Showing posts with label corporate culture. Show all posts
Showing posts with label corporate culture. Show all posts

Monday, October 20, 2025

Corruption at the Top in France and Illinois

An important implication of the saying, a fish rots from the head down, is that it is important that corrupt heads be swiftly punished so underlings get the message that crime in public office carries considerable risk. In the matter of Ukraine’s possible accession (not merger!) into the E.U. as a new state, the old, deeply entrenched, culture of corruption in the potential state has been of particular concern in the E.U.’s executive branch, the European Commission. In both the E.U. and U.S., it’s worth asking whether some states are more corrupt than others. It is a mistake to treat all states alike in terms of where to direct federal resources and how much of a given state’s resources should be devoted to investigations of state officials. At least in 2025, Illinois and France could be said to have been “problem children” in this regard, and this doesn’t mean that Hawaii and Sweden, for example, also had as sordid corrupt cultures.

In September 2025, a state court in Paris “found Sarkozy guilty of criminal conspiracy in connection with the alleged Libyan financing of his victorious 2007 presidential campaign . . . and sentenced him to five years in prison.”[1] A day before going to prison in mid-October, Sarkozy said he would be taking a biography of Jesus and The Count of Monte Christo with him to prison, so it seems that he was continuing with his innocent-victim role in spite of the conviction and sentencing. Short of any contrition or even public recognition by Sarkozy of his own corruption, it fell on Hollande of the Socialist group to praise “the independence of the judiciary,” especially given that the incumbent, Macron, spent an hour with the convicted ex-president on the day before the Sarkozy, of the same political group, was to show up at a prison.[2] In a corrupt culture, it is natural to worry about whether judges might be persuaded that it is in their interests to reduce or rescind the sentence of a powerful political figure.

Admittedly, in notoriously corrupt Illinois, by 2025 four former heads of state had spent substantial time in prison. Otto Kerner, for example, was convicted in 1973 on 17 counts of mail fraud, conspiracy, perjury, and other charges related to a bribery scheme and was sentenced to three years. Dan Walker was convicted in 1987 of bank fraud and perjury related to fraudulent loans that he had obtained after leaving the high office. George Ryan was convicted in 2006 on fraud and racketeering charges related to bribes; he served five and a half years. Last but hardly least, Rod Blagojevich was impeached and removed from office in 2009, and convicted in 2011 on 18 counts of corruption. Whereas the president of the E.U. cannot pardon state officials, the president of the U.S. can, and U.S. President Trump pardoned “Blago’s” sentence in 2020 after the former head of Illinois had served eight years; the former head of France could only hope in vain for a pardon from E.U. President Von der Leyen, but corruption at the state level could end up appreciably shortening Sarkozy’s sentence, and the meeting with Macron could be a sign that their shared political group might work behind the scenes to free the convicted former leader.

Once begun and allowed to spread throughout a state, whether Illinois or France, political corruption involving money is much more difficult than a fire to put out. Companies such as Enron, Wells Fargo Bank, Arthur Andersen, and even Uber came to be known for their deeply dysfunctional organizational cultures. This does not mean that manager-groups at every or even most companies are that unethical.

It is fortunate that not every company is corrupt mentally, for changing an entrenched sordid organizational culture is very difficult at best, with plenty of strategic firings being just one part of the cure. A so-called “coach” hired by Starbucks, for example, to change the attitudes of the executives towards the employees (especially those who try to unionize) would have a full plate. Such a “coach” would find it very frustrating to “drive” talking-points; the obscenely stretched use of jargon wouldn’t get the consultant very far up against the entrenched acerbic attitudes that had come to dominate the organizational culture. Let’s just say the Pike’s Peak blend of coffee was hardly the only thing that was known for being bitter at Starbucks by 2025.




Thursday, December 12, 2024

On the Hidden Police Power of Corporate America

After the UnitedHealthcare chief executive “was gunned down by a masked man outside a Manhattan hotel” in New York City, “a days-long manhunt” occurred that “spanned several states.”[1] The fact that only a few days were needed to find the suspect, Luigi Mangione, indicates just how massive and public the manhunt was. For it was not just any murder, as if the murder of a person who is the chief executive of a large corporation were worth so much more than that of the rest of us. I suspect that the influence of the company, and, moreover, corporate America, on local police in any U.S. member state is more than reaches the headlines. The case at hand my even suggest that that influence includes even tacit instructions to treat anti-corporate suspects of murder violently both in retaliation and as a visible reminder to other potential killers that CEOs are off-limits.

As Pennsylvania sheriff employees took Mangione from a vehicle to the back door of a courthouse, at least two of the employees shoved the suspect—and, remember, in the U.S. a suspect is presumed innocent unless or until proven guilty in a court of law—into a wall even though the wall was not on the way from the vehicle to the back door. In other words, the unnecessary violence was not on the way to the back door, and nor was the suspect resisting going into the courthouse. I contend that the unnecessary violence was at the behest of the corporation whose CEO the suspect allegedly shot. At that time, the evidence that would be found had not yet been found, as per the defense attorney’s statement in the courthouse. Whether the violence being maliciously applied by sheriff employees was merely to show the world how a suspect accused of killing a CEO gets treated by law enforcement, or to stop the suspect from speaking to the media present on his way to the backdoor is not clear. It seems to be possible, at the very least, that corporate instructions given to the police in Pennsylvania included: Don’t let the guy get his anti-corporate message out. This would be ironic, given that corporations had at the time the right of free speech, even through spending as if money constitutes speech.

That Mangione was not resisting going into the courthouse and yet was manhandled rougher than suspects were typically treated at the time may give Americans, as well as the world, a glimpse into the power that large concentrations of private wealth (which is what a corporation is) even as translated into raw violence. The use of police by companies in twentieth-century America to beat workers on strike is well documented. What I am suggesting is that local police were still susceptible to wealthy private interests such as corporations into the next century, at least as of the 2020s. I contend that any contact between police departments and the healthcare insurance company would properly have been limited to the police gaining information in the search for the killer.

Another indication of an over-reaction by local police occurred days after Mangione had been arrested, when Briana Boston was charged with a felony “with one count of making threats to conduct a mass shooting” during a phone call with Blue Cross Blue Shield, her health-insurance company, which was denying a claim that she had submitted. Obviously angry, she said, “Delay, deny, depose. You people are next.”[2] The phrase, “delay, deny, depose,” had been written on bullets by Mangione in reference to tactics that insurers use to avoid paying out claims and had become popular online. Because of the popularity, it could not be assumed that the woman was planning on writing the three words on bullets; the phrase had entered the lexicon. In fact, “(a)ccording to a consumer survey by KFF, more than half of insured [American] adults [had] experienced problems with their insurance provider, and some [of those adults] reported serious consequences.”[3] Strangely, the local police in Lakeland, Florida, said that her statement could be taken as probable cause of “making a threat to conduct a mass shooting . . ., according to the affidavit.”[4] A reasonable interpretation of, “you guys are next,” is that if Blue Cross continues to screw policy holders who do their part in paying premiums, someone may eventually go too far in retaliation. She did not say that she was going to take any violent action, or what that action might be. Given that she was momentarily angry, and perhaps justifiably so, the police employee who leapt to the conclusion that the woman was saying she would conduct a mass killing is ludicrous, and yet the police had the discretion (and thus power) to make an example of the woman by charging her with a crime carrying a fourteen-year sentence, without her having done anything. Had being angry at customer-service employees become a crime? Or, had free-speech that is objectionable to big business become a crime? If so, could corporations next go after certain thoughts, using employees of local police departments who dismiss protecting the public as dutiful sycophants?

We can turn the Lakeland police investigation on its head by investigating that department. It is significant that “Lakeland, Florida police said they were contact by the FBI . . . in response to the alleged threat.”[5] That the police did not waste any time and did not seem to second-guess the FBI may suggest that the FBI had been determined to snuff out the “potential” copy-cat. To be sure, the FBI may simply have been over-cautious, but even that could have been due to pressure from Blue Cross or elected officials who have received campaign contributions from the giant company. That both the FBI and the local police department in Florida would knowingly seek to charge an angry policy holder of a crime that carries a sentence of 14 years in prison indicates a grossly disproportionate reaction, which itself could point back to the deference that the FBI (and local police) give to business in doing its bidding, even to scare the public.

As an anecdote, once when leaving a restaurant after barely eating a very badly cooked meal, I was speaking to people in the shopping center’s parking lot about the food. The manager of the restaurant got wind of this and approached me even though I was no longer on her establishment’s property. “The police here are my friends!” she warned me. “Keep talking about my restaurant and I will get them to make you leave.” The manager’s sheer presumptuousness was laughable, so I kept talking as was my right. She did call her friends, who told me I had to leave the parking lot even though that lot was not owned by the restaurant. That the police dismissed my legitimate objection told me enough; I moved to another suburb of Phoenix only months later; Mormon-run Mesa was simply too corrupt (and drug-ridden).

If my small window into the deference that local police pay to small business in falsely enforcing law that is not really law is correct, it is not difficult to conjecture that the FBI as well as local police may be unduly biased towards, perhaps even de facto working for, large corporations. The sort of unaccountability in accusing a distraught policy-holder of mass murder (even without noticing that she had no record of violence and not even a gun!) and being willing to put her in prison for fourteen years, likely to send the public a message from the large corporations, is consistent with the lack of accountability generally on market participants that are so large and wealthy that even competition is stifled that so enrages consumers and thus prompts anti-corporate politics. The connection can be found in Adam Smith’s claim that one of the main rationales for government is to protect the wealthy from the poor, who would otherwise steal the wealth. Does this hold of the governments in the U.S., or is the public to be served? The official answer may differ from the real answer.

That the governments in the U.S. have allowed companies to become so large as to choke competition without anti-trust law being enforced—something that Adam Smith would not like—is yet another indication of the “under the table” power of large corporations in the United States, thanks in part to unlimited political campaign contributions being legal. Perhaps elected officials were the people delivering the instructions from the health insurance company to the Pennsylvania sheriff in Altoona: Be rough with the guy and don’t let him speak to the media. Push him up against a wall if you want. Grab him by the neck. Show the world what happens if someone goes up against corporate America.  Hence the anti-corporate political movement in a democracy that is premised on accountability rather than plutocracy with impunity.

My main point is that institutionally, or structurally, very large and wealthy private companies, whether corporations or privately held, are incompatible with not only market competition, which ensures fair prices (even at grocery stores after a pandemic), but also political democracy, wherein one person has one vote and thus is just as important as the next. Whether a man on the street or a corporate CEO is murdered, the police-response should be the same in terms of the cost and effort in the manhunt and how the suspects are treated. Innocent until proven guilty means that police violence against a suspect who is not being violent or resistant is itself a crime regardless of how rich the victim’s family or company happens to be. 

The case of the health insurance CEO’s murder in December, 2024 was deliberately not supposed to be a vehicle for getting an anti-corporate message out—with even violence being used to enforce this proscription—but how the Pennsylvania police aggressively treated the suspect unabashedly in public view can be seen as a poster advertising the interlarding of corporate power at the expense of accountability in American democracy. Both economically and politically, it can be asked whether large corporations are accountable in the United States; politically, the same question may be asked of the local police departments in the member states. The American governments in the U.S. could do worse than apply anti-trust law to a variety of markets and apply criminal law to local police departments whose actual paymasters can be characterized proverbially as the man behind the curtain—an allusion to the hidden Wizard in the film, The Wizard of Oz. Then again, perhaps Mr. Smith Goes to Washington is a more pertinent film, as the senator played by Jimmy Stuart filibusters for hours and hours against corruption in his home state.


1. Jessica Parker and Nadine Yousif, “Luigi Mangione Fingerprints Match Crime-Scene Prints, Police Say,” BBC.com, December 11, 2024.
2. Pocharapon Neammanee, “Woman Arrested After Saying ‘Delay, Deny, Depose’ On Call With Insurance Company,” The Huffington Post, December 12, 2024.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5.Ibid.

Wednesday, January 27, 2021

Arizona’s Dysfunctional Business and Governmental Culture Creates a Crisis in the Coronavirus Pandemic

On January 15, 2021, the New York Times reported that Arizona had the highest 7-day daily average per capita of deaths and new cases of the new coronavirus, covid-19.[1] On one day, Arizona had 11,324 new cases.[2] “We’re the hottest spot in the U.S. and among the hottest spots in the entire world,” said Keith Frey, the chief medical officer for Dignity Health’s Arizona division.[3] “If we don’t slow this down over the course of the next days and weeks, then we will be fully into that crisis zone,” he added.[4] It would be a crisis of the state’s own making, and thus preventable but for the local culture at least in the Phoenix metro area. In other words, the crisis did not happen to Arizona; rather, the crisis was in large part homemade, and can thus be used as a window into a dysfunctional culture in the United States.
In spite of county and municipal laws and company policies on wearing masks in stores and on public transportation (buses and the light rail), many stores and the mass-transit company forbid employees from even asking incoming customers to wear a mask (or wear one correctly over the nose and mouth). Grocery stores were particularly problematic, with even their own employees walking around with impunity without masks on (properly). “We don’t enforce that requirement,” a grocery-store director told me. How, then, can the policy be considered to be a requirement? “It just is,” a store manager told me. That wearing masks was not only a company requirement, but also a city and county law was of no interest to the manager. “We don’t enforce the law,” he quipped. “But you are violating it by letting people in who are not wearing masks,” I retorted. This was not his concern.
The Phoenix metropolitan mass-transit company, and thus its two subcontracted bus-operating companies, also had a policy forbidding employees from enforcing the company’s own requirement and the local law. Some bus drivers would even not wear a mask or wear one without covering their noses and mouths! Some light-rail security employees subcontracted by the mass-transit company wore their masks over their chins too, as did a significant proportion of the rail passengers. Some security employees asked passengers to wear their masks correctly, while most of those employees did not. The notion that masks were required on the trains was a farce, and yet notwithstanding this, the company’s representatives had no problem defying logic itself by insisting that masks were required.  It was as if the company policy and the county law mandating masks on public transportation simply did not exist, and yet they did. “It’s not really a law,” a customer-service employee told me. Why? Because the county doesn’t have a legislature and only one of them can pass laws. The county board was apparently extra-governmental in nature.
Both retail and the mass transit were exploiting an exception, that of medical exceptions, to invalidate the rule. Incredibly, the stores and mass-transit company used this exception to justify refusing even to ask customers and passengers, respectively, to cover the nose and mouth area with an existing mask. People with medical conditions exempting them from wearing masks would not have masks on. The absurdity of allowing an exception (e.g., a medical condition) to condemn a requirement was permitted in the dysfunctional culture and amid a lack of accountability by regulators.
The problem was exacerbated by the political extremism that was salient in the state. A steadfast refusal to obey the law on wearing masks had a significant role in the number of people not wearing masks in stores and on public transportation. Such people could easily exploit the managerial incompetence both in retail and mass transit. It does not take long to realize that an intentionally-unenforced requirement is not a requirement, even if this point is not grasped by company managers. Yet the managerial dysfunction enabled this condition to go on for almost a year as of January, 2021. In such a political culture wherein a significant proportion of residents believe they are justified in breaking the law and ignoring company policies, it can be reckoned as inexcusable for companies to follow the invalid logic that the existence of an exception invalidates a rule (or requirement). In other words, it is negligence pure and simple. The lack of accountability, which was well-ensconced in the culture within companies as well as between businesses and local and state government, enabled the corruption that gave the virus the upper hand. It was as if the locals could not help themselves.
Moreover, the local culture wherein political extremism was salient allowed for the erroneous belief that the public good is simply the aggregate of individual wills. Where enough wills decide not to wear masks indoors in public and on public transit, the aggregate public good falls short of being above the ability of the virus to spread. The public good as merely the aggregate of individual wills thus is not good enough; it falls short of what the public good actually is (e.g., being greater than the ability of the virus to spread). The understatement of the public good can be understood too as the belief that the general will (e.g., Rousseau) is reducible to the aggregation of private wills.
The good of the whole, I submit, is more than the sum of the individual parts because some parts may even detract from the public good and thus understate it if it is taken to be merely the aggregation of individual wills. That the market value of a product is determined by the aggregate supply and demand does not mean that the public good is likewise determined. For one thing, the market value of a product is in a closed system (the aggregate supply and demand) whereas the public good is open-ended. In other words, the public good can be higher than the aggregate of the individual wills would have it because enough private-benefit-only wills can detract appreciably from what is the good of the whole. If enough people refuse to wear masks indoors in public places, and stores and even governments look the other way, the result is significantly below the good of the whole, which in this case is stopping the coronavirus. By its self-inflicted crisis, Arizona was functioning well below its own good, and a highly dysfunctional local mentality is to blame.



1. Jordan Allen et al, “Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count,” The New York Times, January 15, 2021.

2. Alicia Caldwell and Ian Lovett, “Arizona Is America’s Covid-19 Hot Spot and on the Brink of Crisis,” The Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2021.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.


Tuesday, June 12, 2018

Bank of America: Downsized From Smallness?

Three years after the near-meltdown of Wall Street in September 2008, Bank of America announced that 30,000 jobs would be eliminated. That amounts to nearly 10% of the bank’s total work force. Over all, BOA was planning to cut $5 billion in annual expenses. The reason is transparent: continued losses stemming from the bank’s acquisition of Countrywide in January 2008 in spite of the fall of the U.S. real estate market and the related losses on sub-prime mortgage-backed CDOs. What could Ken Lewis have been thinking? At least in the case of his acquisition of Merrill Lynch, which was agreed to in principle in September 2008, the investment bank had already sold its $30 billion of toxic assets for over $7 billion in July 2008.
While the $29 per share price for Merrill seems excessive given that the investment bank was trading at only $17 at the time of the agreement, Fleming’s negotiating strategy (stressing the long run value over the short term market volitility) on Merrill’s side, Thain’s preference for a 10% stake/$30 billion line of credit from Goldman, and the sheer strategic fit between BOA and Merrill can explain Lewis’s offer-price being at a premium over the market price. Even so, with Lehman poised to file, the Goldman option would have been insufficient (or would likely have dissolved on the Monday of Lehman’s filing as the market tanked) and Thain would have taken $17 (or even down to $10) in the wake of Lehman’s filing.

According to reporter Greg Farrell (p. 183), Bank of America tended to deal with problems “by finding the quickest, near-term solution and lunging in that direction.” BOA “was not an organization that had the patience for deep, strategic thinking. It was an opportunistic company that preferred action of any kind to inaction.” Although much of the bank’s empire-building had taken place under McColl, the preceding “legendary” CEO, Ken Lewis’s acquisitions of LaSalle, Countrywide and perhaps even Merrill Lynch (to some extent) evince the sort of short-sighted and opportunistic lunging-without-thinking that can go with empire-building. Cutting 10% of the work force may be interpreted as a response to the market’s implicit verdict on Lewis’s shopping spree following Fleet. The losses stemming from Countrywide are evident enough; the case of Merrill Lynch is a bit harder to weigh.


Although Merrill proffered great synergy with BOA and could be picked up on the cheap, Lewis’s rushing to a deal over a weekend (with only about 12 hours for due diligence!) can also be considered as excessively risky, especially considering the history of hidden CDOs at Merrill (Semerci hid $30 billion then unfairly blamed them on his predecessor at Fixed Income). Had Merrill unloaded all of its toxic assets back in July? If so, what caused the $15.31 billion loss of Merrill Lynch announced only after the BOA shareholder vote on the acquisition in December 2008? Furthermore, did Lewis knowingly keep the mounting losses at Merrill from his shareholders as they were preparing to vote? At the very least, failing to disclose the mounting losses in real time was risky, even reckless, given what could be expected—namely,  the $50 billion potential liability that would face the bank from a stockholder suit. Even if Lewis decided not to disclose “non-material” losses because they were in line with Merrill’s results in 2007, was the CEO manipulating his stockholders while puffed up in the vainglory of empire-building? Furthermore, the condition of the market in September 2008 was not exactly ripe for making a deal to acquire a major financial institution. Lewis and Thain knew Lehman would go belly up when signed their agreement at 1am on Monday, September 16, 2008. 
As risky and perhaps even foolhardy as the Merrill acquisition may have been for Lewis, his acquisition of Countrywide defies any good sense. That he was being paid millions of dollars at the time suggests that the dysfunction at Bank of America may include corporate governance. Specifically, deferring too much to the CEO at the expense of the shareholder interest evinces a lack of accountability. Although BOA had a history of duality—splitting the chairman and CEO positions between two people—still the CEO may have too much influence.
Finally, a vital matter of public policy should not be ignored. Although it could be argued that Bank of America is being forced by its own history and the market to downsize, the question can legitimately be raised whether the market can or should be relied on to take faulty banks too big to fail down a notch. The very existence of Bank of America may involve more systemic risk than we should be prepared to accept. Relying exclusively on the market for the correction is, I contend, insufficient. The market can be insufficient in downsizing to a suitable size, or irrational exuberance can take hold such that a 10% reduction becomes a free-fall. That a bank such as Bank of America of over $1 trillion in assets is allowed to exist as a concentration of capital is itself a systemic risk. In other words, something is seriously wrong with the market mechanism for a bank such as BOA to have been able to become so big in spite of its modus operendi or corporate culture.



Sources:

Greg Farrell, Crash of the Titans: Greed, Hubris, the Fall of Merrill Lynch, and the Near-Collapse of Bank of America (New York: Crown Business, 2010).


Steven M. Davidoff, “For Bank of America, a Looming $50 Billion Claim of Havoc,” New York Times, September 28, 2011. 

Friday, May 18, 2018

Losing the Middle Class: An Educational-Industrial Policy

Beneath the headlines showing new figures on unemployment (which do not include the unemployed who are no longer looking for work or applying for unemployment compensation) is the story of the changing distribution of jobs in the American economy. That distribution in turn can give rise to cultural or societal changes. When the jobs in the economic middle are disproportionately lost, American society increasingly resembles a tale of two cities—and by this I do not mean Augustine’s heavenly and earthly cities though the realms of the “haves” and “have nots” could admittedly be called as such by materialists.
According to CNBC, a “report looked at 366 occupations tracked by the Labor Department and clumped them into three equal groups by wage, with each representing a third of American employment in 2008. The middle third — occupations in fields like construction, manufacturing and information, with median hourly wages of $13.84 to $21.13 — accounted for 60 percent of job losses from the beginning of 2008 to early 2010.” The job market turned around since then, but those fields represented only 22 percent of total job growth. “Higher-wage occupations — those with a median wage of $21.14 to $54.55 — represented 19 percent of job losses when employment was falling, and 20 percent of job gains when employment began growing again. Lower-wage occupations, with median hourly wages of $7.69 to $13.83, accounted for 21 percent of job losses during the retraction. Since employment started expanding, they have accounted for 58 percent of all job growth. The occupations with the fastest growth were retail sales (at a median wage of $10.97 an hour) and food preparation workers ($9.04 an hour).” By mid 2012, each category had grown by more than 300,000 workers since June 2009.

Essentially, the job expansion in the wake of the 2008 recession proceeded on two fronts—the high and low ends, rather than in the middle. Microsoft, Google, and Facebook represent high-end employers, while McDonalds, Walmart, and Starbucks hire at the lower end. The wealthy increasingly shopped at Whole Foods while the service industry employees bought their food at Walmart. This rendering is of course simplistic, but separation of two distinct cultures based on wealth is clear as gated communities were becoming increasingly popular among the upper middle-class and the rich in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
In terms of education, the wealthy can send their kids to an Ivy League college, while the pro-profit colleges give a training-based inferior education to the service employees. In actuality, those employees are being trained rather than educated. The lack of education can be seen by the reliance on scripts for employees at many retail establishments. The unthinking herd mentality can be observed from the ubiquitous “have a good one!” which is grammatically incorrect and generally vacuous in meaning. A good what? The antecedent is never specified. The sheer reliance on scripts suggests that were the customers to gleam the true condition of the employees, there would be shock and awe, as in, how could we as a society have so failed the younger generation? Put another way, the centralized training of the chains (we are born free but chained to the culture invented by retail) supplants the education (not training!) that every young person should have. The eclipse of the value of education is a salient though invisible feature of the earthly city, while the inhabitants of the heavenly city make sure that their kids are well-educated. In the earthly city, the blind are leading the blind, and nobody believes he or she can be wrong. Yet how different is the actual condition on the ground!
In the post-industrial society, government policy can emphasize education for the masses, such that the higher-end vocations are “filled to the brim” and the lower-end jobs minimized. The United States can and should orient its citizenry to areas of comparative advantage rather than simply relying on the labor market to assign the distribution of jobs. For example, after its import-substitution policy, India stressed “home grown” computer science and engineering vocations in line with the view of G.D. Birla and J.N. Tata that British India needed to replicate British industry rather than be dependent on it (Gandhi opposed this strategy). In the United States of the twenty-first century, expanding excess to college and university education that is not immediately eclipsed by training would ironically enable people entering the workforce for the first time to go into the higher-end professions. In short, America needs an industrial policy that highlights education such that the upper- and middle-income professions expand proportionately at the expense of the lower-end jobs.

Source:

Catherine Rampell, “Majority of New Jobs Pay Low Wages, Study Finds,” The New York Times, August 31, 2012.

Monday, March 26, 2018

When an Unethical Corporate Culture Becomes Dangerous in a Primitive U.S. State: Uber’s Self-Driving Cars in Arizona

A company with a horrendous reputation for having an unethical, and harsh, company culture is likely to be attracted to places in which lax regulatory oversight exists. A governmental view that regulations should be minimized dovetails with such a company. The two are a match, though not exactly made in heaven. The nexus can be situated closer to the ground, in a desert in North America, in Arizona in particular. In the case of Uber, which was testing its self-driving cars there in 2018, the flashpoint came in March, when such a car hit a pedestrian who was crossing a street without a sustained sidewalk. Suddenly society took another look, a much more hesitant look, at self-driving technology. Missed, however, was the nexus between Uber’s squalid culture/mentality and Arizona—the culpability of both having led to a perfect storm.
“Uber’s robotic vehicle project was not living up to expectations months before” the accident.[1] Specifically, the cars “were having trouble driving through construction zones and next to tall vehicles, like big rigs,” and the company’s “human drivers had to intervene far more frequently than the drivers of competing autonomous car projects. Waymo, formerly the self-driving car project of Google, said that in tests on roads in California [in 2017], its cars went an average of nearly 5,600 miles before the driver had to take control from the computer to steer out of trouble. As of March, [2018] Uber was struggling to meet its target of 13 miles per ‘intervention’ in Arizona.”[2] So Uber’s technology was not as good. The company’s dysfunctional culture can be seen in  the fact that “Uber’s test drivers were being asked to do more—going on solo runs when they had [previously] worked in pairs.”[3]
When two employees had been in a self-driving car, one person sat behind the wheel ready to take over if the autonomous system failed, while the other person kept an eye on what the computers were detecting. “The second person,” in other words, “was responsible for keeping track of system performance as well as labeling data on a laptop computer.”[4] When Uber took out the second person in the self-driving cars, “some employees expressed safety concerns to managers.”[5] Although those concerns centered around whether a person alone could “remain alert during hours of monotonous driving,” the actual problems extended to solo stand-by drivers staying on task. Specifically, drivers would often annotate data onto an app mounted on an iPad in the car’s middle console to alert managers to problems. The drivers were to do so only when the car was at a traffic light or stop, “but many of the drivers did so while the car was moving.”[6] Other problems included drivers falling asleep at the self-driving wheel; one driver was spotted “air-drumming” through an intersection. This reminds me of the local (creeper) bus drivers in Tucson who contort internal mirrors so to be able to stare at riders even while turning the bus through intersections!
When the self-driving Uber car hit the pedestrian in Tempe at full speed, the solo “driver” was reportedly looking down. The extent of the waywardness among the solo “drivers” points to incompetent supervision, but also perhaps a culture in which doing the right thing both ethically and in terms of staying on task is not valued. Furthermore, the managerial decision to go from pairs to solo drivers even though the company had been struggling to meet its target of 13 miles per intervention in Arizona points to managerial incompetence (specifically, to bad judgment). That “there was pressure to live up to a goal to offer driverless car service by the end of the year and to impress top executives” suggests that the company’s dysfunctional culture had a role in the crash.[7] That Uber’s management had been trying to improve the company’s image since Khosrowshahi had replaced Kalanick as CEO could account for the bad substance “on the ground,” as well as a decision not to tackle the unethical climate inside the company, but, rather, to paint a glossy coat on top of it for the public to see.
Matt Kallman, an Uber spokesman, stated after the crash, “As we develop self-driving technology, safety is our primary concern every step of the way.”[8] This was obviously a lie, given the switch to solo “drivers” even without any improvement in the intervention rate. Kallman felt the need to add, “We’re heartbroken by what happened.”[9] Another lie! The company’s culture was not known for sentimental feelings; in fact, managers were quite harsh on their subordinates, and thus without even ordinary empathy. Such lies are themselves indicative of a continuing sordid corporate culture, which combined with managerial, supervisory, and solo-driver incompetence (and bad attitude) goes a long way to explaining why the crash occurred. We can’t simply blame the technology, though it was also behind the loop relative to the technology being used by competitors.
That Uber’s management would seize on Arizona, which offered a relative dearth of regulatory oversight, makes perfect sense. States like Arizona that do not tend to view government regulation as instrumental in protecting the public interest even from companies such as Uber are actually like such companies. Uber got away with “testing its self-driving cars in a regulatory vacuum in Arizona,” whose government officials “had taken a hands-off approach to autonomous vehicles and did not require companies to disclose how their cars were performing.”[10] Uber’s solo drivers and Arizona’s legislators and regulators were all hands off. Let the chips fall where they may.
What might be missed is the congruence—the likeness—between the mentality of Uber’s people and Arizona’s political elite and its supporters. The mentality that looks the other way can find a match between an unethical company and a government that views even just regulatory oversight as too imposing, as noxious. In effect, Arizona was, at the time at least, like one of Uber’s self-driving cars, with government officials “air-drumming” through intersections. Such performances were particularly dangerous where municipal bus drivers, whose driving I was pathetic, felt entitled nonetheless to stare at particular riders inside the bus rather than look out ahead, even while driving through intersections.

See Cases of Unethical Business


[1] Daisuke Wakabayashi, “Uber’s Self-Driving Cars Were Struggling Before Arizona Crash,” The New York Times, March 23, 2018.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.

Friday, March 2, 2018

Having It Both Ways: American Culture or Merely Congress?

Under the terms of the debt-ceiling budget agreement enacted during the summer in 2011, members of a joint Congressional committee, evenly divided between the parties as well as between the two chambers, had until Nov. 23 of that year to recommend ways to reduce budget deficits by at least $1.2 trillion over 10 years. Both houses had to vote on the package by Dec. 23, 2011. If no legislation is enacted, the government would automatically cut almost $500 billion from military spending, with an equal amount from nonmilitary programs, between 2013 and 2021.

As negotiations in the “super committee” were becoming mired in November, some Democrats were becoming “increasingly concerned” that some Republicans on the committee, in declaring that they would not be able to accept new revenues toward deficit reduction, were calculating that they would be able to reverse the triggered cuts. Not just any cuts—only those from military spending were loathed by the Republicans. Even as the joint committee was still meeting, Republicans on the House and Senate Armed Services Committees were “readying legislation that would undo the automatic across-the-board cuts totaling nearly $500 billion for military programs, or exchange them for cuts in other areas.”

“Republicans should not count on taking the easy way out if they continue to resist a balanced deficit deal that includes revenue increases,” warned Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New York. Representative Chris Van Hollen, Democrat of Maryland and a member of the joint committee, said the attempt to undo the triggers “reflects a total lack of seriousness.” Adding that such efforts would not be successful, he said they were “the result of people trying to escape the fundamental choices before us, and one of those choices is whether or not we are willing to end special interest tax breaks to pay for defense.” Interestingly because he is a Republican, the House speaker, John A. Boehner of Ohio, said he wanted the joint committee to succeed, but that he would not tamper with the mechanism for automatic cuts. “I would feel bound by it,” he said. “It was part of the agreement. The sequester is ugly. Why? Because we don’t want anybody to go there.” That’s just the point; the default of automatic cuts was put into the agreement as an incentive for the joint committee to reach an agreement. Consisting of both parties equally, both sides would have to give. I contend that the Republicans were much less used to giving, so they were less tolerant to the hard choice that the default they had voted for foisted on them.

The porous path of least resistance is often easy to spot. Republicans being forced to choose between agreeing to tax increases and defense cuts found themselves between a rock and a hard place—that is, between anti-tax lobbyists such as Grover Norquist and defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin. “There is more fear this time,” Representative Mo Brooks, Republican of Alabama, said about the anxiety being expressed by military contractors in his district. Simply put, the Republicans were used to being able to satisfy both Norquist and Lockheed, so the lawmakers went after what they perceived as a false choice. The Speaker was being a statesman in refusing to support such efforts.

When all of a sudden getting things all one’s way is no longer possible, perception itself can be affected—such as in viewing the defense cuts as unfair or disproportionate even though they were equal to the non-defense cuts that the Democrats would have to swallow in the absence of an agreement in the joint committee. In other words, that the Democrats were not trying to change the mix of sequestration cuts even though half of those cuts were politically noxious. This suggests that the Republicans may have felt more entitled to getting things all their way than did the Democrats. Tolerance for being in a tight spot is easier if one is not used getting one’s way and thus does not necessary expect it. In other words, respect for even one’s own rules tends not to hold up to a mentality that privileges getting 100% of one’s position.

That more Americans are conservative than liberal may have been providing the Republicans in Congress with a “playing field” leaning in their favor. Hence, they could typically avoid being the side to blink. For example, during the summer of 2011, they successfully kept raising taxes off the table. When suddenly faced with pressure to give even a bit on this point, the ongoing mentality seeks to deconstruct the default giving rise to the pressure rather than to respect the hard choice and the structure undergirding it.

Beyond partisan politics, it is legitimate to ask whether the American cultures (and there are several, as in Europe) unduly support or even value the mentality wherein a person demand his own way. “My way or the highway” is a common expression in the U.S. I contend that it is particularly salient in American business. Perhaps Republicans coming from or representing that sector of society are so used the self-serving rigidity of “corporate policy” that they won’t even sit down to discuss a deal unless it fits with their “ground rules.”  I suspect that the instinct to deconstruct anything that pressures a choice that involves not getting everything one’s own way is engrained in American managerialism and corporate culture.

I suspect that people reading this essay who have visited the U.S. and are from other regions may be nodding in agreement, Yes, that’s how the rest of us see you guys, but you don’t see it. Americans are perhaps so used to the entitlement of my way or the highway and so used to evading rather than respecting even self-imposed hard choices the mentality within is hardly even recognized, much less expunged in any meaningful way. I see my fellow Americans so used to the rigidity and selfishness of employees (and managers) in retail sectors of American business that it can scarcely be imagined that customer (or, falsely, “guest”) relations in the states might be severely dysfunctional in terms of social psychology.

If I am correct here, then the way the chronic deficits are dealt with may be as problematic as the fiscal imbalances themselves, for both evince a jejune mentality that refuses to grow up and face adult decisions.

Source:
Jennifer Steinhauer and Robert Pear, “Lawmakers Aim to Stop Defense Cuts if Debt Panel Fails,” The New York Times, November 5, 2011. 

Wednesday, February 22, 2017

How to Cure a Dysfunctional Company Culture: The Case of Uber

Valued at close to $70 billion and operating in more than 70 countries, Uber was giving traditional taxi companies a ride for their money in early 2017 when it came to light just how Hobbesian the company’s culture had become. In February, an engineer who had left the company two months earlier “detailed a history of discrimination and sexual harassment by her managers, which she said was shrugged off by Uber’s human resources department.” Crucially, she claimed that “the culture was stoke—and even fostered—by those at the top of the company.” Interviews with other employees and reviews of internal emails, chat logs, and tape-recorded meetings reveal incidents typified by one manager groping a woman coworker’s breasts at a company retreat, a director shouting an anti-gay slur at a subordinate during an argument, and another manager threatening to beat an underperforming subordinate’s head in with a baseball bat. The operative question is whether anything can be done about the accepted pathology.

The full essay is in Cases of Unethical Business, which is available at Amazon.

Thursday, September 1, 2016

Going Off-Shore, Dodging Sanctions, and Laundering Money: The World of the Richest of the Rich


On April 3, 2016, 2.6 terabytes of data—more than 11.5 million documents—leaked from Panama’s law firm, Mossack Fonseca. The documents show that the firm “helped heads of state, oligarchs and celebrities launder money, dodge sanctions and avoid taxes.”[1] Over 40 years, 214,000 offshore shell companies in 200 countries implicate individuals including the family of Syrian President Bashar Assad, and that of British Prime Minister David Cameron, several friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmunder Gunnlaugsson; financial institutions implicated include UBS, HSBC, and Société Générale.[2] I contend that the markets themselves had been tilted in the interest of the greater power (i.e., the rich), so systemic rather than incremental or piecemeal efforts would be necessary to solve the problem.
To be sure, offshore accounts were not at the time illegal, yet even so, the ethical dimension is stinging. Peter Atwater, a behavior economist, points to the 1% being able to “move anywhere they want and profit handsomely from the relocation” whereas “the 99% are left with the aftermath—the empty buildings of a deserted Detroit, the toxic waste from chemical plants in West Virginai or the unsustainable tax liabilities of Puerto Rico.”[3] In short, the richest of the rich had for years gotten away with minimizing their taxes in ways that are not open to anyone else. Simply put, this is not fair; no social contract with any sort of equitable basis would have such an “out.”
Global Financial Integrity found at the time of the leak that “developing and emerging economies lost $7.8 trillion in cash from 2004 to 2013 because of maneuvers like those allegedly perfected by Mossack.”[4] In 2016, illicit outflows were increasing at the rate of 6.5% a year, twice the rate of global GDP growth.[5] As most emerging economies were slowing in the first quarter of 2016, the outflows could have tipped the global economy into recession.
Clearly, a cultural mentality of self-aggrandizement at the expense of the general economic good (not to mention ethics) had gripped the richest of the rich, with a slanted (i.e., unfair) economic “game-board” resulting. Such a dynamic is the antithesis of a social contract. Put another way, the mentality undercuts the de facto social contracts by which people agree to live within societies and accept even their basic frameworks. Were the 99% organized, we might have seen an effort to re-evaluate how the market mechanism works. As it was, incremental rule-changes by governments was the response. For instance, “new rules released by the U.S. Treasury on April 4 crack down on American corporations that allow themselves to be acquired by foreign firms to avoid U.S. taxes.”[6] Yet if the Panama Papers are any indication, the problem goes well beyond the acquisition of U.S. firms by foreign ones. For instance, a company need only establish operations in a tax-haven to shield taxation at higher rates. Furthermore, what was being done to stop companies from dodging sanctions to do business with certain countries? What of the money laundering? Even answering these questions one by one misses the more fundamental point that the global market-system itself is flawed—and in a way that is convenient only for the rich. Attention to the system itself is needed, yet without the organized pressure of the 99 percent, wholesale political efforts are unlikely.
Abstractly speaking, a system is not a system if certain internal variables can maximize themselves without stopping at the contours of the system. Put another way, a system that restricts the vast majority of people yet is semipermeable to the maximizing few is inherently as well as ethically compromised. Yet efforts to level the board would seem to require lessor power to overrule a greater power unless the power of the vast majority is organized and activated such that it becomes the greater power.



[1] Rana Foroohar and Matt Vella, “The Panama Papers Expose the Secret World of the 1%,” Time, April 18, 2016, pp. 11-12.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.

Tuesday, September 29, 2015

Business Implications of Power in Mergers: The Case of the New United Airlines

Ideally, a merger combines the best features of one company with those of another company such that the whole is of greater value than the sum of the two parts. Optimal combination as such may imply or at least depend on a rough power-balance between the two adjoining companies, for otherwise distended dominance could translate into the worst of one company (i.e., the dominate one) being foisted onto the merged entity. The opportunity cost, or benefit lost in going with the worst of the dominant company, could be measured by the extent to which the same function in the other company is better than that of the dominant company. Put another way, it would make no sense to go into a merger planning to let each company continue to do what it does worse than the other. Sadly, power can eclipse economic criteria even in a company. The merger of Continental Airlines and United Airlines provides a case in point.

According to The New York Times, “The merger . . . was supposed to combine Continental’s reputation for solid customer service with the broader reach of United’s domestic and international network. Instead, [the merger turned into] an exercise in frustration for [the] fliers, with frequent delays, canceled flights, and lost bags.”[1] Customer unhappiness is a pretty good indication that something went horribly wrong in the formation of the combined company.

One business passenger, a frequent flier, provides us with a synopsis. “Continental was probably the best airline . . . that you could travel on pre-United. I would say United is one of the lowest.”[2] Specifically, he cited poor service, bad wifi connections, and cut-backs on perks and upgrades that evince little appreciation for frequent fliers. “I feel that at 100,000 miles, somebody should care and make me feel like a valued customer. You’re treated as just a commodity, and it’s a race to the bottom. They don’t really appreciate me at all.”[3] He would have quickly switched to another carrier, but the new United held 70 percent of all routes in and out of Newark, his main hub, at the time. Monopoly in a market, and perhaps even oligopoly, may enable sub-optimal merged companies to continue when they otherwise would have gone bankrupt.

United's "Love in the Air" promotion highlighting couples who met in the air. The case of the winning couple pictured here just happens to involve an "upgrade." The love in the air does not refer here to the employees on board or at the gate, even though the impression intended may be that flying United is a loving experience. (United Airlines)

In any case, the poor service of the pre-merger United somehow trumped Continental’s excellent service in the combined airline; the sordid mentality survived the salubrious one. Behind this dynamic lies dominance, or power, disproportional, I submit, from the standpoint of an optimized merged company according to business criteria—that is to say, power over effectiveness. Lest it be presumed that business principles and calculation play a predominate role mergers, the management of the power dynamics should not be left out of the equation.




[1] Jad Mouawad and Martha White, “Despite Shake-Up at Top, United Faces Steep Climb,” The New York Times, September 15, 2015.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.

Sunday, August 17, 2014

Mergers and Acquisitions: What about the Stockholders?

Why do companies merge and acquire other companies? Synergy is the textbook answer. Typically, the stockholders of the target company see an appreciation in the value of their stock, while stockholders in the initiating firm see a downtick. The reason why is simple: corporations typically overpay. The value-added of the anticipated synergy must be greater than not only any overpayment, but also the intangible costs in aligning the corporate cultures. Yet another factor—an opportunity cost, really—is frequently overlooked: that of whether the extra cash on hand should be returned to the stockholders as dividends.

During 2014 up to August 15th, merger activity around the world was $2.2 trillion, up from $1.29 trillion in the same period the previous year.[1] Comcast, for example, was buying Time Warner Cable for $5 billion, and Reynolds American was buying Lorillard for $27 billion.[2] The nonfinancial companies in the S&P 500 had a near-record $1.2 trillion in cash in an economic context of low interest rates and a bit of inflation.[3] Buying another company would thus be cheaper than not only expanding from within, but also investing the cash in interest-bearing or tied securities.

In fact, not buying a company under the circumstances could easily be thought of as doing nothing with the cash. As Chris Lee of Fidelity Select Financial Services Portfolio puts it, “Now, the risk of doing nothing seems greater than the risk of doing something.”[4] In spite of the fact that mergers can be very good in the long haul for the stockholders of both companies to a merger or acquisition, a board in touch with its fiduciary duty to the company’s owners would properly consider the alternative of returning the surplus cash to them. Lest too much attention be paid to appreciation in the price of a stock—admittedly of value to those owners who intend to sell—the dividend is a means by which all of a company’s current owners benefit.

To be sure, the decision is not merely a financial one. The return of capital to the providers of equity is an ideological matter as well. To own property, even if most of it is in the form of a concentration of capital, brings with it the right to a share in the profits. This goes beyond the impact of the successive surpluses on the stock’s price. The perspective in which not using extra cash to acquire or otherwise merge with another company is reckoned as doing nothing eclipses the alternative use altogether. Returning excess cash to the stockholders is decidedly not “doing nothing.” The implication that it is intimates a bias in the interest of management that is at odds with its fiduciary duty. 

Put another way, similar to what can easily happen in the political debate over whether to reduce taxes so the citizens will be able to hold onto more of their money or spend the additional revenue on governmental budget items, the tendency of corporate managements, and even boards, to spend excess money rather than return it to the owners may not always be in the best interests of the principals and the principle of property rights.



[1] John Waggoner, “When 2 Companies Love Each Other Very Much . . . “, USA Today, August 15, 2014.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.