Corporate Federalism: Did AOL Miss an Opportunity?

Citing twelve past and present AOL employees, The Wall Street Journal characterized AOL in 2011 as a “culture of clashing fiefs and personalities created by a rapid series of acquisitions that haven’t jelled.”[1] Just in managing the likes of Michael Arrington and Arianna Huffington, Tim Armstrong had his hands full as CEO. Both Arrington and Huffington were strong defenders of editorial independence in their respective units. Arrington started a venture capital firm partly financed by AOL to invest in tech firms even as Arrington’s division at AOL, TechCrunch, wrote on technology firms. The problems for AOL went well beyond acquiescing in a structural conflict of interest of TechCrunch writing on particular tech companies while investing in some of them but not others. A person familiar with AOL said that Armstrong “had a macro vision that was right but didn’t have the right plan to implement it.”[2] That is to say, his visionary leadership was good but his strategic management was bad. Strategic leadership demands better. AOL may have been a good candidate for a federal system of governance because the publishing units needed some autonomy even at the cost of foregone corporate cooperation. 

In a federal system adapted to a corporation, each division or acquisition is like a semi-sovereign state with some autonomy from the general government, which includes the board of directors and the CEO. Were the board by analogy the constitutional court rather than part of the federal government, then it would be too easy for conflicts of interest to be exploited at the expense of division autonomy. This arrangement does not compromise the control that comes with property rights, for the shareholders would still be able to vote on major conflicts wherein a division claims that its autonomy is being compromised by a CEO or board.

The federation form—similar to the Japanese conglomerate “family” of businesses centered around a banking division though with each division having some autonomy from headquarter—is perhaps ideally suited to a publishing company in which pressure exists to tailor articles to particular companies favored financially by a division or the publishing company as a whole. In other words, reconciling editorial freedom (and credibility) with the synergy possible from corporate coordination (otherwise why make the acquisitions in the first place?) may be well-suited to the federal form wherein the parts and whole each of some areas of autonomy from the other. The limited autonomy itself must be in the stockholders’ long-term financial interest; this is not difficult, as sacrificing editorial freedom for immediate financial gain is typically detrimental in the long run. 

1. Jessica E. Vascellaro and Emily Steel, “Culture Clashes Tear at AOL,” Wall Street Journal, September 10-11, 2011. 

2. Ibid.

Taxation and Economic Inequality

The top 1% of U.S. taxpayers had 19.4% of the total income in 2007 and paid 28.1% of all federal taxes. In 1987, the top 1% had had 11.2% of the total income and paid 16.2% of all federal taxes. The share of total income going to the wealthy (income over $353,000 in 1987) and the share of federal income taxes they paid increased. That the poverty rate hit 15% in 2011 while the real wages of the middle and lower classes were back to mid-1990s levels suggests that the rich were getting richer as the poor were getting poorer; income and wealth inequalities were increasing. Differential impacts of a taxation regime can have an impact on a growing inequality, and thus on whether a society should adjust its tax structure. 

Although the share of taxes increased between 1987 and 2007, the 15% rate on dividends and capital gains put in place during the second George W. Bush administration meant that at the time, “many wealthy Americans [paid] considerably less because their earnings [were] derived from dividends or capital gains.”[1] 

Also, advantageous itemized deductions are more likely to be useful to a wealthy taxpayer, enabling a lower effective rate lower than that of a middle-class taxpayer. Few if any low-income taxpayers benefit from itemizing deductions. It could be that the standard deduction (and exemptions) are not sufficient to reflect the actual and necessary expenses—especially relative to income. So to claim that the bottom 1% should pay the same share of taxes as the top 1% ignores the fundamental difference between surplus and necessity. The symmetry of a bell-shaped curve does not apply because the incomes at the respective tails are qualitatively (i.e., not just quantitatively) different (e.g., relative to survival).

As for the effective rates, the unjust inversion with the middle class is not universally the case. For example, the top 400 taxpayers saw their effective federal income tax rate drop from 29% in 1993 to 18% in 2008. By comparison, households with income between $50,000 and $75,000 had an effective rate of 15% in 2008. These are averages, so there were doubtless cases of inversion where middle class taxpayers had a higher effective rate than wealthy tax payers. Depending on restoring justice to such cases does not go far enough in deficit reduction. That is to say, as just as it is, making sure millionaires are at least at the effective rate of the middle class may not go far enough, considering the seriousness and magnitudes of the U.S. deficit and accumulated debt. Given the sheer magnitudes, those who can afford to contribute more should be required to do so. It is doubtful that merely correcting for the effective rate injustice on a case by case basis would go far enough.

In 2009, for instance, 238,000 households filed returns with adjusted gross incomes of at least $1 million. Twenty-five percent of them paid an effective federal income tax rate of less than 15 percent, and 1,470 paid no federal income tax at all. Although the money involved dwarfs the number of taxpayers concerned, focusing on this “effective rate” injustice need not blind us to the fact that the increase to the treasury would fall well short of what is necessary to eliminate a deficit of over $1 trillion (not to mention paying down a debt roughly equal to the annual GNP of the U.S.). A macro justice matter concerns the role of the wealthy in reducing the deficits and debt—beyond the question of effective rates to address the inconvenience to the wealthy versus the pain from cuts to the poor.

To claim that the effective tax rate on the top 1% or even 5% of all taxpayers should be higher than the rates on lower incomes is not “class warfare.” Neither is the claim that those who can afford to contribute more money to reduce the deficit (and debt). The notion that those who can afford to contribute more follows from the principle that those who have means, rather than those who do not, should be relied on disproportionately, given the qualitative difference between surplus and sustenance. To suggest that everyone except those who are able should sacrifice to reduce a deficit is antipodal to the ethical principle of fairness. In other words, it is unfair to try to squeeze blood from a turnip while leaving the watermelons alone.

As easy as it may be to get bogged down on the percentages and dollar amounts, charts and graphs, pros and cons, the debate about taxation, spending cuts, and deficit reduction comes down to values. This is why the debate can get so heated, only we don’t take the cue and cut to the chase. We are perhaps too instrumental and utility-oriented; we miss the broader question of what we as a society value—who we are—things that are even if we don’t make it explicit. I submit, therefore, that the final paragraph below is much more significant than any of the figures and analysis above. Statistics can be manipulated to support virtually any point, whereas values go to the core in defining a society and its members.

A society that cuts its way to eliminating a deficit is saying something quite different regarding itself than a society that includes a solidarity tax on the wealthy. Solidarity itself can mean different things to different people, particularly when self-interest is consulted. How do we weigh society as dog-eat-dog relative to society as solidarity? In other words, is solidarity something more than society as an aggregation? Is it ethical to exempt the rich from paying more while making cuts to the sustenance of the poor? 

1.  David Kocieniewski, “A Tax Others Embrace, U.S. Opposes,” The New York Times, September 21, 2011. 

Bank One: Adding to Systemic Risk after the Financial Crisis of 2008

The financial crisis in September 2008 was indeed a crisis, and yet it is stunning how soon the American financial sector sought to undermine governmental efforts to guard against another such crisis. Exactly three years after the crisis, Republicans in Congress  repeatedly invoked the Dodd-Frank Act’s 848-page length and rules on trading derivatives and swaps as examples of government overreach at the expense of much-needed jobs. “Dodd-Frank is adding safety margins to the banking system,” according to Douglas Elliott at the Brookings Institution. “That may mean somewhat fewer jobs in normal years, in exchange for the benefit of avoiding something like what we just went through in the financial crisis, which was an immense job killer.”[1] To scrap the new law in order to save few jobs would thus be short-sighted even with regard to jobs. Wall Street's concern, however, was not jobs, but, rather, the loss of profit off high-risk trading. 

The banks had grown used to the higher risk and were not about to do without it in spite of its risk to the economy. The Dodd-Frank law “aims to rein in abusive lending practices and high-risk bets on complex derivative securities that nearly drove the banking system off a cliff.”[2] The banks themselves could not be relied on to forestall such “cliff-diving” because it could be so profitable. Nor could the banks be expected to look out for the financial system as a whole in the face of such profitability as the financial derivative instruments were making.

For example, at the Federal Reserve hearing on September 20, 2011 on Capital One’s proposed takeover of ING, John Finneran, Capital One’s general counsel, said the “acquisition of ING Direct will further reduce, rather than increase, any risk to the financial system.”[3] The combination would have around $200 billion in deposits (moving the bank from No. 8 to No. 5 in the U.S.),  however, which raised “questions about the deal’s impact on customers and the broader economy.”[4] John Finneran’s claim of lower risk thus required further support. To be sure, he did argue that the deal would “not lessen competition or result in any undue concentration of resources.”[5] He was thinking in terms of restraint of trade more so than systemic risk. Regarding the latter, John Taylor of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, pointed to the risky subprime loans in the bank’s credit card portfolio. Before the hearing, he had asked, “We already have four too-big-to-fail banks. Why make a fifth?”[6]

That the proposal to carve up the four $1 trillion plus banks was summarily dismissed as Dodd-Frank was being written (with the help of the banking lobby, which Sen. Durbin said still owned Congress) was apparently not enough; preventing an increase in the number of mega-banks too big to fail would still go too far, at least from the vantage point of the banks and, presumably, the Republican party as well. This view was expressed by Dan Tarullo, a Federal Reserve governor. “While Congress instructed us to consider the extent to which a proposed acquisition would pose a greater risk to financial stability, it clearly did not instruct us to reject an acquisition simply because there would be any increase in such risks.”[7] I contend that Tartullo’s stance is wrongheaded and even dangerous.

The continued existence of banks with assets of over $1 trillion allows for enough systemic risk to tank the system. Increasing such risk by permitting Bank One to continue “amassing a big national banking franchise” ignored the risk of there being too much systemic risk in the system already. It is highly unlikely that merely increasing capital requirements for the biggest banks and providing for their possible liquidations reduced the systemic risk in the system to a tolerable level. Therefore, adding more systemic risk to the system should have been forbidden.  

1. Edward Wyatt, “Dodd-Frank Act a Favorite Target for Republicans Laying Blame,” New York Times, September 21, 2011. 
2. Ibid.
3. Ben Protess, “Capital One Denies ING Takeover Would Make It ‘Too Big to Fail’,” New York Times, September 21, 2011. 
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Wyatt, "Dodd Frank."