On Retaining the States’ Veto-Power in the European Council: Sovereignty vs. Democracy

Both the filibuster in the U.S. Senate and the veto in the European Council reflect the act that the respective states were sovereign and retain a portion of that governmental sovereignty that has not been delegated to the respective Unions. But whereas the American filibuster is compatible with a federal system based on dual-sovereignty (states and union), the European veto is not; rather, each state having a veto is at home in a confederation, which is characterized by the states retaining their sovereignty rather than having given up some in becoming a state. In April 2026 shortly after Viktor Orbán had lost his bid for re-election in the E.U. state of Hungary, the E.U.’s foreign minister argued publicly that the states’ veto in the European Council (and the Council of Ministers) runs contrary to the democratic principle of majority rule. The prerogative of retained and residual governmental sovereignty was essentially being pitted against a fundamental principle of democracy.

Kaja Kallas, the E.U.’s foreign minister, castigated the requirement of unanimity in the European Council (in competencies, or enumerated powers, in which qualified majority voting does not apply) because the votes of 26 state governments can be hijacked by a single holdout. Her assumption is that majority-rule rather than the rule by one (holdout) is fundamental to democracy, whether direct or representative. Referring to the vetoes that had been exercised by the then-outgoing governor of the E.U. state of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, Kallas pointed out that the Council doing what only one state wants, “not what the 26 [others] want . . . is not really democracy.”[1] In fact, one-state rule can be thought of as autocratic rather than democratic. If so, then it follows that the remainder of sovereignty retained by the states as veto power is antithetical to democracy. Although both principles are valid in a federal system characterized by dual-sovereignty rather than all sovereignty being retained by the states, I contend that a sufficient recognition of the retained sovereignty of the states lies in the voting method by qualified majority, and furthermore, that such a method is not in conflict with democracy because even a super-majority is majority rule.

To be sure, the E.U.’s basic (constitutional, or government framework) law provides “a legal pathway to move from unanimity to qualified majority voting. However, . . . such a shift itself requires unanimous consent.”[2] Such a blatant “Catch 22” suggests that the state governments were exploiting a conflict of interest in devising and approving the pathway as if they were states in a confederation, which, unlike modern federalism, according to Kenneth Wheare’s Federal Government, involves no transfer of limited sovereignty (i.e., enumerated powers) to the federal level. That the hamstringing non-qualified-majority-vote policy and legislation at the federal level could easily have been foreseen indicates a proclivity to put the interests of their own states, and the states altogether, above federal initiatives for the good of the whole, which is more than merely the sum of the parts. In fact, the veto itself may imply that the whole is merely such a sum.

Qualified-majority voting enables sufficient unity at the level of the whole and enables the federal level to exercise its exclusive and shared competencies, or powers. Kallas said, “we need to be united and able to take decisions.”[3] So unity should not be so total that decisions cannot be taken and implemented at the federal level, which consists not only of the European Council (and the Council of Ministers), but also the Commission, Parliament, and supreme court (i.e., the ECJ), which are not so beholden to state-level interests that can differ from the interests of the whole, as represented by the Union.

The counter-argument made by Charles Michel (interestingly at the time of Kallas’s interview) in favor of keeping the veto in the Council that he had chaired from 2019 to 2024 is spurious. Firstly, he undercut his argument against the pressing need to shelve the veto mechanism by predicting that the European Council would be not be more unified on Ukraine following Orbán’s departure because other governors “share elements of his political stance, including on Ukraine.”[4] Slovakia, for instance, could easily step into Orbán’s shoes. This prediction makes Kallas’ point even more urgent!

Michel went on to claim that “the ‘European Dream’ depends on collective agreement among all 27 member states.”[5] Such would be the case were the E.U. a confederation of sovereign states, such as the Articles of Confederation were as the treaty made by the sovereign countries forming the U.S. until 1789, but the E.U.’s federal level enjoys exclusive and a shared-portion of competencies, or enumerated powers, and such sovereignty does not depend on unanimity at the state level because the states are not fully sovereign. The political-type category mistake in which a modern federal system of dual sovereignty is supposed to be a confederation was ultimately responsible for why Britain seceded from the Union; as prime minister, David Cameron mischaracterized the E.U. as but one of the “networks” of which Britain had joined. It is no wonder that a significant number of the Brits chaffed at even the limited governmental sovereignty that the E.U. itself enjoyed at the expense of full state sovereignty.

Michel’s “European dream” involves yet another problematic claim. “If you stop trying to involve every [state],” he said, “you risk weakening the EU’s weight on the international stage.”[6] This statement incorrectly assumes that any state on the losing end of a qualified-majority vote in the Council is not involved in the process, and that the E.U.’s very credibility on the world stage is not undercut when one state hinders federal action in foreign and defense affairs. Even as Russia continued to invade Ukraine for over four years, that the E.U. could not support Ukraine militarily made the Europeans look weak and unprincipled on such an obvious case of unprovoked military invasion.

Moreover, I dispute Michel’s utopian fantasy that 27 governors of states with differing interests, both economic and geopolitical, will nonetheless be unanimous enough on specific federal policy and legislative proposals for the principle of unanimity to be viable (i.e., workable enough) for the E.U. to exercise its own competencies that are subject to unanimity. Put another way, for the states to have delegated a significant amount of governmental sovereignty to the E.U. and yet selfishly, as per state-specific interests, to hold onto unanimity on many important matters being considered in the federal-level councils constitutes wanting to have one’s cake and eat it too. Such a capricious mentality does not deserve credibility on the world’s stage.

To be sure, Michel warned against governors misusing (to excess) the veto-power of their respective states in the Council, noting that the veto should only be used as it was intended to be used, “only when vital [state] interests are at stake.”[7] Given that the authority has been up to the governors themselves whether to use their power, however, an expansionist wielding of the vetoes should have been anticipated at Lisbon. Besides over-valuing even petty interests, as if they should outweigh the interests of the whole (Union), governors could easily invent such interests in solidarity with a foreign foe of the E.U. and thus undercut the Union itself on the world stage. I am referring here to Orbán’s relationship with Russia’s President Putin—Orbán even went to Moscow, undercutting President Von der Leyen’s policy against Putin’s militaristic aggression unprovoked in Ukraine.

The Von der Leyen administration was wise in looking outward to the credibility of the E.U. and its long-term functioning as a federal rather than state-centric system of governance, whereas Michel was entrenched in a status quo premised on fallacious arguments and even a category mistake. Ironically, for the need to expunge the veto-power from the federal-level councils after the departure of Orbán to still be felt as pressing, Michel’s prediction of no increase in cohesion among the governors was significant. Unfortunately, as an impetus to even needed political reform, the abstraction of a prediction pales in comparison to the actual use of vetoes, such as Orbán’s veto of the loan to Ukraine.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Orbán-Style Vetoes Undermind E.U. Democracy, Kaja Kallas Tells Euronews Hoping for Reset,” Euronews.com, 24 April 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Angela Skujins, “European Council Should “Think Carefully” before Removing Unanmity, Says Michel,” Euronews.com, 24 April, 2026.
5. Ibid.; italics added for emphasis.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.

On the Glacial Pace of E.U. Accession for Serbia and Albania

With Russian troops having been in Ukraine for over four years by March, 2026, the case was indeed being made then for the E.U. enlarging as much and as soon as possible by adding new states, including Ukraine. For in addition to making it more difficult for Russia to invade countries in Eastern Europe by turning them into E.U. states, the main way that a federal union, whether the E.U. or U.S., expands is by the accession of new states from what had been sovereign countries. This is why Canada would enter the U.S. as a state, or, more likely, a few states, rather than in a merge. Especially with the Russians having been dropping bombs on Ukrainian people and infrastructure for years, giving up some governmental sovereignty was arguably not too high a price for state governments to accept.  

In a public effort to push the accession process along for their respective future states, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama published an op-ed in a European newspaper to propose “functional partial integration serving as an intermediate step to revive the EU enlargement process and increase stability in the region.”[1] In other words, Serbia and Albania would at some point get some but not all of the rights that go along with E.U. statehood. The single market and the Schengen area would be granted as the intermediate step, while no decision-making power would be extended at the federal level either for the governments of Serbia and Albania (in the European Council and the Council of Ministers) or for Serbians and Albanians in having elected representatives in the European Parliament. The “trial balloon” of giving Ukraine a similar intermediate limbo-state had popped rather loudly at an E.U. summit, so it would seem to follow that the proposal by the Serbia and Albanian leaders would be dead on arrival at the European Council.

The frustration with the enlargement process in general was certainly palpable by 2026 and could explain the desperate attempt of Serbia and Albania to get  at least one foot into the E.U. sooner rather than later. Thanks in large part to Hungary’s ongoing veto of Ukraine’s accession process from being formally carried out, obstacles to enlargement were getting a lot of press in early 2026. In 2025, an E.U. report on enlargement “highlighted Belgrade’s lack of alignment” with the E.U.’s sanctions against Russia for having unjustifiably invaded Ukraine.[2] Serbia’s lack of reform for media freedom, electoral law, and civil society had also been responsible for the stall in talks. As for Albania, although it was considered “one of the most promising candidates for EU accession,” corruption remained stubbornly entrenched. It would be interesting to compare that corruption with that which was in Ukraine at the time. The question of whether geo-political urgency should relegate concerns about corruption has no easy answer except perhaps in lopping off the extremes. To be sure, Albania had introduced the anti-corruption authority SPAK, but the more interesting question is perhaps whether the Ukrainian government did likewise in a way that leaves a viable record of less corruption.

In general, the “accession process for Serbia and other Western Balkan countries (had) stalled for years, as candidate countries (had not) made sufficient process on rule of law, anti-corruption measures, media freedom and judicial reforms. . .”[3] With the NATO defensive umbrella in place, except for Ukraine, the urgency pertaining to the rest of the candidates was not sufficient, I submit, to justify not finishing the job on rule of law, anti-corruption, media freedom and judicial reforms because all of these are very important to a civil society and a republic on an ongoing basis. Granting some candidate countries some intermediate rights could be expected to reduce the incentive of those state governments to continue to come into alignment with the E.U.’s expectations prior to statehood being fully granted.

Regarding the glacial pace of enlargement generally, a silver-lining to that dark cloud can be seen in that something had to be done about the stultifying impact of the principle of unanimity in the European Council before gaining even more states would make reaching unanimity even more difficult that it was for 27 states. Put another way, making sure that the candidate states made the requisite reforms not only would render the E.U. more solidly democratic and based on the rule of law and freedom (e.g., of the press), but would also give the E.U. more time to reform its internal decision-making process where unanimity was still required for federal law and foreign (and defense) policy to be enacted and promulgated, respectively. Not everything that seems weak in the E.U. is actually weakness, though admittedly requiring unanimity from 27 governments can be coined an exercise in futility in service to the absurd.

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1. Zara Riffler, “Serbia and Albania Issue Joint Text on EU Accession without Veto,” Euronews.com, 11 March, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

The European Commission: An Aggregate of the States?

The European Union’s governmental institutions are not limited to the European Council and the Council of Ministers, both of which represent the state governments directly at the federal level. Nor, moreover, is the E.U. an aggregation of its states. In foreign affairs, for example, the E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, can speak and take decisions on the basis of consensus rather than the unanimous consent of state-level officials being required. Therefore, the Von der Leyen administration did not overreach in taking the “decision to send the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Suica, as an observer to the first former gathering of the United States President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace” on 19 February, 2026.[1] That Suica was merely an observer suggests that the objecting state officials were overreacting as well as misconstruing the E.U. as a confederation of sovereign states.

The Board of Peace originated at the very least in part to guide the real-estate redevelopment in Gaza. Accordingly, a spokesperson at the Commission explained the E.U.’s interest as follows: “Our participation is really to be seen in the context of our long-standing commitment to the implementation of the ceasefire in Gaza, as well as our commitment to take part in international efforts when it comes to the recovery and reconstruction of Gaza. We do believe that we need to be at the table, otherwise we will simply be a payer and not a player.”[2] E.U. was at the time “the biggest donor of humanitarian aid to the Palestinian people, with a total contribution of €1.65 billion to the territories” since Israel’s genocide began.[3] Also, as many as 14 of the E.U.’s 27 states sent their own representatives to the meeting. Therefore, objections by a handful of states to the E.U.’s observer can be relegated as overblown and unjustified, and likely fueled in actuality by ideological objections to the U.S. federal president. That most of the state representatives at the meeting were diplomats or civil servants whereas the E.U. observer was a “political representative” is a petty objection, and thus likely a political subterfuge overlaying anti-American or anti-Trump resentment or jealousy. That the same people who objected to the “political representative” would likely insist that the E.U. was not a political union also points to a hidden agenda.

Regarding the E.U.’s executive branch itself, the European Commission, a state official of France, Jean-Noel Barrot, erroneously claimed that the approval of the E.U.’s state governments was required for the Commission to speak out or act in foreign policy. Slovenia’s Tanja Fajon even insisted that unanimous approval was necessary.[4] Such a view essentially places the Commission as subordinate to the Council of Ministers and ignores any lawful influence that the European Parliament might have with the Commission. The stances of the two state officials treat the E.U. as if it were a confederation—a mere aggregation of fully-sovereign states—rather than a modern federation wherein governmental sovereignty is “dual” rather than unitary.

To be sure, the European Council and the Council of the E.U. play a role in the setting of the E.U.’s foreign policy, and in those councils the principle of unanimity applies, but those two councils are not the exclusive setters of such policy; any executive branch has some leeway, and sending an observer to a meeting is hardly a substantive foreign policy, especially given the E.U.’s direct involvement in Gaza. Sending an observer can hardly be interpreted as an overreach in need of a unanimous decision by the Council of Ministers.

That some state officials were so interested in subordinating the E.U.’s executive branch to the Councils, while leaving the European Parliament out completely as if E.U. citizens had not voted for distinctly federal lawmakers suggests that the state governments have too much power (given their sense of entitlement) at the federal level. Switching foreign policy to qualified-majority voting in the Councils would be more in line with the fact that the E.U.’s foreign minister can indeed speak and act on the basis of consensus and with a nod to the distinctive foreign interests of the European Union, which the Councils cannot protect because they represent the state governments, which have their own interests. In short, neither the Commission nor the E.U. itself is a mere aggregate of the policies and interests of the state governments. Retaining the principle of unanimity in the Councils invites that mistaken view and thus qualified-majority voting is more consistent with the E.U. overall. For neither the Commission nor the Parliament is subordinate to either or both of the Councils as if the E.U. were a confederation of sovereign states.

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1. Mared G. Jones, “France Says Commission Lacks ‘Mandate’ to Join Board of Peace Meeting as Brussels Remains Defiant,” Euronews.com, 19 February 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

The ECJ Castigates the Commission for Paying Off Hungary

In an opinion submitted to the European Court of Justice, which tends to follow the legal opinions the 11 Advocates General, Tamara Capeta recommended in February, 2026 to the Court that it “should annul the European Commission’s 2023 decision to disburse €10.2 billion” to the E.U. state of Hungary.[1] Capeta found that the state government had not sufficiently addressed “concerns over systemic corruption and rule of law violations” to qualify for the payment.[2] That the Commission released the payment nonetheless points to corruption at the federal level—in its executive branch in particular—and this charge against the Von der Leyen administration renders the charge against the Hungarian government rather ironic. Rule of law should apply (and be respected!) at both the federal and state levels for the E.U. to continue to be viable. This applies especially to the Commission, as it is tasked with enforcing E.U. laws, directives, and regulations as well as treaty obligations that the EU, including its state governments, have to other countries, whether they are federal unions (e.g., the U.S.) or independent states.  

The Commission’s decision to reverse itself on the payment “came just days before a crucial December 2023 EU summit, where Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán threatened to veto a €50 billion aid package for Ukraine and block the start of EU accession with Kyiv.”[3] At the European Council’s meeting, “Orbán left the room for a coffee break, allowing the other 26 E.U. [states] to approve the accession talks.”[4] At “an extraordinary” Council session in February 2024, “Hungary lifted its veto on the €50 billion Ukraine support package.”[5] Some representatives in the E.U.’s parliament “suspected the E.U. [had] struck a deal with Hungary, trading unfrozen funds for Orbán’s withdrawal of his veto” even though the Commission “denied any such agreement was made.”[6] Given Orbán’s twice reversal after his state government had just received the suddenly unfrozen funds from the Commission, its denial strains credulity at best, and more realistically actually confirms the charge of sordid dealings in the Commission at the expense of E.U. law.

It is harmful enough to the federal union when a state government violates E.U. law, especially with impunity; for a federal-level governmental institution to shirk federal law says in effect that the E.U. does not respect its own law (so why then should state officials respect it?). Presumably either the Commission and/or one or more of the states could have made a deal with Orbán that did not involve violating E.U. rule-of-law.

Moreover, occasioning the unlawful deal is the staying power of the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of the EU. A minimum of nine states was at the time sufficient for the federal program of “enhanced cooperation” to be invoked, in which case blocs of states could move forward in being subject to a federal law or regulation even though one or more state would still be in opposition but not to be subject to the law. Of course, this program could not apply to votes on whether to annex another state to the Union, and to decisions on whether to spend E.U. funds on other countries, including Ukraine because on such matters, the E.U. itself must either act as one or not act. So a so-called “multiple-speed” E.U. is not a complete answer to the basic problem of applying the principle of unanimity to 27 (and potentially more!) states.

Rather than relying primarily on its state governments for defense and even foreign policy, the E.U. could look to the U.S., which has both a federal military and state armies (called militias). That the federal president can temporarily call upon such armies even if their respective state presidents refuse does not mean that those armies are federal. Such an arrangement, which the E.U. did not have at least as of 2026, is consistent with the underlying dual-sovereignty of both the federal and state governments (or, for the ideologically squeamish, governmental institutions). The augmented federal powers would need to be decided by qualified-majority voting in the Councils that represent the state governments at the federal level; otherwise, no such partial transfer of governmental sovereignty could take place. Being politically unwilling to “step up to the (baseball) plate and bat,” federal and state officials should not collude in deal-making in ways that violate federal laws, lest the Union itself head down a slope wherein federal law has no force. This is especially of value in a world in which military aggressors such as Russia and Israel were wantonly violating international law with impunity; E.U. and U.S. jurisprudence, which is not international, and the corresponding duties at both federal and state levels of government, is not as self-evidently strong as Europeans and Americans may have been assuming in as invasions and genocides elsewhere were going on with impunity internationally.

On a visit to Florida at the time, I was shocked at the extent of brazen refusals by police employees of at least two cities to enforce criminal law—some employees even denying the existence of whole statutes, and the subordinates’ respective managers refused to hold those employees accountable. I was so stunned by the sheer brazenness of the lies that I decided not to move to that U.S. state. The rule of law cannot be assumed as though it castigates sordid personal discretion automatically; rather, law depends on humans to enforce it with integrity. This is why the international “laws” that Putin and Netanyahu were able to violate with such violence for years may not even count as law, for the enforcement-mechanism was entirely lacking de jure et de facto. “Law” without this cannot be counted as law.

The obligation of government officials to recognize and enforce rather than deny the very existence statutory law should be a given. It follows that federal officials in the Commission should not have been permitted to ignore the relevant federal law when it became an obstacle to making political deals with Hungarian state officials. If getting those state officials on board with a political priority of the Commission was so important, then the Commission could alternatively have pressured the states to reduce or end outright the application of the principle of unanimity in the two federal councils that represent state officials directly at the federal level, at least with respect to foreign policy and defense and even on the matter of “enlargement” (i.e., annexing future states). If qualified-majority is too low, then perhaps 75% of the states could be used as a benchmark for such very important policy decisions. The QMV-unanimity distinction is a false dichotomy, given the daylight available between the two voting methods. If one state can hold an entire Union back, then something is wrong with that federal system, and violating federal law to get around that problem is at best a short-sighted, expedient solution. In other words, the E.U.’s federal system has been suffering, at least as of 2026, from a much more serious problem than (collusive) corruption in the Commission and the Hungarian government.

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1. Sandor Zsiros, “E.U. Court Challenges Controversial €10.2bn Payment to Hungary,” Euronews.com, February 12, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

On the E.U.’s “Pragmatic” Federalism

It is ironic that even though European political theorists, including Immanuel Kant, Johannes Althusius, and Kenneth Wheare, made substantial contributions on the topic of federalism, even political leaders in the E.U. as late as 2025 were stumbling over the basics, getting the very concept wrong. Unfortunately, that has caused journalists to trip and fall too, leaving E.U. citizens grappling over the apparent problem of being citizens both of their state and the E.U. even though, according to former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi spoke in 2025 in favor of “’pragmatic federalism’ as the political conditions for a true, federal union do not exist in the E.U. at the moment.”[1] The claims that “pragmatic federalism” is somehow not indicative of “true” federalism, and, moreover, that somehow the E.U. has states that are semi-sovereign (as the E.U. itself has exclusive competences) and yet federalism does not apply are patently absurd. Draghi was confusing the politics of the moment, in which the anti-federalist, Euroskeptic ideology was still too powerful for more governmental sovereignty to be moved to the federal level from the states, with whether the E.U. had a federal system already. In other words, “political conditions” are distinct from whether the E.U. has a federal system of public governance. Draghi’s assertion is all the more astounding not only because of his governmental experience at the federal level, but also because the dual-sovereignty (of the states and the Union) means that the E.U. fits within the category of modern federalism rather than confederalism (using Wheare’s terminology). Europeans have quite understandably been confused in trying to classify the E.U. away from the pull of the anti-federalist ideology in Europe.

That ideology has been a major impediment to the E.U. being able to govern. Although qualified-majority voting applies to some of the E.U.’s enumerated powers, or competencies, enough of the important matters of policy and law have been requiring unanimity in the European Council and the Council of Ministers that the veto-power of each of the 27 state governments has “thrown a wrench” in the governmental machinery at the federal level, especially in foreign policy and defense. Whereas the U.S. at first federalized those areas, the E.U.’s initial emphasis was on economic policy and law, so drifting over to include the more traditionally-federalized domains has been stymied by recalcitrant governors threatening to wield their respective vetoes in the Council even in the face of an overwhelming consensus.

For example, between 2011 and 2025, “Hungary vetoed E.U. proposals more than any other member state . . ., with a total of 19.”[2] A “total of 46 vetoes,” moreover, were “exercised in the E.U. by 15 member states across 38 issues.”[3] Poland ranked second with seven vetoes. “Hungary has vetoed a significant number of joint foreign policy statements, but it has also blocked proposals to lend concrete support to Ukraine and start formal E.U. accession talks,” which are necessary for Ukraine to become the 28^th state in the Union.[4] It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Commission, the E.U.’s executive branch, was by the end of 2025 “deliberately structuring its proposals [for legislation and foreign policies] in order to avoid requiring unanimous consent” from the states in the councils, which, after all, represent the states whereas the European Parliament represents E.U. citizens.[5] With such governmental machinery, plus the E.U.’s supreme court, the European Court of Justice, residing at the Union level, the claim that the E.U. is not a true federal union of states is utterly untenable. “Pragmatic” federalism, which is actually a governmental tool in the E.U.’s basic law, does not nullify the E.U.’s federal system, rendering the E.U. as a “multi-speed bloc.” That label actually signifies decadent jargon rather than any kind of governmental system that is capable of enacting federal laws that are binding on the states and anyone on the E.U.’s territory.

Pragmatic federalism is simply a tactic that the Commission can use to bypass the requirement of unanimity in the Councils, which, like the U.S. Senate, represent the states. The tactic was used, for example, to pass federal legislation to phase-out “Russian fuels under the REPowerEU framework” and to “extend the freeze on the Russian assets.”[6] So too, in passing legislation enabling the E.U. to issue debt to support Ukraine militarily, the European Council “bypassed the need for unanimity among member states” by “gathering those [state governors] who wanted to work together while keeping Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic out of the deal as a condition for it to go forward. In doing so, the E.U. . . . showed a new path forward—one where the unanimity requirement need no longer obstruct” the passage of legislation at the federal level.[7] States could be exempted, such as had been done in the Schengen Agreement and the Stability Pact. The exemption of particular states from a federal program, policy, law, or regulation does not invalidate the federal system; rather, the tool merely renders the federal system more flexible. In fact, the U.S. could benefit by adopting the mechanism, especially because so much power has accrued especially since 1865 at the federal level at the expense of state differences. Exempting certain states from a given proposal would not nullify America’s federal system.

Beyond “pragmatic” federalism in the E.U., the question of rendering the state-veto obsolete was being seriously considered by the end of 2025. With 27 states in the E.U. and Russia invading Ukraine just east of the E.U.’s territory, the E.U. could ill-afford the continuance of the veto, especially in the domains of foreign policy and defense. That unanimity would be required to amend the E.U.’s basic law to rid the union of the state-veto is itself a problem, but it could be solved by any states objecting to such a change being exempted from any “enhanced cooperation” that would be switched from unanimity to qualified-majority voting. In short, the precedents of the Schengen Agreement and the European Stability Pact, which are not incompatible with federalism, could be followed. In terms of such competencies of the E.U. that would be added to those that are already subject to qualified-majority voting, states like Hungary and Slovakia could be exempted. This is not to say that there would be a union, such as the “EU-26,” within the union, or a foreign policy union, a defense union, and so on. Such jargon, as well as the euphemistic-sounding “enhanced cooperation” and, even worse, “multi-speed bloc,” only obscures the point that in a federal system, states can be exempted from particular federal legislation (and policies) without the federal system itself being nullified. Also, to refer to exempting certain states as allowing for “voluntary co-operation” in “coalitions of the willing” is also misleading because there is nothing voluntary about being subject to qualified-majority voting on an E.U. competency manifesting as law. Reducing the E.U. to voluntary cooperation and coalitions of the willing undermines the European Union itself by detracting from what strength it does have as a “true federal union.” The extent of vacuous, ideological jargon outdoes even that of the American retail sector, in which customers are called “guests” and even “members,” customer orders are considered “perfect,” and one of the official public holidays is singled out intentionally to be (ideologically) obscured passive-aggressively as “happy holidays.” But I digress.

To be sure, within the E.U., the state-veto has been seen by some people as “the last resort to protect” state rights.[8] Tamás Lattmann, an international-law expert, said, “A veto power is the last line of defence of vital interests. Every case of circumvention has led to a set of new problems, often the inoperability or discrediting of the system itself.”[9] However, that states could be exempted means that their vital interests would not be threatened. Also, exempting states would not discredit the E.U.’s federal system. In fact, the U.S. federal system could arguably benefit by being more flexible, as so much governmental power has been federalized and “one size does not fit all” in an empire-scale federal union, whether in North America or Europe.

The argument that the state-veto “serves as an equalizer between smaller and larger member states” has also been made, especially because the European Parliament has representation by population.[10] During its debt crisis, for example, the state of Greece could have made the case that E.U. policy reflected the interests of German creditors to the extent that even the anti-austerity party was pressured to accept continued austerity. Furthermore, the smaller eastern states could legitimately argue that the large states in the west have disproportionate (even in terms of the population part of qualified majority voting) informal as well as formal power. The problem is in relying on a mechanism, the state veto, that has been such a detriment to the enactment of federal policy and law.  In the U.S. Senate, which was established principally to safeguard the interests of the small member states, the filibuster, which can be overridden by 60 votes (out of 100), is typically viewed as sufficient for the minority on any given question. To be sure, a minority is not the same as one state. In E.U. competencies subject to qualified majority voting, a single state, whether large or small, could vote no and yet be subject to a federal policy or law. The case of tariffs on Chinese imports was a case in point in 2025. If the filibuster mechanism is sufficient protection for small states in a legislative chamber in which each state has the same number of votes, then the number-of-states set at 65% in qualified majority voting could be deemed sufficient. Generally speaking, a majority of 65 percent has more democratic legitimacy than does a simple majority—a point that Americans might want to consider.

In conclusion, the Commission and Council could hardly be blamed for trying to obviate the state-veto without subjecting objecting states, for their vital interests are untouched because they are exempted. With enlargement of the Union being an issue, as well as the need for federalized defense and foreign policies given the military aggression of Russia and even Israel, the Union could no longer afford the veto-mechanism itself even by 2023. The mechanism actually pertains to confederalism, in which governmental sovereignty is retained by the states, rather than to modern federalism, in which the atom of governmental sovereignty is split, though not necessarily evenly, in a federal system between the states and the federal level. That the E.U., even initially in 1993, has the salient feature of dual sovereignty means that that union has never been a mere confederal system; the E.U. is thus well-within being a “true federal union.” Even though it has been in the interest of E.U. officials to appease Euroskeptics so to as to render them more docile, ideological denial has cost the European project severely, and the state-veto has played a major role in the self-inflicted federal impotency.

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1. Sandor Zsiros, “The EU Wants to End the Era of National Vetoes—But It’s Complicated,” Euronews.com, 23 December, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

On the E.U.’s Mercosur Deal: State Obstructionism

After 25 years negotiating with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, the E.U.’s Commission sought to secure passage of the massive trade-deal in the European Council and the Parliament by the end of 2025. Even though the vote is by qualified-majority voting rather than unanimity in both chambers, one state that was against the treaty sought to delay the vote in the Council, which represents states rather than E.U. citizens. The Commission rightly pushed back on the tactic because for one state in opposition to be able to put off a vote is tantamount to having a veto, which a mechanism only for E.U. competencies that are subject to unanimous approval in the Council.

Due to concerns of possible unfair competition voiced by farmers in the E.U. state of France, that state’s government was “demanding strong safeguards to suspend tariff reductions if imports disrupt EU markets, so called ‘reciprocity clauses’ that align Mercosur’s environmental and agricultural standards with EU standards, and tougher EU sanitary and phytosanitary controls.”[1] Without a veto, making a demand would be too strong, and even presumptuous. So too is the statement that was made by the office of the state’s prime minister’s office: “While a Mercosur summit is scheduled for 20 December, It is clear that . . . the conditions are not in place for any vote by the EU Council on authorizing the signing of the agreement.”[2] This sounds a lot like a statement that the vote could not take place.

The Commission’s deputy chief spokesperson, Olof Gill, cut down the state’s claim that conditions were not in place. In fact, Gill told reporters that in “the view of the Commission signing the deal now is a matter of crucial importance economically, diplomatically, and geopolitically, but also in terms of our credibility on the global stage.”[3] The Parliament was due to vote the next day on a safeguard amendment, with some representatives set to add an amendment on reciprocity. With half of the month of December ahead, the only condition relevant to there being a vote in the European Council was whether the Parliament would vote in favor of the treaty. Whether or not the safeguard and reciprocity amendments pass in the Parliament is a legitimate concern to whether the state of France votes for or against the treaty in the Council, but whether the amendments pass should not pertain to whether the Council holds a vote. In short, the government of France was overreaching even if only in its rhetoric.

The problem of too many E.U. exclusive and shared enumerated competencies, including changes to the E.U.’s basic law, being subject to unanimity in the Council and thus contingent on no state wielding its veto in that upper chamber was already hampering the E.U., especially in the areas of foreign and defense policy even as Russia was invading Ukraine; the E.U. didn’t need the Council to set a precedent of delaying or cancelling a vote just because a state in opposition objects even to there being a vote. Such a precedent is as if each state would have a veto on matters subject to qualified-majority voting rather than unanimity. Even use of language that connotes or implies that the state of France could unilaterally control the European Council is troubling, given the power that the state governments continued to have at the federal level through the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Put another way, the E.U. was already “state-heavy” in terms of obstruction at the federal level; the E.U. could least afford a state in opposition deciding whether conditions for a vote in either of the councils have been met. Moreover, focusing too much on individual pieces of legislation without keeping an eye out for any negative impact on the federal system itself from how the legislative process is being carried out is short-sighted.

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1. Peggy Corlin, “European Commission Turns Up Pressure on France over Mercosur,” Euronews.com, 15 December 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

A Reparations Loan or Common Debt: Undercut by State Rights

“State rights” was a common refrain by the eleven U.S. member states who sought to exit in 1861; the underlying fear was that the exclusive competencies, or enumerated powers, of the U.S., combined with the numerous accessions of new states, were already compromising the power of the eleven states to protect their economies from “encroachment.” In 1858, for instance, a tariff disadvantageous to those economies had been passed in spite of the “Southern” objections in the U.S. Senate. Had each member state had a veto, rather than just the ability to filibuster, the eleven states would have been able to protect the viability of their respective economies from encroachment by the Union. To be sure, the state rights claim that the U.S. was still just a bloc, as had been the case from 1781-1789 under the Articles of Confederation, was sheer denial, for the U.S. Constitution instituted a new kind of federalism—partly national, partly international—based on dual sovereignty, wherein both the member states and the Union have a portion of governmental sovereignty. It is this form of federalism, “modern federalism,” that the Europeans adopted in creating the European Union because the E.U. has exclusive competencies. But whereas the shift made by the Americans in the eighteenth century left the state-veto behind at the Union level, the Europeans retained the veto, which at the very least works against the effective operation of modern federalism. The arduous and much delayed task on a reparations loan for Ukraine in spite of the self-interested objection—and thus promised veto—of one state is a case in point. Even the alternative of the E.U. issuing debt faced state-level opposition, as was the case in the U.S. in the 1790s, but in that case, the self-interested states that were relatively clear of debt could not stop the issuance because none of those states could wield a veto at the federal level. This is important because back then, the American states were still widely viewed as countries by their respective inhabitants. “I must fight for my country,” General Lee told Lincoln in 1861, referring to Virginia. A refresher on American history could help Europeans cross the Rubicon to a more internally consistent modern federalism. Whether Euroskepticism or States’ Rights, the ideology, as etched into the E.U.’s Basic Law, is responsible for Van der Leyen’s headaches in getting the E.U. to put Ukraine in a position of strength against the Russian invaders.

A Union of states that allows a self-interested state to block federal action that is in the good of the whole Union is weak. So, when Ursula von der Leyen said late in 2025 that the European Commission would provide Belgium with sweeping guarantees to unblock a controversial reparations loan for Ukraine, a state official representing Belgium countered that the Commission’s proposals “do not address our concerns in a satisfactory manner. It is not acceptable to use the money and leave us alone facing the risks.”[1] That Belgium’s government could wield its veto gives “not acceptable” the ring of finality. This is despite the guarantees for Belgium consisting “of bilateral contributions by member states, a backstop by the EU budget, legal safeguards against retaliation and a new prohibition on transferring sovereign assets back to Russia.”[2] Experts could of course weigh in on how failproof these guarantees actually would be.

From the perspective of the E.U.’s federal system, the following statement made by President Von der Leyen is crucial: “We have created a very strong solidarity mechanism where in the very end the Union can intervene, because we want to make very sure to all our member states, but specifically also to Belgium, that we will share the burden in a fair way, as it is the European way.”[3] The problem is that to state officials, relying only on “the European way” was insufficient; the veto in the European Council and the Council of Ministers was also felt to be necessary for self-protection. Hence Belgium’s language includes “not acceptable.” Mistrust of the E.U. may be behind at least some of the resistance of the states to agree to an expansion of qualified majority voting.

For the eleven U.S. member states who tried in vain to exit the U.S. in 1861, another kind of qualified majority voting in the U.S. Senate was deemed to be insufficient to safeguard the Southern agrarian economies based on Plantation-level slave-labor. But for the E.U.’s state-veto, we have to go back to the disastrous Articles of Confederation Between the Several States, wherein the U.S. depended on voluntary financial contributions from the states and there was no common debt. The state-veto that is justified in confederal systems by the fact that all of the governmental sovereignty is retained by the states is toxic in modern federalism because the federal level is too prone to being hamstrung even with regard to proposals that are in the interests of the whole even if not in the self-interest of each and every state. A part should not be able to upend the common good.

That Von der Leyen had to go to such lengths that Belgium would have guarantees for its financial interest in attracting sovereign wealth funds in the future is indicative of just how toxic the state-veto mechanism is, especially when Russia was succeeding in invading Ukraine for years by the end of 2025 when the E.U. was yet again proposing a reparations loan (or common debt). This point alone should disabuse any State Rights folks from clutching so tight to the veto. Also, in a union of states, sometimes a state “takes one for the team.” This is true solidarity. “Man up,” may be the relevant expression, given Belgium’s intransigence, but, then again, I’m an American, hence rather crude and thus unbecoming at a European dinner party. “Lose the veto, guys,” I would readily and flatly say amid polite, too polished conversation.

The problem is that no one likes to give up power unless in a crisis, and an invasion to the east is evidently not a crisis. It may be that, like the Schengen Agreement and the Stability Pact, an exogenous “more closer union” may need to be formed by the more federalist-leaning states, sans the sordid veto, for another budget as well as foreign and defense policy. Instead of the 55% in qualified-majority voting (QMV), perhaps 60%, which matches the percent needed in the U.S. Senate to overcome a filibuster, could be used as a compromise. This is not to say that the E.U. and U.S. should converge; the Europeans are smart to fear the sort of consolidation at the Union level that eclipses any sort of federalism, and thus needed space for the states to act as per their respective cultures and ideologies. The American case clearly demonstrates that a citizenry giving primary loyalty to the state level cannot be relied upon as a safeguard in the distant future against creeping encroachments by the Union on the sovereignty retained by the member states. Even so, whereas the U.S. by 2025 had lapsed too close to consolidation at the expense of federalism, the E.U. risked dissolution by states plying themselves away from an ineffectual, internally hamstrung Union, for no one likes to be a part of self-inflicted weakness. Nietzsche taught us this.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Von der Leyen Pushes Ahead with Reparations Loan for Ukraine as Belgium Maintains Its Opposition,” Euronews.com, December 3, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

On the E.U.’s Principle of Unanimity: The Case of Hungary

As of 2024, enlargement policy, foreign affairs, taxation, and the budget was “bound by the principle of unanimity,” which means that each state government has a veto in the European Council.[1] With 27 states, the E.U. could in effect be held hostage quite easily. Even in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the state of Hungary was blocking €55 billion in E.U. aid to Ukraine as of June 24, 2024, although revenue from frozen Russian financial assets in the E.U. could be used (because Hungary had not participated in the G7 decision) and Hungary had just reversed its veto against further sanctions against Russia. However, the €1.4 billion from the investment revenue pales in comparison and sanctions do not deliver desperately needed military hardware to the besieged country.

That Hungary’s de facto pro-Russian stance in E.U. foreign policy was contrary to the interest of the E.U. as a whole can be discerned from S&P Global’s report at the time, which states, “The geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine remain the main risks weighing on our immediate economic outlook.”[2] That the E.U. could ill-afford these foreign geopolitical headwinds economically is clear also from the report, which also claims “that European financial markets are too fragmented, too national, too expensive for issuers and for retail investors.”[3] The report then recommends that capital markets be federalized. What could stand in the way of that is the same residual problem underlying the antiquated principle of unanimity: namely, states’ rights, or, in European parlance, Euroskepticism, which in turn is rooted in nationalism ideology. That in turn had been responsible for so much war in the twentieth century. Indeed, the main rationale of the Shuman Plan in the wake of World War II had been to stave off another war. The European Coal and Steel Cooperative was intended to keep an eye on possible German re-militarization. Whether intentionally or de facto, the E.U. state of Hungary in 2024 was enabling Putin’s Russia and indirectly possibly increasing the risk of war within the E.U. by allowing Putin to divide the union.  

 That the E.U. had to go to the G7 decision to spend the revenue on frozen Russian funds in order to go around the opposition of Viktor Orban of Hungary is itself an indication that a “bug” was in the E.U.’s “software.” That János Bóka, Hungary’s Minister for European Affairs, “made it clear” that during Hungary’s presidency of the Council of Ministers during the second half of 2024, Hungary “would not help Kyiv open any of the 35 chapters that make up the six thematic clusters” of accession talks.[4] Instead, accession talks of Baltic states would be encouraged. Whether pro-Russian or anti-Ukrainian, the Hungarian state government’s use of its veto and temporary presidency of the Council on the federal level seems to put the interest of a part (of the union) above that of the whole.

That the E.U.’s supreme court, the European Court of Justice, had recently found the state of Hungary guilty of violating the E.U.’s basic law and ordered a significant fine be taken from the state’s allocation of federal money may be a factor in the active use of the state’s veto. At the very least, being fined by the E.U. put the state government in a conflict of interest in obstructing federal foreign policy. This is yet another reason why the E.U. could not afford the principle of unanimity. More bad news. Unfortunately, even efforts to correct this problem are fraught with a conflict of interest, as state governments would have to agree to give up the power they enjoy under the principle. Even if retiring the principle is in the interest of the whole (i.e., the E.U.), the political interests of the parts are not likely to subordinate their respective interests even for the good of the whole. Future enlargement of the union (which is not a “bloc” because the union is permanent and based in law) would most likely exacerbate the problems ensuing from putting the interest of a part, or the parts, above the good of the whole. And as argued above, belligerent foreign actors, such as Putin of Russia, could easily exploit this fundamental flaw in the E.U. for their own interests.

Who, therefore, is there to stand up for the E.U.’s interest? Perhaps as E.U. citizens, rather than the states, elect the representatives of the European Parliament, the way out of this pretzel may be to transfer some of the Council’s power to the Parliament, or at least to give the latter chamber more power as a check against excesses by state officials acting in the Council, including the Council’s presidency. That is to say, perhaps the conflicts of interest and the over-heavy interests of the parts at the expense of the whole in the E.U. are indicative of a need for a shift in power not only from the states to the union, but also within the union’s government itself.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Ukraine Heading for Accession Impasse during Hungary’s EU Council Presidency,” Euronews, June 18, 2024.
2. Idrabati Lahiri, “European Financial Markets ‘Too Fragmented,’ Warns S&P Global,” Euronews, June 24, 2024.
3. Ibid.
4. Jorge Liboreiro, “Ukraine Heading for Accession Impasse during Hungary’s EU Council Presidency.

E.U. Political Parties

Following the E.U. 2024 election, political parties jostled for members in the Parliament. Whereas the political duopoly of parties in the U.S. House of Representatives severely limits such skipping around, the European analogue puts more of an emphasis on party management in terms of weighing ideological or policy “purity” against the power that comes from size. In contrast, the two major parties in the U.S. must be content to be “big tents,” each of which contains groups. From the standpoint of the parties in the E.U. Parliament, the groups are at the state level. The defection of Andrej Babis and the rest of his group from the Renew Europe party just weeks after the E.U. election in June, 2024 demonstrates the distinct balancing task of the E.U. parties. Such balancing is not something that the American political duopoly of parties need do. I contend that the Americans could benefit by looking at the European case in this regard.

On the one hand, the departure of Babis’s group caused Renew Europe to go from 81 representatives to 74, further weakening its power in the federal legislative body. On the plus side, however, Valérie Hayer, Renew Europe’s head, observed of the departed representatives that “their divergence from our values” had “increased exponentially and we witnessed this with great concern.”[1] For his part, Babis pointed out, “We went to the European elections saying that we would fight against illegal migration, that we wanted to repeal the ban on internal combustion engines and fundamentally change the Green Deal. . . . Above all, we want the Czech Republic to remain a sovereign country.”[2] Although Babis’ claim that the Renew Europe party would not change its party platform on immigration and the Green Deal is correct, he could not very credibly blame the party because the Czech Republic had given up some of its sovereignty in becoming a state in the Union; qualified majority voting alone is part of that transfer, since Babis’ state could be on the losing side of a QMV in the European Council. Nevertheless, the ideological difference between Bibis’s group and the party on immigration and the Green Deal meant that the Renew Europe party would be more ideologically “tight” and thus powerful in that sense with the departure of Babis and his fellow MEPs, and they in turn could find another party closer to their views precisely because the Parliament contained several parties rather than just two. Hayer pointed to the impact on the party’s ideological position in saying that the departed MEPs’ “unwillingness to continue their commitment to liberal values has led to today’s outcome. They have turned their back to our firm pro-European convictions and values.”[3] More to the point, Hayer predicted that the party would be “more united.”[4]  Fewer members in the legislative body but more united: this is the trade-off that any party leadership in the E.U. Parliament had to balance in the post-election phrase of politics. I submit that this is a good thing.

A major benefit of the balancing act is that E.U. citizens going to the polls could more closely tailor their respective votes to their political positions or ideology than can U.S. citizens voting for members of the U.S. House. An American voter angry at the Israeli government, for example, did not have a choice of party opposing the military incursion into Gaza; both the Democratic and Republican parties supported Israel in 2024. In contrast, a European could vote for a party with a plank opposing military support for Israel. The drawback in the European case is in terms of political stability in the Parliament, but as even an increase in representatives in the parties on the right did not fundamentally alter the majority coalition of parties, the inertia of the status quo has considerable weight in maintaining stability even as multiple parties jostle for members while trying to stay true to specific values on the political spectrum. In other words, the fear of political instability from there being many parties in the Parliament is overstated.

Therefore, Americans could be less scared of deviating from the American duopoly of major parties, as if the credible advent of other parties being truly competitive would trigger seismic political instability. A recalibrated “cost-benefit” analysis of having a duopoly of just two major “big tents” could result in reforms in which voters would be better able to tailor their votes to their values and political positions without having to vote for whichever party is closer even if it isn’t really very close and may even have antipodal positions. The political-legal electoral architecture, or basic framework, that favors the duopoly would have to be fundamentally changed, and in a political culture of incrementalism, such a change is only possible but not probable. Even so, it doesn’t hurt to look to the E.U. for ideas. That is to say, the U.S. could learn a thing or two from the E.U.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “E.U. Liberals Dealt a New Blow after Czechia’s Andrej Babis Pulls Out His Seven MEPs,” Euronews, June 21, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Prospects for Civil War in an E.U. State: The Case of Slovakia

As the E.U. was heading toward legislative elections in 2024, the shooting of Slovenia’s prime minister could have served as a wake-up call concerning the silent benefits of having a union that is political, and thus governmental, rather than merely an economic “bloc.” Were civil war likely in Slovakia, given the aggressive political division there, being a semi-sovereign state rather than a fully independent country meant that explicit and implicit buffers existed that could stave off such war. Considering that an assassination had been the trigger for World War I, having a federal system that could quell aggression within a state is no small benefit.

In 2004, Slovakia became an E.U. state, which means that some of its governmental sovereignty went to a federal level. Slovakia’s velvet reputation for having split peacefully from the Czech Republic in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 may have masked the ensuing stark political reality under Prime Minister Vladimir Merciar, when Slovakia “found itself at a crossroads, stuck between becoming an autocratic regime with close ties to organized crime or a state based on the rule of law.”[1] In 1995, the country’s secret service kidnapped the president’s son. In 2004, Robert Fico’s political career as a “social democrat fighting corruption and unbridled neoliberalism” was just beginning.[2] Yet after becoming prime minister for the first time in 2006, he was accused “of graft and involvement in the Penta Gorilla affair, Slovakia’s biggest post-communist corruption scandal.”[3] In his second stint as prime minister, he and his government “mainly focused on influencing the judiciary, . . . stopping corruption trials and silencing independent media.”[4] He spoke against the E.U. and Ukraine in the midst of the Russian invasion. With all of the press that Viktor Orban of Hungary was receiving for taking the same positions, it was easy to miss Fico’s stances in the E.U.

Together, Fico and Orban can be viewed as a minority stance in E.U. foreign policy in favor of Russia. With such policy requiring unanimity at the federal level, this minority had the potential of hamstringing any foreign policy at the federal level regarding Russia’s aggression. E.U. states would be free to work at cross purposes, and the power of a united front would be missed. This is an argument for applying qualified majority voting to E.U. foreign policy. Such a stance is more evident than another benefit that the E.U. provides to the states—a benefit highlighted by Slovakia.

The shooting of Fico in May, 2024 stemmed from a climate of hateful political polarization in the state. In the wake of the shooting, some fear of a resulting civil war was voiced in the media. Even though the European Steel and Coal Cooperative had been formed to stave off war between states (most notably involving Germany), the less obvious benefit of the E.U. in being able to step in to stave off war within a state has received little attention. The potential benefit for Europe as a whole resonates with the suggestion made by France’s Macron that the defense capability of the E.U. itself be strengthened. For it to be any good, its deployment would have to be decided by qualified majority vote rather than unanimity. Otherwise, Hungary could use its veto to enable Fico’s party to put away its opposition militarily.

A related benefit of the E.U. with respect to Slovakia does not depend on any additional governmental sovereignty being shifted to the federal level. The fact that some sovereignty had already been delegated to the E.U. by its states means that the likelihood of a civil war in a state is buffered, and thus reduced, simply by being in a federal union that has a legislature, executive branch, and a supreme court. Any one of these governmental branches could take action against Slovakia were civil war to break out. Financial levers alone could do the trick, but so too could informal conversations in the European Council, in which the states themselves, through their respective governors, are the members. As nervous as the E.U. officials are about a war just outside the E.U. is, the prospect of war within the E.U. would surely be galvanizing.

Furthermore, within Slovenia, simply viewing itself as a state rather than a sovereign country could work against forces that would otherwise provoke a civil war. In other words, being a state in a political and economic union is itself a moderating force with respect to political polarization getting out of control. In the early U.S., Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts and the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania were doubtless on the minds of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention in making sure that the U.S. president would be able to call the armies of the then-sovereign states into action to put down rebellions in the future semi-sovereign states. So, there is precedent for the E.U. calling on state militias to quell any rebellions in any of its semi-sovereign states, and even for bolstering a federal military force. As E.U. citizens and residents headed to the polls in 2024, it would be a shame were they to take the E.U. for granted. Going even further, it would be a shame were they to miss an opportunity to voice support for an ever more perfect, and thus strengthened rather than hamstrung, union.

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1, Keno Verseck, “Robert Fico Shooting Highlights Slovakia’s Deep Polarization,” Deutsche Welle, May 17, 2024.
2, Ibid.
3, Ibid.
4, Ibid.