense and identity on his conduct (and mentality) can be massively overstated.

The role of religion in politics has been present, however, in reactions to the assumed, overstated impact of a candidate’s religion on his role should he get to the office. For example, based on the overblown fears held by protestant Americans, some protestant leaders, including Jerry Falwell and Billy Graham, and their allies in the political realm were able to gain popularity and power. Graham secretly met with other protestant pastors in 1960 to coordinate campaigning against Kennedy, essentially capitalizing on the popular fear among Protestants. This movement in turn prompted Kennedy to give a speech on September 12, 1960 to the Houston Ministerial Association. He insisted that his Catholicism would not direct or obstruct his policy-making judgment. Interestingly, the push of religion into the political sphere was made by religious figures ostensibly in the religious realm—overextending into the other realm.

In 1980, however, a presidential candidate by the name of Ronald Reagan realized that politicians like himself could make use of the political lobbying of religious leaders and groups. Implicitly, he showed Americans just how trivial the political divide had really been between Catholics and Protestants in presidential politics. While Reagan was still the governor of California in the 1970’s, Phyllis Schlafly, a Catholic, was reaching out to evangelical women to lobby against the Equal Rights Amendment (for women). Along with evangelical political action committees, she established the Eagle Forum in the next decade, when Ronald Reagan was president of the United States. By the time he was in office, he had already realized that he could publically galvanize evangelicals and conservative Catholics to support his political ambitions.

With the political realm dipping into the religious realm and vice versa, the societal issue of abortion also played an important role at the time in uniting socially conservative Protestants and Catholics. After the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade in 1973, Francis Schaeffer brought in prominent evangelicals including Jerry Falwell to oppose abortion politically. Gay marriage in the early 2000’s would play a similar role in uniting the division that had hitherto hampered Al Smith and John Kennedy. James Dobson’s Focus on the Family and the Family Research Council, which had formed in the 1980s during Reagan’s flourishing years in office, pushed what they publicized as family values against both abortion and gay marriage. Both Focus and the Council were both church-related and lobbyists close to the Republican Party. For example, the groups lobbied for conservative fiscal policies—something near and dear to the Party but less obviously based in Christianity, especially as Jesus espouses giving to the poor and giving up one’s wealth to follow him. The rich man getting into the Kingdom of Heaven is like getting a camel through a needle. Even so, the evangelical lobbying groups became wealthy, using the prosperity gospel from the Old Testament—that God would make Israel prosperous if it keeps the covenant—as a rationale. To be sure, the pro-wealth paradigm had long become dominant over the anti-wealth paradigm, which hitherto had been dominant.[1] Perhaps this shift within Christianity made it easier for evangelical/Catholic political groups to not only pursue wealth themselves, but also appeal to the Republican Party that Reagan had made (i.e., fiscal and social conservatism). 

 

In conclusion, Americans could look back by the end of the twentieth century and see the old religious division as politically artificial, and thus not nearly as important as Americans had believed in 1928 and 1960. But could those same Americans see their contemporary divisions as just as artificial or at least over-drawn? In the Middle Ages amid the Commercial Revolution, the sin of usury (i.e., charging interest on loaned funds) was the moral/religious/political controversy in Europe. By Reagan’s time, the charging of interest even on consumption loans was a dead issue, whereas abortion could be viewed as an extremely important matter. Could this presumed overriding importance of the issue of the day be questioned by looking back at how the salience of the usury debate had run its course in its own time? In other words, in matters of religion and politics, and even their intermeshing, can the human mind put even its most cherished ideals in proper perspective? Can we question our own presumed importance, including that of our ideological ideals, whether religious or political (or both!)?

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1. Skip Worden, God’s Gold (1915), available at Amazon.

On the Place of Religion in Business: Refusing to Serve Gays

The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in December 2017 in a case on whether a baker in Colorado had been justified in refusing to sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple. He claimed that his Christian faith forbid him from making wedding cakes for gay couples. “I follow Jesus Christ,” he declared when interviewed at his store. The Gospels are silent on the issue of homosexuality—it being said to be a sin only in the Old Testament—so the inference that following Jesus requires opposition to gay marriage (not to mention that homosexuality is an important issue in following Jesus) can be questioned. If the inference is tenuous, then it is the baker’s ideological stance that was actually at issue before the court. More broadly, is religion vulnerable to acting as a subterfuge, or cover, for what are really personal prejudices?

In terms of constitutional law, the baker contended that the First Amendment, “whose guarantees of free speech and religious exercise supersede any state law, exempts him from [Colorado’s] antidiscrimination act,” which has covered sexual orientation since 2007.[1] The question, I submit, is whether free speech and religious exercise are salient in a business context. Colorado was not contesting the baker’s freedom to speak out against gay marriage and engage in religious worship (i.e., expression) on his own time; the problem is the baker’s assumption that political speeches and religious practice apply directly in business. To claim that decorating a cake—and artistic expression more generally—is free speech over-applies the constitutional doctrine and ignores the fact that a product to be sold is being produced.

Moreover, the domain of business can be distinguished from both the political and religious domains. Even though they may be related, each has its most salient attributes, customs, and laws. In opening a business to serve the public, serving customers trumps making political or religious statements or decisions at the expense of customers. Put another way, in opening doors to serve the public, political and religious differences cannot justify refusing some of the public; the responsibility in serving the public thus supersedes circumscribing service based on personal political and religious prejudices.

“’No one disputes that [the baker] is ‘a man of deep religious faith whose beliefs guide his work, or that the Free Speech Clause protects his right to give voice to those beliefs,’ Colorado’s brief argues. ‘But when a business opens its doors to the public, a state may require that [the business] serve customers on equal terms, regardless of their race, sex, faith, or sexual orientation.”[2] The baker’s religious faith is most salient in the religious domain (e.g., at church), while serving the public is most salient in business. That which is foremost in one domain cannot legitimately claim such a status in another domain, even over its foremost customs and laws. In assuming that his business was a place for free speech and expression of his religious faith at the expense of serving the public, the baker misconstrued the distinct nature of business. In being open to the public, a business takes on an obligation to be open to the public rather than a part thereof based on religious grounds, especially if the religiosity is mere cover for what is actually a personal prejudice.  Overstating the importance or status of minor factors even over major ones in a given domain applies also in giving priority to an Old Testament dictum in what it means to follow Jesus Christ. In Christianity, as distinct from Judaism, the New Testament is more important than the Old Testament. The baker seems to have overlooked the main point in the New Testament: self-giving love towards others, especially when it is inconvenient (i.e., even toward enemies).

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[1] Jess Bravin, “Supreme Court Set to Hear Gay-Rights Case,” The Wall Street Journal, December 4, 2017.

[2] Ibid.

Gay Marriage: God’s Law, Legal Reasoning, and Ideology

Mixing religion, jurisprudence, and ideology together is one potent drink. Ingestion can cause palpable heart-burn as well as migraine headaches. In the case of gay marriage in the U.S., sorting out and evaluating the three elements can be rife with controversy and thus confusion. In this essay, I discuss the county clerk in Kentucky who refused to grant marriage licenses to gay couples because doing so would violate God’s law and thus betray Jesus. Her religious rationale makes for interesting legal reasoning. I then look at the U.S. Supreme Court’s gay-marriage decision. I contend that a natural-right (and thus human right) basis clashes with ideological anger. Human nature itself is on display throughout, particularly as it wades into religion, legal reasoning, and ideology.

The complete essay is at “Gay Marriage: God’s Law, Legal Reasoning, and Ideology.”