Columbia: The United States of South America?

On March 8, 2026, The Associated Press reported on the voting in Columbia that took place that day “for a new Congress and to select candidates . . . in a primary-style contest ahead of a presidential election in May.”[1] This description could hardly be more “American,” in the sense of referring to the United States. I contend that this allusion to the U.S. is overdrawn. Were Columbia to apply for membership in the U.S., the accession would pertain to becoming a state, rather than to Columbia as a United States of South America merging with the other United States. Put another way, even though Columbia appropriated from the federal level of the U.S. in creating a presidency, a Congress that in turn consists of “The Senate” and “The House of Representatives,” and a presidential election process that includes something akin to primaries, Columbia corresponds to the American states (only without being members of a union as they are) rather than to the United States. Columbia’s accession into the U.S. as a state would not instantiate an empire within an empire.

One way of distinguishing Columbian politics from politics at the national level in the U.S. is to point out that the timespan for presidential campaigning in Columbia in 2026 between the “primaries” and the presidential general election was just months. Whereas that is plenty of time to campaign across Columbia, much more time is needed for U.S. presidential candidates to campaign in 50 states. Accordingly, the U.S. presidential campaign “season” is much longer—with the primaries themselves taking place over about 6 months. This is a great way to grasp the qualitative leap (i.e., rather than being a matter of degree) that separates and distinguishes a state from a union that is composed of many such states. Although only a few months are between the nominating political conventions and the general presidential election in the U.S., and only a few months are between the Columbian “primaries” and that presidential election, the American presidential campaign “season” is significantly front-loaded in part because the U.S. is an empire-scale federal system wherein the states play a role in the election of the federal president and thus should at least theoretically be campaigned in. It is not enough to campaign in an area the size of Columbia, for example.

Shifting from process to institutional analysis, Columbia’s system of government as unitary can be distinguished from the U.S.’s federal system. Although imitation has been said to be the highest form of flattery, referring to Columbia’s upper and lower legislative chambers as together being a Congress is misleading. In the United Colonies, which predates the United States, the Continental Congress was so named because it was viewed as international meetings rather than as a domestic legislature. So too, the Congress during the Articles of Confederation was understood to be an international body because the states were then sovereign countries. Although this changed in 1789 when the three branches of the federal government went into effect, the U.S. Senate was understood to be founded on principles of international law. Although the states were then only semi-sovereign (some governmental sovereignty having been delegated to the federal government), that polities rather than individuals would the members of the Senate and that the member-polities all would have the same number of votes meant that the U.S. Senate is an international chamber (i.e., founded on such principles, rather than national principles). The latter principles apply to the U.S. House of Representatives, so with the Senate, the Congress can be construed as a hybrid national-international institution. In utter contrast, Columbia’s Congress is solely domestic in nature—not a thread of international fiber being mixed in. This is so, too, of the legislatures of the U.S.’s member-states. So, in this way too, Columbia can be seen to correspond to a state in the U.S. rather than to the U.S. itself.

Indeed, one reason why federalism fits so well for the U.S. is because of its empire-scale and the related interstate cultural heterogeneity. Massachusetts is very different than Oklahoma, culturally speaking, and Texas is very different than Hawaii. The claim that the regions of Columbia differ culturally to such an extent is based in part on the category mistake of treating a state-scale polity as being commensurate with, or equivalent to, a union of such states.

One implication of seeing Columbia in this light is that it and its neighbors could form a United States of South America, whose Congress would be hybrid-based on international and national principles of government. The Senate of such a Congress would represent Columbia and the other states rather than individual citizens (the direct election of U.S. senators by citizens of the respective states may thus be problematic). Were such a United States of South America in existence, a federal check on power-abuses at the state level would be possible (though not guaranteed). The need for and lack of such a check when the Columbians went to vote in March, 2026 is clear from the assertion made at the time by Columbian Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez “that a group of at least 2,400 people ‘allegedly heading to vote’ were detected trying to enter Columbia at an illegal border crossing with Venezuela in Norte de Santander, despite announced border closures during the election process.”[2] Sixty buses were waiting to take the people to voting stations. Columbia’s simple rather than federal polity did not include such safeguards as would surely come from the U.S. federal government were citizens of one state sent into another state as campaign volunteers to attempt to vote there. In the words of Sánchez, an “avalanche of illegal voting” happened in Columbia on March 8, 2026.[3] Whereas claims of widespread electoral fraud in some of the U.S. states in the 2020 presidential election were met with investigations by Congress and the U.S. Justice Department, which crucially are distinct from any of the state governments, the Columbian government had only itself to investigate why busloads of foreigners allegedly voted for candidates for president even though that government may have been blameworthy. It is not as if Columbia constituted a United States of South America. Of course, political corruption can occur at virtually any scale; the U.S. Federal Government is hardly immune, and neither is the government of the tiny polity of Rhode Island, for instance.

My point is merely that even though Columbia’s legislature is called a Congress and includes a chamber called a senate, Columbia does not have the checks and balances that are built into an empire-scale federal polity such as the United States. Even if some of the U.S. states had federal systems, those states would not thereby be equivalent to the U.S., or, more generally, to an empire-scale and international-national hybrid federal government.

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1. Astrid Suarez, “Colombians Are Electing a New Congress and Choosing Presidential Candidates,” The Associated Press, March 8, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Congressional Subpoenas: The Case of the Clintons

The rule of law is absolutely essential to a representative democracy being able to endure even as strong personalities in public office may seek to bend or even dismiss law for their own purposes. The notion that anyone subject to law gets a pass according to one’s own discretion and power is toxic to a republic being regarded as fair. Just as everyone has a right to due process in legal proceedings in the U.S., no one is above the law there. This applies to former presidents and secretaries of state, and thus to Bill and Hillary Clinton. Their written statement in refusing to recognize a Congressional subpoena as valid—a presumptuous stunt to be sure—reveals that they held the presumption of being able to decide whether a law to which they were subject was valid. This presumption could also be seen when Bill Clinton occupied the White House, for he deliberately lied under oath, “I did not have sexual relations with” Monika Lewinski even though she had performed oral sex with him in the Oval Office when she was a White House intern. My point is that the underlying pattern is clear with respect to a lack of regard for law itself (even though both Clintons went to Yale’s law school) and the presumption of setting oneself in the position of invalidating law to which one is subject. That Bill Clinton was no punished with incarceration in the 1990s was unfortunate even for him and his wife as they were not afforded the opportunity to learn a lesson.

On January 21, 2026, members of the Republican group in the U.S. House of Representatives began the process “to hold former President Bill Clinton and former Secretary of State Hillary in contempt of Congress” because the couple had repeatedly refused to honor a Congressional subpoena to testify on the Epstein sex-girls racket.[1] Photographic evidence that Bill had been in contact with Epstein had been made public, and members of the House had questions for the Clintons regarding what they may have known of Epstein’s crimes. Even though the demand for testimony sounds reasonable enough, Rep. James Comer, the chairman of the relevant committee, had said at the start of a hearing in which the Clinton’s attendance was required that the Clintons had responded not with “cooperation but defiance.”[2] Such a blatant response to a Congressional subpoena is astonishing because, as Comer said, “Subpoenas are not mere suggestions, they carry the force of law and require compliance.”[3] The Clintons contended that the subpoenas were “invalid because they do not serve any legislative purpose.”[4] But it is not for subpoenaed people called to testify to assess whether any such purpose is being served, for otherwise anyone could disregard a Congressional subpoena simply by declaring there to be no legislative purpose.

In his ethical theory, Kant argues that if universalizing a maxim results in a contradiction, such a maxim is unethical.  For example, if no one were to tell the truth, no one would believe anyone else’s truth-claims and so making such claims would not make any sense. Universalizing the maxim that it is ok to lie would result in no claims being made. Similarly, were everyone to act on the maxim, a person subject to a Congressional subpoena can determine the validity of said subpoena and act on that determination, it would not make sense for Congress to issue subpoenas because none would be honored. Universalizing that maxim results in the absurd, so that maxim is unethical.

Another formulation of Kant’s ethical theory holds that rational beings should be treated not merely as one’s means, but also as ends in themselves. In presuming that the committee members were merely playing political games in issuing the subpoenas and dismissing them, the Clintons were treating the members as means only (to the Clinton’s own ends) rather than as ends in themselves worthy of respect by virtue of being rational beings. Why worthy of respect?  Because to Kant, it is by the use of reason that we assign value in the world, so reason itself must have absolute value and thus be worthy of respect. To Kant, the formulations of his Categorical Imperative have the necessity that law does.

It is such necessity, both in law itself and in ethical principles, according to Kant, that the Clintons repeatedly and conveniently overlooked or dismissed outright, and with impunity. It is significant, therefore, that being in contempt of a Congressional subpoena can carry time in prison. There is a good reason for that, so I submit that the criminal charges should be automatic rather than depend on a majority-vote in the House chamber. Obviating accountability by means of political deals does no favor to the guilty in terms of lessons learned, and no favor to an institution that looks weak if its subpoenas can be ignored with impunity. Impunity for some and jail for the rest is no way to run a republic that is based on the rule of law.

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1. Stephen Groves and Matt Brown, “House Republicans Begin Push to Hold the Clintons in Contempt of Congress Over the Epstein Probe,” APnews.com, January 21, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

On the Role of the European Parliament: The Mercosur Treaty

With the European Council, which represents the E.U. states, having passed the Mercosur free-trade treaty by qualified-majority voting, the legislation went on to the European Parliament, which represents E.U. citizens, to vote on final passage before being sent to E.U. President Von der Leyen for her signature. From the standpoint of this standard legislative procedure, it is significant that immediately following the vote in the Council, which is roughly equivalent to the U.S. Senate, efforts were being made to essentially side-step the Parliament, which is equivalent to the U.S. House of Representatives. Von der Leyen’s plan to sign the treaty once it passed in the Council reflects both the disproportionate power of the state governments at the federal level in the E.U. and the fact that the U.S. House is excluded from voting on treaties, whereas the U.S. Senate votes to give its consent to them before the U.S. president ratifies them (or not).  

On 9 January, 2026, the European Council voted by a super majority representing 65% of the E.U.’s population and 55% of its states to approve the Mercosur free-trade treaty with four countries in South America. President Von der Leyen had completed the negotiations on the treaty two years earlier so E.U. companies could “gain access to a market of 280 million consumers . . . where some 30,000 E.U. firms” were already operating.[1] A massive free-trade area with a combined population of 700 million inhabitants would dwarf NAFTA (the North America Free Trade Agreement). It is no wonder that on the heels of the Council’s vote, President Von der Leyen wrote in an official statement, “I greatly look forward to signing this landmark deal . . .”[2] Not so fast. The approval procedure “also requires the consent of the European Parliament.”[3] In the Parliament, a contingent of the Renew party saw an opportunity to scuttle the proposed treaty because of the fears of European farmers, mostly in the state of France, that free trade in agriculture could harm the E.U.’s farmers financially if enough European consumers buy agricultural products from the Mercosur countries rather than domestically.

Admittedly, getting the consent of the Council by even just by qualified-majority voting had been viewed as the challenge. A contingent of the Renew party could presumably be easily outvoted in the Parliament. Nevertheless, the focus on the Council is in line with the inordinate power wielded by the states at the federal level in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Put another way, being slighted doubtlessly came as no surprise to the representatives in the Parliament. The chamber of the people had typically played second fiddle to the chamber of the states.

Even in the U.S., where the two federal legislative chambers have been viewed as equals since their founding, the U.S. House of Representatives is excluded from the procedure in which treaties proposed by the federal president are sent to the U.S. Senate for advice and to be confirmed (or rejected). If confirmed, the president can either ratify or refuse to do so. Such ratification is required for a treaty to go into effect. The U.S. House of Representatives is excluded.

Resonating with the exclusion of the U.S. House, the E.U. state chairing the Council at the time “used a legal procedure” just after the vote “to enable the provisional implementation of the agreement without a parliamentary vote.”[4] Although the Parliament’s upcoming vote could derail the treaty, the provisional implementation would make it more difficult for representatives to vote against the treaty because it would already be underway. Even if President Von der Leyen would sign the treaty before the Parliament’s vote, the treaty would be rendered invalid, but in setting up a fait accompli, the Commission and the Council were making use of momentum such that voting against the treaty would be more difficult. Furthermore, that the U.S. House is excluded from the legislative consent and ratification of U.S. treaties implicitly implies that maybe the European Parliament, which also represents citizens rather than states, should not be involved in the passage of E.U. treaties with other countries. In federal unions in which governmental sovereignty is divided, regardless of the proportions, the legislative chamber in which the semi-sovereign states are represented can be argued to be more important in international treaties precisely because of the sovereignty still reserved by the states in their political union should have a say, even if by qualified majority voting (in the E.U. Council) or a two-thirds majority (in the U.S. Senate).  Put another way, both of these bars, being higher than a simple majority, reflect the fact that the states in the E.U. and U.S. are semi-sovereign.

In tension with the argument that the E.U. Parliament and the U.S. House should also be included so the respective federal citizens could also have a say, the states might object that a defeat in either of those chambers would nullify what the semi-sovereign state governments have agreed to, and that such sovereignty, together with the limited sovereignty of the respective unions, should not be denied domestically with respect to relations with other countries. The tension here reveals a judgment call, which is of such a magnitude and indeterminacy to be properly determined by popular sovereignty—that which is reserved to the people themselves as an electorate. Moreover, this comparison of the E.U. and U.S. works so well that the equivalency of the two unions, even with the very different proportions of governmental sovereignty delegated by basic law to the federal level, can be easily grasped even by Euroskeptics and anti-federalists.

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1, Peggy Corlin, “E.U. Member States Back Mercosur Deal, French MEPs Vow Fight in Parliament,” Euronews.com, 9 January, 2026.
2, "Statement by President Von der Leyen on the Council's Decision to Endorse the EU-Mercossur Trade Agreement," The European Comission, 8 January, 2026.
3. Peggy Corlin, “E.U. Member States Back Mercosur Deal, French MEPs Vow Fight in Parliament,” Euronews.com, 9 January, 2026.
4. Ibid.

Texas Overreaching

With enough Democratic members of the Texas House of Representatives staying in Illinois and New York as of August 3, 2025 that the legislative chamber could not reach a quorum and thus be able to hold a vote on a Congressional redistricting plan that could gain the Republic Party five more seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, Greg Abbott, who at the time was Texas’ head of state and head of the executive branch, was considering various options to bring the lawmakers back. That only one of those options was legal points to the importance of the rule of law being applied to government officials.

The most egregious option, legally speaking, had been proposed by the Attorney General, Ken Paxton, who wrote, the “cowards should be found, arrested, and brought back to the Capitol immediately.”[1] In other words, police whose jurisdiction is limited to Texas would be able to have the jurisdiction expanded by Abbot. “He has no legal mechanism,” Rep. Jolando Jones, one of the departed Texas lawmakers said; “Subpoenas from Texas don’t work in New York, so he can’t come and get us. Subpoenas in Texas don’t work in [Illinois].”[2] The Texas Supreme Court had ruled in 2021 that leaders of the House of Representatives had the authority to “physically compel the attendance” of missing representatives, but not even a decision by Texas’s Supreme Court can reach into Illinois or New York; only the U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction throughout the bloc.[3] Hyperextending police-power in Texas beyond even the jurisdiction of the Texas Supreme Court would set a bad precedent that could be used even to cover police brutality. That the Attorney General of Texas suggested the blatantly illegal usurping of Illinois’s retained sovereignty by extending that of Texas is itself troubling. In a federal system, it is necessary that everyone colors within the lines.

Abbott was also considering what was only “a nonbinding legal opinion issued by Republican Attorney General Ken Paxton that suggested a court could determine that a legislator had forfeited {one’s] office.”[4] Based only on Paxton’s legal opinion, Abbott said he would “begin trying to remove Democratic lawmakers from office.”[5] Presumably he would make the request to a judge rather than remove the lawmakers by his own authority, which again would be illegal even by Paxton’s reasoning.

The only option backed up by extant law that Abbott was considering is fining the absent lawmakers $500 a day, though even that option was being twisted by Ken Paxton, who was running for the U.S. Senate at the time. He “suggested that lawmakers may have committed felonies by raising money to help pay for fines they could face.”[6] So it was apparently illegal to have someone one pay one’s fine. Be careful in Texas if a friend or relative, or even a charity organization, is willing to pay your traffic ticket; you may be committing a felony, which, by the way, is a type of federal law. Perhaps Paxton was actually positioning himself for, or worse, already saw himself, as the U.S. Attorney General rather than a U.S. senator.

That the options that Greg Abbott, the figure-head and chief executive of the Texas government, was considering tended to push beyond what was legal at the time is itself worthy of noticing, for such power-aggrandizement by a member-state in a federal system can, if it were to spread, doom that system as state governments turn on each other and the U.S. president takes sides, thus undercutting that presiding role.

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1. Joey Cappelletti and Andrew DeMillo, “Texas Governor Threatens to Remove Democrats Who Left State over Trump-backed Redistricting,” The Associated Press, August 4, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. I am using a word that is popular in the E.U. for a federal system in which governmental sovereignty is split between a union and states. In truth rather than ideology, “bloc” applies neither to the E.U. or U.S.
4. Joey Cappelletti and Andrew DeMillo, “Texas Governor Threatens to Remove Democrats Who Left State over Trump-backed Redistricting,” italics added for emphasis.
5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

The E.U.’s Parliament and the U.S.’s House of Representatives in Dialogue

On November 1, 2024, “All Saints Day” in Roman Catholic Christianity, the E.U. announced that a peaceful delegation of the elected representatives of the EU’s Parliament would be travelling to Texas during the following week to “meet American counterparts,” which is to say, a delegation of the elected representatives of the US’s House of Representatives.[1] The key word here is counterparts, for the European Parliament is indeed of the same type of legislative body and at the same level in its federal system as is the American House of Representatives.

Both legislative chambers consist of elected representatives who are elected by E.U. and U.S. citizens. Although the respective states are divided into districts, the representatives do not represent the state governments or the states themselves. Just because the state governments map out the districts does not mean that the elected representatives to the federal chamber represent the states. In fact, every party in the Parliament and the House consists of representatives from more than one state. To insist that political parties exist only on the state level, whereas only blocs or nebulous groups exist at the federal level is ideological nonsense geared to “States’ Rights advocates” in the United States and “Euroskeptics” in the European Union. It is significant that members of the European People’s Party in the E.U. Parliament sit together, and the party has members from various states, who, as stated above, do not represent their respective states, but, rather, the E.U. citizens in federal legislative districts. The same is true in the case of the U.S. House.

So it is fitting that a delegation of the members of the E.U.’s Parliament would meet with members of the U.S.’s House. “The inter-parliamentary meeting is usually an opportunity for lawmakers from both sides of the Atlantic to exchange views of their legislative agenda and priorities.”[2] The parity implied here is correct, and thus obviates any ideological claim that a state in one union is equivalent, or on the same political-system level as the other union. In terms of geography alone, Texas and France, and Montana and Germany, are both cases equivalencies. Similar equivalencies pertain to Arizona and California, and Italy and Spain, respectively. In terms of population, whereas many of the respective states of the two unions are in the tens of millions, both unions are in the hundreds of millions. The two clusters evince the qualitative (i.e., a jump, rather than an incremental change) as well as a quantitative difference between the respective state and federal levels.

The E.U’s delegation was set to be chaired by MEP Brando Benifei of the Socialists & Democrats party and the U.S.’s delegation was to be chaired by Rep. Nathaniel Moran of the Republican Party. That the possibility of a U.S. tariff on goods imported from the E.U. was on the agenda, and the E.U.’s executive branch, the Commission, has exclusive authority, or competency, on commercial law in the E.U. does not mean that only economic issues would be discussed, as if the E.U. were a “trading bloc.” The three pillars, or enumerated powers, of the E.U. extend beyond trade and even economics to include social policy and justice, including human rights, for example. The U.S. delegation could enquire of its counterpart whether the recent electoral fraud in the prospective E.U. state of Georgia (not the U.S. state of Georgia, even given the controversy in 2020!) adds to foreign-agents law in significantly reducing Georgia’s chances of gaining statehood. The E.U. delegation could in turn enquire as the viability of U.S. elections, given the accusations in 2020 from within the United States.

In short, both the E.U. and U.S. have federal systems in which governmental sovereignty is “dual,” which is to say that although the respective states have both stated and residual domains of authority, some of them was delegated to the federal institutions, which in both unions comprise governments rather than only multilateral international organizations. To be sure, an element of the latter has been retained in both unions; specifically in the U.S. Senate and the E.U. Council, both of whose members are polities (i.e., the states) rather than representatives of federal citizens. In fact, the citizens have E.U. and U.S. passports, respectively. In general, that the balance of governmental sovereignty is closer to the states in the E.U. than in the U.S. does not mean that the two unions are not both cases of modern (i.e., dual sovereignty) federalism, as distinct from confederalism, in which all of the sovereignty resides with the state governments. In 1603, Althusius distinguished between plena and non-plena federalism with this in mind even though he modeled his theory of federalism on the Holy Roman Empire. Federalism itself was originally confederal, and fit international alliances because the members differed even in terms of the type of government they had. The U.S., and then the E.U. en suite, mixed national and international elements in what is now called modern federalism to distinguish it from confederalism, which is still evinced in international alliances and organizations such as the United Nations.  To conflate either the E.U. or U.S. with such alliances and organizations is to commit a rather basic category mistake. Whether out of ignorance of ideological fervor, such a mistake prevents the two federal unions from looking at each other to gain insights so as to move towards more perfect unions.

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1. Peggy Corlin, “MEPs Seek First Contact with Trump or Harris Regimes in Texas Next Week,” Euronews.com, November 1, 2024.
2. Ibid.

Differentiating the European Council and Parliament: Meloni of Italy

At the federal level of the E.U., the European Council, like the Senate in the U.S., represents the states, whereas the European Parliament, like the U.S. House of Representatives, represents citizens—that’s right, E.U. citizens. The theory behind this difference is a modification of traditional federalism theory, wherein only the polities in a federation are represented at the federal level. In this traditional way of doing federalism, individuals, or citizens, belong only to the first level of political organization. Althusius’s Political Digest (1603) describes that theory, borrowing a lot from the example of the Holy Roman Empire. The advent of both polities and federal citizens being directly represented at a federal level was born out of compromise during the American Constitutional Convention in 1787. The E.U. replicated the structure, wherein the state governments and E.U. citizens (or legal residents) each have their own channel of access to affect federal law and policy on the federal level. For one of the two to cross over and eclipse the other in its own channel is suboptimal because both vantage points contribute to sound federal law in a way that enables them to protect their respective interests, which are not identical. It is thus not appropriate for a state government, including its governor or head of state, to direct members of Parliament how to vote on a given bill, whether their districts are within or outside of the state.

On July 18, 2024, Giorgia Meloni, the governor of the E.U. state of Italy, “ordered the 24 MEPs,” or members of Parliament of her state-level Fratelli d’Italia, or Brothers of Italy, group “to vote against the re-election of Ursula von der Leyen as president of the European Commission.”[1] I contend that those representatives were instead duty-bound to vote the interests of their respective voters rather than serve as an additional resource for the state government at the federal level, or else to vote along with the rest of the European Conservatives and Reformists Party in the Parliament, rather than as a state group representing the state’s government. This is admittedly a different perspective than that which both American and European media outlets have intentionally or unintentionally absorbed from the Euroskeptic ideology wherein the European Parliament is really even a legislative body and thus does not have its own parties (and interests).

From an American perspective, it would be like the governor of a state ordering representatives of the U.S. House of Representatives to vote a certain way, rather than in line with the wishes or interests of the constituents in the respective districts or the federal-level party recognized by the U.S. House.  The U.S. Senate is where the state governments are to exercise their authority at the federal level even though this line is more direct in the European Council because the heads of the state governments themselves sit in that chamber, rather than separately elected senators. Indeed, Meloni already had her chance to vote against Von der Leyen’s nomination in the European Council—Meloni abstained. For her to order members of Parliament to vote against the nominee essentially doubled Meloni’s, and thus her state government’s, role at the federal level. Not only is this excessive; it also eclipses the voice of the E.U. citizens in the districts of the MEPs who followed Meloni’s order. That is to say, the order upset the balance of inputs—that of the states and the E.U. citizens—feeding into the federal level.

Given the staying power of the principle of unanimity at the federal level as of 2024, the power of the state governments at the federal level was arguably too much anyway for the viability of the E.U.’s functioning at the federal level. Eclipsing the voice of the people by attempting to subordinate their directly elected representatives (even though by party) worsens the imbalance.

In his text, Federal Government, Kenneth Wheare describes a federal system as wheels within a wheel. All of those should be in balance for the system as a whole to function well. I disagree strongly with his claim that a balance of powers between the states and the federal institutions is not necessary. He claims that the state governments need only have one domain of authority that is autonomous of the federal government for the federal system to be viable, but such an imbalance would be tantamount to political consolidation rather than dual-sovereignty, wherein the states are not eclipsed by federal preemption and power. After nearly 250 years, the U.S. federal system was arguably much closer to consolidation than in that union’s first 50 years. After 30 years, the E.U. suffered from the opposite danger: too much state power, and thus a risk of dissolution. Although strong institutional safeguards to prevent eventual consolidation at the expense of viable federalism were advisable in the E.U., given the historical trajectory of the U.S. towards consolidation in an empire in which one size does not fit all, given the different cultures therein, too much of a role for the state governments at the federal level was itself a danger for the E.U. in 2024. The staying power of the principle of unanimity alone threatened to excessively encumber E.U. policy-making and law, and thus fuel Euroskeptic movements toward the dissolution of the union (which is neither a bloc nor an international organization). Furthermore, eclipsing the sacred relationship between the representatives in the Parliament and their respective constituencies, E.U. citizens, worsens the “democracy deficit.” Just as the U.S. House was originally intended as the democratic body at the federal level in the U.S., as U.S. senators were initially chosen by their respective state governments and the president by the Electoral College, the European Parliament can be seen as the sole repository of democracy in the European Union. A look at how the Commission’s president is nominated and elected without E.U. citizens voting on the question and the fact that the European Council represents the state governments rather than their respective peoples directly demonstrate the importance of the Parliament in terms of direct representative democracy at the federal level.

In short, the E.U. state governments should keep their paws off the European Parliament; the European Council and the Council of the E.U. is where state-level officials can affect federal policy and law at the federal level. If anything, the authority of the Parliament should have been strengthened in 2024 relative to the powers of the Commission and especially the European Council (and the Council of the E.U.). At the very least, all of the political groups in the Parliament should have been recognized at the federal level as political parties in themselves rather than as informal groups of state-level parties. In 2024, the drastic imbalance in the federal system in favor of the state governments, whose individual and collective interests are in theory and practice different than that of the E.U. both as a federal system and in terms of federal policy and law, was a major problem that did not need to be worsened by encroachments. From a federal perspective, the governor of the E.U. state of Italy was coloring outside the lines in seeking more influence at the federal level. Objecting to this does not suggest in the least that protections for the state governments against possible federal encroachment, as has happened in the U.S., should be disabled or torn down.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Analysis: Giorgia Meloni’s Façade as a Pragmatic E.U. Leader Has Suddenly Crumbled,” Euronews, July 19, 2024.

E.U. Political Parties

Following the E.U. 2024 election, political parties jostled for members in the Parliament. Whereas the political duopoly of parties in the U.S. House of Representatives severely limits such skipping around, the European analogue puts more of an emphasis on party management in terms of weighing ideological or policy “purity” against the power that comes from size. In contrast, the two major parties in the U.S. must be content to be “big tents,” each of which contains groups. From the standpoint of the parties in the E.U. Parliament, the groups are at the state level. The defection of Andrej Babis and the rest of his group from the Renew Europe party just weeks after the E.U. election in June, 2024 demonstrates the distinct balancing task of the E.U. parties. Such balancing is not something that the American political duopoly of parties need do. I contend that the Americans could benefit by looking at the European case in this regard.

On the one hand, the departure of Babis’s group caused Renew Europe to go from 81 representatives to 74, further weakening its power in the federal legislative body. On the plus side, however, Valérie Hayer, Renew Europe’s head, observed of the departed representatives that “their divergence from our values” had “increased exponentially and we witnessed this with great concern.”[1] For his part, Babis pointed out, “We went to the European elections saying that we would fight against illegal migration, that we wanted to repeal the ban on internal combustion engines and fundamentally change the Green Deal. . . . Above all, we want the Czech Republic to remain a sovereign country.”[2] Although Babis’ claim that the Renew Europe party would not change its party platform on immigration and the Green Deal is correct, he could not very credibly blame the party because the Czech Republic had given up some of its sovereignty in becoming a state in the Union; qualified majority voting alone is part of that transfer, since Babis’ state could be on the losing side of a QMV in the European Council. Nevertheless, the ideological difference between Bibis’s group and the party on immigration and the Green Deal meant that the Renew Europe party would be more ideologically “tight” and thus powerful in that sense with the departure of Babis and his fellow MEPs, and they in turn could find another party closer to their views precisely because the Parliament contained several parties rather than just two. Hayer pointed to the impact on the party’s ideological position in saying that the departed MEPs’ “unwillingness to continue their commitment to liberal values has led to today’s outcome. They have turned their back to our firm pro-European convictions and values.”[3] More to the point, Hayer predicted that the party would be “more united.”[4]  Fewer members in the legislative body but more united: this is the trade-off that any party leadership in the E.U. Parliament had to balance in the post-election phrase of politics. I submit that this is a good thing.

A major benefit of the balancing act is that E.U. citizens going to the polls could more closely tailor their respective votes to their political positions or ideology than can U.S. citizens voting for members of the U.S. House. An American voter angry at the Israeli government, for example, did not have a choice of party opposing the military incursion into Gaza; both the Democratic and Republican parties supported Israel in 2024. In contrast, a European could vote for a party with a plank opposing military support for Israel. The drawback in the European case is in terms of political stability in the Parliament, but as even an increase in representatives in the parties on the right did not fundamentally alter the majority coalition of parties, the inertia of the status quo has considerable weight in maintaining stability even as multiple parties jostle for members while trying to stay true to specific values on the political spectrum. In other words, the fear of political instability from there being many parties in the Parliament is overstated.

Therefore, Americans could be less scared of deviating from the American duopoly of major parties, as if the credible advent of other parties being truly competitive would trigger seismic political instability. A recalibrated “cost-benefit” analysis of having a duopoly of just two major “big tents” could result in reforms in which voters would be better able to tailor their votes to their values and political positions without having to vote for whichever party is closer even if it isn’t really very close and may even have antipodal positions. The political-legal electoral architecture, or basic framework, that favors the duopoly would have to be fundamentally changed, and in a political culture of incrementalism, such a change is only possible but not probable. Even so, it doesn’t hurt to look to the E.U. for ideas. That is to say, the U.S. could learn a thing or two from the E.U.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “E.U. Liberals Dealt a New Blow after Czechia’s Andrej Babis Pulls Out His Seven MEPs,” Euronews, June 21, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Two Sizes Fit All: America’s Two-Party-System Stranglehold

A Rasmussen Reports poll conducted in early August 2011 found that “just 17% of likely U.S. voters think that the federal government . . . has the consent of the governed,” while 69% “believe that the government does not have that consent.”[1] Yet an overwhelming number of Congressional incumbents is reelected. Is it that many Americans stay away from the polls on election day, or does the two-party system essentially force a choice? Voting for a third-party candidate risks the defeat of the candidate of the major party closest to one’s views. Such a vote is typically referred to as a protest or throw-away vote. Is it worth driving to the polls to do that?
A poll of 1,000 Americans conducted by Douglas E. Schoen LLC in April 2011 found that a solid majority of Americans were looking for alternatives to the two-party system. A majority of the respondents (57%) said there is a need for a third party. Nearly one-third of the respondents said that having a third party is very important. In the next month, 52% of respondents in a Gallup poll said there is a need for a third party. For the first time in Gallup’s history, a majority of Republicans said so. These readings point to more than simply a desire to vote against the closest major party without merely being a protest or throw-away vote.
Even as Republican and Democratic candidates were at the time in tune with their respective bases, these two segments of the population were becoming two legs of a three-leg stool, rather than remaining as the two defining pillars holding up the American republics. In fact, with the number of independents growing, the two bases combined no longer made up a majority of the citizens able to vote.
To be sure, the electoral systems of the American states and the federation itself have been rigged against  aspiring third parties. For example, a Green Party presence in the U.S. House of Representatives would require one of that party’s candidates to snag the highest percentage of the vote in one of the 435 legislative districts. Were fifteen percent of Floridians vote for Green Party candidates in every House district, Florida's delegation would still not include any Green Party presence. In terms of the Electoral College, many of the states have a winner-take-all system in selecting electors. Furthermore, a third-party candidate doing well in electoral votes could keep none of the candidates from getting a majority, in which case the U.S. House of Representatives would elect the U.S. President (each state delegation getting one vote). A third party would have to be dominant in that chamber, or at least in a few of the state delegations, to have any impact. The proverbial deck, ladies and gentlemen, is stacked against any third party, so merely getting one started is not apt to eventuate in much of anything, practically speaking. For fundamental reform, one must think (and act) structurally, and Americans are not very good at that, being more issue- and candidate-oriented.

The real elephant in the room is the fact that the two animals are the only ones allowed in the room. Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

If the American political order has indeed been deteriorating and disintegrating, its artificial and self-perpetuating parchment walls might be too rigid to allow the vacuum to be filled by anything less than whatever would naturally fill the power-void in a complete collapse. The two major political parties, jealously guarding their joint structural advantages, have doubtlessly been all too vigilant in buttressing the very walls that keep real reform—real change—from happening at the expense of the vested interests. As a result, the electorate may be convinced that it is not possible to venture outside of the political realities of the two major parties that stultify movement. If a majority of Americans want a third party, they would have to apply popular political pressure to the two major parties themselves to level the playing field. A huge mass of dispersed political energy would be necessary, however, given the tyranny of the status quo. Indeed, such a feat might require going against the natural laws of power in human affairs. If so, the already-hardened arteries will eventually result to the death of the "perpetual union." Sadly, the determinism is utterly contrived rather than set by the fates.

1. Patrick H. Caddell and Douglas E. Schoen, “Expect a Third-Party Candidate in 2012,” Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2011.

Congress: Hitched to the Status Quo

To lead is to be out in front, pointing the jet’s nose one way rather than another. Leadership is not that which causes drag at the back of the plane. Leadership is not that which holds a society in place or protects the vested interests. Whether envisioning something new or a return to a better time, a leader is not oriented to the status quo. It is significant, therefore, that the Minority Leader of the U.S. House of Representatives, one of the two chambers in the American Congress, has stated publicly that the Congress is rigged to advantage the status quo. The stunning implication is that members of Congress are actually anti-leaders.

In an interview in 2013, Nancy Pelosi admitted, “This is an environment that is almost rigged, intentionally or not, wittingly or not, rigged so that the status quo just goes on.”[1] This amazing line can be read as confirmation that the fears of some of the American Founders has come true—namely, that the U.S. House would itself become an aristocratic body rivaling the U.S. Senate. With just 435 representatives for over 310 million people, George Washington’s plea on the last day of the Constitutional Convention that a minimum of 30,000 rather than 20,000 in a district would not be sufficiently democratic sounds trite, even antiquarian. With so few representatives relative to the total population, the U.S. House could not help but be aristocratic, each member being like a magnet to huge “gifts” from vested interests. “We have to kick open the door and make our own environment” in the Congress, Pelosi urged, “reduce the role of money [in campaigns], insist on the civility of debates, and bring more women here, and that’s a better reflection of our country.” In painting this picture for us, the Minority Leader was indeed leading, for she was intrepidly venturing out beyond the status quo. Nevertheless, the thrust of leadership is not always enough to counter the gravity of the vested interests grounded in the status quo.

For example, as long as so few representatives hold such power, the money of the vested interests will inevitably find its way to the campaigns and the Congressional bills will continue to be written by the vested interests themselves. In approaching this problem systemically, more is needed. One possibility is to sift the E.U.’s lower legislative chamber for possible solutions. 

The U.S. House of Representatives (top) and the European Parliament (bottom). 

At the beginning of 2012, European Parliament had a maximum of 751 representatives to cover a population of about 504 million, which works out to an average of 671,105 people in a district. Meanwhile, the U.S. House had 435 representatives to cover a population of about 313 million, which corresponds to an average of 719,540 people in a district. The difference is 48,435 people per district. To get down to 671,105 people per district, the U.S. House would need to add 31 seats. Were the House to have 751 representatives, the average number of people in a district would be 416,777. While more democratic than districts with an average population of 719,540, neither figure comes close to satisfying George Washington’s objection that 30,000 people in a given district is not sufficiently democratic (i.e., too many constituents for a given representative).

Therefore, in addition to increasing the number of seats—with the knowledge that 751 in a chamber can work—further reduction in the centralized power would be needed to reduce the money magnet’s power. One option would be returning more domestic policy areas to the state legislatures. At the time of Pelosi’s statement, the U.S. states had 7,382 state legislators altogether. [2] Spreading around additional powers, taken from the Congress, to so many more representatives would not only make American federalism more democratic, but also open up possibilities for real change beyond the grasp of the status quo. As a few examples even without the additional power, some states had legalized gay marriage, two had legalized pot, and one had achieved universal health-insurance. Admittedly, the status quo has a greater grip in some states (e.g., Kansas) than others (e.g., California). However, spreading out governmental power could perhaps be sufficient to give leadership a chance to outpace the moneyed interests in the status quo.     

1. Laura Bassett, “Nancy Pelosi: Congress Is ‘Rigged’ to Maintain the Status Quo,” The Huffington Post, June 5, 2013.

2. National Conference of State Legislatures, “Sizes of Legislatures,” 2013.

Is the U.S. Congress Too Beholden to the Financial Industry?

That financial deregulation had any traction at all following the financial crisis of 2008 in the U.S. is stunning, for the implication is that Wall Street money has tremendous influence in the U.S. Governent even after Wall Street banks have screwed up (even in triggering a financial crisis!). 

According to Gary Gensler, head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in 2012, Congress stood with the big banks in the struggle to shield Americans from the risks and excesses of Wall Street even after the financial crisis of 2008. He pointed in particular to a proposal from the U.S. House’s Appropriations Committee to cut his agency’s funding by 12 percent.[1] The CFTC had been given expanded powers by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. Doubtless the proposed budget-cut had something to do with that. It is astonishing that such a proposal would come in the wake of a financial crisis caused in large part by Wall Street bankers taking too many risks. That the agency was then tasked with regulating the problematic $700 trillion market on derivatives—a task that dwarfed the agency’s regulatory power over futures—suggests that the decision to cut the agency's budget after the financial crisis was especially agrevious, being based, I submit, in Wall Street's denial over its harmful role in triggering the financial crisis in which subprime-mortgage-based bond derivatives collapsed in value even as banks including Goldman Sachs were trying to unload the "crap" as good values. 

CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler staring down the big banks

That an industry with a vested interest in rolling back financial regulations could have any influence at all over elected representatives reflects the general ignorance or naivity concerning conflicts of interest. In a COI, a private interest predominates even if the good of the whole is being estolled. A bank-rolled member of Congress can used the espoused public-interest rationale advanced by the banking industry as cover to hide the cosy relationship. For example, a bank's public affairs department could put out the word that increased financial regulation, even after a financial crisis, is really socialism. The bank-rolled members of Congress could then use the socialism scare-tactic on their respective constituents while quietly accepting the large campaign-contributions from the banks. Meanwhile, the American people feel secure that such representatives are protecting them from a threat rather than enabling one.

1. Alexader Eichler, “CFTC Head Gary Gensler: Congress ‘Sides With Wall Street’,” The Huffington Post, June 8, 2012. 

For more on the conflicts of interest in the financial sector (and others), see: Skip Worden, Institutional Conflicts of Interest, available at Amazon.

.U.S. Constitutional Checks and Balances Under Threat: Congressional Oversight

Ambition checked by ambition. The assumption that political ambition can be counted on is the key to the “checks and balances” feature of the U.S. Constitution. Each of the three “arms,” or “branches,” of the federal government is checked by at least one other. This is not to say that the other arm takes over the function or even has greater competence; rather, the other arm is oriented here to providing accountability on abuses of power and investigating cases of gross negligence or incompetence. An offended branch should thus not be permitted to claim that oversight is not appropriate because it interferes with the function the branch. Treating oversight by another arm of the federal government as inherently partisan or illegitimate eviscerates the vital “check and balance” aspect of the U.S. Constitution. 

In disputes on oversight between two branches, the benefit of the doubt ought to go with the overseeing branch because it is only natural for human beings to resist being held accountable and so accountability itself needs a boost. I have in mind the case the director of national intelligence, Joe Maguire, blocking the inspector general from sharing an intelligence-whistle-blower’s complaint with Congress in September, 2019.

The contents of the complaint included a phone call between President Trump and another national leader in which Trump made a commitment. Ukraine was relevant. Rep. Adam Schiff, chair of the House Intelligence Committee, had been concerned that Trump’s delay in assistance to Ukraine had been politically motivated. The Democrats had planned to investigate whether Trump’s withholding of military assistance was not to get the Ukrainian government to reduce corruption, but, instead “to coerce the Ukrainian government into pursuing politically motivated investigations” into Joseph Biden, President Obama’s former VP and a contender to run against Trump in 2020 for president.[1]

Providing the U.S. House Intelligence committee with the contents of whistleblower complaint was “generally required by law.”[2] The executive branch insisted that the requirement must involve the funding, administration or operations of an intelligence agency, whereas Democrats maintained that the law did indeed apply. Regardless, Congressional oversight of the executive branch goes beyond particular statutes mandating the providing of whistle-blower complaint information to Congress. Nevertheless, the inspector general, Michael Atkinson, wrote to the committee that the complaint fell within the jurisdiction of the director of national intelligence and “relates to one of the most significant and important of the D.N.I.’s responsibilities to the American people.”[3] Atkinson was conflating a jurisdiction within the executive branch with oversight by another branch of the government. Put another way, oversight does not in itself rid the director of his jurisdiction; rather, oversight investigates the contents within that jurisdiction. Furthermore, that the director of national intelligence has an important job does not mean that it is immune Congressional oversight of the executive arm. I submit that the importance of the job is an argument for a greater need for oversight—not less.

It is as if Atkinson believed that the intelligence agencies were immune from such oversight, and thus from the vital checks-and-balance feature of the U.S. Constitution. For oversight to be viable, the branch of the government being overseen cannot decide whether oversight is allowable. Rather, the branch doing the overseeing can make that assessment and the other branch can contest it in the courts. The judiciary arm would serve as a check against the overseeing arm. In other words, the prerogative in the executive branch of somehow being beyond Congressional oversight stands in the way of the functioning of the checks-and-balances constitutional design. Ambition should not be allowed to bar contending ambition. What employee of a company would claim, “I can’t do my job if there is any supervision of my work!”? What department would claim that it is exempt from oversight from the company’s management because of the nature of the work being performed? Rather than cohere, such a company would eventually break apart.

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1. Julian E. Barnes et al, “Whistle-Blower Complaint Sets Off a Battle Involving Trump,” The New York Times, September 19, 2019.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg: Power beyond Corporate Governance

Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg and Sheryl Sandberg did not attend a committee hearing at Canada’s Parliament on May 28, 2019 in spite of having received summons from Bob Zimmer MP, the committee’s chair. Instead, Facebook sent its director of public policy and its head of public policy for Facebook Canada. “Shame on Mark Zuckerberg and shame on Sheryl Sandberg for not showing up today,” Zimmer said toward the end of the hearing.[1] For sending two representatives rather than themselves, Zuckerberg and Sandberg faced the possibility of being held in contempt. They had testified before the U.S. Congress, so by sending two representatives the two leaders of Facebook may have acted rather dismissively concerning Canada’s federal legislature. At the time, Zuckerberg had virtually unchecked power at Facebook, including over the other stockholders. From his perch, the power may have been going to his head; even after two years of user-privacy scandals, Facebook’s CEO and Chairman of the Board may have determined that summons from legislatures where the company was operating were beneath him. Such a mentality is dangerous for a person with autocratic control of such a large company.

Corporate governance can pale up against a formidable CEO who also chairs the board whose raison d’etre is in part to hold the CEO accountable. Even that such a structural conflict of interest could be allowed persist at a company suggests that its corporate governance system is weak, with too much power going to the management at the expense of the non-management stockholders. In the case of Facebook, Zuckerberg founded it, and on this basis he doubtlessly believed he was justified in being the sole holder of class B stock, each share of which having 10 votes such that he was the majority stockholder. In a show of just how pathetic minority stockholder rights can be, Zuckerberg voted down stockholder proposals “to put checks on Zuckerberg’s ironclad grip on the company he founded.”[2] This took place just two days after Zuckerberg had failed to show up at the Canadian committee hearing.

Zuckerberg was doubtless awash in power, for he had refused a legislature’s summons and could easily control his company’s corporate governance. Lawmakers in Congress and even Facebook insiders were raising concerns not only about whether Zuckerberg had too much power, but also the company itself, given the scandals that had been going on for more than two years. Shareholders argued that Zuckerberg’s holding of the board chairmanship “contributed to Facebook missing, or mishandling, a number of severe controversies.”[3] Stockholders also believed that eliminating the Class B shares (i.e., 10 votes per share) would enable stockholders to limit Zuckerberg’s power and “hold management accountable.”[4] As scandals—even one at the time hinging on Zuckerberg’s refusal to take off a distorted video of Nancy Palosi, the Speaker of the U.S. House—came up, stockholders had no recourse to management, which could safely ignore the complaints even though stockholder value was being affected.

I submit that the business judgment rule accords corporate managements with too much power in corporate governance over non-management stockholders. At the broad policy-level in which boards of large corporations operate, business expertise, while relevant, should not push out the role of non-management stockholders being able to act as a check on a CEO’s power. Fundamentally, even beyond the value of business expertise, ownership of the corporate wealth supersedes its management. As stock options as “firm-aligned” compensation for executives becomes more popular, the role of non-management stockholders becomes more important if accountability, or a check, is to be part of the system of governance. In other words, boards of directors should not be controlled by their respective CEO’s. In the case of Facebook, its breaches of private information and its role in influencing political elections as well as politics suggest that the corporation’s system of governance should include accountability.

In such a case in which a company leaves a huge societal footprint, with a potentially dire downside, and yet the corporate governance is monopolized by one person, it is only natural to look to external accountability in the form of anti-trust enforcement. Sure enough, U.S. House Rep. David Cicilline the chairman of the Antitrust Subcommittee, had called for an antitrust investigation into Facebook, “with a focus on its acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp,” both of which had more than a billion users in May, 2019. Even Facebook’s cofounder, Chris Hughes, “called for Facebook to be broken up and raised concerns about Zuckerberg’s ‘unchecked power.’”[5] Alex Stamos, Facebook’s former chief security officer, said Zuckerberg should “give up” some of his power and hire a new CEO.[6] Awash with power, Zuckerberg could ignore such advice. As for the prospect of being broken up, Zuckerberg could use more of the company’s wealth to make political campaign contributions and help lawmakers in other ways. When the lack of accountability in a company senses no threat from corporate governance and the reach of governments, then the exercise of such power can become virtually unstoppable.

See Taking the Face Off Facebook: Strategic and Ethical Issues, available at Amazon

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[1] Donie O’Sullivan and Paula Newton, “Zuckerberg and Sandberg Ignore Canadian Subpoena, Face Possible Contempt Vote,” CNN.com, May 28, 2019.

[2] Seth Fiegerman, “Facebook Shareholders Pressed for Checks on Mark Zuckerberg’s Power. They failed,” Cnn.com, May 30, 2019.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

Climate Change: An Outsider in Democracies

The U.S. House of Representatives was created in part as an outlet for the immediacy of a people’s passions; other governmental institutions at the federal level provide a check. The term of a House representative is only 2 years, whereas that of a U.S. senator is 6 years and that of the U.S. president is four. So presumably societal  or even global  problems requiring immediate action find pressing representation in the House, whereas the perspectives of U.S. senators and presidents, being limited to six and four years respectively, are not long-term-oriented enough for problems that could blow up in decades. To register in the crowded minds of House representatives, a long-term problem yet in need of immediate attention must trigger the immediate passions of the constituents unless the representatives value principled leadership (i.e., acting in the best interests of the constituents and the country). Yet passions demanding immediate action tend, I submit, to involve anger. Climate change is thus excluded, and the long-term forecasts do little to impress upon a people how urgent rectifying action really is. Even if the scientific reports of current conditions emphasize extant dramatic changes (not to mention future forecasts with disastrous implications for humanity generally and particular regions, immediate passion is not sufficiently stirred for the U.S. House at least to prioritize addressing the problem.

A report published in January, 2019 indicates that the world’s oceans were then already 40% warmer than a U.N. panel had projected in 2014.[1] Although the data was not yet in to be included in the report, 2018 was expected to the warmest on record for ocean temperatures.

Considering that the oceans had been providing “a critical buffer” in having “slowed the effects of climate change [in the atmosphere] by absorbing 93% of the heat trapped by the greenhouse gases” that were from human uses (presumably including the methane released as the permafrost melts), the reported acceleration of ocean warming should have sounded over the lands as a clarion call for immediate action.[2] The most important implication from the report is that the oceans would absorb far less of the extra heat from the atmosphere if the oceans’ temperatures get high enough, which likely would come sooner than projected, the atmosphere would then show more and more of the immediately noticeable increased heat in the atmosphere. Although losing much or all of the “absorption drainage” by virtue of the seas would likely register very starkly into immediate effect as people spend time in the atmosphere—and thus likely trigger immediate governmental action, awareness of the implication before that point is likely too indirect to register on the awareness of constituents.

Even though Thomas Jefferson and John Adams agreed in retirement—long after they had sparred like dogs—they agreed that a viable republic (and we could add climate) requires an educated and virtuous citizenry (as it elects the elected government officials in a representative democracy). So universities in the U.S., unlike the E.U. and Asian countries, require that students wanting to become a lawyer or physician first get a degree in another school of knowledge, such as in the Liberal Arts and Sciences. To be sure, such a broad education admittedly helps in being able to make inferences, such as that when the oceans cut back drastically in what the amount of the extra atmospheric heat they can absorb, the atmosphere will warm up rather quickly. Still this is not enough to result in a “wake-up call,” for the proportion of college-educated adults in a given population has not been high enough. In other words, too many voters are not likely to connect such dots and thus will only be motivated to urge immediate governmental or global action with enforcement powers when the atmosphere has gone into “hyperdrive” in terms of warming that can be dramatically felt. Pain, it seems, like anger, can register as an immediate passion of the people whose representatives in at least short-termed offices will be motivated to act upon.
In a general sense, even designing one governmental institution, such as the U.S. House of Representatives, to give immediate passions influence in government is not enough for problems such as climate change to be treated as priorities. The fault extends ultimately down to human nature—how our brains are hard-wired and socially conditioned—so it may be said that the design at least of the U.S. Government is faulty with respect to human nature. In the U.S., a culture wherein the instant gratification of consumerism and quarterly earnings reports are given undue influence at the expense of self-restraint and a longer-term perspective and motivation, a problem like climate change wherein the immediate baleful effects are mitigated by the oceans falls between the cracks. This, I contend, is a major flaw in that the constitutional design has a gaping hole into which problems that are dramatic primarily in the future fall. Both in business and government, systemic design should be redesigned to give due emphasis—and even more so as to counter both the short-term-oriented American culture and human nature—to problems whose immediate effects mask the disaster coming in the future. It is as if an earthquake were reported and yet officials in cities on a coast would not recognize the obvious implication that a tsunami could come so an alarm should sound immediately rather than when the gigantic waves could be seen.  

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1 Lijing Cheng et al, “How Fast Are the Oceans Warming?” Science 363 (no. 6423), January 11, 2019.

2. Kendra Pierre-Louis, “Ocean Warming Is Accelerating Faster Than Thought, New Research Finds,” The New York Times, January 10, 2019.