The European Parliament: Rejecting the Council’s Proposed Budget

On 16 June, 2026, the European Parliament rejected the European Council’s proposed budget for the E.U. not only because of the proposal’s €32.8 billion budget-cut, which would reduce the six-year 2028-2034 federal budget even below that which the Commission had proposed, but also because the Council had refused to address the issue of federal-sources of revenue, which was made increasingly salient by the increasing need of funds at the federal level. In seeking to keep the federal institutions dependent on money supplied by the states, the Council, which like the U.S. Senate represents states, can be viewed exploiting a conflict of interest at the expense of the ability of the E.U. to operate even within its given mandates. Put another way, the requirement that the Parliament pass any proposed budget can be viewed as a check on the state-centric Council’s proclivity to put the interest of the parts above the whole—the individual states above the Union.

Although the proposed federal budget by the Council represented a political compromise between states that wanted “substantial cuts” and other states that “asked for an increase of the budget for agriculture and regional funds,” enough of the Parliament’s representatives elected by E.U. citizens, rather than appointed by state governments, deemed the Council’s proposal as insufficient.[1] Those representatives were oriented to adequately funding extant federal programs rather than doing the bidding even of their own states. This translates into an orientation to the common good that is implied in collection action (i.e., the whole) rather than to the interests of parts. Because the €2 trillion proposal by the Commission had already been rejected as insufficient by the Parliament, the Council’s even lower figure can be interpreted as perplexing unless the states were making a statement that any federal branch is apt to overstate the E.U.’s funding needs so the Parliament’s rejection of the Commission’s proposal could and should be ignored.

Consistent with the alleged proclivity of federal governmental institutions to over-state the E.U.’s needed funding was the refusal of the Council “to touch the issue of the budgetary correction mechanisms known as rebates, revenues coming from taxes at the E.U. level, known as own resources, and the principle of making the budget conditional on the rule of law.”[2] Refusing to increase the E.U.’s own access to revenue independent of funds contributed (and thus controlled by) the state governments was essentially a decision to maintain power over the federal institutions and thus render the Union subservient to the states. At the time, MEP Carla Tavares told the press, “We need to make progress on own resources. . . . It is difficult to achieve a strong and renewed budget with cuts and without new own resources.”[3] In other words, the common good as funded federally would be diminished by the refusal of the state-centric Council to even consider new sources of own resources at the federal level. The distinctly state-level interest in maintaining (inordinate) power in the federal system was operating at the expense of the whole. The self-interested decision of the states in the Council to refuse to make budget-outlays conditional on rule-of-law being upheld in a given state also evinces an institutional (or structural) conflict of interest because using the budget so state governments do not disassemble rule-of-law provisions is in the interest of the whole (i.e., the European Union). One state government being able to backslide could easily domino across state-lines, and as all of the delegates at the U.S. federal Convention thought in 1787, allowing dictators at the state level would be incompatible with a democratic Union. So, the refusal of the Council to address the matter of conditionality can be viewed as putting the Union at risk. Fortunately, the members of Parliament were foremost oriented to the good of the Union rather than to protecting state prerogatives even at the expense of the Union.

One of the benefits of federalism is that the federal and state levels can act as checks on each other so as to preserve liberty against the threat of tyranny. The Parliament’s role in being a check on the use of the Council by the state governments to put the interests of the state government officials and their respective governments above the interests of the whole is thus vital in safeguarding the E.U.’s federal system and thus the E.U. itself. Moreover, putting the interests of parts above the whole of which they are parts is never a good idea, for the interests of a whole are not identical to the aggregate of the interests of the parts; the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

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1. Eleonora Vasques, “EU Parliament Rejects Member States’ First Draft of Long-Term Budget,” Euronews.com, 16 June, 2026.
2. Ibid, italics added for emphasis.
3. Ibid.

The E.U.: A Political Union

Strong’s The Antifederalist is a series of essays critical of the American federal system in which governmental sovereignty is “dual,” meaning that both the Union and the member-states have at least some such sovereignty that the other cannot abolish or override. Had more credence been paid to the arguments in that text, perhaps the state governments would have more power at the federal level to protect their retained sovereignty from federal encroachment. The drafting of the E.U. paid more heed to those arguments in terms of safeguarding state sovereignty by considerable direct involvement of state officials at the federal level. Even so, Euroskeptics have warned of a centralized state in the process, and the U.S. has furnished them with an actual instance of a nearly consolidated empire-scale federal system. The warnings may thus be valid even with the additional safeguards that the E.U. has but the U.S. lacks, at least as of 2026, but claims that the E.U. does not have a federal system and is not a political union of states ring hollow as they are utterly false. So too, but the way, is the mislabeling of the E.U. as a bloc. The E.U.’s parliament alone knocks out all three of these ideological claims.

E.U. citizens elect representatives to the parliament, just as U.S. citizens elect representatives to the U.S. House of Representatives. This itself is inherently political, rather than merely economic, in nature.The resolutions and laws passed by the parliament are also not limited to economic measures. As a case in point, the parliament’s resolutions against the government of Azerbaijan furnish us with a case in point.

By May 1, 2026, the E.U.’s parliament had adopted 14 resolutions critical of Azerbaijan. The latest of those “called for the right of return of Armenians who [had] fled the region in 2023 after an armed conflict [had broken] out over a disputed region. [The resolution] described the detention of Armenian prisoners of war by Azerbaijan as ‘unjust’ and urged their ‘immediate and unconditional release.’”[1] Both the detention and the parliament’s reaction to it are inherently political, rather than concerning trade. Put another way, that which is decried as unjust in the resolution is political; it is not as if the parliament’s resolution opposed an unjust trading agreement between the E.U. and Azerbaijan.

The E.U.’s parliament was even viewed by the government of Azerbaijan as a political (legislative) chamber rather than as a trading organization befitting a bloc. “Hikmet Hajiyev, assistant to the President of Azerbaijan and head of the Foreign Policy Affairs Department of the Presidential Administration, called the European Parliament resolution as ‘a diplomatic disgrace and diplomatic failure,’ and accused members of the parliament of ‘creating obstacles to a peace process.”[2] Besides the fact that peace is a political rather than an economic concept, that the European Parliament was viewed as having engaged in diplomacy, albeit allegedly very badly according to Hajiyev, implies the more fundamental or basic understanding that the parliament is a political body. Diplomacy is that which governments conduct on political matters in international relations.

Therefore, the European Parliament has been viewed by government officials of other countries as a political body engaging in political acts, rather than as a bloc or international organization oriented to trade. As for how that chamber views itself, Roberta Metsola, who is the “Speaker” (translated into American terms for easy comparison) or elected head of the European Parliament, pushed back against the charge that the representatives in that legislative chamber had been obsessing on Azerbaijan by making explicit the political nature of the parliament. Heading to the chamber’s floor to make an impromptu statement, Metsola insisted, “We will never change the way we work, even if it is uncomfortable,” meaning not convenient for people in other countries.[3] Of utmost importance in terms of the parliament’s very legitimacy politically, she had first said: “The European Parliament is a directly elected democratic body, with resolutions adopted by a majority.”[4] The assertion that the E.U. is indeed a political union is satisfied by this statement alone, for that which Metsola described is inherently political.

Furthermore, that the body’s representatives are directly elected, rather than appointed by state governments, means that the E.U.’s federal level is not merely a collection or bloc of states. Just as E.U. law has direct effect on E.U. citizens (and other residents and even tourists), so too do E.U. citizens have political access via elected representatives at the federal level, rather than just through state officials in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Also, through those elected representatives, E.U. citizens can kick out an existing administration at the Commission without the say of state officials.

In short, whereas the European Council and the Council of Ministers, like the U.S. Senate, are founded on international principles, the European Parliament, like the U.S. House of Representatives, is national and thus governmental, in its constitutive principles. This hybrid federal system, differing as it does from a confederation of sovereign states, was invented by political compromise in 1787 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and is detailed in James Madison’s Notes.

To be sure, Euroskeptics would surely bolt from these arguments in utter fury, but I contend that the promulgated axis of political comparison is valid even if it is seldom uncovered and made explicit. The distending nature of ideology finds it easy to engage in denial, especially in the domains of politics and religion. Indeed, the E.U. itself is firmly within the political domain, and on this point Hajiyev and Metsola are in agreement, for it is the very premise on which the statements of both officials are based. San Francisco doesn’t matter.

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1. Vincenzo Genovese, “Roberta Metsola Clashes with Azerbaijan’s Ailyev at European Summit in Armenia,” Euronews.com, 4 May, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Hungary Blocks €90 billion E.U. Loan for Ukraine: Holding the E.U. Hostage

It is one thing for a dog’s tail to lead; even worse is the situation in which the tail refuses to let the dog walk or run. The staying power of the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. enables any one of the state governments to block federal policy and law. Such a blockage makes the tyranny of a minority look tame. In contrast, qualified-majority voting ensures that enough of a majority—a “super-majority”—is in place that the resulting minority should lose. The notion that every state government must be “on board” for the E.U. to enact a policy or law is misplaced because governmental sovereignty in that Union is “dual” because both the E.U.’s federal level and the state governments have at least some sovereignty. The same is true of American federalism. Neither the E.U. nor the U.S. is a confederation of sovereign states; only in such a federation does the principle of unanimity fit.

Facing an uphill electoral contest in two months, Hungary’s sitting prime minister, Viktor Orbán, had one of his ministers, Peter Szijártó, announce on 20 February, 2026, “We are blocking the €90 billion EU loan for Ukraine until oil transit to Hungary via the Druzhba pipeline resumes.”[1] This is an obvious example of a part putting its own interest ahead of the whole, which includes not only the E.U. but also the entire world-order, given Russia’s non-provoked aggression in Ukraine for years with impunity. Regarding the E.U., the implication that a federal program should be in the particular interests of each state in order to go forward reduces the E.U. to a mere aggregation in which every part must be satisfied and thus federal action is severely constrained even at the expense of the E.U. itself, meaning the collective interest that goes beyond the aggregate of the particular interests of the states.

Besides the systemic problem in allowing each of 27 states to block federal action and even statements, Hungary’s use of its veto to block the loan demonstrates that the governor of an E.U. state is perfectly capable of wielding the veto power immaturely and irrationally. Szijjártó claimed “Ukraine is blackmailing Hungary by halting oil transit in coordination with Brussels and the Hungarian opposition to create supply disruptions in Hungary and push fuel prices higher before the elections.”[2] In other words, the E.U. state was blaming Ukraine. The problem with that narrative is that the “Druzhba pipeline, which dates back to the Soviet Union, was damaged after it was hit by a Russian strike and that has impacted transit.”[3] That the strike had been unprovoked and Ukraine was in the midst of massive power outages due to other Russian strikes seem not to have registered in Budapest. Ukraine was “in the midst of a difficult winter, with gruelling temperatures below zero. Russia’s constant pounding with missiles and drones means a large part of [Ukraine’s] energy infrastructure has been destroyed and cannot cope with the heating needs of civilians.”[4] Was Ukraine to drop everything to fix the pipeline that Russia had damaged? Rather than make this claim, the governor of Hungary could have weened his state off Russian oil. The rationale for the veto is thus dubious at best, and this in turn raises the question of whether the governors of the E.U. states are capable of having a veto at the federal level, especially as one of the rationales for the E.U. is to forestall war from breaking out between states or between a state and a foreign country. This rationale is but one of ways in which the interests of the whole—the European Union—are not mere aggregates of the particular interests of the states, for none of the states has a mandate to look out for peace throughout the E.U.

That Hungary even has a veto over the loan is a stretch because the E.U. states of Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic had successfully been granted federal exemptions from contributing financially to the €90 billion loan. It was “subject to unanimity” nonetheless “because it amends the E.U. budget rules to allow borrowing” for a foreign country.[5] That the E.U. allowed exempted states to vote nonetheless is, I submit, yet another indication that the E.U. was still too wedded to the principle of unanimity and the states were too unwilling to give up that power. That Hungary’s use of that power in this instance was so wrong-headed, for Russia rather than Ukraine was responsible for the non-functioning pipeline, adds urgency to the point that the E.U. should finally confront the question of whether to reform itself by expunging the confederation-fitting principle of unanimity.

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1. Maria Tadeo and Jorge Liboreiro, “Hungary Blocks €90 Billion Loan for Ukraine over Damaged Pipeline as Tensions Escalate,” Euronews.com, 20 February, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

Is the E.U. in the U.S.'s Strategic Interest?

Is a more perfect Union in Europe in America’s national interest? On the American holiday in 2026 that principally honors George Washington, whose eight-year commitment as the military commander-in-chief to the cause of freedom for the 13 new sovereign republics that had been members of the British Empire (and would forge a comparable political Union[1]) was decisive, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited the E.U. state of Hungary to deliver “a message of support from the Trump administration to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán,” who was behind in the polls in his re-election campaign.[2] At their press conference, Orbán and Rubio “signed an agreement on energy cooperation and hailed what they described as a ‘golden age’ of bilateral relations.”[3] E.U. officials were nowhere in sight; it was as if Hungary were still a sovereign state rather than a semi-sovereign E.U. state. An implicit question untreated by the media in the E.U. or U.S. is whether bilateral relations between the U.S. and individual E.U. states, as if the E.U. were nonexistent, was still in the U.S. national interest, especially in the context of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

The full essay is at "Is the E.U. in the U.S.'s Strategic Interest?"

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1. Skip Worden, British Colonies Forge an American Empire: A Basis for Trans-Atlantic Comparisons (Seattle: Amazon Books, 2017).
2. Sandor Zsiros, “’We Want You to Continue’: Rubio Delivers Trump’s Campaign Message to Orbán in Budapest,” Euronews.com, 16 February, 2026.
3. Ibid.

On the E.U.’s Complex Federal System

Because the “the EU is built on consensus at 27” states,[1] by 2026 it had become painfully obvious to Europe’s elite that its Union had come to harbor a great disadvantage in terms of united or collective action because political consensus can be elusive even at 27 states, each of which could result to a veto on reforms at the federal level, with enlargement of the Union from 27 on the horizon. Something had to be done, given the intransigence of the principle of unanimity in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Direct access of the state governments at the federal level could stave off too much federal encroachment on the prerogatives of the state governments, but the costs associated with this safeguard were becoming too high. Therefore, in February, 2026, E.U. state and federal officials met to give added weight to something called “two-track Europe.” In actuality, there were already more than two tracks in the European Union. Although complex, the means of releasing the Union from the high bar needed to achieve unanimity or even consensus among the several states could well save the Union from the paralysis of division. The outdated premise that united action should only be allowed when there is no division had become too utopian for federal Europe. Multiple-speed Europe in the E.U. is actually more in line with the E.U.’s federal system already being genuine.

In February, 2026, “frustrations about the pace of [economic] reforms prompted” more interest in groups of states moving forward with respect to federal legislation that would be binding only on those states.[2] Mario Draghi, a former head of the European Central Bank, “recommended exploring the use of enhanced cooperation to ‘move faster’ in high-priority areas such as the Savings and Investment Union, the single market and energy prices.”[3] Already, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), patent and divorce law, the Schengen Area and even the euro itself constituted examples of federal law binding on some states but not on others. The term, “enhanced cooperation” is misleading, for it omits the important point that the states falling under a federal law are obliged to abide by it. This point is an important one, especially in the case of the Schengen Agreement. The E.U. already had a genuine federal system, meaning that dual sovereignty was already the case.

Undergirding the creative approach to federalism—more creative than the unitary approach of the U.S.—were informal blocs of E.U. states, “such as the ‘Frugal Four’ and the ‘Friends of Cohesion,’” the Weimar Triangle, the MED9, the Visegrad group, and the Nordic-Baltic Eight.[4] Perhaps the easiest comparison to the U.S. is the bloc of Great Lake states that must all sign off on fresh-water being taken by other states from the Great Lakes. Given the climatic and cultural differences that exist between the American states, more such blocs would not be a bad idea. The key would be that relevant federal law would only apply to the states in a given bloc. The binding nature of the respective law renders both the E.U. and U.S. as something more than blocs, of course. Creative arrangements within a genuine federal system does not stop the system from being federal; rather, such arrangements fit well with the fact that federal systems are tailor-made precisely for cases in which interstate differences are significant. Rather than containing “multiple speeds,” as if every bloc should eventually converge at the most integrated one within the Union, complexity better denotes the E.U.’s way out of the prison of unanimity. Cases in which a federal system makes most sense are hardly those in which one size fits all, so the American doctrine that a federal law must apply to every state is actually inferior.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Leaders Embrace Two-Speed Europe to Break Impasse as Macron Sets June Deadline for Economic Reset,” Euronews.com, February 12, 2026.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

Bulgaria: From the Lion to the Euro

Just weeks after the government of the E.U. state of Bulgaria resigned amid protests against the rampant corruption, the state traded in its currency, the levs, which means lion, for the federal currency, the euro. In the new year, 2026, Bulgaria stood to relieve holders of the state’s debt and to tame the endemic inflation that has plagued the state’s economy. In November, 2025, for example, food prices had risen by 5% year-on-year, “more than double the eurozone average.”[1] The term “eurozone” is actually problematic, as it, like the application of the jargon, “bloc,” to the E.U. itself is meant to obfuscate readers regarding the genre of the political, federal union. To claim that Bulgaria joined a currency zone is inferior stating that the state adopted the federal currency. Stated properly, the currencies in the E.U. can be compared with those that were in the early U.S., and all of those combinations of state and federal currencies can be held to be compatible with federalism.

When the U.S. “bloc” began in 1776, the members were sovereign countries and therefore they had their own currencies. The federal dollar commenced in 1785. The member-states had their own currencies until 1788, so those currencies were concurrent with the federal dollar for three years. The E.U.’s model has been that state governments can choose whether to retain their own currency or adopt the euro, so no state can have both its own currency and the euro as legal tender at the same time. The E.U. and U.S. provide us with various combinations regarding currencies in a federal system, none of those combinations being at variance with federalism itself. In fact, the salient feature of dual-sovereignty that characterizes early-modern federalism—which is distinct from confederalism, wherein the states hold all rather than just some of governmental sovereignty—is arguably most consistent with two currencies being legal tender. This is not to say that the U.S. got this right for three years when both state and federal currencies were legal tender in their respective jurisdictions. The American “bloc” was a confederation until 1989, after which the federal governmental institutions and the states both had at least some portion of the governmental sovereignty in the system. When dual-sovereignty came into effect, only the federal currency was legal tender throughout the union.

Of course, like the U.S. in its first several decades, the E.U. in 2025 still suffered from being dominated by its states at the expense of collective action at the federal level. Because one of the chief benefits of a federal system of dual sovereignty is that the states can operate as a check against excessive federal encroachment and the federal institutions can operate as a check against excesses, such as corruption and anti-democratic tyranny, in state governments. The latter check has been severely hampered in the E.U. because the state governments dominate even at the federal level. The adoption of the federal currency by Bulgaria can be viewed as a step in the direction of achieving federal-state balance of power because, as Christine Legarde, president of the E.U.’s central bank, said at the time, the euro is a “powerful symbol” of “shared values and collective strength.”[2] Such strength has been the big loser as the heads of the state governments have resisted, as per their political self-interest, proposing and voting for additional transfers of governmental sovereignty to the federal governmental institutions (i.e., government) in the executive and legislative branches.

So perhaps it can be said that dual currencies fits best with dual sovereignty, at least theoretically, but that this presupposes a balance of power between the state and federal governmental institutions. In the case of a “bottom-heavy” federal system, such as the U.S. was through the nineteenth century, and as the E.U. has been through at least its first three decades, as many states as possible should replace their respective currencies with the euro. Admittedly, even if the 27 rather than just 21 E.U. states would adopt the euro, this would not in itself mean that the E.U.’s hand would be strengthened in defense and foreign policy to push Russia back from Ukraine and Israel out of Gaza and the West Bank. Given the tremendous imbalance of power, however, such that the E.U. has had trouble in asserting collective action for the benefit of the whole union rather than just a few states, a powerful symbol of collective strength could help to dispel the allure of the anti-federalist, or Euroskeptic, ideology.

That intangible benefit is irreducibly political, and as such, it can be easily dismissed by E.U. citizens who are in denial regarding the distinctively political genre of their union. For such people, the adoption of the federal currency by more states is viewed primarily as potentially strengthening weak state economies and bad monetary policies. This applies especially to the adoption by small, corrupt states—Bulgaria being roughly equivalent to Maryland in population in 2025. After being turned out of office by mass protests against the systemic governmental corruption, the state government of Bulgaria certainly could not be relied upon to resist the temptation to inflate its currency given the public debt there. Generally speaking, corrupt people lack the self-discipline necessary to govern anything. The E.U.’s central bank was much more reliable, especially with Lagarde having been at the helm for many years, than the government of the E.U. state of Bulgaria. As salient as this benefit is in the state’s adoption of the euro, the impact, although subtle and largely symbolic, on European political integration, already under way, is worthy enough not to be relegated or ignored outright. The power of symbol can be louder in the long run that a lion’s roar. After all, as Leo well knows, the lion comes only late in the summer, when the heat of those dog-days can be unbearable. 

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1. Aleksandar Brezar, “Bulgaria Switches to the Euro Amid Mixed Reactions from Its Citizens,” Euronews.com, 1 January, 2026.
2. Ibid.

On the E.U.’s “Pragmatic” Federalism

It is ironic that even though European political theorists, including Immanuel Kant, Johannes Althusius, and Kenneth Wheare, made substantial contributions on the topic of federalism, even political leaders in the E.U. as late as 2025 were stumbling over the basics, getting the very concept wrong. Unfortunately, that has caused journalists to trip and fall too, leaving E.U. citizens grappling over the apparent problem of being citizens both of their state and the E.U. even though, according to former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi spoke in 2025 in favor of “’pragmatic federalism’ as the political conditions for a true, federal union do not exist in the E.U. at the moment.”[1] The claims that “pragmatic federalism” is somehow not indicative of “true” federalism, and, moreover, that somehow the E.U. has states that are semi-sovereign (as the E.U. itself has exclusive competences) and yet federalism does not apply are patently absurd. Draghi was confusing the politics of the moment, in which the anti-federalist, Euroskeptic ideology was still too powerful for more governmental sovereignty to be moved to the federal level from the states, with whether the E.U. had a federal system already. In other words, “political conditions” are distinct from whether the E.U. has a federal system of public governance. Draghi’s assertion is all the more astounding not only because of his governmental experience at the federal level, but also because the dual-sovereignty (of the states and the Union) means that the E.U. fits within the category of modern federalism rather than confederalism (using Wheare’s terminology). Europeans have quite understandably been confused in trying to classify the E.U. away from the pull of the anti-federalist ideology in Europe.

That ideology has been a major impediment to the E.U. being able to govern. Although qualified-majority voting applies to some of the E.U.’s enumerated powers, or competencies, enough of the important matters of policy and law have been requiring unanimity in the European Council and the Council of Ministers that the veto-power of each of the 27 state governments has “thrown a wrench” in the governmental machinery at the federal level, especially in foreign policy and defense. Whereas the U.S. at first federalized those areas, the E.U.’s initial emphasis was on economic policy and law, so drifting over to include the more traditionally-federalized domains has been stymied by recalcitrant governors threatening to wield their respective vetoes in the Council even in the face of an overwhelming consensus.

For example, between 2011 and 2025, “Hungary vetoed E.U. proposals more than any other member state . . ., with a total of 19.”[2] A “total of 46 vetoes,” moreover, were “exercised in the E.U. by 15 member states across 38 issues.”[3] Poland ranked second with seven vetoes. “Hungary has vetoed a significant number of joint foreign policy statements, but it has also blocked proposals to lend concrete support to Ukraine and start formal E.U. accession talks,” which are necessary for Ukraine to become the 28^th state in the Union.[4] It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Commission, the E.U.’s executive branch, was by the end of 2025 “deliberately structuring its proposals [for legislation and foreign policies] in order to avoid requiring unanimous consent” from the states in the councils, which, after all, represent the states whereas the European Parliament represents E.U. citizens.[5] With such governmental machinery, plus the E.U.’s supreme court, the European Court of Justice, residing at the Union level, the claim that the E.U. is not a true federal union of states is utterly untenable. “Pragmatic” federalism, which is actually a governmental tool in the E.U.’s basic law, does not nullify the E.U.’s federal system, rendering the E.U. as a “multi-speed bloc.” That label actually signifies decadent jargon rather than any kind of governmental system that is capable of enacting federal laws that are binding on the states and anyone on the E.U.’s territory.

Pragmatic federalism is simply a tactic that the Commission can use to bypass the requirement of unanimity in the Councils, which, like the U.S. Senate, represent the states. The tactic was used, for example, to pass federal legislation to phase-out “Russian fuels under the REPowerEU framework” and to “extend the freeze on the Russian assets.”[6] So too, in passing legislation enabling the E.U. to issue debt to support Ukraine militarily, the European Council “bypassed the need for unanimity among member states” by “gathering those [state governors] who wanted to work together while keeping Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic out of the deal as a condition for it to go forward. In doing so, the E.U. . . . showed a new path forward—one where the unanimity requirement need no longer obstruct” the passage of legislation at the federal level.[7] States could be exempted, such as had been done in the Schengen Agreement and the Stability Pact. The exemption of particular states from a federal program, policy, law, or regulation does not invalidate the federal system; rather, the tool merely renders the federal system more flexible. In fact, the U.S. could benefit by adopting the mechanism, especially because so much power has accrued especially since 1865 at the federal level at the expense of state differences. Exempting certain states from a given proposal would not nullify America’s federal system.

Beyond “pragmatic” federalism in the E.U., the question of rendering the state-veto obsolete was being seriously considered by the end of 2025. With 27 states in the E.U. and Russia invading Ukraine just east of the E.U.’s territory, the E.U. could ill-afford the continuance of the veto, especially in the domains of foreign policy and defense. That unanimity would be required to amend the E.U.’s basic law to rid the union of the state-veto is itself a problem, but it could be solved by any states objecting to such a change being exempted from any “enhanced cooperation” that would be switched from unanimity to qualified-majority voting. In short, the precedents of the Schengen Agreement and the European Stability Pact, which are not incompatible with federalism, could be followed. In terms of such competencies of the E.U. that would be added to those that are already subject to qualified-majority voting, states like Hungary and Slovakia could be exempted. This is not to say that there would be a union, such as the “EU-26,” within the union, or a foreign policy union, a defense union, and so on. Such jargon, as well as the euphemistic-sounding “enhanced cooperation” and, even worse, “multi-speed bloc,” only obscures the point that in a federal system, states can be exempted from particular federal legislation (and policies) without the federal system itself being nullified. Also, to refer to exempting certain states as allowing for “voluntary co-operation” in “coalitions of the willing” is also misleading because there is nothing voluntary about being subject to qualified-majority voting on an E.U. competency manifesting as law. Reducing the E.U. to voluntary cooperation and coalitions of the willing undermines the European Union itself by detracting from what strength it does have as a “true federal union.” The extent of vacuous, ideological jargon outdoes even that of the American retail sector, in which customers are called “guests” and even “members,” customer orders are considered “perfect,” and one of the official public holidays is singled out intentionally to be (ideologically) obscured passive-aggressively as “happy holidays.” But I digress.

To be sure, within the E.U., the state-veto has been seen by some people as “the last resort to protect” state rights.[8] Tamás Lattmann, an international-law expert, said, “A veto power is the last line of defence of vital interests. Every case of circumvention has led to a set of new problems, often the inoperability or discrediting of the system itself.”[9] However, that states could be exempted means that their vital interests would not be threatened. Also, exempting states would not discredit the E.U.’s federal system. In fact, the U.S. federal system could arguably benefit by being more flexible, as so much governmental power has been federalized and “one size does not fit all” in an empire-scale federal union, whether in North America or Europe.

The argument that the state-veto “serves as an equalizer between smaller and larger member states” has also been made, especially because the European Parliament has representation by population.[10] During its debt crisis, for example, the state of Greece could have made the case that E.U. policy reflected the interests of German creditors to the extent that even the anti-austerity party was pressured to accept continued austerity. Furthermore, the smaller eastern states could legitimately argue that the large states in the west have disproportionate (even in terms of the population part of qualified majority voting) informal as well as formal power. The problem is in relying on a mechanism, the state veto, that has been such a detriment to the enactment of federal policy and law.  In the U.S. Senate, which was established principally to safeguard the interests of the small member states, the filibuster, which can be overridden by 60 votes (out of 100), is typically viewed as sufficient for the minority on any given question. To be sure, a minority is not the same as one state. In E.U. competencies subject to qualified majority voting, a single state, whether large or small, could vote no and yet be subject to a federal policy or law. The case of tariffs on Chinese imports was a case in point in 2025. If the filibuster mechanism is sufficient protection for small states in a legislative chamber in which each state has the same number of votes, then the number-of-states set at 65% in qualified majority voting could be deemed sufficient. Generally speaking, a majority of 65 percent has more democratic legitimacy than does a simple majority—a point that Americans might want to consider.

In conclusion, the Commission and Council could hardly be blamed for trying to obviate the state-veto without subjecting objecting states, for their vital interests are untouched because they are exempted. With enlargement of the Union being an issue, as well as the need for federalized defense and foreign policies given the military aggression of Russia and even Israel, the Union could no longer afford the veto-mechanism itself even by 2023. The mechanism actually pertains to confederalism, in which governmental sovereignty is retained by the states, rather than to modern federalism, in which the atom of governmental sovereignty is split, though not necessarily evenly, in a federal system between the states and the federal level. That the E.U., even initially in 1993, has the salient feature of dual sovereignty means that that union has never been a mere confederal system; the E.U. is thus well-within being a “true federal union.” Even though it has been in the interest of E.U. officials to appease Euroskeptics so to as to render them more docile, ideological denial has cost the European project severely, and the state-veto has played a major role in the self-inflicted federal impotency.

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1. Sandor Zsiros, “The EU Wants to End the Era of National Vetoes—But It’s Complicated,” Euronews.com, 23 December, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

Immobilizing E.U. Holdings of Russian Assets

By invoking Article 122 of the E.U.’s basic law, a clause that had been used most significantly during the Coronavirus pandemic and in the 2022 energy crisis, the E.U. in December, 2025 finally circumvented the twice-threatened veto by the state of Hungary and indefinitely froze €210 billion of assets of the Russian Central Bank that had been within the E.U.’s territory since Russia began its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine nearly four years earlier. I contend that the European Court of Justice, the E.U.’s supreme court, could apply a rational basis in a judicial review of the triggering of the emergency-conditioned article, especially because the Commission invoked the article in order to obviate Hungary’s threatened veto. Because every E.U. state except for Belgium and Hungary were for freezing the assets until Russia such time as Russia ends its militaristic aggression and compensates Ukraine financially for damages the Belgian and Hungarian state governments were violating the informal norm of consensus in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Like the U.S. Senate, the European Council, which also represents the states, is like a club of sorts. The problem facing the Commission is that violating a norm is not a legal basis for obviating a threatened state-veto by invoking an emergency clause of the E.U.’s basic law, especially if no emergency actually exists after nearly four years of the invasion. Even though I am personally in favor of the E.U. obviating Hungary’s serial obstructionism that may be, at least in part, retaliation against President Von der Leyen’s Commission for having penalized the Hungarian government financially for having violated E.U. law, legal reasoning should not succumb to the gravity of the “black hole” of personal opinion.  There may be nothing so much like a god as a general on a battlefield, with power over life and death, but neither the European Commission nor myself is a general. In short, the Commission’s legal justification in invoking Article 122 is tenuous at best, even though countering Hungary’s Viktor Orbán’s abuse of his state’s veto-power in the European Council and the Council of Ministers was needed for the E.U. to be able to function within its enumerated competencies (i.e., powers).

The reason for indefinitely holding the Russian central bank’s financial assets that have been in the E.U. since the beginning of the invasion is so the E.U. could use those assets as a basis for making loans to Ukraine to bolster the sovereign state’s military position without the E.U. having to issue its own debt. “We are sending a strong signal to Russia that as long as this brutal war of aggression continues, Russia’s costs will continue to rise,” President Von der Leyen said.[1] The objective was to “make sure that our brave neighbour beomes even stronger on the battlefield and at the negotiating table.”[2] According to Euronews, the E.U. was able to shore up “its mightiest leverage,” push back against “external interference” and insulate “the money from the Kremlin’s war machine—all at once.”[3] The external interference was not really external, as this refers to the financially self-interested objection of the state of Belgium and the pro-Russian objection of Viktor Orbán of Hungary. Obviating self-interested states whose governors are willing to go against the other 25 states in the Council is laudable even though this objective can be traced back to the E.U.’s federal system, which must be taken as a given to the ECJ. To be sure, finding a way to do it by invoking an article of the E.U.’s basic law was not an easy task for the Commission.

“At first, the Commission suggested activating Article 31.2 . . . to switch the [6 months] renewal of sanctions from unanimity to qualified majority.”[4] The sanctions include holding the Russian financial assets. The article is vaguely, and thus problematically from the standpoint of constitutional language, based on “strategic interests and objectives.”[5] This wording could potentially enable the E.U., by qualified majority voting, to encroach excessively on governmental sovereignty retained by the states. That any state government could invoke “vital and stated reasons” of “policy”—again too vague—to veto any such bills that are in the strategic interests and objectives of the E.U. as a whole meant that the governor of Hungary could easily invoke its ties to Russia as vital reasons to veto the proposal to freeze the Russian assets indefinitely.

So, the Commission turned to Article 122, which applies qualified-majority voting rather than unanimity in the European Council (and the Council of Ministers) “in a spirit of solidarity . . . appropriate to the economic situation.”[6] Here too, the constitutional language is too vague. Hungary’s Orbán had been fragrantly violating the spirit of solidarity for years, and “economic situation” is so vague that the article could potentially be used to expunge unanimity from the federal level.

Furthermore, that Article 122 “bypasses the European Parliament” is also problematic because that democratically elected legislative chamber, the “lower house,” could otherwise act as a check on the Commission and the councils exploiting the article to rid the E.U. of the need for unanimity in the councils. Also, requiring a qualified majority vote in the Parliament would not in itself give the state governments the power to use their respective vetoes in the councils. One of the principal benefits of federalism, as distinct from confederalism, is the mechanism of state-federal checks-and-balances. Considering the American history of consolidation at the expense of the governmental sovereignty retained by the states, the vague constitutional language of Article 122 could be exploited. This is not to say that retaining the state-veto mechanism in the councils is at all healthy for the European federal system. Other means, such as requiring a qualified majority in the European Parliament, are consistent with federalism.

Such a check would be of value in terms of the indefinite freezing of Russian financial assets because the Commission interpreted “appropriate to the economic situation” to be invokable due to a “serious economic impact,” including in “supply disruptions, higher uncertainty, increased risk premia, lower investment and consumer spending,” as well as “non-economic drone incursions, sabotage and disinformation.”[7] Again, higher uncertainty and lower investment and consumer spending provide the Commission with virtually a wide-open door to obviate unanimity in the councils.

Earlier in 2025, the Commission had invoked Article 122 “to set up SAFE which allows member states to directly approve a Commission proposal [by qualified majority rather than unanimously] ‘if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain produces’ or if a member state is ‘seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control’.”[8] Tellingly, it was the Parliament rather than a state government that objected, which is a telling indication that the Parliament should not have been excluded from the procedure to be followed according to the article.

With regard to the “emergency” said by the Commission to justify invoking Article 122 to indefinitely freeze the Russian financial assets in the E.U., the governor of Belgium, Bart De Wever, “questioned the existence of any EU-wide emergency,” as Russia’s invasion was nearing its fourth anniversary.[9] For instance, only 10% of energy in the E.U. was by that time from Russia.[10] Even though the E.U.’s evident economic woes, coupled with the vague wording of Article 122 and its limited jurisprudence, gave the Commission enough leeway to forge ahead,” using even “the economic situation” to invoke the article is highly problematic, especially as the obvious intent was to undercut the state-veto mechanism, which under the E.U.’s basic law at the time, was valid even though Hungary and Belgium were, for self-interested political and financial reasons, respectively, abusing the mechanism given the norm of consensus in the councils.

The upshot is that the E.U. could do better in tightening its constitutional, or basic-law, language, enlarging the coverage of the Parliament (especially as a check on the Commission). In the meantime, the ECJ should take a look at the Commission’s invoking of Article 122, especially on the Commission’s interpretation that “economic situation” really means “economic emergency,” which actually makes sense so to avoid the article from being invoked for virtually anything, and that an emergency was still the case almost four years after the commencement of the Russian invasion, which does not seem to be a valid claim. In the background is the consolidation by the U.S. of power at the expense of that of the member-states, and the related switch from the state governments appointing U.S. senators to them being elected by the citizens of the states. Citizens of a state may not vote so to protect the remaining governmental sovereignty held by their state, whereas senators appointed by state governors and/or legislatures would naturally have an incentive to keep an eye on the federal division of governmental sovereignty. Nevertheless, the veto power of the E.U.’s state governments, especially as there were 27 at the time of the invocation of Article 122 to freeze Russian assets, is arguably excessive and thus harmful to the E.U. level as well as the federal system itself, which should allow for federal oversight “with teeth” on abuses by state governments, especially in infringing on democracy and liberty.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “By Locking in Russian Assets for Good, the EU Is Finally Playing Hardball,” Euronews.com, 13 December 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

The E.U.: A Political Union

As if having elected representatives and political parties in the European Parliament were not enough evidence that the E.U. has been a political union all along, the distinctly political role of the E.U. with regard to Ukraine amid the Russian invasion renders the E.U. political not merely institutionally in regard to representative democracy, which is a political rather than an economic system. Also, that the European Commission has exclusive competency on trade does not eclipse the union’s distinctly political activity. That the E.U. agreed to move forward informally with Ukraine’s accession request even though the state of Hungary was formally vetoing the accession demonstrates a political function or role of the European Union.

In December, 2025, the E.U. announced that it had “drawn up an action plan” for Ukraine to meet accession standards “despite official talks being blocked by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.”[1] To be sure, for one state to wield its veto at the federal level when all of the other states are opposed is arguably a case of an abuse of the informal consensus model; after all, it was not as though Ukraine’s accession would threaten the vital interests of the state of Hungary. That veto-power of the states in the European Council and the Council of Ministers on E.U. competencies (i.e., enumerated powers) is itself a misplaced harbinger of a confederal system of government, wherein the states retain all governmental sovereignty, rather than modern federalism, wherein competencies, or governmental sovereignty, are divided between federal and state governmental institutions. So the Commission was entirely justified in working informally to find a political means by which the government of Ukraine could get itself up to the anti-corruption, pro-democratic standards of the E.U. (even though Bulgaria’s government collapsed that December due to mass protests against corruption in that government/administration).

The E.U.’s ten-point plan for Ukraine to follow in order to be assessed at a later date, perhaps after Orbán’s upcoming election, is inherently political (rather than economic) because the Commission framed the accession as “essential” to providing Ukraine “with future security guarantees.”[2] The Union’s Enlargement Commissioner, Marta Kos, said at the time of the announcement that Ukraine’s accession is “the political arm of the European security guarantee for Ukraine” and would be “central to make any peace settlement sustainable.”[3] The E.U.’s executive branch was thus acting in a political capacity. Thus the E.U. is a political union even at its distinctly federal level (i.e., apart from any institutional involvement of the state governments at the federal level).

Put another way, because the E.U. executive branch used it 10-point plan to “bypass Hungary’s political veto on the official opening of accession negotiations,” the E.U. itself was carrying out a distinctly political function. It is difficult to argue that the E.U. was not a political union at the time, yet operated politically even apart from any formal involvement of the state governments at the federal level. Yet ideological denial was still strong enough for many E.U. citizens to deny not only that the E.U. is a political union, but that also that it has a federal system even though having states is sufficient for the E.U. to have a federal system. Underneath the antiquated state-veto lies the Euroskeptic and anti-American political ideologies that have been holding the E.U. back not only from being able to enlarge, but also to adequately aid Ukraine militarily through years of it being invaded by Russia.

1. Mared G. Jones, “EU and Ukraine Agree 10-Point Plan to Speed Up Kyiv’s Accession Bid Despite Hungary’s Veto,” 11 December, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. Italics added.

A Reparations Loan or Common Debt: Undercut by State Rights

“State rights” was a common refrain by the eleven U.S. member states who sought to exit in 1861; the underlying fear was that the exclusive competencies, or enumerated powers, of the U.S., combined with the numerous accessions of new states, were already compromising the power of the eleven states to protect their economies from “encroachment.” In 1858, for instance, a tariff disadvantageous to those economies had been passed in spite of the “Southern” objections in the U.S. Senate. Had each member state had a veto, rather than just the ability to filibuster, the eleven states would have been able to protect the viability of their respective economies from encroachment by the Union. To be sure, the state rights claim that the U.S. was still just a bloc, as had been the case from 1781-1789 under the Articles of Confederation, was sheer denial, for the U.S. Constitution instituted a new kind of federalism—partly national, partly international—based on dual sovereignty, wherein both the member states and the Union have a portion of governmental sovereignty. It is this form of federalism, “modern federalism,” that the Europeans adopted in creating the European Union because the E.U. has exclusive competencies. But whereas the shift made by the Americans in the eighteenth century left the state-veto behind at the Union level, the Europeans retained the veto, which at the very least works against the effective operation of modern federalism. The arduous and much delayed task on a reparations loan for Ukraine in spite of the self-interested objection—and thus promised veto—of one state is a case in point. Even the alternative of the E.U. issuing debt faced state-level opposition, as was the case in the U.S. in the 1790s, but in that case, the self-interested states that were relatively clear of debt could not stop the issuance because none of those states could wield a veto at the federal level. This is important because back then, the American states were still widely viewed as countries by their respective inhabitants. “I must fight for my country,” General Lee told Lincoln in 1861, referring to Virginia. A refresher on American history could help Europeans cross the Rubicon to a more internally consistent modern federalism. Whether Euroskepticism or States’ Rights, the ideology, as etched into the E.U.’s Basic Law, is responsible for Van der Leyen’s headaches in getting the E.U. to put Ukraine in a position of strength against the Russian invaders.

A Union of states that allows a self-interested state to block federal action that is in the good of the whole Union is weak. So, when Ursula von der Leyen said late in 2025 that the European Commission would provide Belgium with sweeping guarantees to unblock a controversial reparations loan for Ukraine, a state official representing Belgium countered that the Commission’s proposals “do not address our concerns in a satisfactory manner. It is not acceptable to use the money and leave us alone facing the risks.”[1] That Belgium’s government could wield its veto gives “not acceptable” the ring of finality. This is despite the guarantees for Belgium consisting “of bilateral contributions by member states, a backstop by the EU budget, legal safeguards against retaliation and a new prohibition on transferring sovereign assets back to Russia.”[2] Experts could of course weigh in on how failproof these guarantees actually would be.

From the perspective of the E.U.’s federal system, the following statement made by President Von der Leyen is crucial: “We have created a very strong solidarity mechanism where in the very end the Union can intervene, because we want to make very sure to all our member states, but specifically also to Belgium, that we will share the burden in a fair way, as it is the European way.”[3] The problem is that to state officials, relying only on “the European way” was insufficient; the veto in the European Council and the Council of Ministers was also felt to be necessary for self-protection. Hence Belgium’s language includes “not acceptable.” Mistrust of the E.U. may be behind at least some of the resistance of the states to agree to an expansion of qualified majority voting.

For the eleven U.S. member states who tried in vain to exit the U.S. in 1861, another kind of qualified majority voting in the U.S. Senate was deemed to be insufficient to safeguard the Southern agrarian economies based on Plantation-level slave-labor. But for the E.U.’s state-veto, we have to go back to the disastrous Articles of Confederation Between the Several States, wherein the U.S. depended on voluntary financial contributions from the states and there was no common debt. The state-veto that is justified in confederal systems by the fact that all of the governmental sovereignty is retained by the states is toxic in modern federalism because the federal level is too prone to being hamstrung even with regard to proposals that are in the interests of the whole even if not in the self-interest of each and every state. A part should not be able to upend the common good.

That Von der Leyen had to go to such lengths that Belgium would have guarantees for its financial interest in attracting sovereign wealth funds in the future is indicative of just how toxic the state-veto mechanism is, especially when Russia was succeeding in invading Ukraine for years by the end of 2025 when the E.U. was yet again proposing a reparations loan (or common debt). This point alone should disabuse any State Rights folks from clutching so tight to the veto. Also, in a union of states, sometimes a state “takes one for the team.” This is true solidarity. “Man up,” may be the relevant expression, given Belgium’s intransigence, but, then again, I’m an American, hence rather crude and thus unbecoming at a European dinner party. “Lose the veto, guys,” I would readily and flatly say amid polite, too polished conversation.

The problem is that no one likes to give up power unless in a crisis, and an invasion to the east is evidently not a crisis. It may be that, like the Schengen Agreement and the Stability Pact, an exogenous “more closer union” may need to be formed by the more federalist-leaning states, sans the sordid veto, for another budget as well as foreign and defense policy. Instead of the 55% in qualified-majority voting (QMV), perhaps 60%, which matches the percent needed in the U.S. Senate to overcome a filibuster, could be used as a compromise. This is not to say that the E.U. and U.S. should converge; the Europeans are smart to fear the sort of consolidation at the Union level that eclipses any sort of federalism, and thus needed space for the states to act as per their respective cultures and ideologies. The American case clearly demonstrates that a citizenry giving primary loyalty to the state level cannot be relied upon as a safeguard in the distant future against creeping encroachments by the Union on the sovereignty retained by the member states. Even so, whereas the U.S. by 2025 had lapsed too close to consolidation at the expense of federalism, the E.U. risked dissolution by states plying themselves away from an ineffectual, internally hamstrung Union, for no one likes to be a part of self-inflicted weakness. Nietzsche taught us this.

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1. Jorge Liboreiro, “Von der Leyen Pushes Ahead with Reparations Loan for Ukraine as Belgium Maintains Its Opposition,” Euronews.com, December 3, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

E.U. Citizens on the Union’s Enlargement

Having recently been presented with an E.U. citizen denying the E.U. has citizens even as he admitted that he could vote for a candidate to represent him in the European Parliament, I had my faith in human rationality restored the following day in reading of a poll of E.U. citizens on whether additional states should be added to the Union; ideology, even of the tribal sort, need not distort rationality beyond recognition. Even in the reporting of such a poll, however, the Euroskeptic, or states’ rights, ideology left its imprint. Even such an auxiliary presence is a sign of the headwind that has been facing the E.U. since its founding.

Euronews reported on 28 October, 2025 that 56% of E.U. citizens approved of adding new states. “Young Europeans in particular support enlargement. 67% of 15-24 year olds are in favour, ahead of 25-39 year olds at 63%.”[1] If the young adults maintain their optimism in the decades to come, we could expect the power of the Euroskeptic, states’ rights (i.e., anti-federalist) ideology to lessen over time. This in turn could allow the E.U. to accumulate enough additional enumerated powers, or exclusive and even shared competencies, so the benefits of united action could be realized more fully, especially in the domains of foreign policy and defense. As of 2025, it has been as if state officials had tied one arm behind the E.U.’s back even regarding existing federal competencies. The poll indicates that this could change.

The poll can also be taken as an argument for a more vigorous education prior to university and trade school, for the support for enlargement “comes to a large extent from young people and educated people.”[2] To be sure, an educated person could argue that because of the unwillingness of enough state governments to delegate additionally competencies (or even just strength those that the E.U. already had), the veto mechanism enjoyed by each state should be more restricted before additional states are annexed to the Union. It is possible, for example, to up the double majorities from 55% to 60% on major pieces of federal legislation, in place of keeping the veto-mechanism in place. Even at 27 states, unanimity is unrealistic; it could therefore be unrealistic to expect unanimous agreement with there being even more states in the Union.

The force behind retaining the veto-mechanism in the European Council and the Council of the E.U. is none other than the Euroskeptic, or states’ rights ideology that is just fine with allowing even small states to block proposed legislation even if it is in the interest of the Union as a whole. In the twentieth century, that ideology manifests as strident nationalism, which of course gave rise to war on more than one occasion. Unfortunately, old ideologies die hard even in the face of the fact of political development, such as that of several states forming a federal union of states. Such a development, especially after several decades, inherent relativizes otherwise unmitigated pro-state-oriented ideology.

That ideology is to some extend built into the poll, according to which “the most supportive Member States are Sweden (79%), Denmark (75%) and Lithuania (74%). Conversely, Austria (45%), the Czech Republic (43%) and France (43%) are the least supportive” of enlargement.[3] Although admittedly much daylight exists between 79% and 43%, and pro-E.U. advertising could be directed by the Commission to run in local media in the least supportive states on the basis of this way of dividing up the results, reporting by state is itself a reinforcement of the state-centric, Euroskeptic ideology that has held the federal legislative and executive branches back even from being able to fully exercise its enumerated powers, or competencies.

On May 1, 2025 at Yale, I met the E.U.’s ambassador to the U.S. after her talk. I pointed out that the media in the E.U. labeling the Union as a mere bloc as if the E.U. were only active in one power-domain and were temporary, was subtly undermining the E.U. itself and fortifying the Euroskeptics. To my surprise, she agreed with me, but my feedback had zero impact.  She told me that just admitting even that the E.U. has a federal structure would enrage powerful Euroskeptic officials in some states, such as Hungary. As a result, however, more uneducated Europeans could be expected to conflate the “bloc” with international organizations such as NATO and the UN, and the poll supports this point. Why expand something as weak as a bloc?

On October 24, 2025, an Oxford professor of political economy spoke at Harvard’s Center for European Studies. Whereas Yale’s Center acknowledges and so includes talks on the E.U. being intergovernmental relations only, Harvard’s political economists have been stuck in the political economy paradigm of Europe prior to the founding of the E.U. in the early 1990s. So, the professor from Oxford presented a European poll in which both the E.U. itself and the related impact of European cultural integration from the states being in a federal system were ignored. Instead, he (or the discussant) insisted that Denmark and Sweden are so different with respect to how the poor view public policy that is oriented to reducing economic inequality, even though both northern states are Scandinavian and have relatively low economic inequality, whereas every rural American is a libertarian against constraints on rising economic inequality. In other words, the interstate cultural differences are magnified when it comes to the E.U., while such interstate (mostly non-linguistic-based) differences in the U.S. are virtually ignored as if one cultural attitude spans across a continent. The European states’ rights, or nationalistic, ideology can be so exaggerated that cognition is twisted even in the minds of scholars! Unfortunately, the E.U. itself has been paying the price for this ideological denial; it is not just an artifact of ideology under the subterfuge of scholarship. Ironically, as long as the E.U. continues to pay the price from being reckoned by enough uneducated European citizens as merely a bloc (or even as nonexistent), enlargement by the accession of additional states without basic reform of the federal system would be likely to compound paralysis rather than increase the Union’s strength.

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1. Gregoire Lory, “56% of Citizens Support EU Enlargement, New Eurobarometer Poll Shows,” Euronews.com. 28 October, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

The E.U.’s Proposed Sanctions Against Israel: Excessive Reliance on the State Governments

To leverage the combined power, or united front, that is possible in Europe, the European Union was established in the waning years of the twentieth century. Roughly thirty years later, the power of the state governments at the federal level still compromised the leverage, especially in foreign affairs and defense. Even in sanctioning trading partners, even qualified majority voting in the Council of the E.U. can be said to have negatively impacted the ability of the E.U. Commission, the executive branch, to leverage the political muscle of the E.U. against other countries. State-level political agendas could essentially hold any possible leverage hostage. It may be worth thinking about why a qualified majority vote in the Council of the E.U., which represents the state governments, rather than in the E.U.’s parliament, which represents E.U. citizens, was necessary for trade sanctions to be applied to duty-free imports from Israel. That state-level political or economic interests could possibility trump applying economic leverage to stop Israel’s genocide and holocaust in Gaza, as well as Israel’s military attacks on other countries in the Middle East can be an indication that the state governments have too much power at the federal level. For if the E.U. is only an aggregation of states, without the whole being more than the sum of the parts, then the whole sans the aggregate cannot very well enact leverage on foreign actors abroad, even those whose behavior has been nothing short of atrocious.

On September 17, 2025, the European Commission released its proposal to sanction Israel “for its ongoing military assault in Gaza, as well as deepening occupation of the West Bank, which Brussels says breach the EU-Israel Association Agreement.”[1] Regarding that treaty, I contend that the E.U.’s state governments should not have any say on the consequences for Israel because the treaty is between the E.U. and Israel. As trade is an exclusive competency of the E.U., only federal institutions, which include the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice, rightly have sufficient jurisdiction (i.e., competence) to terminate the Agreement due to the violation or sanction Israel economically (as the Agreement is economic in nature).

Moreover, developing the habit of distinguishing distinctly federal governmental (i.e., executive, legislative, and judicial) institutions from other E.U. bodies that represent the states would not be a bad idea for the European political elite, many of whom have been in fear of even using the term federal because of what that might provoke in Euroskeptic states such as Hungary. That fear, I submit, is likely overblown, and it subtly undercuts the E.U. itself, especially in it being a whole beyond a mere aggregation of states.

The E.U. Commission, subject to judicial review by the ECJ, determined that Israel had violated the Agreement. The decision to act against Israel was based on “’the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza following the military intervention of Israel, the blockade of humanitarian aid, the intensifying of military operations,’ including the ongoing ground offensive, according to the European Commission.”[2] Such a credible finding against Israel does not justify state governments intervening through their access at the federal level through the European Council or the Council of the E.U. on suspicion that the E.U. president and her commissioners were acting out of prejudice against Israel. This in turn is clear from the fact that the proposed sanctions also apply to ten members of Hamas, in addition to two Israeli ministers, Security Minister Gvir and Finance Minister Smotrich “for their role inciting violence in the West Bank.”[3] The Agreement, of course, only holds for Israel, rather than Hamas, so that the proposed sanctions extend to Hamas demonstrates that the Commission was “bending over backwards” to be fair in such a one-sided war that it is not really a war, but, rather, a genocide and even a holocaust of cruelty wherein death is not deemed as “punishment” enough according to the utterly fallacious theory of collective justice. 

E.U. President Von der Leyen said the week before the announcement of the proposed sanctions, “The horrific events taking place in Gaza on a daily basis must stop. There needs to be an immediate ceasefire, unrestrained access for all humanitarian aid, and the release of all hostages held by Hamas.”[4] She continued, “We propose to suspend trade concessions with Israel, sanction extremist ministers and violent settlers, and put bilateral support to Israel on hold . . .”[5] I submit that it would be difficult for the justices at the ECJ to find bias in her rationale or remedy, or, moreover, with her legitimacy in taking such a decision for the E.U. as a united front even though some state governments were at odds with her decision. 

The whole is more than the sum of the parts, and yet only if one of the two largest states in opposition vote in favor of the sanctions would they pass. The E.U.’s foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, was pessimistic, noting at the time, “The political lines are very much in the place where they have been so far.”[6] But that is at the state level; things might have already changed in the European Parliament, whose representatives not only represent European voters, but also have the interests of the E.U. itself, including its treaties with other countries, in mind. 

That the bias woven into the federal-level fabric of the E.U. in favor of the state governments over E.U. citizens could inhibit the E.U. from taking even an economic stand against a genocidal government indicates that the state governments have too much power at the federal—and it is federal—level of the European Union, such that reform in the Union’s basic or constitutional law is warranted. If such is the case, care should be taken so too much power be taken away from the state governments such that they could not even defend their retained sovereignty from undue encroachment by the feds. Americans could afford to take a lesson on that, for a one-size-fits-all public policy becoming monopolistic at the expense of differences between states, whether American or European, does not bode well in any empire-scale union.  

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1. Shona Murray, “EU Moves to Sanction Israel over Gaza, West Bank Humanitarian Crisis,” Euronews.com, September 17, 2025.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.