At the federal level of the E.U.,
the European Council, like the Senate in the U.S., represents the states, whereas
the European Parliament, like the U.S. House of Representatives, represents citizens—that’s
right, E.U. citizens. The theory behind this difference is a
modification of traditional federalism theory, wherein only the polities in a
federation are represented at the federal level. In this traditional way of
doing federalism, individuals, or citizens, belong only to the first level of
political organization. Althusius’s Political Digest (1603) describes
that theory, borrowing a lot from the example of the Holy Roman Empire. The advent
of both polities and federal citizens being directly represented at a federal
level was born out of compromise during the American Constitutional Convention
in 1787. The E.U. replicated the structure, wherein the state governments and
E.U. citizens (or legal residents) each have their own channel of access to
affect federal law and policy on the federal level. For one of the two to cross
over and eclipse the other in its own channel is suboptimal because both
vantage points contribute to sound federal law in a way that enables them to
protect their respective interests, which are not identical. It is thus not appropriate
for a state government, including its governor or head of state, to direct
members of Parliament how to vote on a given bill, whether their districts are
within or outside of the state.
On July 18, 2024, Giorgia Meloni,
the governor of the E.U. state of Italy, “ordered the 24 MEPs,” or members of
Parliament of her state-level Fratelli d’Italia, or Brothers of Italy, group “to
vote against the re-election of Ursula von der Leyen as president of the
European Commission.”[1]
I contend that those representatives were instead duty-bound to vote the
interests of their respective voters rather than serve as an additional
resource for the state government at the federal level, or else to vote along
with the rest of the European Conservatives and Reformists Party in the Parliament,
rather than as a state group representing the state’s government. This is admittedly
a different perspective than that which both American and European media
outlets have intentionally or unintentionally absorbed from the Euroskeptic
ideology wherein the European Parliament is really even a legislative body and
thus does not have its own parties (and interests).
From an American perspective, it
would be like the governor of a state ordering representatives of the U.S.
House of Representatives to vote a certain way, rather than in line with the
wishes or interests of the constituents in the respective districts or the
federal-level party recognized by the U.S. House. The U.S. Senate is where the state governments
are to exercise their authority at the federal level even though this line is
more direct in the European Council because the heads of the state governments
themselves sit in that chamber, rather than separately elected senators.
Indeed, Meloni already had her chance to vote against Von der Leyen’s
nomination in the European Council—Meloni abstained. For her to order members
of Parliament to vote against the nominee essentially doubled Meloni’s, and thus
her state government’s, role at the federal level. Not only is this excessive;
it also eclipses the voice of the E.U. citizens in the districts of the MEPs
who followed Meloni’s order. That is to say, the order upset the balance of
inputs—that of the states and the E.U. citizens—feeding into the federal level.
Given the staying power of the
principle of unanimity at the federal level as of 2024, the power of the state
governments at the federal level was arguably too much anyway for the viability
of the E.U.’s functioning at the federal level. Eclipsing the voice of the
people by attempting to subordinate their directly elected representatives
(even though by party) worsens the imbalance.
In his text, Federal Government,
Kenneth
Wheare describes a federal system as wheels within a wheel. All of those should
be in balance for the system as a whole to function well. I disagree strongly
with his claim that a balance of powers between the states and the federal institutions
is not necessary. He claims that the state governments need only have one
domain of authority that is autonomous of the federal government for the
federal system to be viable, but such an imbalance would be tantamount to political
consolidation rather than dual-sovereignty, wherein the states are not eclipsed
by federal preemption and power. After nearly 250 years, the U.S. federal
system was arguably much closer to consolidation than in that union’s first 50
years. After 30 years, the E.U. suffered from the opposite danger: too much
state power, and thus a risk of dissolution. Although strong institutional
safeguards to prevent eventual consolidation at the expense of viable
federalism were advisable in the E.U., given the historical trajectory of the
U.S. towards consolidation in an empire in which one size does not fit all,
given the different cultures therein, too much of a role for the state
governments at the federal level was itself a danger for the E.U. in 2024. The staying
power of the principle of unanimity alone threatened to excessively encumber
E.U. policy-making and law, and thus fuel Euroskeptic movements toward the
dissolution of the union (which is neither a bloc nor an international
organization). Furthermore, eclipsing the sacred relationship between the representatives
in the Parliament and their respective constituencies, E.U. citizens, worsens
the “democracy deficit.” Just as the U.S. House was originally intended as the
democratic body at the federal level in the U.S., as U.S. senators were
initially chosen by their respective state governments and the president by the
Electoral College, the European Parliament can be seen as the sole repository
of democracy in the European Union. A look at how the Commission’s president is
nominated and elected without E.U. citizens voting on the question and the fact
that the European Council represents the state governments rather than their
respective peoples directly demonstrate the importance of the Parliament in
terms of direct representative democracy at the federal level.
In short, the E.U. state governments should keep their paws off the European Parliament; the European Council and the Council of the E.U. is where state-level officials can affect federal policy and law at the federal level. If anything, the authority of the Parliament should have been strengthened in 2024 relative to the powers of the Commission and especially the European Council (and the Council of the E.U.). At the very least, all of the political groups in the Parliament should have been recognized at the federal level as political parties in themselves rather than as informal groups of state-level parties. In 2024, the drastic imbalance in the federal system in favor of the state governments, whose individual and collective interests are in theory and practice different than that of the E.U. both as a federal system and in terms of federal policy and law, was a major problem that did not need to be worsened by encroachments. From a federal perspective, the governor of the E.U. state of Italy was coloring outside the lines in seeking more influence at the federal level. Objecting to this does not suggest in the least that protections for the state governments against possible federal encroachment, as has happened in the U.S., should be disabled or torn down.
1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Analysis: Giorgia Meloni’s Façade as a Pragmatic E.U. Leader Has Suddenly Crumbled,” Euronews, July 19, 2024.
