The U.S. Government Spying on Americans: Was It Ethical?

In early June, 2013, while Barak Obama was the U.S. president, Americans learned of the U.S. Government’s domestic surveillance program, under which the Verizon Business Network Services subsidiary had been turning over call logs “on an ongoing daily basis” to the National Security Agency[1] The order, signed by a judge on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in April of that year, was "lawful,” U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein contended.[2] The program analyzed time and number logs that did not include the calls’ content. According to U.S. Senator Chambliss, “All of these numbers are basically ferreted out by a computer, but if there’s a number that matches a [suspicious] number that has been dialed . . . , then that may be flagged. And they may or may not seek a court order to go further on that particular instance. But that’s the only time that this information is ever used in any kind of substantive way.”[3] Harry Reid, Majority Leader in the U.S. Senate at the time, added that the phone-data program had “worked to prevent” terrorist attacks.[4] Does it make any difference. ethically speaking, that the program had helped stop a domestic attack? Shortly after The Guardian broke the story on Verizon’s subsidiary serving corporate customers, The Wall Street Journal reported, “[T]he initiative also encompasses phone-call data” from AT&T and Sprint, as well as from Verizon itself (i.e., beyond its business subsidiary).[5] Does this revelation on the vast scale of the program make any difference ethically? Moreover, does a positive collective consequence--or the lack of a negative harm to the public good--justify forays into the privacy of a vast number of individuals? 

Not surprisingly, privacy advocates were alarmed at the sheer scope of the program. Kate Martin of the Center for National Security Studies, a civil liberties advocacy group, said that “absent some explanation I haven’t thought of, this looks like the largest assault on privacy since the N.S.A. wiretapped Americans in clear violation of the law” under the Bush administration.[6] Her statement raises the question of whether the fact that the Obama administration had confined itself to court orders makes the program ethical.

Whereas the content of the phone conversations, including the parties’ names, were said to be not included in the trove of data turned over to the government, internet companies had been providing the contents of emails, online chats, Facebook accounts, Skype video calls, and web searches to the government as per court orders (i.e., not through direct access).[7] Does the inclusion of content make any difference, ethically speaking? Applying a few ethical theories may get us closer to some answers. 

                        I. Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism maintains that conduct is ethical if it provides the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. This can be in terms of pleasure over pain or benefits over costs. In terms of phone records, the question is whether the harm from attacks that are prevented by the program outweighs the harm from the loss of privacy. Put another way, do the benefits of prevented attacks exceed the costs in terms of privacy that is lost?
That at least one attack had already been prevented indicates that benefits do indeed exist—but for how many people (saved)? Furthermore, how grave would the attacks have been? Attacks can vary in their severity and breadth of harm. The reduction in the fear of a possible attack is also a benefit, and the program, once exposed, can be expected to have put that fear at ease, at least to some degree. That these factors require judgment means that different people are likely to come to different conclusions on a given issue.
On the harm or cost side, the number of people whose calls have been reported is relevant. Judgment again intrudes in the determination of the harm from the loss of privacy if the parties are not aware of it, and then if they are aware of it. That the contents of the calls are not reported suggests that the cost or harm may not exceed the program’s benefits, even though the data provided covers a great number of people. In other words, it is reasonable to conclude that the harm to them pales in comparison to the harm that would be unleashed by mass attacks were they not prevented by the program. In the twenty-first century, access to chemical weapons and nuclear bombs can translate into massive harm. Anyone having parents, a brother or sister, or a child living in a major city would likely judge that giving the government access to his or her phone log is worth the loss in privacy. In terms of utilitarianism, therefore, the phone-records government program can be regarded as ethical because it is consistent with the greatest net happiness for the greatest number. The pain prevented would likely have been severe, whereas, even though the phone-logs involve many more people, the costs in terms of loss of privacy are far less intense. In other words, saving legs and lives is a benefit so significant that the loss of some privacy of many more people would likely be less overall than the benefits overall. To be sure, weighing and relating benefits and costs both in terms of severity and the number of likely people involves considerable uncertainty. Utilitarianism is therefore often a matter of judgment rather than mathematical calculation. The value of the theory here may be in comparing the two programs.
For example, going on to the Prism program, it can be regarded as less ethical from a utilitarian standpoint because of the extent of content provided. The possibility of government “Nixonist” abuse is greater here. Further, it could be asked whether the sheer amount of content is necessary to prevent attacks. In other words, would more attacks in the works be prevented, and if so, would this increased benefit be worth the added cost in terms of privacy lost? Even though judgment again comes into play, the Prism program is likely less ethical than the phone-log program—perhaps even unethical.

            II. Kantianism

Kant argued that treating others as ends in themselves rather than only as a means is a duty owing to the value of rational nature, given that it assigns values to things. The people whose calls are being reported are in one sense being used, but it is also possible that they or their loved ones could be saved from being killed or wounded as a result of the program. The more people whose calls are being reported, the stronger is the case that they themselves are being protected, and thus treated not merely as means, but also as ends in themselves. That three major phone companies have been submitting the logs suggests that the people can be regarded as the point of the program, rather than only as the means. The program can thus be viewed as ethical in Kantian terms.
In regard to the Prism program, the inclusion of so much content makes it easier to argue that the people are being used. At the same time, that so much from the internet is included means that more people are included. The assertion that the people harmed are also those being protected is thus stronger. However, it is also true that a lower proportion of those whose data is being mined would likely be those saved from the prevented attacks. A person could feel uncomfortable knowing that government employees could be reading his or her emails and tweets as well as looking at his or her Facebook pictures even though it is unlikely that he or she, living in the woods in Idaho, would ever be a victim of a terrorist attack. Such a person would rightly feel used for the sake of others’ safety.
For the Prism program to be ethical under Kantian ethics, one would be on more solid ground asserting that “the People” are being used and protected. As a government policy oriented to the general welfare, the program may thus be ethical. Even so, particular individuals could claim that they are being used.  

                        III. Social Contract: Rights and Obligations

Even if people have not sat down in the state of nature to agree to a social contract as a basis for a society, the balance of rights and obligations can be understood in terms of a contract. The rights and obligations are both for the good of the people. The question for us regarding the phone program is whether the obligation to allow one’s calls to be noted and used secretly by a government agency would be viewed by actual or hypothetical contract negotiators as going too far in encroaching on the right to privacy. That is, the question is whether people in the state of nature would agree to giving up that right in exchange for being (or feeling) protected. Because the contents of the calls and the names of the callers are not part of the obligation, people in the state of nature could reasonably agree to it in exchange for feeling or actually being protected.
Regarding the Prism program, people devising a social contract would be less likely to agree to provide their emails, web-searches, blogs, tweets, and Facebook contents in exchange for feeling or being more secure in a society. From a social contract perspective, the Prism program can be regarded as unethical. This approach assumes that the right to privacy is created in the making of a social contract, rather than being a natural right. If the right is “hardwired” into human beings, we could not simply “trade it in” without an enduring psychological cost.

                        IV. Natural Rights

That privacy is typically subject to questions of how much it benefits us relative to how much the loss of privacy benefits society suggests that the right is not natural. However, when a person’s privacy is not respected, such as by someone demanding personal information, it is natural to react in anger—to have what Hume calls a sentiment of disapprobation. Hume claimed this emotional reaction is the moral judgment itself that some conduct is unethical. In other words, that we react rather instinctually to someone who presumes access to personal information or ignores personal space suggests that the right to privacy stems from a natural right built into being constituted as a human being. From this basis, both programs can be regarded as unethical—the Prism program being even more unethical than the phone program because of the additional contents being provided to the government.
That just suspecting that a stranger might be reading one’s personal email or seeing a personal photo from Facebook would make the typical person cringe suggests that something unethical is going on—that the person is being violated in a way that cannot be justified. As the news reports of the programs were being digested by the American people, a collective negative emotional reaction was palpable with such immediacy that it must have been natural, and thus triggered by the violation of a natural right. Even people who reasoned that security justifies the loss of privacy doubtlessly had the emotional reaction too. From this perspective, it can be predicted that the more privacy, or access to that which the person regards as person, is compromised, the more psychological harm to the person is incurred as a result. A person adopting the social-contract approach might agree to trade some privacy for security, but the natural right theory would stress the psychological cost and thus be much less inclined to “trade” the right.

In conclusion, whether or not the phone and Prism programs were unethical depends on not only judgment and which factors are included, but also the particular ethical theory being used. It is unlikely that a definite ethical “answer” can be obtained or even exists unless the breach of privacy was so grave (i.e., harmful to the individuals being spied on) that utilitarianism and natural rights would become inflamed. Even so, that the ethical theories analyzed above do not give the same answer suggests that at least some ethicists would still object. From my own analysis above, two factors strike me as decisive: how personal the information that being provided (and how much) is, and how useful a given amount of information is in preventing attacks. A trade-off is implied here, and it in turn is related to the long-standing trade-off between privacy and security, or, moreover, rights and related harms of individuals and the public good. Surely at some point, it becomes unethical to extract too much from certain individuals--especially if they are many--for the public good. Yet we should not be hoodwinked into thinking that all ethical theories speak with the same voice. This grayness can be expected to diminish as the harm increases. Also, the grayness may give way only on a gradual slippery slope, and thus not be detectable either by the general public. For example, when the Nazis invaded The Netherlands, Jews there were subject to a gradual tightening (i.e., adding) of restrictions--the purpose of the "bit by bit" approach was doubtless so the Jews would not raise an uproar, for who would for a slight change? Spying on citizens by the U.S. Government probably also increased by small iterations, each of which, on its own, could easily be justified in governmental circles. Herein lies a danger to liberty even in a democracy.  

1. Charlie Savage and Edward Wyatt, “U.S. Is Secretly Collecting Records of Verizon Calls,” The New York Times, June 5, 2013.

2. Charlie Savage and Edward Wyatt, “U.S. Maintains Vast Database of Phone Calls, Lawmakers Say,” The New York Times, June 5, 2013.

3. Ibid.

4. Siobhan Gorman, Evan Perez, and Janet Hook, “U.S. Collects Vast Data Trove,” The Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2013.

5. Ibid.

6. Charlie Savage and Edward Wyatt, “U.S. Is Secretly Collecting Records of Verizon Calls,” The New York Times, June 5, 2013.

7. Siobhan Gorman, Evan Perez, and Janet Hook, “U.S. Collects Vast Data Trove,” The Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2013.

Was U.S. President Obama the Antichrist?

In the twentieth century, Christian apocalypticism thought it saw the end of days in the midst of baleful signs, including historical biblical criticism, the return of the Jews to the Holy Land, evolutionary science, and the United Nations. In the United States, the consolidation of power in the federal government at the expense of federalism (and, theoretically, liberty as well) was apocalyptically taken as a precursor to the end. According to Matt Sutton, “As the government grew in response to industrialization, fundamentalists concluded that the rapture was approaching.” The trajectory, in other words, was viewed as headed toward a global super-state under the thumb of a seemingly benevolent ruler. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “consolidation of power across more than three terms in the White House, his efforts to undermine the autonomy of the Supreme Court, his dream of a global United Nations and especially his rapid expansion of the government confirmed what many fundamentalists had feared: the United States was lining up with Europe in preparation for a new world dictator. This “leader would ultimately prove to be the Antichrist, who, after the so-called rapture of true saints to heaven, would lead humanity through a great tribulation culminating in the second coming and Armageddon.”

Thanks to Obamacare and the Dodd-Frank financial regulation law of 2010, some of the anti-state apocalyptic voters viewed Barak Obama during his first few years as president as possibly being the antichrist. Questions about Obama’s birth only fueled the speculation. According to Sutton, the “specious theories about his place of birth, his internationalist tendencies, his measured support for Israel and his Nobel Peace Prize fit their long-held expectations about the Antichrist. So does his commitment to expanding the reach of government in areas like health care. In 2008, the campaign of Senator John McCain, the Republican nominee, presciently tapped into evangelicals’ apocalyptic fears by producing an ad, ‘The One,’ that sarcastically heralded Mr. Obama as a messiah.” On the Fox News network, one host regularly referred to Obama as “the anointed one.” This reference was not lost on evangelical apocalyptic voters.  

Analysis:

The sheer paradigmatic distance between twenty-first century secularists and evangelical apocalyptics may go a long way in explaining the blockages between the U.S. House Republicans and the U.S. Senate Democrats (and the president). In other words, the voters represented by the two parties are not only on different pages—the two groups are reading different books. Indeed, beyond having radically different theological assumptions and beliefs, the two groups may differ even on whether religion is legitimate. For example, a modernist secular voter might characterize the apocalyptics as superstitious. The voter could point to the failure of the world to end in the twentieth century in spite of all the signs of the impending rapture and period of tribulation. Indeed, “the sky is falling” Christian reading goes back to the pre-Constantine persecutions. 

In spite of the problems with the apocalyptic interpretation (which seems to have been applied in any decadent or disruptive period in the history of Christianity), definite trends can be identified, such as the U.S. Government’s increase of power at the expense of the several states. Furthermore, increasing global interdependence—such as in regard to health, nuclear weapons, and climate—has indeed increased pressure on politicians to increase the power of the U.N. The proliferation of empire-scale federal unions beyond that of the U.S.—as evinced by the E.U. and even the A.U.—can also be viewed as a trend toward globalized governance (i.e., a federation of regional federations, which themselves are made up of kingdom-level states).

How such trends are interpreted is what triggers the gulf between the apocalyptics and the secularists (and even the mainline churches). My main point is that political intransience can be expected with such divergent views of social reality and its basis. For instance, does society (and government) result from a social contract (e.g. Hobbes, Locke, Kant) or a divine decree (e.g., Augustine and Aquinas)? Is increasing statism a sign of the Antichrist or simply a response to problems of industrialization? The interpretations go beyond whether the trends are good or bad. Accordingly, discourse itself can be expected to be extremely difficult. It is not, however, impossible, and solutions are possible.

For example, federalism can accommodate such divergent views as long as the federal units have enough autonomy from the general government. The E.U. is in a better condition in this respect than is the U.S., though the European Union risks dissolution (e.g., the state debt crisis) because the E.U. Government does not have enough competencies to effectively manage the integration already accomplished.  However, federalism should not be viewed as a panacea. It is possible that the fundamentally disparate differences between the apocalyptics and the secularists regarding the role of government are such that political separation is the only suitable solution. This may be why Texas under Rick Perry flirted with succession in Obama’s early years. In any case, as difficult as discourse between the representatives of the two groups may be, being in political union demands tolerance and discussion, which in turn require humility (including a recognition that one can be wrong). Yet even here, Biblical inerrancy throws in a wrench, making discourse tortuous for both sides.

The distance between the parties is indeed formidable and perhaps even intractable. Even deciding whether to separate would be daunting. A union containing a very deep cleft is thus what we Americans suffer to manage amid political paralysis, finger-pointing, and shouting. God must surely be diverting his eyes in utter disgust and ultimately sadness—not about the signs or trends necessarily, but, rather, concerning the sheer anger being evinced in such tight quarters. Were there any adults willing to come to the fore, a secular voter might lightheartedly proffer in generosity, God shines His light on this city on a hill. Otherwise, we are together in quite another place.

Source:

Matthew A. Sutton, “Why the Antichrist Matters in Politics,” The New York Times, September 25, 2011. 

Ebola in Liberia: The Government’s Fault?

With the Ebola virus “spreading like wildfire” in Liberia, “devouring everything in its path,” Brownie Samukai, the state’s defense minister, went on to tell the U.N. Security Council on September 9, 2014 that “Liberia is facing a serious threat to its national existence.”[1] With more than half of the epidemic’s deaths in that state—1,224 out of at least 2,2296 in West Africa as of September 6, 2014—and new cases “increasing exponentially,” the World Health Organization (WHO) declared that “the demands of the Ebola outbreak have completely outstripped the government’s and partners’ capacity  to respond.”[2] Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that the illness had severely handicapped the mining, agriculture, and service sectors of the state’s economy.[3] Quite understandably, pleas for the government to do more peeled like frightened bells across the state. “The patients are hungry, they are starving. No food, no water,” a terrified woman told journalists. “The government needs to do more. Let Ellen Johnson Sirleaf do more!”[4] Even if valid, such blame is hypocritical to the extent that the people themselves had been refusing to do what is necessary to stop such a virus from spreading.

Concerning the validity of woman’s charge that the government was not doing nearly enough, Samukai pointed out that the “already weak health infrastructure” was overwhelmed.[5] That is to say, the government had to deal with an already-insufficient healthcare system. Why insufficient? Two theories of development give different answers. According to dependencia, or dependency theory, the infrastructure of a colony is oriented to getting commodities out to the colonizer rather than to developing an internal, web-like system. Roads of a coastal colony, for example, are prioritized that go from the interior to the coast, where ships can pick up the goods and transport them to the core economy (e.g., Europe). The colonists and even their successors cannot be blamed for the lack of internally-oriented infrastructure, yet at some point after a sufficient amount of time as a sovereign state the lack of any progress is surely blameworthy.

The modernization theory says that what holds a developing country back is not its colonial infrastructure, but, rather, things like tradition and ignorance that a people stubbornly cling to even when offered a better way. Superstition, for example, may keep people from working on certain days while tradition has it that a person should stop working as soon as he or she has enough for subsistence living. This inverse of the Protestant work ethic can keep capital from accumulating to the point that reinvestment can broaden an agrarian economy to include manufacturing industries. Rigidly sticking with the custom that puts child labor above education, a people can keep its young from becoming professionals, business entrepreneurs, and managers. Quite understandably, executives of foreign corporations are hesitant to start operations where such a base labor pool exists and reinforces itself.

Taken together dependencia and modernization theory can account for the weak health infrastructure in Liberia and other former colonies in Africa. Health-care of the natives had not been a priority of the colonizers. Additionally, education and investment, as well as even foreign direct investment, may be lacking even though they would contribute much to building a sound healthcare system.

Applied to the Ebola outbreak, we can look beyond the government and healthcare infrastructure to apply modernization theory to the people themselves. The funeral custom, for example, of touching the body the deceased friend or relative is great for the virus, which spreads by touch rather than air. Even so, the African who have this tradition stubbornly and/or ignorantly held to it even as the epidemic was spreading. Additionally, villagers took to hiding sick residents rather than allowing visiting healthcare workers to take the infected people to makeshift treating facilities out of fear that people go to die at such places; meanwhile, the villagers themselves could become infected. In some cases, villagers even attacked the visitors, stubbornly ignoring their pleas.

Scared villagers in Liberia stand far away from the healthcare worker, even as they risk getting the virus by rubbing up against each other--ignoring the worker's pleas. (Image Source: The Washington Post)

Simply maintaining a distance from other people, rather than continuing to touch them, would have done a lot to smite the Ebola. Especially sordid is the assumption that the healthcare workers and government officials don’t know what they are talking about, especially if the person also assumes that he or she cannot be wrong—such as in knowing that touching a dead body brings with it benefits that can keep the person healthy or safe. Ignorance that cannot be wrong, backed up by tradition, can indeed be a silent killer, the odor of which can only be pleasing to the Ebola virus. Blaming the government rings hollow from such a putrid drum, even if officials could be doing a better job in mopping up the mess.

---

[1] Abby Ohlheiser, “Ebola Is ‘Devouring Everything in Its Path.’ Could It Lead to Liberia’s Collapse?” The Washington Post, September 11, 2014.

[2] WTO, “Ebola Situation in Liberia: Non-Conventional Interventions Needed,” September 8, 2014; Elahe Izadi, “Ebola Death Toll Rises to 2,296 as Liberia Struggles to Keep Up,” The Washington Post, September 9, 2014.

[3] Anna Yukhananov, “IMF Says Ebola Hits Economic Growth in West Africa,” Reuters, September 11, 2014.

[4] Abby Ohlheiser, “Ebola.”

[5] Ibid.

Is States' Rights in the E.U. Racist?

Thousands of Romania’s Roma people (also known as Gypsies) headed for the wealthier Western E.U. states, setting off a clash within the European Union over just how open its “open borders” really were. Migration within the 27 states of the E.U. became a combustible issue during the economic downturn. The Union’s expansion that brought in the relatively poor states of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 renewed concern that the poor, traveling far from home in search of work, would become a burden on the state governments of the wealthier states. The migration of the Roma also raised questions about the obligations of Romania and Bulgaria to fulfill promises their governments had made when they joined the Union. Romania, for instance, mapped out a strategy for helping the Roma, but financed little of it.

Nicolas Sarkozy of the E.U. state of France demanded in 2010 that the Romanian state government do more to aid the Roma at home. He vowed to keep dismantling immigrant camps and angrily rejected complaints from E.U. Commission officials that the French authorities were illegally singling out Roma for deportation.

Sarkozy, being oriented to state politics, tried to revive his support on the political right by deporting thousands of them, offering 300 euros, about $392, to those who go home voluntarily, and bulldozing their encampments.[1] The European Commission threatened legal action against the state of France over the deportation, calling it disgraceful and illegal. Perhaps it could also be called racist. If so, might Sarkozy’s action be comparable to a Southern state in the U.S. trying to kick black people out. That is, might Sarkozy’s action evince state rights perpetrating racism? Arizona’s immigration law requiring people being investigated by the police to show I.D. pales in comparison.  Might the association of state rights and racism have shifted from the U.S. to the E.U.? If so, it is doubtful that state rights would be marginalized in the E.U. as it has been in the U.S. on account of the association; the state governments in the E.U. enjoy more than enough loyalty by their citizens to defeat it.

More generally, this case illustrates the problems that the E.U. has had in enforcing compliance of the terms of the accession talks of new states. Prime facie, the case showcases the difficulty involved in integrating Europe, particularly as states such as Italy, Spain, France and Denmark have striven to keep out immigrants from Africa. The case of the Roma could be just the tip of the iceberg in how state rights may be fueled by racism to keep certain groups out. In other words, there could be a rather troubling pattern here, and Europeans may have been torn—looking to the E.U. to thwart the racism while supporting their state governments in keeping out “troubling” groups. It is part and parcel of the checks and balances in modern federalism that member governments can be called on their sordid policies even when they are popular within the particular states.

1.Suzanne Daley, “Roma, on Move, Test Europe’s ‘Open Borders’,” The New York Times, September 16, 2010.