Public Policy on Housing in the E.U.: On the Impact on Federalism

With rents and the price of houses being historically high in 2024 in the E.U., it is no surprise that housing was a salient issue in the E.U. election campaigns that summer. Legislative action on the state level had been insufficient. Hence, President von der Leyen told the parliament, “I want this Commission to support people where it matters most, and if it matters to Europeans, it matters to Europe.”[1] The Union complementing legislative action by state governments on such an important issue is admittedly a step in the direction of solving an urgent problem, but the impact on the federal system in the future should not be ignored. As important as a pressing issue of the day is, someone should be keeping an eye on the shop itself. The gradual political consolidation of the U.S. federal system over more than two centuries at the expense of federalism is an example of what can happen when policy-makers are too oriented in putting out policy “brush fires” without bothering to ask how the federal system itself could be impacted.

To be sure, homelessness and high house prices and rents had become big problems by 2024. In 2023, an estimated 890,000 people were homeless in the E.U., while over 650,000 people were homeless in the U.S., out of total populations of almost 447 million and 336 million, respectively. Even though less than 1 million out of hundreds of millions looks minor, the trauma of being without a stable shelter, as well as the fear of losing one’s shelter due to a dire change in economic condition, argues in favor of housing being recognized as a human right that governments are obliged to supply where reliance on a market and personal income falls short. Put another way, the sort of existential angst that is triggered by homelessness and, to a much lesser though significant (yet subtle) degree, losing a job (or even knowing that it is possible) belongs in the state of nature rather than in civil society. Where the supply of available units of affordable (i.e., low-income, and no-income) housing is less than the number of homeless in a given geographical area, this argument suggests that government should see to it that the gap is filled. This is, of course, a normative argument, one that has been much more prevalient in the E.U. than in the U.S.

Generally speaking, government targets for new units tend to fall short of those that would be necessary to expunge actualized existential angst. In the E.U. state of Ireland, a local-government official bragged to a journalist in 2024 that the city government would reach its target, and the journalist pointed out that it is insufficient to eliminate homelessness in the city. Both in terms of being shy in having more affordable-housing units built and in standing up to hedge funds that are driving up house prices by buying up some as investment (and even by keeping some units vacant to increase the shortage), local governments have fallen short.

Besides spending money on the construction of new units, government can restrict the use of residential real estate for investment and even as small hotels (e.g. Airbnb). At least as long as homelessness exists, so this argument goes, shelter’s use for speculation is inconsistent with housing as a human right. To be sure, the moneyed interests in a society can be hard for democratically-elected representatives to resist even when a significant number of people are paralyzed by existential angst.  

Not going nearly so far but signaling a shift in societal and governmental priorities, President von der Leyen of the European Commission set up her second portfolio, or term of office, in the summer of 2024 by stressing “the urgency of tackling the housing crisis, proposing the first-ever European affordable housing plan and a commissioner responsible for the policy area, as the Socialists had demanded as a condition for backing her second term.”[2] At the time, “a significant investment gap in social and affordable housing” existed in the Union.[3] In addition to there being the homeless, people were “struggling to find affordable homes,” von der Leyen said at the mid-July plenary in Strasbourg.[4] “Between 2010 and the end of 2023, average rents in the E.U. increased by almost 23% and house prices by nearly 48%, leading to protests in cities.”[5] The general economic interest was being negatively impaired by the housing- (and food-) led cost of living increases.

The E.U. being a federal system of dual sovereignty, like the U.S., von der Leyen had to contend with the “limited competency” of the E.U. in housing; by this I do not mean incompetence. Rather, the federal and state levels could both legislate in housing. Because the states could “only use public funds to target the most vulnerable groups,” space was open for the federal government to legislate to bring the cost of housing down. In other words, the states were oriented to the homeless problem, which arguably represents a greater, or more severe harm in society, so the Union’s activity on the wider problem of high rental and house markets would not usurp the residual sovereignty of the state governments.

This is not to trivialize the problem of high housing markets, whether in California or Ireland. “In terms of state aid [at the federal level], we would like to see the recognition of social and affordable housing for all—beyond disadvantaged groups or social groups with fewer opportunities—as a service of general economic interest,” said Christophe Rouillon, president of the PES group in the European Committee of the Regions (CoR).[6] The scope not only of the problem, but also of the legislative means, or power, is such that this “limited competency” of the Union could have a significant impact on shifting more power from the states to the Union. “The E.U. can influence housing through financial regulation, competition law, energy efficiency, regulatory and planning standards, cohesion policy, climate action, urban/rural and social policies,” Rouillon stated.

The impact of federalism should not be lost on policy makers both at the federal and state level even though the primary focus is on the policy issues (i.e., homelessness and high real estate markets). In reaching a fever pitch of societal displeasure, these issues may give us a glimpse into how modern federal systems, which are characterized by split (or dual) governmental sovereignty, tend to consolidate power at the federal level at the expense of the state governments over time. Europeans would be wise to think about whether the E.U., just over 30 years old in 2024, would be as consolidated at the U.S. in 2024 after more than two-hundred more years. Both unions being of vast territorial expanse in 2024, such that states in each union can differ from one another in the same union so much that “one size does not fit all” in public policies, political consolidation comes with significant drawbacks. Additionally, the “check and balance” feature of federalism is rendered inoperative when a federal government has so much power that the state governments cannot counter-balance it. The question of whether the E.U. might end up as consolidated politically as the U.S. is thus not at all trivial.

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1. Paula Soler, “Von der Leyen Promised an EU Commissioner to Tackle the Housing Crisis,” Euronews, August 13, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. For those readers who feel the need to substitute “bloc” for “Union,” there is help.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.

Encroaching Political Consolidation: The Weakening of the U.S. Federal System

It is much easier to point out the sliver in the other person's eye than the plank in one’s own. Regarding the gradual political consolidation of power at the federal level in the U.S. at the expense of not only the member-state governments, but also the federal system itself, it is easier for a political party to dismiss its own contribution than to take a wider stance including the continued viability of the federal system, or federalism, itself. As a result, both of the major parties has contributed to the increasing political consolidation at the expense of the check-and-balance feature that a balanced federal system has.

Texas’s former governor, Rick Perry, wrote in his book, Fed Up!, “From marriage to prayer, from zoning laws to tax policy, from our school systems to health care, and everything in between, it is essential to our liberty that we be allowed to live as we see fit through the democratic process at the local and state level.”[1] If it is essential to the liberty of the people that these policy domains be legislated and enforced at the member-state level, then any backtracking on any of these areas would diminish freedom. Hence the considerable consolidation of power by the U.S. Government since the war between the U.S.A. and C.S.A. from 1861-1865 has come at a cost. 

For instance, U.S. Government can preempt state legislating on a given domain even if no federal legislation is even attempted. The citizens of Texas would be hamstrung should they want the Texas Government to legislate on what is a serious problem in Texas. Preemption ignores that a given societal problem can be worse in one of the member republics than in others. The E.U.'s doctrine of subsidiarity, wherein the lowest level of government in the federal system that can deal with a problem is preferred, gives the states the preference over the federal government. 

So too does the fact that the governors of the states sit on the European Council, which is roughly equivalent to the U.S. Senate, where senators can ignore their respective governments to vote in such a way that makes reelection more likely.[2] The interests of the citizens of Texas are not the same as the Texas Government. Given the change to popular election for U.S. senators, the member-state governments had no power at the federal level to stop the federalizing of health-insurance legislation (e.g., Obama's Affordable Care Act).[3] 

American federalism can be repaired and strengthened. I'm not sure how many people realize the extent to which the federalism has deteriorated. Even people such as Perry who have emphasized a more balanced federal system have advocated policies that would add to the encroaching consolidation. “In one of his more well-publicized shifts, Mr. Perry proclaimed that gay marriage was an issue for individual states to decide, but backtracked in [August 2011 and said] he supports a federal amendment banning gay marriage. He . . . also signaled support for various federal actions to restrict abortion rather than leaving the issue to states.”[4] The governor of a large U.S. state put an ideological agenda, even one that is popular with the Texas electorate, before his own warnings of political consolidation. If federalism is to be sabotaged even by its high-level advocates, the problem has indeed become intractable. 

More generally, if Republican office holders want to federalize “social issues” and expand the military-industrial complex while Democratic officials insist on federalizing health-insurance, housing, and food aid for the poor while both parties federalize large portions of criminal law, then not only is the federalism pushed further off from a federal-level/state-level balance, but also the blame can be pushed to others such that no party takes on the matter of fixing the federal system. Any given representative could claim that his or her desired federalization would not break the camel’s back (i.e., effectively keep the federal system from working given the consolidation). Don’t look at me; its the other guy.  

The truth may well be that no elected official at the state or federal level is truly interested in the long-term viability of the governance system; the motivation is more a function of what is politically expedient at the time. Each politician may authentically believe that his or her top issues should be made to apply to all Americans—in every member state. In terms of an enabling context, perhaps the American cultures had become too egoist and short-sighted to support the difficult decisions needed to repair the American federal system. In fact, the cultures may even have contributed to the problem itself being one of America's blind-spots. The result is that everything is federalized and the state governments can no longer operate as a check on the federal level. As each official is busy imposing what is most important to him or her on as many people as possible, the question needing to be asked may therefore be, who, exactly, is minding the store?

1. Rick Perry, Fed Up! Our Fight to Save America from Washington (New York: Little and Brown, 2010). A critique of Perry's book interpretation of federalism can be found in American and European Federalism, available at Amazon.

2. Since 1913, the American states have switched from their respective governments appointing U.S. senators to the popular election of them. If it still be claimed that the senators still represent their respective governments, then popular election sets up a conflict of interest. In my view, the U.S. Senate could strengthen the American federal system by having the governors represent their respective states, as is the case in the European Council. See Essays on Two Federal Empires: Comparing the E.U. and U.S., available at Amazon.

3. The U.S. Senate, like the E.U. Council would meet formally in summits and for occasional special purposes (e.g., confirmation hearings where necessary) rather than more often, given the workload of a chief executive and head of state. The Senate's staff, like its counterpart in the Council, and the respective staffs of the governors in the member-states would do much of the coordinating and other work.

4. Manny Fernandez and Emily Ramshaw, “As a States’ Rights Stalwart, Perry Draws Doubts,” New York Times, August 29, 2011. 

Citizens United: A U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Ensconced in the Status Quo?

According to Rodell Molineau, executive director of the Democratic super PAC American Bridge in 2012, "The meta-lesson from [the 2012] election cycle is that showing up and participating in the process is key, which is something that we didn't do in 2010. I think a lot of Democrats ceded the field on super PACs because most people in progressive circles didn't believe in the Citizens United ruling."[1] The U.S. Supreme Court’s Citizen’s United ruling on January 21, 2010 opened up unlimited corporate and union spending on political campaigns. The fact is, sometimes you have to play by rules you don’t agree with in order to compete. The obvious danger is that one gets coopted by those rules in the process, even having a financial disincentive to push for a repeal of the problematic ruling. In other words, the ruling accrues the benefit of being the status quo and thus becomes extremely difficult to dislodge.

In 2010, the Huffington Post reported, “conservative outside groups held a three-to-one advantage in spending on House races and a slightly more than two-to-one advantage in Senate races, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. The formation of the Democratic super PACs and their coordination with traditional liberal groups—labor, environmental and women's groups—helped cut that advantage to less than two-to-one in both House and Senate races in 2012, according to Federal Election Commission data. . . . In the end, conservative groups reported spending $102 million on House races, compared with $79 million for Democratic groups. In Senate races, conservatives spent $135 million, compared with $89 million for Democrats.”[2] However, former U.S. senator Russ Feingold, co-author of the 2003 campaign finance reform act, said, “I don’t think we won because of this thing.”[3] This remark is crucial, should it be necessary to ween Democratic Congressional leaders off an addiction to the saccarine superPAC money.

One other major factor Feingold could have been referring to was the impact on Congressional races of the Obama campaign’s ground-game and related systematic data-collection efforts in 2012. Specifically, the campaign was able to identify new voters, track their opinions, and get them out to vote. Congressional campaigns and even groups such as MoveOn were able to tap into that resource in getting out the vote too. Getting out the base made all the difference in the 2012 election, particularly as most counties in most states shifted back in a Republican direction after having tilted blue for Obama in 2008.

We should also consider the mistakes that Congressional candidates themselves made, such as Richard Mourdock, the Republican candidate in Indiana for the U.S. Senate seat formerly held by Dick Lugar. Mourdock claimed that a rape victim getting pregnant is “God’s will.” It is questionable whether any amount of superPAC money could undo such a gaffe.  A similar though less outlandish case involved Mitt Romney’s comment made in private to a group of rich potential donors that it would not be his job as president to worry about the 47 percent of Americans who did not pay income taxes (but paid other taxes) in 2011. I wonder whether voters are capable of ignoring the plethera of superPac-funded political ads in such cases and voting instead on the basis of what they have reason to believe more accurately depicts the candidate’s judgment and opinions (i.e., via the gaffes). One would like to think that voters could see through the slickly marketed political ads on television in every case, but having the ad edge can indeed help even a pathetic candidate, particularly in reducing the opponent’s support.

Sadly, having a lot of money counts a lot in Congressional elections. In the constitutional convention in 1787, some delegates worried that Congress, unlike the state legislatures, would be an aristocratic body—even the U.S. House, which was to be the repository of democracy in the new federal government. By the twenty-first century, the populations of the states had become much more than they were in 1787, including relative to the number of members of Congress. The U.S. as a whole reached 300 million around the year 2000, with only 535 members of Congress. The aristocratic element can be seen in these numbers alone. It should be no surprise that candidates for those offices would attract a great amount of money, and with it private influence over public policy. Even were Citizens United upended by a future decision or an amendment to the U.S. Constitution, it would be difficult to hold back the flood of money attracted to all the power that Congress has amassed since the Great Depression in the 1930’s. In other words, the sound of money is simply a reverberation of the nature of power in an increasingly consolidated political empire.

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1. Paul Blumenthal, “Democratic Super PACs Trim Conservative Advantage in Congressional Races,” The Huffington Post, November 10, 2012.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

Christianity by State: The Religious Dimension of Federalism

According to the  2010 U.S. Religious Census of Religious Congregations & Memberships Study by the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies, less than 50 percent of the people living in the United States identified themselves as Christian adherents in 2010. There were more than 150.6 million out of 310 million. Even so, candidates for the U.S. presidency still felt the need to vocalize the fact that they are Christian (while the opponent doesn't quite measure up in that respect). President Obama made a point during his first two years in office to stress his Christianity as if it were the membership card to the Oval Office. It would seem that the litmus test was already antiquated and thus needlessly constrictive on potential candidates.

The study also discerned differences between the states, once again giving evidence of the heterogeneous nature of the empire of fifty republics. States where more than 55% of the residents identified themselves as Christian were either in the South or in the Midwest. Mississippi (59%), Utah (57%), Alabama (56%), and Lousiana (54%) top the list. Interestingly, the two clusters of dark red on the map point to two distinct Christian cores in the United States. It would be interesting to study whether or how the two cores differ. One indication is that there were differences is that all of the states in the southern core had the death penalty at the time, whereas two of the three states in the northern core did not. I suspect that the southern core was more ideologically conservative in nature (i.e., social issues)--the Northern core's conservatism being moderated perhaps by the tradition of Hubert Humphrey.

States where less than 36% of the residents identified as Christian were in the West and New England. Vermont (23%), New Hampshire (23%), Maine (25%), and Massachusetts (28%) have the fewest Christians on a percentage basis (the map incorrectly shows MA as bright red). In these states, it would be particularly untenable were public services and offices to close on Good Friday and the following day. Unlike Christmas, Easter does not have the secular holiday component (which is recognized as a national holiday in the U.S.).  In fact, the sheer extent of difference between states like Mississippi (high 50s) and those like Vermont (low 20's) suggests that holidays should be declared on the state rather than the federal level. The question of whether the U.S. Constitution's establishment of religion clause applies at the state level is also relevant.

In short, the multi-colored map of the U.S. in terms of Christianity suggests that a "one size fits all" approach through Congress has the significant downside of ignoring significant cultural and religious differences. In other words, to take Vermont and Mississippi and "split the difference" is not likely to fit with the condition in many states. The fact that those two states are in the same union testifies to the fact that the union itself is on the empire-level, meaning that its member states are themselves commensurate with countries around the world that are not themselves on the empire-level. It should be no surprise, then, that federalism, which originated at the empire level in alliances, is a system of governance particularly well-suited to accommodate the sort of diversity that exists in the U.S. (and E.U.). The key to enabling federalism to accommodate the different religious makeups of the states is to keep the imperial-level government from stifling the state governments. In other words, they need to have enough space to produce legislative action that is tailored to their respective religious cultures. In states that are dark red, it makes sense that Good Friday would be a recognized holiday, whereas such a practice in Vermont or Oregon would impose too much on too many people. 

On Federalism in America and Europe, see Essays on Two Federal Empires: Comparing the E.U. and U.S., Essays on the E.U. Political Economy: Federalism and the Debt Crisis, and British Colonies Forge an American Empire, all available at Amazon.

Source:

The Huffington Post, "Most and Least Christian States in America," May 29, 2012. 

Was U.S. President Obama the Antichrist?

In the twentieth century, Christian apocalypticism thought it saw the end of days in the midst of baleful signs, including historical biblical criticism, the return of the Jews to the Holy Land, evolutionary science, and the United Nations. In the United States, the consolidation of power in the federal government at the expense of federalism (and, theoretically, liberty as well) was apocalyptically taken as a precursor to the end. According to Matt Sutton, “As the government grew in response to industrialization, fundamentalists concluded that the rapture was approaching.” The trajectory, in other words, was viewed as headed toward a global super-state under the thumb of a seemingly benevolent ruler. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “consolidation of power across more than three terms in the White House, his efforts to undermine the autonomy of the Supreme Court, his dream of a global United Nations and especially his rapid expansion of the government confirmed what many fundamentalists had feared: the United States was lining up with Europe in preparation for a new world dictator. This “leader would ultimately prove to be the Antichrist, who, after the so-called rapture of true saints to heaven, would lead humanity through a great tribulation culminating in the second coming and Armageddon.”

Thanks to Obamacare and the Dodd-Frank financial regulation law of 2010, some of the anti-state apocalyptic voters viewed Barak Obama during his first few years as president as possibly being the antichrist. Questions about Obama’s birth only fueled the speculation. According to Sutton, the “specious theories about his place of birth, his internationalist tendencies, his measured support for Israel and his Nobel Peace Prize fit their long-held expectations about the Antichrist. So does his commitment to expanding the reach of government in areas like health care. In 2008, the campaign of Senator John McCain, the Republican nominee, presciently tapped into evangelicals’ apocalyptic fears by producing an ad, ‘The One,’ that sarcastically heralded Mr. Obama as a messiah.” On the Fox News network, one host regularly referred to Obama as “the anointed one.” This reference was not lost on evangelical apocalyptic voters.  

Analysis:

The sheer paradigmatic distance between twenty-first century secularists and evangelical apocalyptics may go a long way in explaining the blockages between the U.S. House Republicans and the U.S. Senate Democrats (and the president). In other words, the voters represented by the two parties are not only on different pages—the two groups are reading different books. Indeed, beyond having radically different theological assumptions and beliefs, the two groups may differ even on whether religion is legitimate. For example, a modernist secular voter might characterize the apocalyptics as superstitious. The voter could point to the failure of the world to end in the twentieth century in spite of all the signs of the impending rapture and period of tribulation. Indeed, “the sky is falling” Christian reading goes back to the pre-Constantine persecutions. 

In spite of the problems with the apocalyptic interpretation (which seems to have been applied in any decadent or disruptive period in the history of Christianity), definite trends can be identified, such as the U.S. Government’s increase of power at the expense of the several states. Furthermore, increasing global interdependence—such as in regard to health, nuclear weapons, and climate—has indeed increased pressure on politicians to increase the power of the U.N. The proliferation of empire-scale federal unions beyond that of the U.S.—as evinced by the E.U. and even the A.U.—can also be viewed as a trend toward globalized governance (i.e., a federation of regional federations, which themselves are made up of kingdom-level states).

How such trends are interpreted is what triggers the gulf between the apocalyptics and the secularists (and even the mainline churches). My main point is that political intransience can be expected with such divergent views of social reality and its basis. For instance, does society (and government) result from a social contract (e.g. Hobbes, Locke, Kant) or a divine decree (e.g., Augustine and Aquinas)? Is increasing statism a sign of the Antichrist or simply a response to problems of industrialization? The interpretations go beyond whether the trends are good or bad. Accordingly, discourse itself can be expected to be extremely difficult. It is not, however, impossible, and solutions are possible.

For example, federalism can accommodate such divergent views as long as the federal units have enough autonomy from the general government. The E.U. is in a better condition in this respect than is the U.S., though the European Union risks dissolution (e.g., the state debt crisis) because the E.U. Government does not have enough competencies to effectively manage the integration already accomplished.  However, federalism should not be viewed as a panacea. It is possible that the fundamentally disparate differences between the apocalyptics and the secularists regarding the role of government are such that political separation is the only suitable solution. This may be why Texas under Rick Perry flirted with succession in Obama’s early years. In any case, as difficult as discourse between the representatives of the two groups may be, being in political union demands tolerance and discussion, which in turn require humility (including a recognition that one can be wrong). Yet even here, Biblical inerrancy throws in a wrench, making discourse tortuous for both sides.

The distance between the parties is indeed formidable and perhaps even intractable. Even deciding whether to separate would be daunting. A union containing a very deep cleft is thus what we Americans suffer to manage amid political paralysis, finger-pointing, and shouting. God must surely be diverting his eyes in utter disgust and ultimately sadness—not about the signs or trends necessarily, but, rather, concerning the sheer anger being evinced in such tight quarters. Were there any adults willing to come to the fore, a secular voter might lightheartedly proffer in generosity, God shines His light on this city on a hill. Otherwise, we are together in quite another place.

Source:

Matthew A. Sutton, “Why the Antichrist Matters in Politics,” The New York Times, September 25, 2011. 

On the Virtue of a Constitutional Moment: Reassessing the American System of Government

A constitutional moment engaging the citizenry is urgently needed with respect to the system of government in the United States. In short, the citizenry should decide, as a people, whether to revert back to a federal system or to make the political consolidation that has ensued official. If the latter, Alexander Hamilton's suggestion that the states be districts of the US Government, whose energy he thought could not directly extend to the outer reaches of the empire (i.e., into the wilderness of states distant from the seat of the U.S. Government). This was Hamilton's view in the U.S. Constitutional Convention; his writings eventually published in The Federalist Papers were meant to sell the proposed constitution rather than to give his own proposal. His own view may have come to pass, though through incremental Congressional encroachment on the turf of the governments of the several states and concurring U.S. Supreme Court assuaging (or enabling) doctrines.  I submit that this process of change over many years has eventuated in a gap between the system of governance as it is and as it is to be constitutionally.  Whereas some people argue that we must revert back to the constitution following a "strict" construction, I believe we the people, as a people, should commence a constitutional moment of heightened attention and debate concerning whether we want centralized consolidation (i.e., no states), decentralized consolidation (i.e., states as districts), or federalism (which entails dual sovereignty and a balance of power between the general government and the governments of the states).  I believe the latter is the best suited for an inherently diverse empire-scale political union, but that the people reach a decision is the imporant point now.  For otherwise, we will continue to live a lie--to claim to be a federal system while actually being consolidated: essentially flying with miscalibrated instruments. 

Actually making a decision on the type of political system is better than having the system inadvertantly change as a byproduct of whatever issue is being legislated at the moment. If the latter habit continues, I suspect that the United States will continue along the trend of consolidation at the expense of the State governments, with Congress, the U.S. President, and the U.S. Supreme Court gaining more and more power without sufficient checks on their abuse of power.  Progressives could look back on Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court allowing President George W. Bush to essentially declare war on Iraq and command the forces, while conservatives could look back on "Obamacare" applying to every state. Being concerned about the government of the Union having too much power is or ought to be an American proclivity. So too, the need for a decision on what type of political system the United States should have bears on every citizen, regardless of party.  This is what a constitutional moment is, after all; the people itself rising to discuss the system of government itself without being distracted by partisan issues of the day. To be sure, such a moment requires self-discipline among the people and responsibility in the media, so to keep on topic.

I find myself wondering why I even make the arguments.  It would take so much energy and agreement just to get to a constitutional moment wherein the citizenry as a whole become engaged in revisiting the governance system itself.  We are so easily distracted, and do we, as a citizenry, really care whether our government is federal or consolidated?   It might be that most of the citizenry is ready to say good bye to federalism.  If so, then so be it.  Let’s at least make a decision.  If we as a people are incapable of making such a decision, it might be asked whether we are capable of democracy itself. It would be ironic if we were preaching democracy to the Middle East while not embracing popular sovereignty here at home.

Eleven Time Zones in Russia: A Problem of Consolidated Empire

As of 2011, Russia had 11 time zones, from the Polish border to near Alaska, a system so vast that a traveller could get a walloping case of jet lag from a domestic flight.  In 2009, Russia was considering shedding some of its time zones.  People running businesses in the far east were complaining because the regulators were typically in Moscow, which could be several hours behind.    The issue blossomed at the end of 2009 into an intense debate across the Russian Federation about how Russians saw themselves, about how the regions should relate to the center, and about how to address the age-old problem of creating a sense of unity in a diverse federation that had been consolidated politically.  In short, the issue concerned the challenges involved in a consolidated empire. 

The sheer amount of territory in an empire that is made up of republics that are on the scale of independent states or countries makes “one size fits all” from the center extremely difficult.  It might have been different when kingdoms and empires were smaller—such as the medieval sort (e.g. the Swiss confederation and the Netherlands—both empires on a medieval scale but states in modern terms).  For China, the US, the EU and Russia, the extent of geography is a limitation on how much centralized authority is possible.  The Chinese government maintains one time zone for China, when there could easily be four or five.  In the case of Russia, such consolidation would mean that people in some places would be getting up and having breakfast in the middle of the night!   Even reducing the number of zones could make it more difficult on some, given the short duration of daylight in the winter.   Consider, for example, the trouble of going to and from daylight savings time in the US and EU.  Eliminating a few time zones in Russia would be to act as though a few hours difference doesn’t matter much.  The far east may already be two hours off of the correct biological time—meaning the most fitting with the human biological clock. 

In the end, the problem is one of consolidating an empire-scale polity.  Given the inherent heterogenuity involved in such an expanse, there are limitations in what can be done centrally.  Moscow can’t simply issue an order and expect that every Russian city will be awake and thus able to reply immediately.  Resentment toward central control in such cases (i.e., empires) is quite natural.  Indeed, proposals to modify the time zones have stirred deep suspicions, especially in the Far East and Siberia, where people have long resented Moscow, much the way people in places like Idaho distrust the goings-on in Washington.  So the issue is not simply one of whether time zones should be adjusted.  The tensions come when an empire seeks an inordinate amount of centralized control—more than that which is consistent with natural differences.  A consolidated empire on the modern scale (i.e., early-modern kingdoms being the scale of the units) is an artificial construction.   The time zones, I submit, should be oriented to biological clocks, while the federal system is given greater weight (i.e., more autonomy for the republics and regions).  “We have to look at this from a biological standpoint, how it is going to affect health,” said Yekaterina Degtyareva, 27, a personnel manager who lives in Novosibirsk, the most populous city in Siberia, and often travels to the Far East and Moscow. “If it is going to be a centralized, so-called totalitarian decision, then nothing good will come of it.”

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/07/world/europe/07zones.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=russia%20time&st=cse

On U.S.Senators Being Elected

According to David Firestone of The New York Times, a “surprising number” of the Tea Party members were calling for the repeal of the 17th Amendment of the US Constitution during the election campaign season of 2010. That amendment, which was ratified in 1913, provides for direct election by the people of each state of US senators. According to Firestone, “allowing Americans to choose their own senators seems so obvious that it is hard to remember that the nation’s founders didn’t really trust voters with the job. The people were given the right to elect House members. But senators were supposed to be a check on popular rowdiness and factionalism. They were appointed by state legislatures.” That it may seem so obvious to us does not mean that we have it right. Yet Firestone presumes so in writing, “a  modern appreciation of democracy — not to mention a clear-eyed appraisal of today’s dysfunctional state legislatures — should make the idea unthinkable.” Should it really?  Firestone seems biased in his dogmatism.

For one thing, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1786 didn’t want to restrict direct representative democracy in the US Government to the US House only out of fear of mob rule as Firestone suggests.  They thought the direct power of the state governments in the US Government would be necessary to keep the new empire from consolidating at the imperial level (i.e., in the US Government). Firestone himself admits that to most authors of the Constitution, “allowing states to appoint the Senate was the linchpin of the entire federalist system and the real reason there are two houses of Congress.” Whereas the British House of Lords represents wealth, the US Senate was to represent not only that, but semi-sovereign republics as well.  The latter likens the US Senate to the European Council rather than to the upper chamber of one of the EU’s states.  Firestone makes a category mistake where he avers that it “may be true that appointed senators, accountable only to state legislators, would never approve of many useful federal mandates designed to put the national interest above local parochialism — including everything from the minimum wage to the new health care reform law.” States commensurate with European kingdoms/countries are not local polities.  Furthermore, reducing the US Government to a “national” interest ignores the semi-sovereign nature of the states (and thus the international principles in the design of the US Senate as opposed to the US House, which is national in nature).

Firestone seems to misunderstand what the US Senate is.  In referring to returning to having the state legislatures appoint their delegates to the US Senate as an “elitist notion,” Firestone forgets that state legislators are elected by the people and in fact have smaller electorates than do US House or Senate members.  Empowering state legislators would ironically be to bring power back closer to the people.  ”Senate candidates have to raise so much money to run that they become beholden to special interests,” Tea Party members say according to Firestone.  The members ”argue that state legislators would not be as compromised and would choose senators who truly put their state’s needs first.” That in turn would restore checks and balance to federalism, wherein both the state and federal governments would be checked (by the other). This is not just a matter of state rights; rather, it is a matter of a viable federalism instead of consolidation. As Tim Bridgewater, who ousted Sen. Robert Bennett of Utah as the Republican candidate writes, “We traded senators who represent rights of states for senators who represent the rights of special interest groups.” By rights of the states, one can infer an empowerment of the representatives elected by the people of the states.  Such a change would hardly be anti-democratic or elitist; rather, it would reduce the power of the elitism in Washington DC.  A writer ought to be careful in dogmatically writing that something is ridiculous or unthinkable, for the lack of thought could come back to haunt him or her.  It is clear that Firestone is not very open to the possibility that he could be wrong.  The arrogance of centralized power at an empire-level is truly remarkable, even in its press.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/opinion/01tue4.html?hp

See American and European Federalism  and Essays on Two Federal Empires, both available at Amazon.

Van Rompuy as the European Council's First Extended-Term President

“In a sense, Europe seemed to be living down to expectations. Earlier, the foreign minister of Sweden, Carl Bildt, warned against a 'minimalist solution' that would reduce the European Union’s 'opportunity to have a clear voice in the world.'"  Olivier Ferrand, president of Terra Nova, a center-left research institute in France, said, “It is quite astounding. . . . It is jaw-dropping. It is the end of ambition for the E.U. — really disappointing.”

I think these are rather extreme positions on the selection of Herman Van Rompuy on November 19, 2009 as the first non-rotated president of the European Council.  Moreover, I don’t think the E.U. is going the way of the dinasaur just because Van Rompuy was not well known at the time of his selection.  He has written six books, is a writer of Japanese poems, has consensus-skills, and seems humble enough.  Would popular election have yielded a better candidate? As the election would have been E.U.-wide, it is doubtful that a high proportion of the voters would have been sufficiently familiar with him to make an informed decision. 

The New York Times continues, “The deal that produced the two choices emerged as a result of backroom negotiations among leaders jockeying for future and more important economic portfolios that could be more powerful in the enlarged European Union, which is still more of an economic union than a political one and looks to remain so.”  However, the E.U. includes a popularly-elected Parliament. Is a parliament not political? Is a parliament not a government body?  Perhaps, moreover, we should simply say that transfers of sovereignty are now economic in nature.

One might ask: who would have a vested interest in perpetrating such a subterfuge wherein governmental institutions, whether intergovernmental (e.g., the European Council) or national (e.g., the E.U. Parliament) are to be portrayed as solely economic in nature? According to The New York Times,  “The leaders of Europe’s most powerful countries, France and Germany, did not want to be overshadowed. Nor apparently did their foreign ministers.”   After the European Council elected Van Rompuy, Gordon Brown, the then-current British Prime Minister who had been pushing for Tony Blair (his precursor), told reporters that the posts are only ceremonial anyway since the state governments are still in control.  However, is Van Rompuy's role in presiding over the European Council merely for show? Is there not power in chairing a political institution? Furthermore, are the heads of the state governments in charge of the E.U. Commission, the E.U. Parliament, and the European Court of Justice? Even within the European Council where the governors of the states sit, qualified majority voting on most issues means that any given state government is not in control. We can conclude that E.U. level officials are not mere gloss on a window, and that the member states have indeed transferred some of their governmental sovereignty to the E.U. Government. Lest is be thought otherwise--that the E.U. does not have a government, there is a saying in English: If it quacks like a duck, walks like a duck, and swims like a duck, odds are it is a duck.  It might be useful to ask why it is in the interest of some that the obvious conclusion be withheld.

My only caveat concerning the selection of Van Rompuy is that the consensus maker was not the sort to make transparent the "duck" subterfuge and denial, which had gone unchecked at the expense of greater European integration. In other words, the E.U. needs its own leaders who can garnish attention for the E.U. itself (i.e., apart from its state governments) because if integration falters, the danger will be dissolution unless or until more governmental sovereignty is transferred to the E.U. As for Van Rompuy's low name recognition outside Belgium at the time of his selection, let’s not forget that few, if any, presidents of the U.S. Senate (the Vice President of the U.S.) have been known at the beginning of their respective terms. Of course, outside of breaking tie votes, the president of the U.S. Senate (whose members are the member states of the union) is more ceremonial than is the president of the European Council.  In fact, senators regularly stand in for the presiding officer when the U.S. Senate is in session, whereas Van Rompuy himself presides over sessions of the European Council.  Also, the European Council is possibly more powerful among E.U. governmental institutions than the U.S. Senate is in the U.S. This is probably so because the state governments in the E.U. have more power at the E.U. level than the American state governments do in the U.S. This could explain why Van Rompuy's position, the President of the European Council, is powerful (because the Council he chairs is powerful) even if Van Rompuy had been an unknown outside of Belgium and was not an attention-getter in the media (e.g., unlike Tony Blair).

Source:

Stephen Castle and Steven Erlanger, "Low-Profile Leaders Chosen for Top European Posts," The New York Times, November 19, 2009.

In Defense of the Tea Party

In the wake of the U.S. House’s “Tea Party” caucus in the Republican caucus on July 28, 2011, which effectively delayed the Speaker’s bill for raising the debt ceiling, it might be useful to row against the current for a moment if only to present a defense of the Tea Party’s agenda. To be sure, problems exist in it, but a defense can be made. I submit that the media has not been particularly accurate, or fair, concerning the movement or its involvement in the U.S. Government.

Most notably (but not obviously), Tea Party representatives are correct that August 2^nd does not necessarily bring with it default, for that refers only to the Treasury department not making the required interest and principal payments on the debt. That some government agencies have to shut down does not constitute default, for the latter pertains ONLY to serving debt. Indications are that the U.S Government could service its debt August from incoming tax revenue. If so, default would only be voluntary—if the Treasury should decide to use the tax revenue for other uses.

It is more accurate to say that delaying raising the debt-ceiling would increase the likelihood that the U.S. Government’s credit rating will be lowered to AA from AAA. On this front, the refusal to compromise can be excoriated. For its part, the Tea Party might say that it is worth risking if a structural re-alignment could occur.

What does the Tea Party really want: a reduction in government or a reduction in the federal government? Or both? Other things equal, I suspect that the party would prefer a given domestic program to be at the state level, but even there the spending (and taxing) would receive some ire. If the goal is primarily to restore federalism, the Tea Party is on firmer ground. Since the CSA-USA war (1861-1865), the United States has been trending toward political consolidation at the expense of the innate diversity coming with an empire-scale. Nothing—not even Ronald Reagan and his Supreme Court—could turn the tide. One could not blame the Tea Party for saying: if not now, when? Indeed, the existence of a $14.3 trillion U.S. Government debt—roughly the amount of the annual GNP—can be viewed as a manifestation, or symptom, of the imbalance.

So it makes sense to pick the debt-ceiling as the matter on which structural adjustments can be made. However, what if the majority of the people, or branches, prefer consolidation to federalism in any meaningful sense? Is it fair to foist a structural shift on the majority? Would not it be fairer to promote a constitutional amendment directed on the question of federalism?

Of course, the Tea Party representatives could simply be opposed to the debt, and therefore of increasing it. If it is unsustainable already, then raising the debt ceiling might make matters worse even if it assuages short-term difficulties. If the leverage possible in a debt-ceiling decision is given up, there might not be another chance to stop the trend of more and more debt being added to what is already unsustainable. Rather than force massive short-term spending cuts in federal programs and agencies, however, the leverage could be used to agree to longer-term cuts, say over ten years. This is what the Tea Party has been for, though at the risk of short-term shock.

However, it could be countered that were the Tea Party really focused on reducing the debt, the objection to increasing tax revenue, especially for the rich whose effective rate is eighteen percent, would not exist. That is to say, even if citizens and residents are being taxed too much, it is not too much relative to the debt (past spending that was borrowed). This is different than saying that spending should be cut, for that applies to current and future deficits. An enhanced Tea Party position would be to come down hard on the debt (and further deficits), and thus be for both spending and revenue means of closing the gap. Even combined, it will be difficult to pay off the $14.3 trillion.  From this perspective the spending/revenue debate is premised on a false dichotomy wherein one or the other is assumed to be sufficient. The magnitude of the debt relative to GNP—the highest since the end of WWII in the twentieth century—suggests that the Tea Party is not radical enough.

Compromise in Congress Impeded by Empire-Scale Federalism

While it may take much effort and skill to compromise on disparate budget numbers, whether to have a public health-insurance option for the poor or sick, and whether to add regulations for the biggest banks, these compromises are actually rather narrow relative to the political-ideological spectrum. Broadening out the poles could include adding revenue considerations to the differences on spending, replacing private health insurance companies with an expanded Medicaid/Medicare program, and breaking up the $1 trillion plus banks. It could also include a balanced budget amendment complementing drastic spending cuts, having the state governments decide whether Medicaid and Medicare continue as state rather than federal programs (and how), and deregulating the financial sector further. Were public officials to enlarge the domain subject to compromise, compromise itself would be more allusive even as more positions would be represented.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.

The E.U.'s Membership in the U.N.'s General Assembly: An Oxymoron or Reality Catching Up?

On May 3, 2011, the United Nations’ General Assembly passed Resolution 65/276 by a vote of 120 to 0 (with two abstentions—countries subject to E.U. sanction). The resolution makes the European Union a non-voting member of the General Assembly. As such, the E.U. can “be inscribed on the list of speakers among representatives of major groups and be invited to participate in the Assembly’s general debate, in accordance with the order of precedence and the level of representation.” The E.U. is also “able to present oral proposals and amendments, which, however, would be put to a vote only at the request of [a voting member].” Hence, the E.U. membership is without the right to vote, co-sponsor resolutions or decisions, and put forward candidates. In other words, the E.U. has been granted a sort of “quasi” status commensurate with the world’s notion of the E.U. as a “regional organization”—whatever that means.  I contend that this misunderstanding of what the E.U. is has led to the resolution giving the union a quasi-status in the General Assembly even as another such union, the U.S., enjoys not only voting membership in the General Assembly, but also a veto on the Security Council. In short, the world is confused on the E.U. and the resolution bespeaks this condition.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires, available at Amazon.

The Consolidation of Power in the American and Roman Empires: On the Rise and Fall of Empires

The American federal government was for at least a century, and perhaps even longer, primarily involved in defending the new empire and regulating commerce between the republics (or states more generically). By the dawning of the twenty-first century, the U.S. Government had grown both in scope and in the number of employees on its payroll while the governments of the republics had been reduced to functioning as little more than local governments. In other words, Congress had come to act like a state legislature, while the states had accepted their status as mere localities. This fundamental shift with respect to American federalism, as well as the empire-“kingdom”-city arrangement, bears a striking resemblance to the Roman empire. By implication, this similarity might lead us to some conclusions regarding the future the United States within the larger story of the rise and fall of empires.

The complete essay is at Essays on Two Federal Empires.