The Right in European and American Politics: Disentangling Right from Right

The far-right in Europe has been quite different than the right-wing in American politics. Putting aside the usual caricature of “people in pointy hoods and the Ku Klux Klan,” Marine Le Pen said she still believed “the American right [was] much more to the right than the National Front.” She may have agreed with those who wanted to manage American frontiers more effectively and prevent massive illegal immigration, but she was also a big believer in the state’s ability and obligation to help its people. “We feel the state should have the means to intervene,” she said. “We are very attached to public services à la française as a way to limit the inequalities among regions and among the French,” including “access for all to the same level of health care.”[1] This statement implies that survival is a human right--something the American right has tended to eschew in favor of a survival-of-the-fittest mantra that conflates the state of nature with the interdependency in a developed economy. 

Therefore, it can be concluded that American right has been more far-right than the European far-right has been in terms of government having a responsibility to take care of people in need, even providing a survival-net so that no one need go hungry, homeless, and without medical-care. Of the latter, it took President Obama, a corporate Democrat, to widen the net on medical insurance, though even he caved to the private-insurance lobby, which threatened it would withdraw its support unless the president dropped his support for a public option.  

So from an American standpoint, it is particularly striking that the European right has consistently advocated universal health-care. To the American right, even a “public option” for government-run health insurance can only be odious socialism, which in turn, if generalized, could bring down the Union. Moreover, the American rich who retort, “I don’t want to help others with my tax dollars—just defense,” is absent from the E.U.'s far-right. This point demonstrates a real cultural divide between the E.U. and U.S. 

In terms of federalism, the “Euroskeptics” have been much more skeptical of the E.U. than the state rights advocates in America have been of the federal-level of governance in the U.S. Even though in both unions secession movements have resulted from the Euroskeptic ideology, it has had more influence in terms of the constitutional design of the E.U.'s federal system as well as in European politics. For example, the governor of Hungary came to the defense of Poland when the federal Commission went after the latter for subjugating the judiciary to politics. In terms of federalism, the European right is more to the right than is the American right.

Immigration is another policy area in which the European right is further right. France's president Sarkozy’s attempt to send the Roma out of his state makes Arizona's Jan Brewer’s proposal to allow her state's police to verify the citizenship of people already involved in a police action seem down-right moderate. Whereas in the spring of 2011 the Danish government considered putting up border guards to keep African immigrants out, the Arizona government did not add border guards of its own in 2010. To be sure, U.S. President Trump did exactly that in 2018, perhaps to keep certain peoples out or to stop drug-trafficking and illegal immigration. In European far-right politics, going after particular peoples already legally in the E.U. has been fair-game. In the E.U. state of Belgium, some establishments in the Flanders region as late as 2010 have brandished signs stating “No Walloons Allowed”—similar to “No Blacks Allowed” in Alabama until the 1970s. It would be interesting to compare racism in the E.U. against Africans with racism in the U.S. against Black Americans (who go by the misnomer of African-Americans, which is an ethnic rather than a racial designation).

Perhaps it could be said that whereas culturally and in terms of federalism the European right has been more to the right, the European value of solidarity has moderated that far-right appreciably, whereas the right-wing in American politics has known no such moderating factor. Therefore, caution should be exercised when comparing seemingly-parallel parties in American and European politics. The two unions have rather distinct politics even though “right” and “left” apply to both unions. 

For more comparisons, see Essays on Two Federal Empires, available at Amazon.

1. Tracy McNicoll and Christopher Dickey, “What a Tea Party Looks Like in Europe,” Newsweek, September 6, 2010.

Two Conflicting Views of E.U. Federalism: Accounting for Brexit

"You have lost a good opportunity to shut up," Sarkozy said to Cameron during a bitter two-hour exchange which held up a meeting of all 27 European Union states on 23 October 2011, according to the  Guardian. Translating the relatively polite European English into American slang, Sarkozy’s statement becomes, Shut the fuck up. "We are sick of you criticizing us and telling us what to do," Sarkozy added. "You say you hate the euro, and now you want to interfere in our meetings." Cameron had insisted on participating in the euro zone meetings because he anticipated that, perhaps along the lines of taxation without representation, unfavorable regulations would be imposed on Britain without its consent, according to The Telegraph. Cameron also claimed that the euro zone crisis was having a "chilling effect" on all European states, including Britain. He insisted that all 27 E.U. state governments, rather than just the 17 using the euro, should be able to have the final say over Europe's rescue package, according to The Guardian. I submit that the argument portends in retrospect, at least, the decision taken by the British to secede from the Union. 

Was Cameron trying to have it both ways by having refused to transfer the governmental sovereignty necessary for monetary union yet going on to demand being entitled to a vote on monetary policy regarding the euro? Might it be that the prime minister presumed himself to be in a superior position from having evaded the common-currency trap, and thus he felt entitled to tell the E.U. “euro” states, which had found themselves in a pickle, what to do? Alternatively, if British banks are called on to take sizable losses on their Greek debt holdings and/or to increase capital reserves, the state government would indeed be entitled to participate in the decision-making process at the E.U. level on those proposals.

Cameron would doubtless go further, insisting that just the fact that Britain would be adversely affected economically by a Greek default justifies the British prime minister in having a seat at the table. At the time of the E.U. conference, the Huffington Post observed: “Europe already is entering a continent-wide economic slowdown, as manufacturing output recently reached an 18-month low, according to the Wall Street Journal, and European economic growth fell to its lowest rate in two years,  according to The New York Times.” Any mishandling of the Greek situation could easily rock the European economic boat, which Britain is in. In other words, if the debt crisis had gone well beyond the matter of the euro, then Cameron had a legitimate point that the entire E.U. should decide on a solution. This could mean that all 27 states contribute to the European Financial Stability Facility, for otherwise it would be difficult to bracket the involvement of the non-euro states in the decision-making process. In other words, if the most serious of the financial problems involve European banks and wayward E.U. states rather than centering on the euro itself, then all of the states should be involved in the decision-making at the E.U. level.

Sarkozy and Cameron eventually reached an arrangement on October 23^rd that the 27 E.U. state governments “would initially debate the measures to write down Greek debt, increase the size of the bailout fund, and recapitalize European banks, but ultimately the euro zone would have final say over the rescue package  [on October 26^th] , according to The Guardian.” Presumably British banks would not be called on to write down their Greek debt, and this might cause banks in the “euro zone” states to demur. The same goes for any recapitalization requirements. As for the bailout fund, that would rightly be governed by the states that had contributed to it.

Perhaps the squabble between the two state leaders can be seen by the rest of us as a harbinger of the difficulty involved not just in achieving fiscal integration within the “euro zone” requisite for stable monetary union, but also in there potentially being two levels of fiscal integration in the E.U. itself. The E.U. would have a major structural/procedural/political problem if the “euro zone” states were to cede additional governmental sovereignty regarding their fiscal or budgetary/tax policy and Britain were to insist nonetheless on having a vote on particular “euro zone” fiscal policy proposals that might affect it even though it had not agreed to cede the sovereignty to being subject to “euro zone” decisions, including those on which Britain participates. That is to say, extending the “two tracks” tradition of the European Union to fiscal policy (including state budgeting and taxation) could mean that an “outer” state such as Britain is negatively impacted by a decision made by the players in the “inside track” and yet not be able to have any formal involvement in the decision-making. Rectifying this would mean that the “outer” state government could participate in “inside” policy while not be subject to it. Is the prospect of being negatively impacted by others’ policy sufficient in the E.U. to justify the right to vote on the policy even without being subject to it? It would seem that exasperating its “two track” tradition might put the Europeans in a double-bind. If so, it may be that E.U. state governments may all have to bite the bullet and cede more governmental sovereignty, whether or not they adopt the euro.

Source:

Bonnie Kavoussi, “Nicolas Sarkozy To David Cameron: ‘You Have Lost a Good Opportunity To Shut Up’,” The Huffington Post, October 24, 2011. 

Sarkozy’s Electoral Campaign in the E.U.: Not for the U.S. Presidency

On February 15, 2012, France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy formally announced his intent to file as a candidate for the office in what would be his second term. The announcement took place just over two months from the election (April22nd). If no candidate wins an absolute majority, the two top candidates would be on the ballot in a runoff held on May 6, 2012.[1] The European sense of a decent length for a campaign “season” could be taken to heart by Americans.

For example, as Nicolas Sarkozy was undergoing two or three months of campaigning in France, Scott Walker had been campaigning for months already in Wisconsin, well in advance of a recall election that could still be six months away. I suspect that generally speaking, the campaigns in the U.S. states are much longer in duration than in the E.U. states. Perhaps Europeans are less tolerate of excess, or more willing to “just say no.”

Comparing a state-level campaign season with the election of an office at the empire-level (i.e., of a Union of such polities) is problematic. For one thing, at the E.U. and U.S. level, the states themselves would expect to have a say. Hence, primaries and caucuses to nominate a party candidate for the office of the President of the United States are by state. This involves several problems, such as what to do if a state voting later has a narrowed range of possible candidates from which to choose. Having every state nominate on the same date, with a run off a week or two latter, would be an improvement, but it would take away the distinctiveness of the states—something Europeans appreciate.

The American Electoral College, wherein electors vote for the President of the United States by state (literally in the capitols), is also not convertible into elections at the state level. It would make no sense to apply such a mechanism to a state itself (i.e., voting by state). My more general point is that it is hazardous to compare state and federal electoral politics and processes because the nature of a federal union does not apply to a particular state thereof. Yet this is typically ignored and I’m sure many people are trying to compare Sarkozy’s campaign with that of Obama.

This raises a much larger point: what to do with a societal category mistake that has become the legitimate default. The human proclivity of ignorance to presume that it cannot be wrong only complicates the matter of correction. Treating the U.S. as if it were a state in the E.U. with a large backyard conflates apples and oranges. Moreover, the error involves treating an empire as if it were on the kingdom level (i.e., a part of itself). It is like treating one person in his entirety as if he were equivalent to another person’s arm. The problems with such a comparison become clear once clothing is considered. What covers your arm is not going to cover my entire body, and going with it in January in Wisconsin or Wyoming would be dangerous. Similarly, it is dangerous to a polity to disregard what it is and treat it as if it were something else.

Therefore, although the U.S. Presidential campaign “season” (now two years!) is entirely too long and is in urgent need of reform, it would be a mistake to look at Sarkozy’s announcement, coming just two months before of his election, as a basis of comparison. Perhaps it is because empire-level federal unions of states have added elements (as well as scale) that complicate (and thus extend) the selection process of an empire-wide office such as the Presidency of the United States that the European Union has so far decided not to have an elected president. Given the nature of the level and scale of the E.U. and U.S., there is a lot to be said of the proposals in the U.S. Constitutional Convention wherein state legislatures or chief executives select the U.S. President. As it is, the U.S. House of Representatives, voting by state, elects that office where no candidate has an absolute majority of the electors in the Electoral College. Because the delegates in the convention thought it unlikely that any one person could be so well-known even in the empire of 13 republics, I suspect that they presumed that most presidents would be elected by the democratically-elected federal representatives, voting by state as the U.S. is a union of states (i.e., the states being members too).

No one would be happier than me were the American presidential election reformed to have a two or three month campaign season, but given the fundamental difference between the U.S. and E.U. on the one hand and their respective states on the other, we could expect problems because a category mistake would be involved. For instance, two months given the empire scale would mean that grass-roots campaigning would be virtually impossible; the television media would be the conduit, and perhaps with undue manipulation from the funded-pundits and media “personalities.” There is a reason why in traditional federal theory, officials of the states select the empire-wide office holders. The state officials themselves having been elected (after a two month campaign!), their involvement would not be at the expense of democracy. In fact, it would heighten public attention on the state-level elections, as is the case in the E.U. Put another way, were the E.U. to have an overall president (rather than one of a given institution, such as the European Council), I doubt it would be a simple election decided only by the E.U. citizens as a whole. That would be to conflate the E.U. with one of its states. See what I mean? If so, you will see the mistake being made over and over again as a matter of course, as a generally accepted default rather than a gross error. Welcome to my world.

1. Gabriele Parussini and David Gauthier-Villars, “Sarkozy Launches His Bid for New Term,” The Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2012. 

Is States' Rights in the E.U. Racist?

Thousands of Romania’s Roma people (also known as Gypsies) headed for the wealthier Western E.U. states, setting off a clash within the European Union over just how open its “open borders” really were. Migration within the 27 states of the E.U. became a combustible issue during the economic downturn. The Union’s expansion that brought in the relatively poor states of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 renewed concern that the poor, traveling far from home in search of work, would become a burden on the state governments of the wealthier states. The migration of the Roma also raised questions about the obligations of Romania and Bulgaria to fulfill promises their governments had made when they joined the Union. Romania, for instance, mapped out a strategy for helping the Roma, but financed little of it.

Nicolas Sarkozy of the E.U. state of France demanded in 2010 that the Romanian state government do more to aid the Roma at home. He vowed to keep dismantling immigrant camps and angrily rejected complaints from E.U. Commission officials that the French authorities were illegally singling out Roma for deportation.

Sarkozy, being oriented to state politics, tried to revive his support on the political right by deporting thousands of them, offering 300 euros, about $392, to those who go home voluntarily, and bulldozing their encampments.[1] The European Commission threatened legal action against the state of France over the deportation, calling it disgraceful and illegal. Perhaps it could also be called racist. If so, might Sarkozy’s action be comparable to a Southern state in the U.S. trying to kick black people out. That is, might Sarkozy’s action evince state rights perpetrating racism? Arizona’s immigration law requiring people being investigated by the police to show I.D. pales in comparison.  Might the association of state rights and racism have shifted from the U.S. to the E.U.? If so, it is doubtful that state rights would be marginalized in the E.U. as it has been in the U.S. on account of the association; the state governments in the E.U. enjoy more than enough loyalty by their citizens to defeat it.

More generally, this case illustrates the problems that the E.U. has had in enforcing compliance of the terms of the accession talks of new states. Prime facie, the case showcases the difficulty involved in integrating Europe, particularly as states such as Italy, Spain, France and Denmark have striven to keep out immigrants from Africa. The case of the Roma could be just the tip of the iceberg in how state rights may be fueled by racism to keep certain groups out. In other words, there could be a rather troubling pattern here, and Europeans may have been torn—looking to the E.U. to thwart the racism while supporting their state governments in keeping out “troubling” groups. It is part and parcel of the checks and balances in modern federalism that member governments can be called on their sordid policies even when they are popular within the particular states.

1.Suzanne Daley, “Roma, on Move, Test Europe’s ‘Open Borders’,” The New York Times, September 16, 2010.