On Britain’s Possible Accession after Seceding from the Union

Secession is a nasty business. Both Britain and South Carolina learned that lesson. Whereas the American member-state failed to secede from the U.S., Britain succeeded in seceding from the E.U. The parallelism presented here is no accident, for just as the U.S. federal system has been charactered by dual sovereignty—both the Union and the members having at least some governmental sovereignty—so too does the E.U.’s federal system. In deciding whether or not they want Britain to become an E.U. state again, the British ought to keep this fact in mind. 

Calling states “members” makes no difference to the divided sovereignty; in neither the E.U. nor the U.S. are the states fully sovereign, and neither the E.U. nor the U.S. itself is fully sovereign at the expense of any sovereignty remaining in the so-called members (i.e., states). In contrast, to refer to countries that belong to an international organization such as NATO or the UN as “member-states” just compounds the category mistakes that have been oriented to the false assertion that the E.U. and U.S. are qualitatively different rather than of the same (empire-scale) level and political genus (modern federalism of dual sovereignty). Just as sovereign countries formed the E.U., such countries formed the U.S., which at first was nothing more than a military alliance, and then a confederation of sovereign countries, and finally, from 1789, a federal system characterized by dual sovereignty. 

That feature of (early) modern federalism was salient for the British voters who voted to secede from the Union. In fact, their refusal to accept the E.U. having any governmental sovereignty was hardly absent from their judgment to vote in favor of their state seceding from the Union. Such a fundamental divide—between the actual sovereignty held by the E.U. and the Euroskeptic denial that such sovereignty even exists—is more important than other “pros” and “cons” that the British voters considered in voting on secession. So it is unfortunate that after Britain seceded, the question of whether the state should once again become a state has been dominated by “pros” and “cons” without giving much attention to the more fundamental matter of sovereignty.

In late September, 2026, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham “told a Labour Party conference that he would present ‘options’” concerning the relationship between the former E.U. state and the European Union.[1] He told his group’s delegates, “We could stay as we are. We could look at what George Osborne has said about a customs union, we could look at what the Liberal Democrats said about the (EU) single market, or we could go all the way.”[2] He went on to say, “We have to look at what is doable and what would be the problem is (sic) and cons of each.”[3] That is to say, they would have to look at the problems associated with each option. Such a practical, piecemeal approach ignores the more fundamental problem that existed when Britain was state: namely, getting the E.U. itself wrong, meaning mis-categorizing it in its basic, or constitutional, law, as if it were, as the former prime minister, David Cameron once said, “a network to which Britain happens to belong.” International networks, or “blocs,” do not have supreme courts that can overrule state courts, a parliament whose representatives are elected by federal (i.e., E.U.) citizens, and an executive branch. Blocs do not have three branches of government that individually and together, constituting a government, have at least some sovereignty.

Fundamentally understanding what the E.U. is politically is incompatible with being in the Union. This incompatibility dwarfs the particular advantages and disadvantages of various options. That is to say, if Britain is to become a state in the Union again, acceptance of the dual sovereignty enshrined in the E.U.’s basic law should be requisite by the British government and a majority of the electorate voting in a referendum. A house divided cannot stand, especially if each state retains a veto in the European Council and the Council of Ministers; the UK could “enforce” its erroneous disavowal of any E.U. sovereignty by holding federal legislative and executive action hostage. Put another way, if a majority of the British, as well as the British legislature, approaches the E.U. as if it were an international organization or bloc, the E.U. would be executing a self-inflicted wound by allowing Britain’s accession as a state. Obviously, other options, such as a customs union, would be fine, but to be a state, the UK would need to accept the fact of dual sovereignty.  

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1. Mared Gwyn Jones, “UK’s Burnham Floats Going ‘All the Way’ and Rejoining the EU,” Euronews.com, 30 September 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

The Declaration of Independence at 250

Ahead of the 250^th anniversary of the signing of a Declaration of Independence by representatives, or delegates, from thirteen British colonies in North American, a rare copy was discovered at the British government’s archives. Besides the obvious irony, how the copy had come into the possession of the British is a reminder of just how much the rebelling colonists risked by taking on the mighty British Empire. Although the task of actually achieving political independence must have seemed formidable, the political elites on both sides “of the pond” (i.e., the Atlantic Ocean) had already grasped the inherent instability in there being an empire within an empire, for an empire as a political category or type consists of kingdom-level polities rather than empires. The British Empire had run aground in terms of the logic, and the American Revolution can be interpreted as a working-out of the illogic.

Having been a young teenager when America celebrated its bicentennial, I was less than taken with marking the passage of just fifty more years in 2026. Similarly, anyone who remembers New Year’s 2000, which marked a change of year, decade, century, and millennium (!) would be hard-pressed to get excited about departing from 2025 to begin 2026, for example. Even so, the number 250, half of 500, catches the eye. Even though 250 years is but a blink in the expanse of human history, let alone human existence (1.8 million years!), the passage of even just 250 years can come with a significant loss, and even misconstruing, of a historical event as it was perceived in its time by participants and onlookers.

The long odds in 13 “former” colonies taking on the armed forces of the British Empire could scarcely be grasped on July 4, 2026. How the rare copy of the document fell into the hands of the British provides us with a glimpse of the actual risks. The document, which is “one of the rarest forms of the Declaration we know about,” “was seized by the Royal Navy after the capture of the privateer ship Dalton on Christmas Eve in 1776.”[1] The capture came after seven hours of pursuit by the Royal Navy ship HMS Raisonable off the coast of Portugal. Over a hundred men were subsequently taken prisoner and stayed in prison in Britain under very harsh conditions, including food deprivation, for years until freed in a prisoner-exchange. It not for nothing that Benjamin Franklin remarked at the signing of the Declaration, “We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.” He knew what they were up against, and what could befall them at the hands of the British. He also knew why urging the delegates of the then-former colonies to stick together in the conduct of the war, which would doubtlessly long unless easily snuffed out by the empire’s forces, for the colonies were declaring their respective independences concurrently, rather than creating one new nation. This point had by 2026 been largely lost to history.

The heading of the document consists of the following: “In Congress, July 4, 1776, DECLARATION by the REPRESENTATIVES of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, in GENERAL CONGRESS Assembled.” Parsing this heading, the word Congress then meant an international political meeting (or “summit” in modern political parlance), rather than a country’s legislative body. The self-declared independent polities were called states generically because their respective forms of government (e.g., kingdom, republic) had yet to be decided by their already-existing legislatures. The words, United States of America, referred to the states being united rather than to a country with its own government and comprising states. In fact, prior to independence, the title United Colonies had been used on both sides of the ocean, albeit with a baleful connotation on the British side. Not only did the United Colonies not refer to anything formal politically, but also both the colonial and the British elites, according to the Massachusetts-born historian George Bancroft, viewed the United Colonies as empire-scale, and thus an empire at least in expanse within an empire, which was believed to be an inherently unstable arrangement because the empire within the empire would almost certainly eventually break free. Some people even ascribed the label empire to New England, the Mid-Atlantic, and the South, such that the United Colonies consisted of three empires—yet another unstable arrangement.[2] Accordingly, Franklin urged the delegates from the independent new states to hang together; it was not only because United action would be necessary to defeat the British Empire. In 1776, no one thought of the title, United States, as referring to a country, so the latter misconstruing of the heading as referring to the United States as a country having begun then is inaccurate. On July 4, 1776, what would become that country with a federal system of dual sovereignty could only be anticipated, and thus understood as being formed by sovereign countries.

That 13 countries began on July 4, 1776, even though only years later recognized as such by the British, rather than a country called the United States of America, has implications for comparative politics generally and comparative federalism in particular. Just as sovereign countries under the Articles of Confederation joined the U.S. in 1789, so too sovereign countries began and have joined the E.U. since its founding on 1 November, 1993. Unlike international organizations, such as the European Coal and Steel Community and the Economic Community, the E.U. is federal characterized principally by governmental sovereignty being held both by the states and the Union itself. Just as the U.S. States are members of the U.S. institutionally at the federal level in the U.S. Senate, the E.U. states have direct federal involvement in the Council of Ministers, which like the U.S. Senate, is legislative, and in the European Council, which can be likened to the U.S. Senate when it is in executive session and to the National Governors Association, which does not have formal power. However, by glancing over at the European Council, it can be understood that the governors assembled could play a formal role at the federal level in the setting of priorities for that Union. Such insights are potentially of great advantage in doing comparative federalism in line with historical contexts rather than from contemporary reformulations of the past.

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1. Nathan Rennolds, “’Vanishingly Rare’ Copy of US Declaration of Independence Discovered in the UK,” Euronews.com, 4 July 2026.
2. Skip Worden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire: Comparing the E.U. and U.S. (2015).

On Retaining the States’ Veto-Power in the European Council: Sovereignty vs. Democracy

Both the filibuster in the U.S. Senate and the veto in the European Council reflect the act that the respective states were sovereign and retain a portion of that governmental sovereignty that has not been delegated to the respective Unions. But whereas the American filibuster is compatible with a federal system based on dual-sovereignty (states and union), the European veto is not; rather, each state having a veto is at home in a confederation, which is characterized by the states retaining their sovereignty rather than having given up some in becoming a state. In April 2026 shortly after Viktor Orbán had lost his bid for re-election in the E.U. state of Hungary, the E.U.’s foreign minister argued publicly that the states’ veto in the European Council (and the Council of Ministers) runs contrary to the democratic principle of majority rule. The prerogative of retained and residual governmental sovereignty was essentially being pitted against a fundamental principle of democracy.

Kaja Kallas, the E.U.’s foreign minister, castigated the requirement of unanimity in the European Council (in competencies, or enumerated powers, in which qualified majority voting does not apply) because the votes of 26 state governments can be hijacked by a single holdout. Her assumption is that majority-rule rather than the rule by one (holdout) is fundamental to democracy, whether direct or representative. Referring to the vetoes that had been exercised by the then-outgoing governor of the E.U. state of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, Kallas pointed out that the Council doing what only one state wants, “not what the 26 [others] want . . . is not really democracy.”[1] In fact, one-state rule can be thought of as autocratic rather than democratic. If so, then it follows that the remainder of sovereignty retained by the states as veto power is antithetical to democracy. Although both principles are valid in a federal system characterized by dual-sovereignty rather than all sovereignty being retained by the states, I contend that a sufficient recognition of the retained sovereignty of the states lies in the voting method by qualified majority, and furthermore, that such a method is not in conflict with democracy because even a super-majority is majority rule.

To be sure, the E.U.’s basic (constitutional, or government framework) law provides “a legal pathway to move from unanimity to qualified majority voting. However, . . . such a shift itself requires unanimous consent.”[2] Such a blatant “Catch 22” suggests that the state governments were exploiting a conflict of interest in devising and approving the pathway as if they were states in a confederation, which, unlike modern federalism, according to Kenneth Wheare’s Federal Government, involves no transfer of limited sovereignty (i.e., enumerated powers) to the federal level. That the hamstringing non-qualified-majority-vote policy and legislation at the federal level could easily have been foreseen indicates a proclivity to put the interests of their own states, and the states altogether, above federal initiatives for the good of the whole, which is more than merely the sum of the parts. In fact, the veto itself may imply that the whole is merely such a sum.

Qualified-majority voting enables sufficient unity at the level of the whole and enables the federal level to exercise its exclusive and shared competencies, or powers. Kallas said, “we need to be united and able to take decisions.”[3] So unity should not be so total that decisions cannot be taken and implemented at the federal level, which consists not only of the European Council (and the Council of Ministers), but also the Commission, Parliament, and supreme court (i.e., the ECJ), which are not so beholden to state-level interests that can differ from the interests of the whole, as represented by the Union.

The counter-argument made by Charles Michel (interestingly at the time of Kallas’s interview) in favor of keeping the veto in the Council that he had chaired from 2019 to 2024 is spurious. Firstly, he undercut his argument against the pressing need to shelve the veto mechanism by predicting that the European Council would be not be more unified on Ukraine following Orbán’s departure because other governors “share elements of his political stance, including on Ukraine.”[4] Slovakia, for instance, could easily step into Orbán’s shoes. This prediction makes Kallas’ point even more urgent!

Michel went on to claim that “the ‘European Dream’ depends on collective agreement among all 27 member states.”[5] Such would be the case were the E.U. a confederation of sovereign states, such as the Articles of Confederation were as the treaty made by the sovereign countries forming the U.S. until 1789, but the E.U.’s federal level enjoys exclusive and a shared-portion of competencies, or enumerated powers, and such sovereignty does not depend on unanimity at the state level because the states are not fully sovereign. The political-type category mistake in which a modern federal system of dual sovereignty is supposed to be a confederation was ultimately responsible for why Britain seceded from the Union; as prime minister, David Cameron mischaracterized the E.U. as but one of the “networks” of which Britain had joined. It is no wonder that a significant number of the Brits chaffed at even the limited governmental sovereignty that the E.U. itself enjoyed at the expense of full state sovereignty.

Michel’s “European dream” involves yet another problematic claim. “If you stop trying to involve every [state],” he said, “you risk weakening the EU’s weight on the international stage.”[6] This statement incorrectly assumes that any state on the losing end of a qualified-majority vote in the Council is not involved in the process, and that the E.U.’s very credibility on the world stage is not undercut when one state hinders federal action in foreign and defense affairs. Even as Russia continued to invade Ukraine for over four years, that the E.U. could not support Ukraine militarily made the Europeans look weak and unprincipled on such an obvious case of unprovoked military invasion.

Moreover, I dispute Michel’s utopian fantasy that 27 governors of states with differing interests, both economic and geopolitical, will nonetheless be unanimous enough on specific federal policy and legislative proposals for the principle of unanimity to be viable (i.e., workable enough) for the E.U. to exercise its own competencies that are subject to unanimity. Put another way, for the states to have delegated a significant amount of governmental sovereignty to the E.U. and yet selfishly, as per state-specific interests, to hold onto unanimity on many important matters being considered in the federal-level councils constitutes wanting to have one’s cake and eat it too. Such a capricious mentality does not deserve credibility on the world’s stage.

To be sure, Michel warned against governors misusing (to excess) the veto-power of their respective states in the Council, noting that the veto should only be used as it was intended to be used, “only when vital [state] interests are at stake.”[7] Given that the authority has been up to the governors themselves whether to use their power, however, an expansionist wielding of the vetoes should have been anticipated at Lisbon. Besides over-valuing even petty interests, as if they should outweigh the interests of the whole (Union), governors could easily invent such interests in solidarity with a foreign foe of the E.U. and thus undercut the Union itself on the world stage. I am referring here to Orbán’s relationship with Russia’s President Putin—Orbán even went to Moscow, undercutting President Von der Leyen’s policy against Putin’s militaristic aggression unprovoked in Ukraine.

The Von der Leyen administration was wise in looking outward to the credibility of the E.U. and its long-term functioning as a federal rather than state-centric system of governance, whereas Michel was entrenched in a status quo premised on fallacious arguments and even a category mistake. Ironically, for the need to expunge the veto-power from the federal-level councils after the departure of Orbán to still be felt as pressing, Michel’s prediction of no increase in cohesion among the governors was significant. Unfortunately, as an impetus to even needed political reform, the abstraction of a prediction pales in comparison to the actual use of vetoes, such as Orbán’s veto of the loan to Ukraine.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Orbán-Style Vetoes Undermind E.U. Democracy, Kaja Kallas Tells Euronews Hoping for Reset,” Euronews.com, 24 April 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Angela Skujins, “European Council Should “Think Carefully” before Removing Unanmity, Says Michel,” Euronews.com, 24 April, 2026.
5. Ibid.; italics added for emphasis.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.

Hungary Blocks €90 billion E.U. Loan for Ukraine: Holding the E.U. Hostage

It is one thing for a dog’s tail to lead; even worse is the situation in which the tail refuses to let the dog walk or run. The staying power of the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. enables any one of the state governments to block federal policy and law. Such a blockage makes the tyranny of a minority look tame. In contrast, qualified-majority voting ensures that enough of a majority—a “super-majority”—is in place that the resulting minority should lose. The notion that every state government must be “on board” for the E.U. to enact a policy or law is misplaced because governmental sovereignty in that Union is “dual” because both the E.U.’s federal level and the state governments have at least some sovereignty. The same is true of American federalism. Neither the E.U. nor the U.S. is a confederation of sovereign states; only in such a federation does the principle of unanimity fit.

Facing an uphill electoral contest in two months, Hungary’s sitting prime minister, Viktor Orbán, had one of his ministers, Peter Szijártó, announce on 20 February, 2026, “We are blocking the €90 billion EU loan for Ukraine until oil transit to Hungary via the Druzhba pipeline resumes.”[1] This is an obvious example of a part putting its own interest ahead of the whole, which includes not only the E.U. but also the entire world-order, given Russia’s non-provoked aggression in Ukraine for years with impunity. Regarding the E.U., the implication that a federal program should be in the particular interests of each state in order to go forward reduces the E.U. to a mere aggregation in which every part must be satisfied and thus federal action is severely constrained even at the expense of the E.U. itself, meaning the collective interest that goes beyond the aggregate of the particular interests of the states.

Besides the systemic problem in allowing each of 27 states to block federal action and even statements, Hungary’s use of its veto to block the loan demonstrates that the governor of an E.U. state is perfectly capable of wielding the veto power immaturely and irrationally. Szijjártó claimed “Ukraine is blackmailing Hungary by halting oil transit in coordination with Brussels and the Hungarian opposition to create supply disruptions in Hungary and push fuel prices higher before the elections.”[2] In other words, the E.U. state was blaming Ukraine. The problem with that narrative is that the “Druzhba pipeline, which dates back to the Soviet Union, was damaged after it was hit by a Russian strike and that has impacted transit.”[3] That the strike had been unprovoked and Ukraine was in the midst of massive power outages due to other Russian strikes seem not to have registered in Budapest. Ukraine was “in the midst of a difficult winter, with gruelling temperatures below zero. Russia’s constant pounding with missiles and drones means a large part of [Ukraine’s] energy infrastructure has been destroyed and cannot cope with the heating needs of civilians.”[4] Was Ukraine to drop everything to fix the pipeline that Russia had damaged? Rather than make this claim, the governor of Hungary could have weened his state off Russian oil. The rationale for the veto is thus dubious at best, and this in turn raises the question of whether the governors of the E.U. states are capable of having a veto at the federal level, especially as one of the rationales for the E.U. is to forestall war from breaking out between states or between a state and a foreign country. This rationale is but one of ways in which the interests of the whole—the European Union—are not mere aggregates of the particular interests of the states, for none of the states has a mandate to look out for peace throughout the E.U.

That Hungary even has a veto over the loan is a stretch because the E.U. states of Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic had successfully been granted federal exemptions from contributing financially to the €90 billion loan. It was “subject to unanimity” nonetheless “because it amends the E.U. budget rules to allow borrowing” for a foreign country.[5] That the E.U. allowed exempted states to vote nonetheless is, I submit, yet another indication that the E.U. was still too wedded to the principle of unanimity and the states were too unwilling to give up that power. That Hungary’s use of that power in this instance was so wrong-headed, for Russia rather than Ukraine was responsible for the non-functioning pipeline, adds urgency to the point that the E.U. should finally confront the question of whether to reform itself by expunging the confederation-fitting principle of unanimity.

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1. Maria Tadeo and Jorge Liboreiro, “Hungary Blocks €90 Billion Loan for Ukraine over Damaged Pipeline as Tensions Escalate,” Euronews.com, 20 February, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

Is Europe in Civilizational Decline?

Does the E.U. itself instantiate a decline in European civilization? So says a National Security Strategy for the United States released by the Trump administration in December, 2025. That report also claims that migration to Europe was in the process of causing European nations to face “civilizational erasure.” That is to say, the European nation-state was by the end of 2025 facing existential threats due to the E.U. and migration. The report also highlights the loss of democracy in Europe, due both to the E.U. usurping the governmental sovereignty of the states and the clamping down on voices on the right in Europe. I contend that the report contains a sufficient number of fallacies that it can reasonably be dismissed as bias ideology under the subterfuge of national security.

The report “proposes to ‘cultivate resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations.’”[1] This can be interpreted as an intent to aid Orbán’s anti-E.U. strategy in Hungary and to encourage other governors of E.U. states to resist the E.U.’s exercise of even its existing exclusive competencies, or enumerated powers (i.e., as per the dual-sovereignty feature of that federal system). To hamstring President Von der Leyen’s efforts to aid Ukraine, for example, “kills two birds with one stone,” as the saying goes, because in keeping the E.U. from strengthening, Ukraine’s strength against Russia is also held back.

The report finds “subversion of democratic processes” in Europe, and claims that the E.U. undermines “political liberty and sovereignty.”[2] This would be news to the European Parliament, whose representatives, like those in the U.S. House of Representatives, are elected directly by citizens and thus represent them, rather than even their respective states (the European Council and the Council of Ministers do the latter, as the U.S. Senate does in the U.S.). So, the E.U.’s bicameralism, if anti-democratic, means that the U.S. Congress also suffers a democracy deficit such that most Congressional powers should be returned to the American member states.

Whereas in confederal systems of public governance, democracy is only at the state level, which by the way is fine because the states retain all governmental sovereignty, federal systems characterized by dual sovereignty (i.e., governmental sovereignty being split or divided between the federal and state levels, or subsystems) should have democracy at both levels, rather than just at the state level. This is true of the E.U. grace á the European Parliament, even though its powers could stand to be augmented and those of the European Council lessened so as to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the E.U. even more.

Aside from the erroneous perspective that the E.U. is itself a reduction in European democracy, Trump’s claim that European migration policies had been “transforming the continent and creating strife, censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition, cratering birthrates, and loss of national identities and self-confidence” also warrants critique.[3] Does the administration mean to claim that migration policies have been causing birthrates to drop? The application of reason alone can easily dispel such a claim. The same goes for self-confidence, though there may be more to the claim that mass migration dilutes national identities if enough of the new arrivals refuse to integrate culturally. Furthermore, such a dilution is qualitatively different than any from a new-found sense of identifying as Europeans, which, although coming along slowly, is facilitated by the very existence of the European Union. That is to say, even if cultural diversity within a member state is not desirable, identifying increasingly as European rather than merely by member state has the advantage of making war within at least Western Europe less likely in the future. Additionally, identifying culturally as a European can aid indirectly in efforts to enhance the E.U.’s foreign policy and defense competencies, given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Surely Europeans in some of the E.U.’s eastern states would not lament feeling more European and less exclusively of their respective states if that meant that the united action of the E.U. would be more likely to be augmented to include defense without state veto-power standing in the way at the federal level. In short, criticism of migration and the E.U. should not be conflated.

As for free speech, in 2025 it came under threat arguably more as anti-genocide protesters were being arrested as if they were promoting violence rather than protesting against Israel ironically for having been so violent, and with impunity internationally. That the Trump administration had been enabling Israel’s genocide and perhaps holocaust explains why the report ignores the arrests, especially in Germany and Britain, of human-rights protestors while complaining as if Orban has been made into a scapegoat in the European Union even though he has serially violated E.U. law. His support of Russia and criticism of Ukraine, no doubt related to Hungary’s reliance on Russian energy, may have something to do with the report’s “finding” that free speech in Europe has been compromised by forces on the political left rather than the pro-Zionist right. Recently, I encountered such denialism in a coffee shop from a native South African man, whose daughter attends Columbia University. The man insisted that all of the images of destruction in Gaza have been created by AI, and that in actuality, the residents there have been eating well. Regardless of our political disagreement regarding enabling a genocide, I was stunned that his perspective was so divorced from even credible media reports. A European reading Trump’s National Security report might have the same reaction, especially concerning migration causing a drop in birthrates. Such denialism, from ideology, with even credible, mainstream journalism being relegated as illusionary, may be the real sign of a civilizational decline.

Given the impotence of the United Nations to combat the militaristic aggressiveness of Israel and Russia, the collective action that is possible by means of the E.U. can be regarded as a good thing, even though the member-states, or “nations,” would need to give over more governmental sovereignty. Due to the existence of the European Parliament, a democratic legislative chamber, a transfer of additional governmental sovereignty from the states to the Union would not mean that Europe is less democratic. In fact, adding the Parliament to state legislatures means more democracy, with democracy being able to exercise more of a check on itself (i.e., the Parliament on the state legislatures).  Of course, no political union is perfect, or ever can be, and the Parliament could stand to be given more authority in the making of law, so to strengthen the democratic institution at the federal level. Were the Trump administration really for democracy in Europe, the report would include this proposal rather than go with the erroneous claim that democracy only exists, or should only exist, at the state level. Moreover, were the Trump administration to avoid making political category mistakes, the report would compare the E.U. with the U.S., and thus be able to make helpful proposals to strengthen both unions of states. Even though Europeans may bristle at this axis of comparison, my motive in writing is to make such proposals for the good both of Europeans and Americans, for we are more alike in what we value than we sometimes realize.

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1. Andrew Naughtie, “Trump Administration Warns Europe of ‘Civilisational Decline’ in New National Security Strategy,” Euronews.com, 5 December 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Entangling Confederalism and Modern Federalism: A European Quagmire

On America’s Thanksgiving Day, 2025, Dmytro Kuleba, a former foreign minister of Ukraine, was asked whether Ukraine’s government officials could trust American officials negotiating with the Russian officials, given the fact that Steve Witkoff, the U.S. Envoy at the time, had recently been caught coaching Kirill Dmitriev, a top Russian official, on how to get U.S. President Don Trump on the side of Putin even though the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine was still in violation of international law, which, by the way, trumps historical reasons, such as a lost Russian empire. Stalin’s forced famine in Ukraine during the 1930s would seem to nullify any imperial claims from the past. Kuleba relied to the journalist’s question with, “Not really, but we do not have another America.”[1] He was really giving Europe a wake-up call, but the problem there was not a lack of consensus, but a structural deficiency in the federal system of the European Union.

The full essay is at "We Don't Have Another America."

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1. Mared Gwyn Jones, “European Decision-Making on Ukraine ‘Embarrassing,’ Former Foreign Minister Kuleba Says,” Euronews.com, November 27, 2025.

E.U. Flag Day

Both the E.U. and U.S. have their respective flag days during the month of June—on the 29^th and 14^th, respectively. This isn’t the only thing that the flags have in common, and what sets both off from the flags of the states. I contend that these similarities and difference regarding political symbols can function as markers for what both unions are as complex polities of polities even as ideologies seek to obfuscate and dissimilate, even dismissing or ignoring the history of both unions. In other words, flags don’t lie; people do.

The first flags of the E.U. and U.S. were both used by their predecessors, rather than being created in 1993 and 1789, respectively. These dates mark when the states gave some of their governmental sovereignty to the union-level judicial, legislative, and executive branches. The first E.U. flag had been used by the European Communities since 1986, and the first U.S. flag had been used beginning in 1777 by the alliance’s Second Continental Congress, and, moreover, under the Articles of Confederation, under which each of the 13 member countries was sovereign after having been colonies in the British Empire until 1776. Crucially, the Declaration of Independence declared the independence each of the 13 colonies, which even while colonies had been in a military alliance like modern-day NATO.

The original E.U. and U.S. flags. The sheer paralellism is astonding, especially given how differently the two unions are perceived today by the general public on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. 

The E.U. flag contains stars representing its 12 original states and the U.S. flag contains stars representing its 13 original states because all of those states had been sovereign countries and still retained some governmental sovereignty. In fact, in 1993 and 1789, respectively, the states still held most of the governmental sovereignty, with the federal governmental institutions, or branches, being much restricted in their respective exclusive competencies and enumerated powers.

The parallelism itself is astounding, especially given the tendency in Europe to perceive the E.U. incorrectly as a “bloc” or international organization like NATO and NAFTA, and in America to perceive the U.S. like France with a large back-yard rather than an empire-scale union of semi-sovereign polities. This is precisely why the history of the two flags is so important to know, for treating the U.S. as if it would be a state in the E.U. rather than on the same level and scale as the E.U., and treating the E.U. as if it were a temporary “bloc” of sovereign countries for a single purpose like trade or defense as if a trade agreement of military alliance incur rather basic yet invisible category mistakes.

The basic, or qualitative difference between the unions and their respective states can be grasped by the fact that the E.U. flag’s twelve golden stars, “explicitly, and in contrast to” the flags of the states, represent the states and “the ideals of unity, solidarity and harmony,”[1] which are especially important at the union, empire-level because empires are inherently heterogenous (i.e., interstate differences in culture, norms, and values as well as dominant ideologies) whereas the states themselves are relatively homogenous. Rather than a difference in degree, the difference is that of a leap, given that there is a leap in geographical scale between that of a state and a union of many such states. 

That the stars in the E.U. flag are in a circle better stands for unity than does the arrangement of the 13 stars in the original Star-Spangled U.S. flag, but the circle configuration was in the Betsy Ross version, which although not the official flag, was consistent with the specifications in the Flag Act of 1777. The parallelism between the stars in the Ross flag and in the E.U. flag is very strong.

The Betsy Ross Flag, a close up of part of that flag, and the E.U. flag. The close up and the E.U. flag are directly parallel, with only the color of the stars differing. The stars on both flags stand for states.

The value being placed on unity and solidarity at the federal level is more crucial than at the state level, and this is reflected in the fact that the state flags not only do not have stars representing sovereign and then semi-sovereign polities therein, but also do not symbolically highlight unity or solidarity. 

In short, unity and solidarity, which by the way are put at risk by relying too much on the principle of unanimity in having state vetos at the union level, are more valuable at the federal level in an empire-scale union of states than at the state level. Therefore, empire-scale governance contains, or should contain, dynamics that do not exist at the state, or (early-modern, rather than medieval) “kingdom” level, such as in managing diversity of state preferences at the union level.  Interstate differences are more salient in union-level governance than regional differences are in state-level governance, and early-modern federalism, as distinct from confederalism, treats the two levels as qualitiatively different as a result. To conflate them is thus one hell of a category mistake, and yet people on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean do it much too often, given the reasoning potential of the human brain. Yes, ouch! Just for added fun, let's put corrective braces on the crooked teeth of "Brexit" and add some disinfectant mouth-wash to extirpate the bad odor from former British Prime Minister David Cameron's erroneous statement that the E.U. was just one of the international networks that Britain had been in. 

Before the United Kingdom seceded from the E.U., it could be said that the ideological and cultural differences throughout the empire-scale union bearing on political decisions needed to be managed in the European Council, the Council of the E.U., the European Parliament, and the European Commission dwarfed the differences between the four regions or provinces of the United Kingdom that had to be managed at the state level there. Put another way, whereas the original E.U. flag has stars representing the states, the state flag of the United Kingdom does not have stars representing its regions. Nor, for that matter, does the flag of Germany have stars representing its 15 regions. 

The governmental dynamics at the scale of former and existing E.U. states are in crucial respects qualitatively different than the unique dynamics that empire-scale unions of such states must have in order not to fall apart due to pressure from state differences seeking their own expressions yet while there is unity at the union level. This is the balance that renders federalism itself an unstable form of government, yet the best suited form to empire-scale unions of states. Contrasting union from state flags warns us not to conflate state with union-level governance, and thus states with unions of such states.

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1. Andreas Rogal, “European Flag Celebrates 40 Years as Symbol for EU and Predecessor,” Euronews.com, June 29, 2025.

The E.U. Stance on Tariffs: Pressure from the States

After the U.S. took the decision to impose reciprocal and car tariffs on the E.U., it did not take long for several of the E.U. states to pressure the federal executive branch, the European Commission, to punch holes in the E.U.’s counter-tariffs so favored industries in the E.U. would not face higher prices on supplies from the United States. As in U.S. states, E.U. states have their own dominant industries, whose financial interests it is only natural for government to protect, as jobs translate into votes. But pressuring the E.U.’s federal government to carve out exceptions for imports desired by favored industries at the state level, such as automobiles in the E.U. state of Germany, would deny the E.U. the full benefit of a united front that federalism can provide against other countries. For maximum leverage in trade negotiations, unilaterally removing counter-tariffs is not wise; it is like a person intentionally tripping over himself while trying to get to the grocery store. Given the regional pressures, trade is rightfully one of the enumerated powers, or exclusive competencies, of the E.U. rather than a shared competency or a power retained by the states.

At a basic level, first of all, to pretend that the E.U. is merely a confederation, in which governmental sovereignty still resides exclusively with the state governments, is a much more subtle way of enervating the E.U., whether out of denial or a desire by federal officials to appease purblind Euroskeptic governors, such as Viktor Orban of the E.U. state of Hungary. Fortunately, though for some people regretfully antagonistically, transparency is valued by truth-tellers. Both qualified majority voting and the exclusive and even shared competencies enjoyed by the E.U. government are incompatible with a confederation, not to mention a mere “bloc” or economic treaty like NAFTA. Correctly “mapping” the E.U. is a prerequisite to being able to get “maximum bang for the buck” (an American expression, wherein “buck” strangely means “dollar”) in terms of collective action at the federal level.

On the summer solstice, 2025, which by the way is not the first day of climate summer as some American meteorologists were claiming as if they were deer in headlights or cows chewing cud, the E.U.’s Commission warned state governments that some of their “sensitive goods” would not be shielded “from planned retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods” because the E.U. was “weary of undermining its negotiating hand in high-stakes trade talks with President Donald Trump, three E.U. diplomats and officials” said.[1] Not to resist the pressure would unilaterally weaken the E.U.’s negotiating leverage even before sitting down to negotiate with the Americans. In a confidential meeting at the Commission, it was determined that acceding to all of the state requests would mean that the E.U. “would only target €25 billion worth of U.S. exports . . . instead of the €95 billion” that the E.U. “initially targeted as a response”.[2] The sheer difference between €25 billion and €95billion attests to the leverage that collective action at a federal level has over the negotiating power that an aggregation of European countries would have. In other words, the dollar value lost in the shielding can point to the power that is gained by collective action from an exclusive competency residing at the federal rather than state level.

In seceding from the E.U., the former E.U. state of Britain lost any future benefits that can be gained from collective action at the federal level of an empire-scale union of states, for even a secessionist state is commensurate in scale and polity-type with the remaining states rather than the union of such states. A leap in scale from (early-modern) kingdom and empire, and a qualitative difference in polity-type between a state and federal union of such states are why Britain is not equivalent to the European Union. In other words, the United Kingdom is not a small E.U.

In conclusion, subtly letting air out of the tire by insisting that the E.U. does not have a federal system or intentionally allowing states to shield certain imports from America at the expense of the federal stance is not exactly putting the best foot forward in arriving at the negotiation table. Given the sheer amount of benefit that would be lost were the Commission to acquiesce to every state request on carve-outs, proposals to expand the federal competencies subject to qualified majority vote instead of unanimity should be considered with greater urgency, and additional enumerated domains of power federalized from the states. Fears of a leviathan “central state” can be allayed by realizing that the E.U. has a federal system of divided sovereignty and that the state governments have significant access to policy-making at the federal level in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. even though the executive branch, the European Parliament and the E.U.’s supreme court provide less access and thus can protect federal prerogatives and thus the benefits obtainable from collective rather than associative action. Unity need not mean uniformity; collective action is possible at the federal level while states can retain the ability to reflect their own interests and cultures as long at the benefits from collective action are not unduly compromised.

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1. Camile Gus and Ari Hawkins, “Brussels Resists Pressure from E.U. [State] Capitals to Shield Exports in U.S. Trade Fight,” Politico.com, June 20, 2025.

2. Ibid.

On the Ideological Illogic of European Federalism

Europe may have contributed immensely to philosophy but logic seems to have been in short supply at times, as Europe ties itself in ideological knots in service of nationalism itself, as if that ideology had not given rise to two world wars in the twentieth century. I am not referring to the incendiary, irrational fear of the word, federalism, being applied to the European Union, but, rather, to the role of nationalist ideology in distorting the application of comparative institutional politics by journalists.

Take, for example, the following paragraph from Euronews: “Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni hosted three-way transatlantic talks in Rome on Sunday, which European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen highlighted as a possible ‘new beginning in international relations between the two blocs.”[1] Scant reasoning is needed to conclude that the two blocs being referred to are the E.U. and U.S., and that the Italian prime minister represents the third party, Italy.

The logic begins to fray, however, because the E.U. state of Italy is not separate from the E.U., so the talks were not actually three-way. To treat a state in a union of states as equivalent to that or any other like union is to commit a category mistake. Politically, the other E.U. states might get jealous were the E.U. state of Italy to be reckoned both as a state of the E.U. and as a third party in the talks, as if an umpire between the two “blocs.”

Typically, European journalists refer to only the E.U. as a “bloc” in order to differentiate that union from the other empire-scale union across the proverbial pond. To refer to both unions as blocs defeats that purpose. In actuality, neither union is a bloc because neither union is temporary nor oriented around one issue, or pillar. Furthermore, the federal, yes, federal governmental institutions of both unions are more than merely a playground for intergovernmental relations among state governments. In other words, both the E.U. and the U.S. have the sort of federal system wherein governmental sovereignty is split between the federal and state systems. In Federal Government, Ken Wheare uses “systems” instead of levels to make the point that where sovereignty is divided up, one locus is not “above” the other. In fact, the system of state governments can act as a check on over-reaches at the federal level, and vice versa.

Therefore, the E.U.-U.S. talks were actually bilateral between two empire-scale federal unions comprised of federal and state governmental institutions. The same powers need not be federalized in both unions for the latter to evince what Wheare calls modern federalism to distinguish it from confederalism, wherein the states hold all governmental sovereignty. Nor need there be a balance of power between that of the “feds” and the states, although I contend that balance is important in both loci being able to serve as a check on the other. Neither the E.U. nor the U.S. has, at least as of 2025, achieved balance, and it may not be an altogether stable property of federalism. This does not relegate either union to being a “bloc,” and the E.U. ambassador to the U.S. agreed with me on this point when we met on May 1, 2025, when we met at Yale, whose European Studies Council takes the E.U. as being more substantial than does the counterpart at Harvard. The E.U. is neither mainly intergovernmental relations nor an alliance.

So in Rome on May 18, 2025, Meloni was simply playing host to the Vice President of the U.S. and the President of the E.U., both unions (not blocs) having distinct roles in foreign policy. The governor of Italy was not present to negotiate on behalf of the E.U. on tariffs pertaining to the U.S.; in regard to them, von der Leyen and Vance had their work cut out for them in dealing with both tariff and non-tariff barriers to E.U.-U.S. trade.

If the E.U. were a bloc, then the U.S. would be one too, but actually both claims would be counter-productive at a time when strength at the respective federal levels was needed. This is not to imply that any two empire-scale modern-federal unions are or even should be identical for them the be classifiable in the same political genus: modern federalism as distinct as a political “species” from confederalism, and also from instances of modern federalism at the “kingdom” (i.e., member-state) rather than empire-level. The inter-state heterogeneity in an empire-scale polity is a leap, or step, rather than degree, more than that which exists within a state, and this difference gives modern federalism at the empire-scale distinct properties, and in fact federalism itself is geared to such heterogeneity. This is not to say that regional differences do not exist at the state, or “kingdom” level, and a federal system can be useful there as well. Hence, California, for example, could benefit by adopting a federal system for itself. New York and Illinois could benefit too, as could the former E.U. state of Britain, which, like Switzerland, is (early modern) kingdom-level too. Hence UK-US or EU-UK is misleading in a way that E.U.-U.S. is not, even if nationalism goes down hard.

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1. “Italian PM Meloni Hosts EU-US Talks on Trade, Ukraine and Defence,” Euronews.com, May 18, 2025.

The E.U. and U.S. on Defense and Foreign Policy: Helping Ukraine

In March, 2025 after the U.S. had direct talks with Russia on ending Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the E.U. stepped up its game in helping Ukraine militarily. This was also in the context of a trade war between the E.U. and U.S., which did not make transatlantic relations any better. The E.U.’s increasing emphasis on military aid to Ukraine and the related publicity inadvertently showcased how federalism could be applied to defense and foreign policy differently that it has in the U.S., wherein the member states are excluded, since the Articles of Confederation, when the member states were sovereign within the U.S. confederation. Although both manifestations of early-modern federalism have their respective benefits and risks, I contend that the E.U.’s application of federalism to the two governmental domains of power is more in the spirit of (dual-sovereignty) federalism, even though serious vulnerabilities can be identified.

Kaja Kallas, the E.U.’s foreign minister, “pitched an ambitious plan to mobilize up to to €40 billion in fresh military support for Ukraine, which, if achieved, would represent a twofold increase from the defence assistance the European Union provided” in 2024.[1] Whether premised on the assumption that Russia would not agree to a truce or that Ukraine would need additional leverage in negotiations, “the Kallas initiative” put the E.U.’s defense and foreign policy in the spotlight globally. Lest it be assumed by assuming an exact likeness to the U.S. federal system that the E.U.’s defense and foreign policy areas were exclusive competencies (i.e., domains of enumerated power) at the federal level, the E.U.’s state governments, including their respective foreign ministers, played a significant role in the actual provision to Ukraine of artillery ammunition, missiles, drones, and even fighter jets. This arrangement, which includes overall federal coordination and significant funding, resembles the directive, which is a federal law that requires the state governments enact legislation to implement the content of the federal law. That Kallas, the federal foreign minister, took “into account” non-lethal provisions, including “training and equipment for Ukrainian brigades, . . . to ensure the participation of neutral” state governments shows just how much of a role the E.U. states had at the time in defense and foreign policy.[2]

Marco Rubio, Kallas’ counterpart in the U.S., would not have even consulted with state governments in coming up with an initiative regarding Ukraine. That approach, wherein foreign policy and defense are completely federalized, does not reflect modern (i.e., dual-sovereignty) federalism, whereas the shared competencies of the E.U. do. This is not to say that every enumerated power or federal competency should be shared. In fact, that the principle of unanimity applied to foreign policy and defense in the E.U. represents a serious vulnerability. Essentially, the requirement that every state government consent treats modern (dual-sovereignty) federalism as if it were confederalism, where the states hold all governmental sovereignty. Similarly, David Cameron, a prime minister of the ex-E.U. state of Britain, confused the two in stating that the E.U. is just another international network.” Given this category mistake, the E.U. was better off after Britain seceded from the union. Even the linguistic subterfuge of “Brexit,” as well as Kallas’ strange job title as “high representative” rather than foreign minister, attests to the vulnerability inherent in obfuscating (early) modern federalism with confederalism.

In short, involving the state governments in foreign policy and defense federal policy and legislation applies federalism more so than does consolidating those two domains at the federal level, and yet giving each state government a veto not only renders the federal system vulnerable to being exploited and paralyzed from within, but also treats a federal system in which two systems of government each have some amount of sovereignty like a confederation in which the states retain sovereignty.

The U.S. could improve how it manifests federalism by having the heads of the state governments represent them in the U.S. Senate, just as the heads of the state governments in the E.U. sit in the European Council. Additionally, the U.S. member states could play more of a role in the implementation of foreign policies and defense, such as in receiving money from the Pentagon to send machinery from the states’ respective militaries (called militias) to countries that are to be supported militarily. The federal level could then act as a check on corruption in the implementation. To be sure, giving the state governments veto-power would carry the check-and-balance feature of federalism too far. So both the E.U. and U.S. could stand to improve their respective federal systems towards ever perfect union—neither one being a trading “bloc” or confederation.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Kallas Pitches Plan to ‘Potentially’ Mobilize €40 Billion in MilitaryAid for Ukraine,” Euronews, March 14, 2025.
2. Ibid.

The Patriots for Europe Party: On Anti-Federalism

At a party meeting in Madrid, E.U. on February 8, 2025, the Patriots for Europe party sent out the message of wanting to be the new normal in the E.U., as against the default of the “mainstream” parties, which include the Renew Europe party and the European People’s Party—the president of the E.U. being in the latter party. The Patriots party’s banner, “Make Europe Great Again,” shows a kinship to U.S. President Trump’s MAGA movement, but the E.U.-specific planks are significant and thus should not be dismissed. As is the case with any large political party, the planks can be a bit like a tossed salad, with even disparate ingredients being in the mix. I contend that this makes it difficult to discern the will of the voters who vote for a party in terms of how much support there is for a particular policy. As a result, if a party is like a grab-bag of various policies, one such policy could be enacted without much of a democratic will behind it.

The Patriots for Europe party’s officials had high hopes for their party at the party meeting. At the time, the only sitting governor at the state level was Viktor Orban of Hungary. In the E.U.’s parliament, the party held only 89 seats, but this was enough to make the party third after the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Socialists and Democrats party (S&D). The Renew Europe had slipped in the last federal election. To gain more seats, and more governorships at the state level, the Patriots for Europe party had taken positions on a variety of issues, so as to attract more single-issue voters.

André Ventura, the leader of a political group in the E.U. state of Portugal, said at the Patriots’ meeting, “We have to reconquer a Europe that is ours and that belongs to us. A Christian Europe.”[1] That E.U. society had long before become secular was not the point; rather, the party was against the contentiousness of anti-assimilation Muslim immigrants from Africa, and especially their refusal to accept free-speech even on matters of religion. Therefore, this plank should not be confused with the revivalism of evangelical Christianity in the 1740s, wherein a conversion experience was newly stressed as part of the litmus test for whether a person is or is not a Christian. In 2025, calls for a Christian Europe were really about going back to the days of a relatively homogeneous E.U. culture. By relatively, I mean to account for the expected cultural differences that exist from state to state in any empire-scale federal system.

Indeed, one of the main benefits of federalism is that the system is able to deal with those differences without the polity being rent asunder by political conflicts between individual states. In calling for the return of governmental sovereignty to the states, which means even doing away with qualified majority voting at the federal level, even cultural differences within a more narrow Christian European society could throw a confederated (rather than dual-sovereignty-based federated) E.U. against the rocks within a decade. At least some governmental sovereignty must be delegated by the states to a federal government (rather than a confederated council) for conflicts between states to be resolved before they become insurmountable.

Diluting its anti-federalist, states-rights political ideology, the Patriots for Europe party was also against federal regulations because they stifle business, the Green Deal for the same reason, and LGBT rights because they are progressive. For example, Andrej Babis criticized the parties in power then in the E.U. for imposing “regulations that strangle businesses and [E.U.] citizens.[2] A pro-business voter could thus vote for the PfE party in the European Parliament and a social conservative could vote for the party so transgender men would not be allowed to be on women’s sports teams and use women bathrooms in the E.U., while still believing that returning the delegated federal sovereignty to the states would destroy the union. Yet because the party contains that plank, voting on business-interests or social ethical interests would make it more likely that the E.U. could be vitiated. Put another way, being pro-business or anti-trans does not mean that someone is a Euroskeptic to the point that the E.U.’s governmental sovereignty should be vitiated.

Therefore, with regard to whether the E.U. should continue to have a federal system characterized as “modern federalism,” with dual sovereignty being its basis, or become a confederal inter-governmental council wherein governmental sovereignty is fully vested in the state governments, something more than merely voting for an variegated party is necessary. A referendum on the question could be put to the E.U. citizens, for example. Just because pro-business voters would be inclined to vote for the Patriots for Europe party to see a drawback in federal regulations does not mean that they reject the E.U. having some delegated governmental sovereignty. This argument can be interpreted as claiming that direct democracy can be applied to significant political issues where it cannot be assumed that the voters of a major party agree with every plank. For it is one thing to contravene specific federal policies and even laws, and quite another to fundamentally change the type of an extant federal system.

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1. Paula Solder, “’Your Time Is Over:’ Far-Right Leaders Take on the E.U.’s Mainstream Parties,” Euronews.com, February 8, 2025.
2. Ibid.

Euro-skeptic Anti-Federalism: An Institutional Obstacle in the E.U.

On December 6, 2024, the E.U. finally—meaning more than twenty years after negotiations had begun—reached a free-trade agreement with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The deal would cover 780 million people, but the completion of the negotiations between the E.U. president and those of the South American countries was “just a first stage before a long process”[1] that would require passage by a qualified majority vote—meaning 55% of the E.U. states and 55% of the E.U. population—in the E.U. Council and in the European Parliament and in enough state legislatures. Presumably if enough state ministers for trade in the E.U. Council vote yes, their respective state governments would go along and also be sufficient for final passage. I contend that the requirement that enough state legislatures also vote yes on the deal is excessive.

The most obvious point to be made concerning the excessiveness is that the state governments were directly represented in the E.U. Council, so for those governments then to need to approve the E.U.’s treaty is at best duplicative, and, at worse, enabling opposition yet another means of thwarting final passage. Moreover, the treaty is that of the E.U., rather than any of the state governments because the E.U.’s executive branch negotiated the trade deal. To be sure, the presence of non-trade terms in the deal, including binding commitments by the South American countries to stop illegal deforestation, explains why the Commission did not have exclusive competency, which the Commission had as of 2024 in commercial policy as when President Van der Leyen had the Commission enact tariffs on imports from China.  Even though the trade deal with four South American countries did not fall under the Commission’s exclusive competency (i.e., domain of authority), this only means that the E.U. Council and the Parliament had to approve the treaty too; non-exclusive competency does not mean that the state governments must or even should approve federal legislation (and E.U. treaties with other countries).

A subtle reason can also be cited for why the E.U. is too fettered by the excessive role of the state legislatures in being required to pass a federal trade treaty. Specifically, the ongoing Euroskeptic, or states-rights (or “nationalist”), ideology, which had been so unproductive for the E.U. precisely because of the extent of sovereignty that the states retained (i.e., had not already delegated to the federal union), relishes the duplication of the state governments’ power in passing federal trade treaties as indicating that the E.U. had remained merely an alliance of sovereign countries. Before Britain seceded from the Union, Prime Minister David Cameron referred to the E.U. as just one of the networks to which Britain happened to belong. With such a jarringly unreal notion of what the E.U. was politically, it was best that that state seceded. The state of France had not been wrong in halting Britain’s accession in the early 1970s.

In short, a bottom-heavy federal system awash in an anti-federalist ideology can really be paralyzing at the federal level. At the very least, having an excessive number of institutional hurdles for a bill (or trade treaty) to become law undermines the legislative process. Moreover, even dissolution is more likely to occur when the state governments wield a lot of power over federal legislation.  

This may seem trivial or even silly, but words matter because language can feed (and starve) an ideology. Let’s unpack the following passage from Euronews on the proposed trade deal: “Negotiators from the Latin American bloc were assembled . . . with the EU trade negotiation team to iron out the deal, that will cover 780 million people between both zones. But the deal will need a sign off (sic) from EU 27 member states.”[2] That European and American journalism often referred to the E.U. as a “bloc,” even though an informal grouping of sovereign countries does not have a constitutional (i.e., basic law) court, an executive branch, and a bi-cameral legislature whereas the European Union contains the governmental European Court of Justice, the E.U. Commission, the E.U. Council (like the U.S. Senate, representing the states), and a (lower) Parliament, implies that in using the word “bloc” to describe four South American countries as the Mercosur group, and we might think too of the BRICS countries, those trade groups are of the same genre as a federal union. That both the E.U. and U.S. cases of “modern federalism” include dual sovereignty, wherein two governments have domains in which they are sovereign for a given territory, nullifies the appellation of “bloc” or “zone” to either union, even if anti-federalists on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean have been in denial concerning this point.

At an academic talk at Harvard’s Center for European Studies in which the dean of Boston University’s School of Global Studies said that the E.U. does indeed have a federal system, a Harvard graduate student dismissed this point and, in “asking” a question, insisted that the E.U. is only an alliance of countries. I then asked the dean to confirm her judgment that the E.U. is not an alliance, which she did. Yet I doubt whether the Harvard graduate student had enough intellectual humility to let this point sink in. In fact, at another talk at the Center, another graduate student, who had been present at the visiting dean’s talk, insisted that economically, a Swiss (county-sized) canton could be compared to “a red or a blue state,” including Texas and California. That speaker, from MIT, had said that in looking at the economic inequality between rural regions and a metropolitan city, E.U. states should be compared with U.S. states rather than with the U.S. overall (as there is no focal city of the U.S.). That the European graduate student ignored this and implied that Switzerland is a United States of Europe (and thus as equivalent to the E.U. even though the latter treats Switzerland akin to a state in trade matters and free movement sans borders) stunned me. I had been thinking of applying to be a visiting scholar at Harvard’s Center for European Studies, but the stubborn, jejune disrespectful attitude of the two graduate students, as well as their abject ignorance and yet presumption concerning federalism theory, convinced me to cancel my application, for I was already too old for the grief (and passive aggression). Also, I was not about to buy an airline ticket to the E.U. only to be dismissed as a stupid American for claiming that the E.U. has a federal system of government and is thus not a “bloc” or “zone” equivalent to four countries in South America that have a trading relationship.

Given the excessive ability of state governments in the E.U. to styme federal legislation and treaties, misconceiving the E.U. as a “bloc” or “zone” can cement the anti-federalist systemic bias and thus render the E.U. itself as too paralyzed even with respect to federal policy, regulations, law, and treaties that are at the level of the E.U. and thus proper to it, with the state governments having direct federal access through not only the E.U. Council (of Ministers), but also the European Council, which sets the overall political priorities for the Union. Officials of the state governments sit on both councils, and may even have excessive influence over the political parties (not groups!) in the European Parliament. That one of those parties, the European People’s Party, has nonetheless been labeled as a “group” rather than a party from a state-level perspective is yet another instance of how federal law-making must brace against a head-wind of federal illegitimacy.

Lastly, it bears remembering that thirty years from the U.S. having instituted a federal system characterized chiefly by dual sovereignty in 1789 (before which the U.S. was an alliance, or confederation, unlike the E.U.!), the American state governments had too much sovereignty for the good of that union, given the multiple “Brexits” in 1861. To be sure, Lincoln was better off than General Washington had been in fighting a war, for Lincoln’s Union had dual-sovereignty whereas Washington had a confederation (i.e., the state governments were sovereign until 1789).  Connecting the dots for my European friends (and those Americans who are awake concerning the E.U. even existing), the E.U. in 2024 was of the same federal genre or type as the U.S. had been since 1789 but not since 1776! Now this should get several Harvard graduate students from Europe scratching their heads.

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1. Peggy Corlin, “Von der Leyen Clinches E.U.-Mercosur Trade Deal, in Face of French Opposition,” Euronews.com, December 6, 2024.
2. Ibid, italics added.